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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the attempt to establish human rights exceptions to foreign state immunity. 
The problem has multiple facets. Firstly, suits against foreign governments should be distinguished 
from suits against foreign officials. Further, in the latter context there is a distinction both between 
criminal and civil cases and between cases against individuals with immunity ratione personae and 
those with immunity ratione materiae. Individuals suffering extraterritorial jus cogens violations 
have been increasingly seeking justice against foreign governments and officials. Restrictive 
immunity largely displaced absolute immunity in the Western and developing world during the 
latter half of the Twentieth Century. This restrictive immunity only retained immunity for acta 
jure imperii. Many common-law nations entered into treaties and enacted foreign state immunity 
legislation purportedly embodying the restrictive doctrine, but these treaties and statutes actually 
accord a complete immunity to foreign states, subject only to specific, enumerated exceptions. 
Drafted mostly from the 1960s to the 1980s, they are to some extent from a bygone era. The chief 
issue of the time was whether state-owned trading entities should be immune from suit. The rights 
of private traders were upheld with the recognition of inter alia the commercial activity exception. 
In modern times, the human rights or jus cogens exception is now an important battleground.  
Research into attempts to establish such an exception to immunity was split into: (1) the origin 
and history of foreign state immunity and foreign official immunity; (2) the human rights 
dimension to foreign state immunity; and (3) the human rights dimension to foreign official 
immunity. In each part, representative cases were selected to best draw out the developmental 
contours. To aid holistic understanding of these cases, the litigation is followed from first instance 
to the exhaustion of appeals. The main findings of the thesis were, in regard to: (1) it is arguable 
whether sufficient uniformity in practice established absolute immunity as a binding norm and, 
even if it did, this could only have been during 1920-1976; (2) foreign state immunity statutes 
were mostly drafted before human rights cases against foreign states became an issue, as such they 
are not designed to cope and a jus cogens amendment may be necessary; (3) the High Court of 
Australia has the chance to break with older UK precedent, favoured by Canada, by paying closer 
regard to the discussion of the US Supreme Court on the matter of whether the definition of 
foreign state should include a foreign official. 
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Introduction 
ince 1980, the increasing number of civil claims brought against foreign states and foreign 
officials for human rights violations has been the most conceptually challenging area in the 
field of immunity from jurisdiction. In the 1970s and early 1980s, many Western states enacted 
foreign state immunity legislation, which aimed both to ostensibly implement a version of the 
restrictive immunity doctrine but more importantly to provide certainty in the law, where 
common-law doctrine based on customary norms relating to the nature and purpose test produced 
uncertainty. These statutes usually grant foreign states a blanket immunity, lifted only when an 
enumerated exception applies. Some were enacted in pursuance of a treaty, and in any case 
practically all were drafted at a time when civil human rights cases against foreign states or their 
officials were either non-existent or not a high priority. The statutes were therefore not drafted 
with human rights cases in mind and consequently do not contain exceptions for human rights 
abuses, even where the conduct violates jus cogens norms, such as torture, genocide, or slavery. 
Claimants in nations with such statutes faced difficulties in civil suits against foreign states.  
Various attempts have been made to get around a statute’s blanket immunity where there was no 
enumerated exception for human rights abuses. These included: attempting to read an implied 
exception into the blanket immunity such that it does not apply to serious violations of peremptory 
international norms; the normative hierarchy theory, where hierarchically-superior jus cogens 
norms supposedly prevail over regular norms such as state immunity; attempting to characterise 
the conduct complained of within the commercial activity or territorial tort exception; proposing 
that jus cogens violations constitute implied waiver; and the claim that immunity infringes the right 
of access to court. In jurisdictions where foreign state immunity statutes have been enacted, 
however, courts have fairly consistently found the clear wording of the statute prevails. That is, 
even if the court thought the statute contravened customary international law, by not including an 
exception for jus cogens it has been ruled that the clear wording of the domestic statute nevertheless 
prevails. Rulings like this hinge on a dualist view of the relationship between municipal and 
international law, which is arguably dominant in the modern era. It is questionable what value 
such rulings have for the content of any relevant customary international norm, if the ruling was 
based on the provisions of a statute. This is because the statute may have been enacted to execute 
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a treaty, or for any number of other reasons. In other words, the requisite opinio juris is lacking. 
Wherever an immunity statute mandates immunity, the court is bound by the statute, not by a 
customary international norm; so the requisite opinio juris may be absent unless it can be shown 
the statute was enacted because the legislature felt bound by a customary norm. 
States without foreign state immunity statutes have had a different experience. Greece and Italy 
are two examples. Both nations heard important civil suits against Germany and, in the absence of 
a domestic statute mandating a blanket immunity subject only to enumerated exceptions, the 
Greek and Italian courts were able to apply their understanding of the relevant customary 
international norms and arrive at a finding that Germany was not immune. Ultimately, Italy’s 
actions in not only lifting Germany’s immunity from jurisdiction but also its immunity from 
execution led to an action by Germany against Italy in the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). 
The ICJ’s ruling there upheld Germany’s immunity, on the basis that the territorial tort doctrine 
did not allow for a lifting of immunity—at least in the case of armed forces—and because it rejected 
Italy’s three-pronged jus cogens or ‘last resort’ argument. In its rejection of the jus cogens argument, 
the court made an arguably artificial divide between the procedural and the substantive. It defined 
immunity as a procedural matter, dealt with at the preliminary stage of proceedings, because it 
represents a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. If this bar is granted, the case is resolved at the 
preliminary stage, so that the immunity norm does not clash with the jus cogens norm because 
inquiry into the latter would have come at the substantive stage of proceedings.  
The court’s logic is not unassailable. While immunity is undeniably a procedural matter, this does 
not mean some inquiry into the nature of the act complained should not be allowed at the 
preliminary stage of proceedings. If that were the case, the restrictive immunity doctrine would 
never have been able to develop. If judges had not been allowed to inquire into the nature of the 
act complained at the preliminary stage they could not discover whether the act was jure imperii or 
jure gestionis and could not make a ruling on immunity. Some inquiry into the nature of the act 
complained must be allowed. Throughout the Twentieth Century, courts inquired at the 
preliminary stage into whether, for instance, the purchase of boots for the army constituted a 
sovereign or a private act, and in myriad other scenarios. If the behaviour was jure imperii the 
matter could not proceed, but it could for jure gestionis behaviour. Inquiring into whether the act 
complained, if proven, would constitute a violation of a jus cogens norm, is no different. The 
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argument against such a stance appears to be the contention that this will allow many claims to 
proceed which will not in the end be proven. Requirements for certification that the claim has a 
‘good chance of success’ seem to already address this worry and further accommodation could no 
doubt be made. The ICJ ruling appeared to have a chilling effect on the near-term prospects of 
establishing a human rights exception to foreign state immunity, with the Italian legislature and 
judiciary initially scrambling to comply. Later developments in the Italian Constitutional Court 
have, however, continued to develop a jurisprudence denying immunity for jus cogens violations 
by finding the grant of immunity conflicted with a constitutionally-guaranteed right of access to 
justice. This builds on earlier arguments in this regard made in some UK and Canadian cases and 
at the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). 
Faced with the blanket immunities contained in immunity statutes, claimants in human rights 
cases increasingly brought suit against individual foreign officials, instead of simply suing the 
foreign state itself. Applicants in various jurisdictions alleged the particular foreign state immunity 
statute’s definition of foreign state did not include individual foreign officials, at least other than 
the head of state. This strategy has met with mixed success. In the United States, various circuit 
courts of appeal considered the issue, splitting on the issue, until the Supreme Court eventually 
decided the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not apply to suits against individual 
foreign officials. Some years earlier, the House of Lords had decided the State Immunity Act 1978 
(UK) does apply to such suits. Canadian and Australian courts, despite the more recent US decision 
in Samantar v Yousuf, chose to follow the UK precedent in Jones v Saudi Arabia, ruling the 
respective statutes’ definition of foreign state does include foreign officials. In Australia’s case, 
unlike Canada, the apex court has not yet considered the issue. It is still therefore open for the 
High Court of Australia (‘HCA’) to consider carefully the logic in the US stance on whether the 
definition of foreign state includes foreign officials. Arguably, the language of most of the statutes 
is similar enough to the US statute to warrant careful consideration of the Samantar precedent. 
The prime argument in favour of including foreign officials within the definition of foreign state, 
despite the fact it requires a strained reading of the statutory provisions, is because it is thought 
unwise to allow a ‘backdoor’ for suing the foreign state in situations where it would otherwise be 
immune. This argument loses some force when one considers the content of the customary norms 
pertaining to criminal or civil cases against individuals with immunity ratione personae or ratione 
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materiae has always been different to those pertaining to the immunity of a foreign state or its 
agency or instrumentality, for example. The latter types of case, for example, involve inquiry into 
whether the act was jure imperii or jure gestionis. Whereas, in a case against an individual with 
immunity ratione materiae, the question is whether the individual acted in an official capacity. The 
official/non-official capacity test is distinct from the public/private state behaviour test, which in 
turn has historically involved the nature/purpose tests. The second consideration is how the rules 
of state responsibility allow for the responsibility of the state to be engaged by ultra vires behaviour 
of its officials, without prejudice to their individual responsibility. Therefore a suit against the 
individual is not necessarily a disguised suit against the state. It would only be if there was a 
requirement to indemnify the foreign official. International law does not seem to contain any such 
requirement; it may be a matter of municipal law. 
It is also not true that absolute immunity historically applied in civil suits against foreign officials 
in the ‘classic’ period of the Eighteenth Century. Scholars have identified half a dozen US cases 
from the 1790s and succeeding years, where the immunity of foreign officials other than heads of 
state was a conduct-based plea that was a defence on the merits, rather than a procedural bar to the 
exercise of jurisdiction. This means opponents of proposed human rights exceptions to foreign 
state and foreign official immunity cannot justifiably claim it has always been a case of absolute 
immunity. These decisions show that for suits against regular foreign officials there was no blanket 
immunity. Instead, the law always recognised such officials were immune for official acts and not 
for unofficial acts. The American cases all along recognised also that a foreign official acting in an 
ultra vires capacity was not acting in an official capacity, despite possibly having acted under colour 
of law. This has always been the proper customary international law pertaining to suits against 
individuals with immunity ratione materiae: they are immune for official acts, but not for non-
official acts. The American cases further show that individual foreign officials will not benefit from 
immunity if their actions—despite being cloaked with authority—were in fact violations of the 
individual official’s lawful duty. Whether the state itself is immune in such circumstances is 
irrelevant as a technical matter, because the law of state responsibility says that while ultra vires 
behaviour of a foreign official entails the state’s responsibility, this is without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the individual official. The state might have immunity due to a foreign state 
immunity statute with a blanket immunity and no relevant enumerated exception, or it might not 
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have immunity if the forum state does not have such legislation. A case against an individual official 
is not just a case against the state, unless it can be shown there is some legal obligation requiring 
states to indemnify officials who commit flagrant violations of the law while abusing the trust of 
their office. 
The methodology of the research is analytical, case-based research. The jurisdictions were selected 
for their significance to the development of customary international law and the number of 
pertinent cases heard in the forum. The UK began the common-law tradition and many leading 
cases are now heard in the US. Leading human rights cases against foreign governments and 
officials in these jurisdictions were selected for analysis, as were important cases in other common-
law nations, including Canada and Australia. Several Greek and Italian cases were also selected, 
providing an insight into how courts decide human rights exception cases in the absence of a 
binding foreign state immunity statute. An attempt was made to limit the number of cases selected 
for in-depth analysis; the course of discussing these decisions usually involves significant 
engagement with numerous authorities cited in the rulings. Space limitations prevent a further 
expansion of scope. It is hoped the method selected gives a holistic understanding of how the law 
developed through key cases. 
Foreign state immunity is a much-studied area. Lady Hazel Fox’s The Law of State Immunity has 
been an indispensable practitioner text for some time. More recently, Xiaodong Yang published 
State Immunity in International Law, a well-received overview of an expansive topic. Some years 
earlier, Ernest Bankas published The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits 
Against Sovereign States in Domestic Courts, which contains much good information, if sometimes 
oddly-phrased. Some decades prior, Gamal Badr wrote State Immunity: An Analytical and 
Prognostic View. A few years earlier, Sir Ian Sinclair delivered a course at the Hague Academy of 
International Law titled The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments. In more recent 
times, the human rights angle to foreign state immunity has been addressed by many publicists. 
Some, such as Alexander Orakhelashvili, have supported the primacy of the jus cogens trumping 
argument. Others, inclding Andrea Gattini, reject these views. In the US many publicists, 
including Chimène Keitner have focused on foreign official immunity in the wake of the Supreme 
Court ruling the foreign state immunity statute does not apply to suits against foreign officials. 
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This thesis contributes substantively to the field of human rights exception literature by 
comprehensively dealing with most of the key precedents. The major arguments are analysed and 
categorised. Other publicists have written texts or monographs on foreign state immunity, but 
these covered the field generally. In the human rights context, many scholars have written articles, 
but there has been little long-form coverage. The investigation into the human rights angle to 
foreign state and foreign official immunity aims to yield findings of value to the future of both 
fields. 
As to the structure of this thesis, Part One of the thesis provides some background. A brief history 
of foreign state immunity is given in Chapter I. More detailed research into the origins of foreign 
state immunity and its development from earlier doctrines and the opinions of classical publicists 
was deemed outside the scope of this research and has been excised on that basis. Attempts to 
codify the customary international norms pertaining to foreign state immunity, in the form of 
treaties and municipal legislation are outlined in Chapter II. Part Two deals with the human rights 
exception in the context of suits against foreign governments. Chapter III provides the US 
experience; Chapter IV analyses the UK experience; Chapter V looks at the Canadian experience; 
while Chapter VI looks at the inter-related experiences of Greece, Germany, and Italy concerning 
suits pertaining to the actions of German WWII soldiers. Part Three then deals with the human 
rights exception as it applies to suits against foreign officials. Chapter VII provides the US 
experience and Chapter VIII deals with other common law nations. A conclusion summarises the 
main findings. A final note on scope: this thesis is chiefly concerned with civil suits and does not 
consider criminal cases against foreign officials—except to the extent they impact upon civil 
cases—nor does it consider other international immunities such as diplomatic immunity, the 
immunities of armed forces, or the immunity of international organisations, except where necessary 
to provide background or illustrate a point. 
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 The History of Foreign State Immunity 
ourts could scarcely, consistently with the general principles which have 
guided them, refuse immunity to the ships of foreign nations used in trade. 
Sovereign authority would shrink to small proportions if not permitted to 
determine what uses of its property are public. To inquire into the use of property 
declared by a foreign sovereign would be to flout the dignity of sovereignty which 
the courts have declared entitled to respect. 
Charles H Weston1 
1.1. Outline 
Charles Weston today would surely have something different to say about whether foreign 
sovereigns should be immune in regard to their purely commercial trading activities. Outside of 
China, it would be difficult to find many nations adhering to the absolute immunity doctrine. As 
this chapter will show, the doctrine of the foreign sovereign’s absolute immunity, if it ever really 
was an international custom, was largely cast aside in the Twentieth Century. The Charles Westons 
of the modern world are to be found in their opposition to the refusal of immunity for 
extraterritorial jus cogens violations. The human rights aspect of state immunity, however, will be 
dealt with in later chapters. This chapter outlines the development of foreign state immunity from 
its inception, through the period of absolute immunity, toward the trend to restrictive immunity. 
1.2. ‘Absolute’ Immunity 
The general conception in today’s literature is that foreign state immunity first appeared as a 
doctrine of absolute immunity, which absolutely prevented the government of a foreign state from 
being impleaded in a domestic court against its will. This was regardless of whether the acts 
complained of were performed in a public or private capacity. According to such an understanding, 
a foreign government would be immune in a shipping matter regardless of whether the ship was a 
ship of war on official state business or whether it was a trading vessel engaged purely in commercial 
enterprise. 
                                                 
1 Charles H Weston, ‘Actions against the Property of Sovereigns’ (1919) 32(3) Harvard Law Review 266, 273. 
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The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon2 is often cited as the originator of foreign state immunity 
generally and is almost as often called the beginning of the absolute immunity doctrine.3 The case 
concerned a ship captured at sea and re-purposed as a ship of war in Napoleon’s navy. When the 
vessel came back into port some time later, its owners filed suit for restoration of their property. 
The case eventually came to the Supreme Court, where Marshall CJ recognised the immunity of 
foreign war ships.  He seems to have considered the recognition of such immunity as a matter of 
comity, going to the dignity and high regard in which friendly sovereigns must hold each other.4 
He mentions the ‘equal rights and equal independence’5 of sovereigns, but nowhere does he claim 
this utterly mandates the recognition of immunity. In fact he specifically states ‘all exceptions […] 
to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the 
consent of the nation itself.’6 (Emphasis added.)   
Although the case is often called the progenitor of the absolute immunity doctrine, Sinclair doubts 
whether it ‘necessarily carries with it this implication’7 and claims the judgment is ‘in no way 
inconsistent’8 with what would later be termed restrictive immunity. Badr agrees with him.9 There 
is force to Sinclair’s view, for at the conclusion of his reasoning Marshall CJ states ‘without doubt, 
the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication [of immunity].’10 Marshall CJ 
seems to have considered foreign state immunity not as a binding custom, but as a matter of 
comity11 that created an implied consent to immunity, which however could be dispelled by the 
active choice of the host sovereign (but not by a court; which entity Marshall CJ considered to be 
the sovereign of the USA is debatable, perhaps a Presidential decree or an act of Congress would 
have sufficed).  Marshall CJ also confined his decision to foreign ‘ships of war’ or ‘public armed 
vessels’.12 There was no ruling on public property generally, or public property employed solely for 
                                                 
2 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
3 See Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1984) 9-10. 
4 The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 145 (1812). 
5 Ibid 136. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ian Sinclair, ‘The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments’ (1980 II) 167 Hague Recueil des Cours, 
121-122. 
8 Ibid, 122. 
9 See Badr, above n 3, 13; plaintiffs in a later British claimed McFaddon was confined to ships of war, see The 
Parlement Belge (1879) 4 PD 129, 137-138; The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 200, but see also 208. 
10 The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 145-146 (1812). 
11 Weston, above n 1, 270. 
12 The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 144, 147 (1812). 
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private ends. Therefore, it appears Marshall CJ left open the possibility of treating acta jure imperii 
and acta jure gestionis separately. 
1.2.1. The Strict Scope of The Schooner Exchange  
The Schooner Exchange was by no means first attempt to implead a foreign sovereign in a domestic 
tribunal. We read in Marshall CJ's judgment, for instance, of the 'Spanish ships of war seized in 
Flushing for a debt due from the King of Spain.'13 The Hanseatic League, during the Middle Ages, 
'sued the king of France for League goods ruined by his troops, and forced the king of England to 
pay for Masses to redeem from purgatory the souls of Hanseatic merchants drowned by 
Englishmen.'14 The unique aspect of The Schooner Exchange was not so much the nature of a suit 
against a foreign sovereign, but rather the separation of the notion of the sovereign from any 
personal embodiment. With this case, the doctrine of foreign state immunity finally emerged from 
its uncertain heritage in the personal immunities—both foreign and domestic—of princes. It was 
now possible to speak of a distinct doctrine of foreign state immunity. The world was changing. 
The French Revolution was within living memory. The United States of America had recently 
come into being. Absolute rule was long extinguished in Britain. The divine right of kings was a 
dead doctrine everywhere in Europe, with the exception of Russia. Monarchy was in decline, while 
democracy flourished. Despite Marshall CJ clearly confining his judgment to a narrow scope, 
successive interpretations of the ruling by later British jurists, whose decisions also built on one 
another’s, led to the development of a sort of absolute immunity, which ended up being quite 
contrary to the spirit of the original judgment. 
The facts of The Schooner Exchange were as follows.15 John McFaddon and William Greetham 
owned a schooner-class ship named the Exchange. In 1809, she sailed from Baltimore on a voyage 
to San Sebastián, Spain. En route, the libellants claimed, she was forcibly boarded and seized by 
agents of the French emperor Napoleon. The Exchange, re-christened the Balaou and apparently 
armed as a ship of war at Bayonne, France, thereby became a public armed vessel in the imperial 
French navy. She later re-appeared in American territory. The US attorney in the case filed a 
                                                 
13 Ibid 145.  
14 Will Durant, The Age of Faith (Simon & Schuster, 1950) 618; Miriam Beard, A History of the Business Man 
(Macmillan, 1938) 79. 
15 For the following paragraph see The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 117-120 (1812). 
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suggestion at the instance of the US federal executive, to the effect even if the vessel had once 
belonged to McFaddon and Greetham their ownership had been divested; ownership of the vessel 
now lay with the French state. Regardless of these factual disputes, the relevant issue was clear: 
could the French state be impleaded (indirectly, the action was in rem) against its will in an 
American court?  
Despite having been called the progenitor of the absolute immunity doctrine, strictly the ruling in 
The Schooner Exchange was confined to a fairly narrow scope: ships of war. This is evident in the 
language of the decision at first instance, where 'the district judge dismissed the libel ... upon the 
ground that a public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign ... is not subject to the ordinary judicial 
tribunals of the country.'16 (Emphasis added.) Clearly, then, the original decision had confined the 
immunity not to public vessels in general, but only to ships of war. Furthermore, the US Attorney 
Mr Dallas on appeal had clearly urged a wider immunity, by claiming all foreign ‘public vessels … 
may freely enter the ports of … the United States … and at pleasure depart therefrom without 
seizure, arrest, detention or molestation’17 (Emphasis added.) This contention was not accepted by 
Marshall CJ. The confined scope of Marshall CJ’s decision is evident in the very wording of the 
first sentence in the syllabus: ‘a public vessel of war of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United 
States, coming into our ports and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, is exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the country.’18 (Emphasis added.) Throughout his judgment, Marshall CJ carefully 
and precisely limits his reasoning to ships of war. In fact, the only time he even mentions the wider 
category of foreign public ships in general, is in a passage of obiter.19 
There is even evidence that, had the Exchange been engaged solely in private or commercial 
activities, Marshall CJ might have ruled another way. He describes in detail why purely private 
vessels (owned by ordinary people) should not have immunity in the waters of a foreign nation.20 
Yet, he opposes to this not the example of all foreign public vessels, but only foreign public armed 
ships. The matter of a public ship, employed for private purposes, he leaves open. But Washington 
J, at first instance, was less equivocal: 
                                                 
16 Ibid 119-120. 
17 Ibid 118. 
18 Ibid 116. 
19 Ibid 141-142. 
20 Ibid 144. 
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What is there in the character of a public armed vessel to withdraw her from the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court? It is admitted, and such indubitably is the law, that if 
such a vessel should … do any act which would expose a private vessel to forfeiture, she 
would not be protected on account of her publick [sic] character.21 
Considering the opinion of Bynkershoek, that the private property of a foreign sovereign is indeed 
amenable to jurisdiction, Marshall CJ preferred not to indicate 'any opinion on this question.'22 
Nonetheless, he did allow that '[a] prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may 
possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be 
considered as so far laying down the prince and assuming the character of a private individual.'23 
These hypothetical scenarios of a personal sovereign's private property equate by analogy to the 
modern situation of a public vessel engaged in private conduct or, rather, acting in a jure gestionis 
capacity. But regardless of how Marshall CJ might have ruled if different facts had prevailed, the 
ratio of The Schooner Exchange was strictly and clearly confined to the immunity of foreign public 
ships of war. The category of cases where today it would be said the government has acted in a jure 
gestionis capacity was left for another day; however, this does not appear to have been noticed by 
some later judges. In no way can it be said that Marshall CJ’s ruling established a doctrine of 
absolute immunity; however, it became the basis for such a doctrine, which developed over the 
course of more than a century across the Atlantic Ocean, in England. 
1.2.2. Entrenchment of Absolute Immunity in the UK 
The development of the absolute immunity doctrine in the UK can be charted over a string of 
representative cases spanning the years 1820 to 1920. The Prins Frederik24 was the first25 and is 
somewhat similar to The Schooner Exchange in that it dealt with a claim over a foreign government’s 
ship of war that had been damaged at sea; however, this was a salvage case, not a title claim. The 
King’s advocate, on behalf of the ship’s Captain, one Van Senden, stressed ‘the great distinction of 
things in the Roman law, and in the laws of modern nations, between those that are properly 
articles of commerce, and those extra commercium, as many things are reputed to be, on account 
                                                 
21 ‘M’Fadon & Greetham v. Schooner Exchange’ (1813) 4(2) American Law Journal 233, 236. 
22 Ibid 145. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The Prins Frederik (1820) 2 Dods 451. 
25 Both advocates who argued for immunity were unable to provide relevant British precedent; Ibid 460, 472. 
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of their connection with the public service of the state.’26 He referred to the passages in 
Bynkershoek that Marshall CJ averred to in The Schooner Exchange and in general the case he 
presented relied greatly on thatdecision.27 In closing, he specifically stated ‘[t]he reasoning used by 
the learned judge upon that occasion, is similar to that which I have endeavoured to express as my 
own view of this case’.28 The Advocate of the Admiralty, who confessed ‘I am on the same side in 
this case’29 as the King’s Advocate, relied chiefly on the latter’s case, but added a few points of his 
own. He expanded upon the extra commercium point, stating ‘there is a class of things which are 
[…] extra commercium, and quorum non est commercium, and in a general enumeration are 
denominated sacra, religiosa, publica—publicis usibus destinata’ and, as such, they must be ‘free 
from all private rights and claims of individuals’.30 The Admiralty Advocate made much of the 
need for ‘every sovereign independent state to maintain unimpeached its honour and dignity.’31 
He also admitted his case was put exactly along the lines of the Schooner Exchange ratio.32 
Although Scott J declined to rule on jurisdiction, it is probable that he accepted these arguments;33 
despite this, it is apparent that the case at its highest only claimed immunity for the public property 
of a foreign sovereign destined for a public purpose. This gels with Sinclair and Badr’s view that 
the initial cases on foreign state immunity are not inconsistent with what would later become the 
restrictive theory. A somewhat similar statement might be made about the decision in Duke of 
Brunswick v King of Hanover.34 Charles II, Duke of Brunswick had been deposed in the July 
Revolution and replaced by his brother William on the authority of an instrument signed by that 
brother and by William IV, King of Hanover and the United Kingdom; Charles filed suit against 
Ernest Augustus I, who had become King of Hanover upon William IV’s death. The dispute was 
in relation to guardianship of Charles’s fortune. Ernest claimed immunity on the basis that, being 
a foreign sovereign, he was immune from suit; he was successful in this defence, although it is 
disputable how far the precedent went. Cottenham LC claimed ‘a foreign sovereign, coming into 
                                                 
26 Ibid 455. 
27 His description of the principles mirrors parts of Marshall CJ’s judgment; ibid 458-461; cf The Schooner 
Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 137-139 (1812). 
28 The Prins Frederik (1820) 2 Dods 451, 462. 
29 Ibid 466. 
30 Ibid 468. 
31 Ibid 471. 
32 Ibid474. 
33 Sinclair, above n 7, 123. 
34 Duke of Brunswick v King of Hanover [1848] 2 HLC 1. 
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this country, cannot be made responsible here for an act done in his sovereign character in his own 
country; whether it be an act right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country 
or not’.35 (Emphasis added.) Notably, he avoided ‘the question … how far a foreign Sovereign, 
coming into this country, is amenable at all … because it does not necessarily arise’.36 This 
statement seems incongruent with Langdale MR’s opinion at first instance ‘that a sovereign prince, 
resident in the dominions of another, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Courts there,’37 because 
Langdale MR’s conception is wider than Cottenham LC’s. Additionally, Brougham LJ mentioned 
‘it ought to have been shewn [sic] that there were private transactions in order to make it possible 
that the court could have jurisdiction.’38 (Emphasis added.) Such a statement obviously does not 
accord with any conception of ‘absolute’ immunity, because it conceives that immunity could be 
lifted in jure gestionis cases. So it is not possible to talk about any absolute immunity doctrine 
applying at this period. 
Nonetheless, the Prins Frederik and Duke of Brunswick rulings provided the initial authority in the 
United Kingdom for later cases that gradually built up into the absolute immunity doctrine. The 
Charkieh39 was an action in rem over damage caused to the ship Batavier. Isma'il Pasha, the Khedive 
of Egypt, was part owner of the ship and filed an appearance under protest. The Khedive was a 
subordinate ruler in the Ottoman Empire, roughly equivalent to viceroy, though possessing 
imperium over the relevant territory as a de facto sovereign, albeit as a de jure subordinate of the 
Sultan.40 Accordingly, ‘his highness the Khedive, however exalted his position and distinguished 
his rank, has failed to establish that he is entitled to the privileges of a sovereign prince’.41 In 
obiter,42 however, Phillimore J decided that even if such a privilege had been established, it would 
                                                 
35 Ibid 17. 
36 Ibid 18. 
37 Duke of Brunswick v King of Hanover [1845] 6 Beav 1, 51. 
38 Duke of Brunswick [1848] 2 HLC 1 24. 
39 The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59. 
40 Oxford University Press, Khedive, n. (September 2012) OED Online 
<http://www.oed.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/103204?redirectedFrom=khedive>; note, 
however, the entry does claim it is the Egyptian equivalent of ‘king’; nonetheless, Egypt was a vassal of the 
Ottoman Sultan. 
41 The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59, 100. 
42 Sir Hardinge Giffard as Solicitor General claimed it was obiter because ‘the Court thought it necessary, even 
though the vessel was a trader, to inquire whether she belonged to a sovereign prince’: The Parlement Belge 
(1879) 4 PD 129, 142; Sir Robert Phillimore was the judge in The Charkieh and at first instance in The Parlement 
Belge; Giffard was in an unenviable position of trying to explain to Phillimore J one of his own adverse rulings. 
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have been waived by the purely commercial nature of the conduct.43 Here was an early reaction 
against the chain of cases preventing suits against foreign states and sovereigns, and this theory of 
waiver by conduct is practically identical to the proto-restrictive doctrines of various European 
nations in the early 20th century noticed by Eleanor Wyllys Allen in her monograph on state 
immunity.44 Nonetheless, Phillimore J’s opinion was against the grain; the immunities of foreign 
sovereigns were still progressing toward the absolute in a trend that would not abate for another 
century in the UK at least. 
The Parlement Belge45 concerned a shipowned by the King of Belgium that through the negligence 
of its mariners had crashed into a tug, the Daring, causing £3,500 in damage. The Belge was 
carrying mail between the UK and Belgium, according to a postal treaty between those two nations, 
but was also carrying passengers and freight. The plaintiffs at first instance therefore argued inter 
alia the ship had ‘by assuming the character of a trader, waived any privilege of exemption from 
the jurisdiction of this court’.46  Putting the matter another way, they claimed ‘a foreign state 
cannot, by describing a trading vessel […] as a vessel of war, gain for her privileges which she would 
not otherwise possess.’47 In response, the defendants claimed the Belge was a public vessel, which 
should therefore be accorded the same protections as a foreign ship of war, and relied on The Prins 
Frederik, De Haber, and The Schooner Exchange amongst other authorities.48 Sir Robert Phillimore 
presided, as had been the case at first instance in The Charkieh; considering the views expressed on 
trading vessels and implied waiver in the case,49 it is perhaps unsurprising that the Belge was held 
not to be immune.50  On appeal the case was heard by Brett, James, and Baggallay LLJ. They 
overturned the initial ruling, in a unanimous decision relying very much on dicta from The 
Schooner Exchange and The Prins Frederik.51 Although their lordships appeared to look with 
                                                 
43 The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59 99-100. 
44 Eleanor Wyllys Allen, The Position of Foreign States Before National Courts (Macmillan, 1933) 30-31. 
45 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 PD 129; The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197. 
46 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 PD 129, 137. 
47 Ibid 138. 
48 Ibid 141. 
49 The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59, 100. 
50 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 PD 129, 149, 155. 
51 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 197-198, 206, 208-210. 
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disfavour upon the decision in The Charkieh, they appear to have left undecided the issue whether 
a ship acting substantially or entirely in a commercial capacity might fail to attract immunity.52  
The Parlement Belge was an important decision, however, because it established the notion that a 
public vessel engaged in trading activity could be immune. Brett LJ laboured at some length to 
establish the proposition that Marshall CJ in The Schooner Exchange was not making a ruling about 
an ‘armed ship of war’ but a ‘public vessel belonging to his Imperial Majesty, and actually employed 
in his service.’53 The reasoning, however, is specious. As averred to above, it was only the US 
Attorney-General who attempted to frame the case in this way, but this language was rejected by 
Marshall CJ who clearly confined his decision to an armed ship of war, not the wider category of 
government vessels being put to public use. Their Lordships decided in The Parlement Belge that 
the law of nations required immunity to be accorded to ‘the public property of any state which is 
destined to its public use’,54 and appeared to favour what would be later termed the purpose test 
in defining what constituted public use. Absolute immunity’s scaffolding was now largely in place. 
It only remained for a state-owned vessel engaged in purely commercial character to be granted 
immunity. Such a judgment would finally establish the truly absolute immunity of foreign 
sovereigns, in England at least. 
The Porto Alexandre55 concerned a vessel of the Portuguese government, which went aground in 
England’s Crosby channel on a voyage carrying cork shavings from Lisbon to Vessel. It required 
salvage, rendered by three British tugs, the owners and masters of which filed suit in rem against 
the Portuguese ship. Solicitors entered an appearance under protest and filed a motion asking for 
the plaintiff’s writ to be set aside on the basis the Portuguese government was immune. This was 
granted, but the plaintiffs appealed. The key point in this case was that the vessel was engaged 
solely in commercial enterprise. The judge at first instance had made that finding, but found the 
prior ruling in The Parlement Belge applied to all of a government’s property and ‘it mattered not 
how the property was being employed.’56 C R Dunlop KC and J B Aspinall for the appellants 
argued that this was not the case; that the immunity only applied if the property was ‘employed in 
                                                 
52 Ibid 219-220. 
53 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 208. 
54 Ibid 217. 
55 The Porto Alexandre [1920] P 30. 
56 Ibid 31. 
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the public service;’ and that although the ‘decision of the Court of Appeal in The Parlement Belge 
no doubt qualifies to some extent the views of Sir Robert Phillimore as expressed […] in that case 
and in The Charkieh’ it did not overrule them, because the court took a different view of the facts.57 
Counsel also quoted Marshall CJ’s statement that when a government acts as a trader it might lose 
its sovereign character.58 All three judges—Bankes, Warrington, and Scrutton LLJ—disagreed with 
the appellants, finding that The Parlement Belge was not distinguishable on the facts and therefore 
controlled the outcome.59 Bankes LJ noted that although many earlier cases made a point of vessels 
being ‘on public service and employed in the public service’60 this was only because of the particular 
circumstances of cases in those days when practically all state vessels were ships of war, and that no 
doubt the actual principle courts were trying to express was much wider and applied to all 
government property.61 In light of the above comments of Marshall CJ in The Schooner Exchange, 
Bankes LJ’s statement is certainly wrong. 
An interesting aside to The Porto Alexandre was the adoption around half a decade later of the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-
Owned Ships62 (‘1926 Brussels Convention’). German President Paul von Hindenburg and King 
Albert I of Belgium had their plenipotentiaries sign the 1926 Brussels Convention, intent on 
‘[r]ecognizing the desirability of determining by common agreement certain uniform rules 
concerning the immunity of State-owned ships.’63 Importantly, the treaty laid out that ‘ships 
owned or operated by States […] shall be subject […] to the same rules of liability […] as those 
applicable in the case of privately-owned ships’.64 It should be stressed, however, that this was only 
a bilateral treaty between Germany and Belgium and ‘ships of war’ and several other types of state-
owned vessels were specifically exempted.65 The Porto Alexandre decision may also have been seen 
                                                 
57 Ibid 32. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 34, 36, 38. 
60 Ibid 34; Bankes LJ may be referring to the publicis usibus destinata concept, see The Prins Frederik (1820) 2 
Dods 451, 468. 
61 The Porto Alexandre [1920] P 30 34-35. 
62 Signed 10 April 1926. 
63 Ibid. See preamble. 
64 Ibid art 1. 
65 Ibid art 3. 
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as problematic for states as well as private parties, as rescue vessels might be unlikely to tow a state-
owned ship if compensation was thought not to be available for the provision of the service. 
It should be noted that when the UK finally adopted the restrictive immunity approach, in The 
Philippine Admiral v Wallem Shipping66 it did so because their Lordships felt the decision in The 
Porto Alexandre had incorrectly constrained itself to follow the Parlement Belge precedent.67 In 
effect, The Philippine Admiral impugned 150 years of British jurisprudence on foreign state 
immunity.68 Here was high judicial authority, to go along with the opinions of publicists, in 
support of the notion that British courts had erroneously proclaimed an absolute immunity 
doctrine by incorrectly interpreting earlier judgments, until a narrow precedent became a wide 
immunity. The truth is, there never really should have been an absolute immunity. The Porto 
Alexandre was an incorrect decision. Brett LJ’s reasoning in The Parlement Belge is also highly 
suspect. Although courts in the UK and US undeniably applied what could be called an absolute 
doctrine immunity for a certain time, this was only a short period, for the majority of the 
intervening period the full immunity had still not been built out.This is an important fact to bear 
in mind, because at the same time courts in various Mediterranean nations were applying restrictive 
immunity.69 The various foreign state immunity statutes all proceed from the basis of an absolute 
‘blanket’ immunity, from which various exceptions are carved out, but it is questionable whether 
there was ever sufficient uniformity of practice for absolute immunity other than possibly during 
a brief period of the early 20th Century. Even at that time, numerous countries were practicing 
restrictive immunity.  
This review of a century of British jurisprudence shows how the strictly confined immunity for 
foreign public armed ships of war, granted by Marshall CJ in The Schooner Exchange, was gradually 
expanded into a fully-fledged doctrine of absolute immunity in the UK.70 With each case, the 
immunity doctrine became more entrenched and more expansive. Importantly, at key junctures, 
the judiciary–with the exception of Phillimore J–neglected the opportunity to consider whether it 
                                                 
66 [1977] AC 373 (‘The Philippine Admiral’). 
67 Ibid 394, 402; The Porto Alexandre [1920] P 30, 34. 
68 See generally Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) 705. 
69 See section 1.3 below. 
70 The same thing happened in the US when the Supreme Court decided Berrizi Bros v The Pesaro, 271 US 562 
(1926). This later decision of the Supreme Court undeniably applied an absolute immunity doctrine. 
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was proper to extend Marshall CJ’s immunity for ships of war to the wider category of government 
property in general. What resulted was a British common law where private traders had been 
entirely unsuccessful in their attempts to seek remedies against foreign sovereigns, despite a century 
of trying.71 Sooner or later, the stance was bound to prove untenable. Musing upon the general 
problem of state traders, Scrutton LJ proclaimed: 
No one can shut his eyes, now that the fashion of nationalisation is in the air, to the fact that 
many states are trading, or are about to trade, with ships belonging to themselves; and if these 
national ships wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs will become difficult; but 
it seems to me the remedy is not in these Courts.72 
The remedy, however, indeed lay in the British courts (it was even in the same Court of Appeal);73 
however, that development still lay far in the future. It would be more than fifty years before the 
British courts demolished absolute immunity; their achievement quickly followed by legislative 
enactment of a statute designed to put the nation in conformity with a treaty it had signed. 
1.3. Restrictive Immunity 
Although present in some European and Mediterranean nations in an earlier age, some publicists 
attribute the emergence of the USSR and its adoption of state trading on a previously unforeseen 
scale as perhaps the key factor in restrictive immunity’s rise to dominance in the West.74 
Communism was seen as threat to the West. It is natural to imagine the predisposition of Western 
nations to the removal of immunity in the case where a communist nation shields its liability to 
contractual breach behind the barrier of state ownership.75 Yet the very nature of the Westphalian 
system seems guaranteed to produce complaints by private entities who feel wronged by immune 
foreign state entities. In an increasingly globalised world and, perhaps as importantly, an 
increasingly communicative and technologically-connected world, these just complaints were 
unlikely to disappear. If the just complaints of injured private parties within the courts of Western 
nations were less of a catalyst than the Soviet menace in the rise of restrictive immunity then it can 
at least be noted the shift has proven a reliable and dependable benefit to the ordinary claims of 
                                                 
71 The case of The Charkieh must be ignored, as technically Phillimore J found the Khedive was not a sovereign. 
72 The Porto Alexandre [1920] P 30, 38-39. 
73 Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529. And also in the Privy Council: The Philippine 
Admiral [1977] AC 373. 
74 Bernard Fensterwald, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading’ (1950) 63(4) HLR 614. 
75 It should be noted many of these same Western nations benefited immensely from the presumption of 
immunity in the conduct of their own affairs. 
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private traders, while the Soviet Union is no more. It has even been claimed that basic unfairness 
to private traders was one of the primary reasons for the mass adoption of restrictive immunity. 
Lord Justice Wilberforce, for instance, said: 
[The] limitation [of] the so called “restrictive theory,” arises from the willingness of states to 
enter into commercial, or other private law, transactions with individuals. It appears to have 
two main foundations: (a) it is necessary in the interest of justice to individuals having such 
transactions.76 
The Anglo-American world, until then adhering absolute immunity, was undoubtedly concerned 
with what it assuredly perceived as an existential, Communist threat. Yet the two explanations are 
not mutually exclusive: restrictive immunity partially solved the perceived abuse of state trading 
problem by socialist states, whilst also ensuring justice for regular private individuals who may 
never have come into contact with the Soviet bloc. 
1.3.1. Incubation of Restrictive Immunity in Europe 
The Schooner Exchange spread the seed of absolute immunity throughout the common law world, 
but this was not necessarily the case elsewhere. In particular, the mercantile nations of the 
Mediterranean, and other states dependent on its trade, incubated a doctrine of restrictive 
immunity from an early date. Other continental European powers followed suit, long before US 
State Department official Jack B Tate penned his 1952 letter (‘the Tate Letter’) to Acting Attorney-
General Philip B Perlman, signalling the US adoption of restrictive immunity.77 This progressive, 
restrictive doctrine denied immunity for acta jure gestionis. These were acts of a non-sovereign 
nature, including commercial activity. 
1.3.2. Originators: Belgium and Italy 
Belgium and Italy seem to have originated the doctrine of restrictive immunity. Both nations can 
point to multiple precedents upholding the distinction between acta jure gestionis and acta jure 
imperii before the close of the 19th century. F P Walton thought that ‘Italian Courts were the first 
to adopt the distinction … between the sovereign acts of a foreign State and acts […] of a private 
                                                 
76 I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 244, 262. 
77 Jack B Tate, 'Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments' (1952) 
26 State Department Bulletin 984. 
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nature.’78 The earliest Italian authority espousing restricting immunity that he cites is from 1889.79 
Perhaps with the benefit of his work on the Annual Digest and Reports of Public International 
Law Cases,80 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was able to identify in Guttieres v Elmilik81 a relevant case 
decided three years prior. Badr,82 in turn, mentions Guttieres, but identifies an even earlier Italian 
precedent supporting restrictive immunity: Morellet v Governo Danese.83 Therefore, we find: 
As early as 1882, the Corte di Cassazione in Torino, in a case involving the Government of 
Denmark, ruled that since the state as a juristic person ‘must acquire and possess property, it 
must sue and be sued and, in a word, it must exercise civil rights in like manner as any other 
juristic person or private individual.84 (Emphasis added.) 
This may be the earliest Italian espousal of restrictive immunity. However, there are earlier Belgian 
decisions. Two decisions predate Italy’s 1882 Morellet decision: Rau, Vanden Abeele et Cie v 
Duruty85 in 1878 and Peruvian Guano Co v Dreyfus86 a few years later. Incidentally, both cases 
related to the said guano. Xiaodong Yang agrees, Duruty is ‘perhaps’ the earliest recorded case of 
restrictive immunity.87  
Both Italy88 and Belgium89 can similarly lay claim to an extensive string of cases recognising 
restrictive immunity in the decades before any prominent Westernnation abandoned the absolute 
                                                 
78 F P Walton, 'State Immunity in the Laws of England, France, Italy, and Belgium' (1920) 2(3) Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law 252, 255. 
79 Ibid 256; Journal de Droit International Privé (Clunet), 1889, pg 335. 
80 Now continued as the International Law Reports. 
81 Foro Italiano, I (1886), pp 920, 922. 
82 See Badr, above n 59, 24. 
83 (1882) I Guirisprudenza Italiana 125. 
84 Badr, above n 5, 24. 
85 (1879) Pasicrisie Belge, vol II, pp 175, 176 (Duruty). Note: Sinclair says this ruling was handed down on 17 
July 1878. 
86 (1881) Pasicrisie Belge, vol II, p 313. 
87 Xiaodong Yang, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 13. 
88 See generally Typaldos, Console di Grecia v Manicomio di Aversa (1886) I Guirisprudenza Italiano 228, 229; 
Hamspohn v Bey of Tunis (1887) I Foro Italiana 486; Storelli v French Republic (1924) 2 ILR 129; French 
Government v Serra & Co (1925) 3 ILR 178; Russian Commercial Representation v Tesini & Malvezzi (1925) 3 ILR 
176; Perucchetti v Puig y Cassauro (1929) I Foro Italiano 112; Slominitzky v Trade Delegation of the USSR in 
Italy (1932) 6 ILR 169; Russian Trade Delegation in Italy v Kazmann (1933) 7 ILR 178; Little v Riccio & Fischer 
(1934) 7 ILR 177; Russian Trade Delegation in Italy v De Castro (1935); De Semenoff v Railway Administration of 
the Norwegian State (1935) 8 ILR 234. 
89 See generally Société pour la fabrication des cartouches v Col M, Ministre de la Guerre de Bulgarie (1889) La 
Belgique Judiciaire 383; Société anonyme des chemins de fer Liégeois-Luxembourgeois v État Neerlandais 
(1903) I Pasicrisie Beige 294; Feldman v Itat de Bahia (1908) II Pasicrisie Belge 55, 57-58; Gouvernement 
Ottoman v Gaspary (1911) III Pasicrisie Beige 104; West Russian Steamship Co v Captain Sucksdorff (1920) 1 ILR 
152; Portugal v Sauvage (1921) I ILR 154; Société Lemoine & Co v Belgian & British Governments (1925) 3 ILR 
169; Société Monnoyer et Bernard v France (1927) 4 ILR 177; Brasseur & Associates v Greece (1932) 6 ILR 164; 
Époux Perevostchikoff—Germeau v Canada (1934) 9 ILR 249; Urrutia & Amollobieta v Martiarena (1937) 8 ILR 
237. 
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immunity doctrine. In fact, most of these cases were decided before absolute immunity calcified 
into its final form in Britain during the early Twentieth Century. As other European nations 
looked to an alternative to absolute immunity, they had the distinct advantage of a robust tradition 
of Italian and Belgian jurisprudence from which to draw reason and inspiration. In the dawn of 
the 20th Century, that is precisely what occurred. Although it had originally followed the absolute 
immunity approach, Austria was perhaps the first nation to tentatively follow the Italo-Belgian 
lead in adopting restrictive immunity. A 1907 case ruled: 
[T]he State as entrepreneur is a juridical person within the realm of private law and 
can, therefore, be sued in the ordinary courts in all matters concerning private law. … 
This applies undoubtedly to the home State, but there is no reason to depart from this 
principle in the case of a foreign State. This does not constitute an infringement of 
territorial sovereignty any more than does the act of suing a foreign national in a 
municipal court.90 (Emphasis added.) 
A chain of Austrian cases91 similarly followed the restrictive approach in that nation, but there was 
some uncertainty with other cases adopting the old absolute approach. The problem was solved 
finally with the landmark case of Dralle v Czechoslovakia,92 which upheld restrictive immunity and 
likely influenced Anglo-American abandonment of absolute immunity. 
1.3.3. Other Early Adopters: Greece, Egypt, etc 
Mediterranean nations, especially Egypt and Greece also adopted the public/private approach at 
an early date. The Mixed Courts of Egypt, founded in 1875 by His Highness Isma'il Pasha, 
Khedive of Egypt,93 were progressive institutions with inherent international characteristics. Their 
stated aim was the governance of relations between foreigners. It is not surprising, then that they 
adopted restrictive immunity with gusto. Coincidentally, Isma'il Pasha was the same Khedive 
whose plea of immunity was unsuccessful in The Charkieh.94 A string of decisions95 in the Egyptian 
                                                 
90 Röll, Eisenbahnrechtliche Entscheidungen, XXI (1907) No. 122. Quoted in Dralle v Czechoslovakia (1950) 17 
ILR 155, 156. 
91 Osterreichisch-ungarische Bank v Ungarische Regierung (1920) 28 Niemeyer's Zeitschrift far internationales 
Recht 506; Immunities (Foreign State in Private Contracts) Case (1920) 1 ILR 118; Foreign States (Legation 
Buildings) Immunities Case (1928) Decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court in Civil and Administrative Matters, 
vol X, No 177, 427-429. 
92 (1950) 17 ILR 155. 
93 Apparently at the insistence of Western states. 
94 The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59, 100. 
95 Dame Marigo Kildani v The Ministry of Finance of Greece [1911-1912] 24 Bulletin de Legislation et de 
Jurisprudence Egyptiennes 330; Hall v Bengoa (1920) 1 ILR 157; Borg v Caisse Nationale D'épargne Française 
(1926); Egyptian Government v Palestine State Railways Administration (1942) 11 ILR 146; Egyptian Delta Rice 
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Mixed Courts entrenched the restrictive doctrine in that nation until the abolishment of those 
courts in 1949. Similarly, in Greece, courts were reluctant to protect sovereigns acting in a private 
capacity, and denied immunity for non-sovereign behaviour in several key cases96 prior to the 
Anglo-American adoption of restrictive immunity. By the 1920s, even those European nations that 
were formerly staunch advocates of absolute immunity were beginning to waver. Some of the 
strongest pronouncements of absolute immunity, outside of the severe Porto Alexandre ruling in 
the UK, had come from France97 and Germany.98 Yet, Germany tentatively,99 and France 
wholeheartedly,100 adopted restrictive immunity between WWI and WWII. The stage was set for 
an explosion of the restrictive doctrine into the Western, common law world. 
1.3.4. Restrictive Immunity’s Rise to Prominence 
While more than a dozen European and Mediterranean nations had adopted restrictive immunity 
between 1879 and 1928, the Anglo-American nations and others in their sphere of influence 
remained mired in an absolute conception of immunity until after WWII at the earliest, and in 
many cases until after the Vietnam War. There were a few holdouts. Japan finally relinquished 
absolute immunity last decade.101 Some nations, notably China and its Special Administrative 
Regions,102 still adhere to the doctrine. 
                                                 
Mills Co v Comisaria General de Abastecimentos y Transportes de Madrid (1943) 12 ILR 103; Henon v Egyptian 
Government & British Admiralty (1947) 14 ILR 78; Aboutebout c. État Hellénique (1950) 44(2) American Journal 
of International Law 420. 
96 Soviet Republic (Immunity in Greece) Case (1928) 4 ILR 172; Consular Premises (Greece) Case (1931) 6 ILR 
338; Soviet Republic (Immunity in Greece) Case (1935) 8 ILR 30; Roumanian Legation (Greece) Case (1949) 16 
ILR 291. 
97 Two cases from 1849 and 1893. See Walton, above n 1, 255. 
98 Hellfeld Case (1911) 5 American Journal of International Law 490; The Ice King (1921) 1 ILR 150. 
99 Gehrckens v Järnvägstyrelsen (1925) 8 Hanseatische Rechts-Zeitschrift 904; Halig v Polish State (1928) 4 ILR 
164. 
100 Roumania (State of) v Pascalet (1924) 2 ILR 132; Société le Gostorg et Union des Republiques Socialistes 
Sovietiques v Association France-Export (1926) 3 ILR 174; USSR v Association France Export (1929) 5 ILR 18; 
Government of Morocco & Maspero v Laurens, Société Marseillaise de Crédit, & Others (1930) 5 ILR 116; De 
Fallois v Piatakoff (1937) 8 ILR 223; Chaliapine v USSR (1936) 8 ILR 225; Lahalle & Levard v The American Battle 
Monuments Commission (1936) 8 ILR 227; Société Viajes v Office National du Tourisme Espagnol (1936) 8 ILR 
227; Roumanian State v Arricastre (1937) 8 ILR 232; Hertzfeld v USSR (1938) 9 ILR 243; Procureur Général près 
la Cour de Cassation v Vestwig et al (1946) 13 ILR 78; Étienne v Government of the Netherlands (1947) 14 ILR 
83. 
101 Tokyo Sanyo Trading Co v Pakistan, 2003 (Ju) No 1231; Interquest Co v Saudi Arabia (2005) ILDC 1020. 
102 C L Lim, 'State immunity in post-handover Hong Kong' (2011) 127(Apr) Law Quarterly Review 159; C L Lim, 
'Absolute immunity for sovereign debtors in Hong Kong' (2011) 127(Oct) Law Quarterly Review 495. 
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Nonetheless, the post-WWI period was instrumental in planting the seeds of the restrictive 
revolution. During this period publicists, for example Weiss,103 noticing the practice of European 
nations, began to advocate a restrictive approach in other jurisdictions. Despite the flood of 
academic opinion supporting restrictive immunity during the interwar period, these opinions of 
scholars had little immediate effect on the judges of the common law world; although, Lauterpacht 
does provide evidence of not insignificant state practice during the period.104 In the post-WWII 
world progress was swifter. In Austria, the Dralle decision of 1950, notable for its ample survey of 
state practice, caught the Anglo-American world's attention. The following year, Lauterpacht 
renewed his predecessors' call for reform. The US Secretary of State Jack B Tate announced in the 
Tate Letter the Department of State’s decision to adopt the restrictive immunity doctrine in its 
recommendations to courts. The approach was followed by the courts, who ruled that State 
Department recommendations were determinative; therefore, from 1952 until around 1976, 
generally speaking US practice was dependent upon executive direction and control. Nonetheless, 
the State Department recommendations of this period ostensibly followed the restrictive immunity 
doctrine. Critics were alarmed by the ability of the state department to seemingly grant or deny 
immunity on a whim, allowing for its use as a political football. 
The situation in the UK was another matter. British courts adhered to the absolute immunity 
doctrine until the mid-1970s. Prima facie this is surprising, considering the UK's historic economic 
dominance and London's status as a mecca for world trade and finance, because the absolute 
immunity doctrine is detrimental to private traders: presumably, it might drive a portion of them 
away, to other important economic hubs that were more accommodating to private traders. A 
curious student might inquire whether the British reluctance to adopt a restrictive immunity 
doctrine had any effect on the decline of its relevant percentage of global gross domestic product. 
Bastion of tradition though it has been, Britain could not withstand the overwhelming tide of 
reform amongst the nations of the Western civilisation. The Philippine 
Admiral and Trendtex finally established a common law restrictive immunity in the UK. With both 
the US and UK now following the restrictive approach, the tide had decisively turned. 
                                                 
103 Lauterpacht, above n 1, 225. 
104 Ibid. 
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1.3.5. The Nature or Purpose Question 
In the first half of the 20th Century, as restrictive immunity became more popular in Europe and 
was gaining ascendancy in the minds of publicists worldwide, there arose a prominent dispute 
about how to classify acts as private or public.105 The distinction was vital, as the restrictive doctrine 
accorded immunity only to the latter. It was also a particularly thorny issue, as one could reach a 
different conclusion, on the same facts, as to whether an act was private or public, according to 
which test one applies. For instance, Lauterpacht showed how judges have reached different 
conclusions based on seemingly similar facts:106 two hypothetical judges applying the same test 
could come to a different conclusion whether a contract entered into by a government to procure 
boots for its army could be considered as either a private or public act. 107 Under the purpose test 
it would be a public act, because it was for a public purpose (to ensure the good working order of 
the defence forces); whereas, under the nature test, since entering into the contract is an act which 
an individual would be capable of performing, it must be a private act; however, Lauterpacht 
showed cases where judges applying the same test came to different conclusions, which he 
considered evidence for an intolerably high level of uncertainty in the law. 
Clearly, the move from absolute to restrictive immunity had not solved all the problems in this 
area of the law. Absolute immunity was found untenable, because it produced too much injustice 
for private parties in their commercial dealings with foreign state-owned enterprises; restrictive 
immunity had the potential to obviate these injustices, but in its classic form it suffered from an 
inability to precisely and reliably characterise acts as private or public. This imprecision could lead 
to considerable injustices of its own, because of the lack of determinacy.108 
States looking to provide determinacy in their domestic application of foreign state immunity law 
therefore faced a definitional quandary in the second half of the 20th Century. Absolute immunity 
was being abandoned because of its lack of fairness to private traders. The nature test, first 
formulated by Weiss, was making headway over the purpose test as the preferred application of the 
                                                 
105 See generally M Sornarajah, 'Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity' (1982) 
31(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 661, 668-671. 
106 Lauterpacht, Hersch, 'The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States' (1951) 28 British Yearbook 
of International Law 220, 222-224. 
107 Ibid 225. 
108 See generally Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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restrictive doctrine. Yet even the nature test suffered from significant and foundational issues 
relating to the reliable classification of acts as private or public. Some more precise method of 
categorisation was required, to provide assurance that the same facts and acts would always be 
categorised the same way, leading to the same result under the same test. States turned to treaties 
and legislation as a means of codifying precisely defined terms, to grant sufficient determinacy. It 
remains to be seen whether this solution had other perhaps unintended side-effects. Nonetheless, 
this trend toward codification of the law of foreign state immunity will be covered in the following 
chapter. 
1.4. Summary 
This chapter showed the growth of foreign state immunity from Marshall CJ’s decision in The 
Schooner Exchange, through a chain of British authorities solidifying an absolute immunity, with a 
later trend toward the restrictive immunity that some nations like Belgium, Italy, and Greece had 
always followed. Careful examination of Marshall CJ’s decision shows the ruling was confined to 
a strict scope. Nothing in the language suggests a grant of absolute immunity. Marshall CJ 
specifically conjectured about situations in which a prince’s commercial activities might result in a 
throwing off of the cloak of immunity. A chain of English cases cemented the narrow ruling on 
public armed ships of a foreign prince  until it included all public property being put to public use, 
and gradually even the requirement of public use was dropped as the immunity became absolute,  
even while Mediterranean nations were refining  the doctrine of restrictive immunity.
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 Codification 
he set of draft articles has been the product of an inductive approach based 
on State practice rather than deductions from abstract principles. In terms of 
theories, State immunity is sometimes believed to be absolute and other times 
restrictive or limited. In practice, as is clearly shown, immunity is relative from 
the very start, depending on the volition of the State concerned. This relativity 
finds expression in State practice which has never at any given moment favoured 
an absolute doctrine. The practice of countries like Italy, Belgium and Egypt, for 
instance, adopted a restrictive rule of State immunity from the very beginning. 
Sompong Sucharitkul1 
2.1. Outline 
The prior chapter focused on the first appearance of foreign state immunity in municipal courts, 
with Marshall CJ’s seminal decision in The Schooner Exchange v Mcfaddon.2 It charted the 
development of the ‘absolute immunity’ doctrine in England over the next century, but in 
accordance with Sucharitkul’s observation in the above quote, the preceding chapter also noted the 
parallel existence of a ‘restrictive immunity’ doctrine in Italy, Belgium, Greece, and other 
Mediterranean nations such as Egypt. The question of whether foreign state immunity began in a 
truly absolute form is important, because if one is minded to accept this as fact the logical approach 
for the drafter of a treaty or statute is to proceed from a point of absolute immunity for the foreign 
state, ‘carving out’ exceptions as one goes along. As can be seen in the texts of the instruments 
analysed below, this seems to have been the general approach taken. All begin with a plenary 
‘blanket immunity’ which prohibits the impleading of a foreign state in all circumstances; this is 
then made subject to a number of specific, enumerated exceptions. This is despite the fact that by 
the time common-law nations came to legislate on the topic of foreign state immunity the 
restrictive doctrine had already supplanted absolute immunity.  
Scholars such as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht appeared to foresee the weakness in an approach to 
codification which proceeds from a basis of absolute immunity. Instead of recommending a blanket 
immunity, Lauterpacht recommended legislation or treaties might begin by proceeding from an 
assumption of no immunity, with immunity only to be granted in a set of specific, enumerated 
                                                 
1 Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘Immunity of States’ in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed) International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 327, 332. 
2 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (‘The Schooner Exchange’). 
T 
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circumstances.3 After considering the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity and after noting 
the difficulties inherent in the jure gestionis/imperii dichotomy originally proposed by Weiss, 
Lauterpacht notes: 
The practical consequences […] would seem to be the abolition, subject to specified 
safeguards and exceptions, of the rule of immunity of foreign states. That end can be achieved 
either by way of international agreement or by unilateral legislative action of states’.4 
This approach mirrors that which was eventually taken by the framers of the various treaties and 
statutes; however, according to Lauterpacht it would have been more useful for the continued 
development of the law if the instruments began by assuming a lack of immunity. This is because 
novel cases which might not have been considered by the framers are able to be accommodated. 
The framers of the various treaties and statutes were not turning their minds to human-rights 
related cases, because such cases only began to be brought in the decades following.  It is therefore 
logical that the instruments do not make specific mention of such cases, but because these cases 
are not included as exceptions, the blanket immunity prevails. If Lauterpacht’s approach had been 
taken this would not have been the case, and if the lack of immunity became a significant problem 
in any new category of case the treaty or statute could be amended. 
On the topic of amendments, there have been calls by publicists to amend, for instance, the 2004 
United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. As will be 
seen in Part Two of this thesis, below, the customary international norms pertaining to foreign 
state immunity have undergone somewhat of a change in recent decades as claimants have brought 
civil actions in municipal courts against various foreign states for compensation relating to human 
rights violations. As the various treaties and statutes were drafted and implemented before these 
cases were decided, the instruments do not contain any exceptions for jus cogens violations. 
Arguments by counsel for various claimants have attempted to get around this by, for example, 
positing that the blanket immunity must be read against the background of international law (the 
so-called implied exception argument) or by attempting to ‘shoehorn’ jus cogens violations into one 
of the existing exceptions to immunity (such as implied waiver, commercial activity, or the 
territorial tort exception); on the whole, however, these attempts have mostly proven futile.  
                                                 
3 Hersch Lauterpacht, 'The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States' (1951) 28 British Yearbook of 
International Law 220, 227. 
4 Ibid 237. 
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present an authoritative history behind the drafting and 
adoption of all the treaties and statutes pertaining to foreign state immunity. Nor is it this chapter’s 
role to present an in-depth analysis of the instruments and all their provisions. Specialist works 
perform this task.5 Instead, this chapter provides an overview of the codification process, 
introducing the major treaties and statutes in addition to providing notes on some of the key 
provisions. A more in-depth consideration of some of these provisions and how they apply in 
various cases, especially in the human rights context, will be seen in Parts Two and Three below. 
For now, this chapter proceeds by first examining the various treaties which have been entered 
into, followed by a summary of the major foreign state immunity statutes which have been enacted 
by various states. 
2.2. Treaties 
For his part, Lauterpacht preferred an international treaty to piecemeal legislation by states;6 
however, he showed the concept could work in both situations. Treaties he deemed preferential 
simply because statutes were a piecemeal solution, while a multilateral treaty could (theoretically) 
yield greater adoption of a uniform approach. At the time Lauterpacht was writing, the ILC had 
in its First Session selected jurisdictional immunities of states and their property as one of the topics 
suitable for codification. The ILC would eventually produce a set of Draft Articles on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, which would go on to be adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly and become the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property.7 This, however, would be a long and drawn-out process. In the 
meantime, several European states drafted and signed the European Convention on State Immunity8 
in 1972. Decades later, a 1983 Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States would follow. 
 
                                                 
5 See for example Roger O’Keefe and Christian J Tams, The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
6 See Lauterpacht, above n 3, 247-248. 
7 opened for signature 2 December 2004 (not yet in force) (‘2004 UN Convention’). 
8 opened for signature 16 May 1972, CETS No 074 (entered into force 11 June 1976) (‘1972 European 
Convention’). 
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Exception Commercial transaction/activity Tort 
1972 
European 
Convention 
on State 
Immunity 
Article 4  
(1) Subject to the provisions of 
Article 5, a Contracting State 
cannot claim immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of 
another Contracting State if the 
proceedings relate to an 
obligation of the State, which, by 
virtue of a contract, falls to be 
discharged in the territory of the 
State of the forum. 
Article 11 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity 
from the jurisdiction of a court of another 
Contracting State in proceedings which 
relate to redress for injury to the person or 
damage to tangible property, if the facts 
which occasioned the injury or damage 
occurred in the territory of the State of the 
forum, and if the author of the injury was 
present in that territory at the time when 
those facts occurred. 
2004 United 
Nations 
Convention 
on 
Jurisdictional 
Immunities 
of States 
and Their 
Property 
Article 10 
Commercial transactions 
(1) If a State engages in a 
commercial transaction with a 
foreign natural or juridical 
person and, by virtue of the 
applicable rules of private 
international law, differences 
relating to the commercial 
transaction fall within the 
jurisdiction of a court of another 
State, the State cannot invoke 
immunity from that jurisdiction 
in a proceeding arising out of 
that commercial transaction. 
Article 12 
Personal injuries and damage to property 
Unless otherwise agreed between the 
States concerned, a State cannot invoke 
immunity from jurisdiction before a court 
of another State which is otherwise 
competent in a proceeding which relates to 
pecuniary compensation for death or injury 
to the person, or damage to or loss of 
tangible property, caused by an act or 
omission which is alleged to be attributable 
to the State, if the act or omission occurred 
in whole or in part in the territory of that 
other State and if the author of the act or 
omission was present in that territory at 
the time of the act or omission. 
Table 1: Comparison of commercial transaction and tort exceptions in the European and UN Conventions 
2.2.1. European Convention 
As noted by Ian Sinclair, the codification of rules pertaining to foreign state immunity had a long 
history stretching back to an Institut de Droit International resolution and being considered ‘ripe’ 
for codification by a League of Nations body in 1928.9 Despite being similarly listed by the ILC 
in 1949, nothing had been produced on the matter. Sinclair notes a string of cases in various 
Western nations,10 which embraced the restrictive doctrine instead of absolute immunity. ‘Against 
this background, the Austrian delegation to the Third Conference of European Ministers of Justice 
[…] proposed that the question of State immunity in all its aspects should be studied within the 
framework of the legal programme of the Council of Europe.’11 A ‘Committee of Experts held 14 
                                                 
9 Ian M Sinclair, ‘The European Convention on State Immunity’ (1973) 22 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 254, 261. 
10 Ibid 263-265. 
11 Ibid 266. 
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meetings between 1965 and 1970,’ eventually producing the 1972 European Convention and its 
Additional Protocol.12 The scheme of the Convention is as follows. Article 15 provides a blanket 
immunity to the foreign state unless one of the exceptions in Articles 1 to 14 applies. A foreign 
state is therefore immune unless:13 it instituted or intervened in proceedings before a court; has 
submitted to the jurisdiction to a court;  it takes any step as to the merits; if the proceedings relate 
to an obligation of the state which falls to be discharge in the forum state; if the proceedings relate 
to a contract of employment; if the contracting state participates with one or more private persons 
in a company and the proceedings concern the relationship in matters arising out of that 
participation; if the contracting state has an office in the forum state where it engages in commercial 
activity and the proceedings relate to that activity; if the proceedings relate to patents, industrial 
designs, trade-marks, service marks or other similar rights; if the proceedings relate to a contracting 
state’s rights or interests in immovable property situated in the forum state; if the proceedings 
relate to a right in movable or immovable property arising by way of succession, gift or bona 
vacantia; the proceedings relate to injury to a person or damage to tangible property if the facts 
which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the forum state and the author was present in 
the territory at the time the facts occurred; the contracting state has agreed to submit to arbitration; 
the contracting state asserts in proceedings before a foreign court to which it is not a party that it 
has a right or interest in property which is the subject-matter of the proceedings;  the suit involves 
trust property in which a contracting state merely has an interest. 
2.2.2. Inter-American Convention 
In 1983, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States. Like the other instruments in this chapter, it began with a 
blanket immunity, proclaiming ‘A State is immune from the jurisdiction of any other State.’14 
Enumerated exceptions then applied. It is not proposed to focus on this draft convention further 
as its features are similar to the 1972 European Convention and 2004 UN Convention. 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 1972 European Convention on State Immunity. 
14 ‘Organization of American States: Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States’ 
(1983) 22(2) International Legal Materials 292. 
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2.2.3. United Nations Convention 
As noted above, the origins of the 2004 UN Convention go back to the League of Nations, which 
considered foreign state immunity a ripe topic for codification. In the new age of the United 
Nations, the ILC also considered the topic ripe, but nothing was done on the matter until 1978 
when the ILC set up a working group dealing with the topic of foreign state immunity. Sompong 
Sucharitkul was appointed special rapporteur, with the rest of the working group made up by 
Abdullah El-Erian, Laurel B Francis, and Willem Riphagen. This working group was invited to 
prepare a preliminary report, which was annexed in Ch VIII of the ILC’s report on the work of its 
Thirtieth Session (an abbreviated summary of the process leading to the General Assembly’s 
adoption of the 2004 UN Convention can be seen in Figure 1 on the following page). Perhaps the 
entry into force of the 1972 European Convention and the passage of the State Immunity Act 1985 
(UK) (fulfilling the UK’s treaty obligations having signed the treaty on 16 May 1972; ratified the 
treaty on 3 July 1979; and it entered into force for the UK three months later on 4 October 1979) 
stirred the ILC to work toward an instrument of much wider application, at least in terms of states 
parties. 
After many reports on work in progress, the working group completed its job and the ILC in 1991 
adopted its Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. The General 
Assembly then invited15 states to submit their written comments and observations on the Draft 
Articles. It also established an open-ended working group of the Sixth Committee to examine issues 
of substance arising out of the Draft articles.16 Another decade of work under various auspices 
passed and in 2000 the General Assembly established17 the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee after several years 
was presented to the General Assembly which on 2 December 2004 adopted the 2004 UN 
Convention. Although the topic had been mooted for almost a century, serious work on the topic 
took about 25 years, 1979-2004. When considering how conceptually similar this convention is 
to the 1972 European Convention, it is difficult not to ask if many of those years were wasted. 
                                                 
15 Consideration of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, GA Res 46/55, UN 
GAOR, 46th Sess, 67th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/46/55 [2]. 
16 For the ILC’s own account of the convention’s history, see <http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/4_1.shtml>. 
17 Convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, GA Res 55/150, UN GAOR, 55th Sess, 
84th plen mtg, UN DOC A/RES/55/150 [3]. 
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Figure 1: 2004 UN Convention Timeline 
International Law Commission
1949 ILC at its 1st Session 
selects Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and 
Their Property as one of 
the topics for codification
1977 ILC at its 29th 
Session recommended 
Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their 
Property for selection in 
near future as possible 
additional topic for study
1978 ILC sets up working 
group to consider future 
work; working group 
submitted report to the 
Commission dealing inter 
alia with general aspects 
of jurisdictional 
immunities. Sompong 
Sucharitkul appointed as 
Special Rapporteur and 
invited to prepare a 
preliminary report
1991 ILC at its 43rd 
Session adopted Draft 
Articles on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and 
Their Property
United Nations General Assembly
1977 UN GA in its 32nd 
Session in Resolution 
32/151 invites ILC to 
commence work at an 
appopriate time on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property
1991 UN GA in Resolution 
46/55 invites states to 
submit their written 
comments and 
observations on the ILC's 
Draft Articles.
1991 UN GA also in 
Resolution 46/55 
establishes an Open-Ended 
Working Group of the Sixth 
Committee to examine 
issues of substance arising 
out of the ILC Draft Articles
2000 UN GA in Resolution 
55/150 establishes the Ad 
Hoc Committee on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property
2004 Ad Hoc Committee 
report is submitted and 
considered by the General 
Assembly, 59/22
2004 UN GA in Resolution 
59/38 on 2 December 2004 
adopts text of Draft 
Convention
Convention
2004 United 
Nations 
Convention on 
Jurisdictional 
Immunities of 
States and Their 
Property
Codification 
28 
 
In terms of overall conceptual content, the 2004 UN Convention is remarkably similar to the 1972 
European Convention. They both basically adopt the classical response to a shift to the restrictive 
doctrine from a supposedly absolute immunity of the past. One governing clause grants a blanket 
immunity to the foreign state, which applies unless one of the enumerated exceptions apply. The 
2004 UN Convention grants exceptions for commercial transactions; contracts of employment; 
personal injuries and damages to property; ownership, possession and use of property; intellectual 
and industrial property; participation in companies or other collective bodies; ships owned or 
operated by a State; and arbitration agreements. In this respect it is remarkably similar to the 1972 
European Convention, which has corresponding sections explicitly covering all of those issues except 
for one, ships. Considering the wealth of human rights-related foreign state immunity cases which 
have occurred world-wide from 1979-2004 it is surprising this new category of cases was not dealt 
with by the framers, who appeared to think this body of law was still in development. The 2004 
UN Convention is not a hugely controversial instrument, but it already appears antiquated, having 
neglected to deal with important issues which had been around for over two decades prior to its 
adoption. As noted by one scholar, ‘[s]ignificantly, the ILC did not adopt the suggestions of the 
working group [on human rights cases and jus cogens violations] contained in the appendix, and in 
the Sixth Committee, no representative of any state ever picked up on the question.’18 It is not 
surprising in light of a convention so long under development, where  the convention has simply 
not taken account of developments over the prior quarter of a century, that calls for a protocol to 
the 2004 UN Convention almost immediately after its adoption.19 
2.3. Statutes 
Most common-law nations now have foreign state immunity statutes; however, the majority also 
enacted these statutes for differing reasons. Some might act in accordance with a treaty, others for 
less obvious reasons.  
 
                                                 
18 Andrea Gattini, ‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is the time ripe for a 
change of the law?’ (2011) 24(1) Leiden Journal of International Law, 173, 175. 
19 See Christopher Keith Hall, ‘UN Convention on State Immunity: the Need for a Human Rights Protocol’ 
(2006) 55(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 411, 425-426. Hall argues interpretive declarations 
or reservations would not be sufficient to achieve the aim, and an optional protocol to the treaty would be 
better. Hall claims Amnesty International and Redress also support such a protocol. 
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Exception Commercial transaction/activity Tort 
Foreign 
Sovereign 
Immunities 
Act of 1976 
1605 General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign state 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the 
States in any case—(2) in which the action is based 
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; 
or upon an act outside the territory of the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of 
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect in the United States; 
1605 General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign state 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of 
the States in any case—(5) in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of 
property, occurring in the United States and 
caused by the tortious act or omission of that 
foreign state or of any official or employee of 
that foreign state while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment; except this 
paragraph shall not apply to—(A) any claim 
based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function regardless of whether the discretion be 
abused, or (B) any claim arising out of malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with 
contract rights 
State 
Immunity Act 
1978 (UK) 
3 Commercial transactions and contracts to be 
performed in United Kingdom. 
(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings 
relating to— 
a. a commercial transaction entered into by 
the State; or 
b. an obligation of the State which by virtue 
of a contract (whether a commercial 
transaction or not) falls to be performed 
wholly or partly in the United Kingdom 
5 Personal injuries and damage to property. 
A State is not immune as respects proceedings 
in respect of— 
(a) death or personal injury; or 
(b) damage to or loss of tangible property 
caused by an act or omission in the United 
Kingdom. 
State 
Immunity 
Act, RSC 
1985, c S-18 
Commercial activity 
5 A foreign state is not immune from the 
jurisdiction of a court in any proceedings that relate 
to any commercial activity of the foreign state. 
Death and property damage 
6 A foreign state is not immune from the 
jurisdiction of a court in any proceedings that 
relate to 
(a) any death or personal or bodily injury, 
or 
(b) any damage to or loss of property 
that occurs in Canada. 
Foreign 
States 
Immunities 
Act 1985 
(Cth) 
11 Commercial transactions 
(1) A foreign State is not immune in a proceeding 
in so far as the proceeding concerns a 
commercial transaction. […] 
(3) In this section, commercial transaction means 
a commercial, trading, business, professional 
or industrial or like transaction into which the 
foreign State has entered or a like activity in 
which the State has engaged and, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
includes: 
a) a contract  for the supply of goods or 
services; 
b) an agreement for a loan or some other 
transaction for or in respect of the 
provision of finance; and 
c) a guarantee or indemnity in respect of a 
financial obligation; but does not include a 
contract of employment or a bill of 
exchange 
13 Personal injury and damage to property 
A foreign State is not immune in a proceeding in 
so far as the proceeding concerns: 
(a) the death of, or personal injury to, a 
person; or 
(b) loss of or damage to tangible property; 
caused by an act or omission done or omitted to 
be done in Australia. 
Table 2: Comparison of commercial transaction and tort exceptions in various immunity statutes 
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2.3.1. Common-law States 
The US had no treaty to implement, but it was thought desirable to enact a statute to take control 
from the State Department and place it in the judiciary. State Department control of immunity 
decisions historically was not productive of a uniform practice, as decisions—or the decision not 
to render a ruling—could often be made for political reasons. The State Department had espoused 
the restrictive immunity doctrine since 1952, when legal adviser Jack B Tate wrote the Tate Letter; 
however, the State Department still had ultimate control of recognising or not recognising 
immunity for any reason it wished. Before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,20 (‘FSIA’) 
the State Department had claimed the right to issue Statements of Interest and Suggestions of 
Immunity, which the judicial branch treated as binding. The FSIA would give control to the courts, 
to apply the law in accordance with the statute. 
The UK had signed the 1972 European Convention and the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) (‘SIA’) 
was enacted at least in part to fulfil these treaty obligations, but also because the UK courts in 
Trendtex and The Philippine Admiral had clearly adopted the restrictive immunity approach. The 
text of the SIA can be seen to mirror that of the 1972 European Convention in various areas, for 
instance the similarity of the language in s 3 of the SIA to art 4 of the 1972 European Convention: 
‘falls to be discharged’ in the treaty, ‘falls to be performed’ in the statute.21 
The Canadian State Immunity Act22 was first enacted in 1982. The similarity of the tort provisions 
in s 5 of the UK act and s 6 of the Canadian act shows the former’s influence on the Canadian 
legislation. Since 2012, the Canadian legislation has allowed suits against foreign states who 
support terrorism, provided the supporting state is on a list of state sponsors of terrorism.23 This 
provision mirrors the position in the US. 
Australia was one of the last common-law realms to introduce legislation when its Foreign States 
Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) was passed. One of the statute’s key architects, Prof (now Judge) James 
Crawford, had been writing in support of such a statute for years.24 Judge Crawford later served as 
                                                 
20 28 USC § 1330, 1602-1611 (1976). 
21 See Table 1 above. 
22 RSC 1985, c S-18. 
23 Ibid s 11. 
24 JR Crawford, ‘A Foreign State Immunities Act for Australia?’ [1978] Australian Yearbook of International Law 
3; (1978-1980) 8 Australian Yearbook of International Law 71. 
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the Commissioner in Charge under Chairman The Hon Justice Michael Kirby in an Australian 
Law Reform Commission Report on Foreign State Immunity,25 which advocated in favour of a 
foreign state immunity statute for Australia and appended a draft statute as an appendix to the 
report.26 So far as the human rights context goes, it is enough to notice nowhere in the report deals 
with jus cogens violations or things of that sort, neither are the positions of foreign officials really 
discussed. This shows the drafters of the Australian legislation did not really have these matters in 
mind when enacting the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). 
2.3.2. Other Nations 
Singapore adopted the State Immunity Act 1979 (Singapore). The South African government 
enacted the Foreign States Immunities Act 1981 (South Africa). Pakistan enacted the State Immunity 
Ordinance 1981 (Pakistan). Malaysia adopted the Immunities and Privileges Act 1984 (Malaysia). 
Japan adopted an act in 2009. The scope of these instruments is largely in line with the treaties 
and statutes listed above, purportedly embracing the restrictive doctrine by providing a blanket 
immunity subject to specifically enumerated exceptions. 
2.4. Summary 
From the early 1970s to the dawn of the Twenty First Century, codification of the law of foreign 
state immunity has taken place through treaties and statutes. Most of these form a general scheme, 
which adopts a blanket immunity with enumerated exceptions. None of these instruments deal 
with the human rights context, for instance by not making provision for situations where there has 
been a jus cogens violation. Although the US and Canadian legislation now have provisions to bring 
suit against a foreign government accused of supporting terrorism if the state is listed as a state 
sponsor of terrorism, and new US legislation goes further, allowing recovery in respect of terrorist 
acts committed on US soil, even if the foreign state’s support took place outside US territory.27
                                                 
25 Foreign State Immunity [1984] ALRC 24. 
26 Ibid 107. 
27 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub L 114–222 (2016). 
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 The US Experience 
don’t know of any case that I have had where there was so much merit to the 
cause of action brought by the plaintiff. There was so much merit, yet there 
was an inability on the part of the legal system to deal with it, which, I think, 
shows you that we still have problems with the legal system. The legal system 
has got to get together with the needs and demands of its citizens. 
Judge Stanley Sporkin1 
3.1. Outline 
Judge Sporkin may have been upset his judgment was overturned, but his point ran deeper. 
Through Judge Sporkin’s tenacity, Hugo Princz was eventually awarded a financial settlement; 
however, this was not the result of any court order but instead the fruit of diplomatic negotiation. 
Sporkin J’s point was that one should not have to rely on the viccisitudes of diplomacy to get 
justice. As the cases in this chapter show, this can be difficult when the plain wording of a statute 
prevents such a ruling. The fact that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 (‘FSIA’) creates 
a blanket immunity subject only to some enumerated exceptions leads claimants to seek creative 
ways to shoehorn their claim into provisions which were not drafted with such claims in mind. 
3.2. Von Dardel 
In the latter period of World War II, the United States Government entered into ‘an effort to save 
from extermination by the German Nazis the thousands of Jews then domiciled in Hungary.’3 At 
war with Hungary, the US had to act through a neutral third party: Sweden. Architect Raoul 
Gustaf Wallenberg was appointed Secretary of the Swedish Legation to Hungary, and was given 
diplomatic immunity, funding, and honorary citizenship from the United States.4 Wallenberg used 
this position to arrange for the evacuation of nearly 100,000 Jewish people from Hungary. Arrested 
by the Soviets during the Siege of Budapest on 17 January 1945, Wallenberg subsequently 
disappeared. Although reported dead by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A Gromyko, the 
report’s validity was disputed and his ultimate fate remains unknown. Wallenberg’s half-brother 
                                                 
1 Toni Locy, ‘Holocaust Survivor’s Hard-Won Triumph; Germany to Pay American Who Lost Family in Death 
Camps’, The Washington Post (Washington DC), 20 September 1995, A01. 
2 28 USC § 1330, 1602-1611 (1976) (‘FSIA’). 
3 Von Dardel v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F Supp 246, 248 (D DC, 1985) (‘Von Dardel’). 
4 Ibid 249. 
I 
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Guy Von Dardel sued the USSR in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
for his brother’s seizure, imprisonment, and possible death. Due to the defendant’s status as a 
sovereign State, the plaintiff had to establish the Court’s jurisdiction was not barred by the terms 
of the then recently-enacted FSIA. Von Dardel proffered five arguments against immunity:5 (1) by 
defaulting, the USSR failed to raise immunity as a defence; (2) under the FSIA governments are 
not immune for acts violating universally-accepted maxims of international law; (3) since the FSIA 
is limited by treaties the US has ratified,6 the USSR could not claim immunity for acts in violation 
of those treaties; (4) the USSR implicitly waived immunity; and (5) the USSR’s actions fell under 
the exception to immunity for tortious acts.7 The Court only accepted the first four arguments, 
which are examined below. 
On the first point, Parker J ruled that, by defaulting, the USSR ‘has deliberately chosen to forego 
whatever entitlement it might have had to immunity’.8 This ruling was faulty, however, because 
even if immunity is not raised the court must still be satisfied it is not a bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction before addressing the substantive matter.9 Indeed, in a later stage of proceedings 
Robinson CJ made precisely this observation when overturning District Judge Parker’s decision 
on this point.10  
Regarding the second argument, the Court noted the historical basis of immunity in principles of 
grace and comity—rather than an obligation based on custom—and found immunity was 
‘appropriately disallowed’ where the defendant State clearly violated international law.11 This 
emplacement of immunity within voluntary considerations of grace and comity harkens back to 
Marshall CJ’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon12 and places the Court’s decision at 
odds with modern international practice, which considers immunity a matter of obligation based 
on binding custom or treaty ties (although US courts occasionally still stress the original basis in 
                                                 
5 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 251 (D DC, 1985). 
6 FSIA § 1604. 
7 Ibid 1605(a)(5); however, this only applies to so-called ‘territorial torts’ and the USSR acted outside the USA. 
8 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 253 (D DC, 1985). 
9 FSIA, § 1608(e). 
10 Von Dardel v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F Supp 1, 4-5 (D DC, 1990). Robinson CJ relied on a 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruling two years after Parker J’s decision, which 
unequivocally found failure to appear does not constitute waiver: Practical Concepts Inc v Republic of Bolivia, 
811 F 2d 1543, 1547 (DC Cir, 1987). 
11 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 253 (D DC, 1985). 
12 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (‘The Schooner Exchange’). 
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comity). District Judge Parker’s decision that the FSIA ‘should be read, then, not to extend 
immunity to clear violations of universally recognized principles of international law’13 was helpful 
to the plaintiff, although it conflicts with later decisions of American,14 British,15 and Australian16 
courts that refused to read implied exceptions into state immunity statutes. In fact, after the US 
Supreme Court ruled in 1989 that implied exceptions to immunity could not be read into the 
FSIA, Von Dardel had to concede the ‘implied “clear violation of international law” exception to 
the FSIA was incorrect.’17 
Regarding the third argument, Parker J noted § 1604 of the FSIA placed the operation of the 
statute in subjection to treaties the US was a party to at the time of its enactment in 1976.18 His 
Honour supposed this provision prevented the application of any FSIA provisions that would 
interfere with any such treaty. Since Wallenberg was a Swedish diplomat, he was entitled to 
inviolability and other protections under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations19 and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents.20 The relevant provisions of those treaties supposedly could not 
operate if the perpetrator was not subject to liability; therefore, thought District Judge Parker, ‘the 
immunity granted by the FSIA must be limited so as to avoid such a result’.21Again relying on a 
US Supreme Court decision handed down after Parker J’s initial judgment,22 Robinson CJ later 
overturned Parker J’s ruling on this point, because the FSIA did not expressly conflict with the 
VCDR or the Convention on Internationally Protected Persons; specifically, the latter convention 
required parties to exercise jurisdiction over ‘crimes, not civil suits, and in any event not necessarily 
over foreign states.’23 
                                                 
13 Ibid 254. 
14 Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Co, 488 US 428 (1989) (‘Amerada Hess’); Siderman de Blake v 
Republic of Argentina, 965 F 2d 699, 714 (9th Cir, 1992) (‘Siderman’). 
15 Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536, 537, 542-544. 
16 Zhang v Zemin (2010) 243 FLR 299, 326. 
17 Von Dardel No 2, 736 F Supp 1, 3 (D DC, 1990). 
18 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 254 (D DC, 1985). 
19 opened for signature 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95 (entered into force 24 April 1964) (‘VCDR’). 
20 opened for signature 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 20 February 1977) (‘Convention 
on Internationally Protected Persons’). 
21 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 255 (D DC, 1985). 
22 Amerada Hess, 488 US 428 (1989). 
23 Von Dardel No 2, 736 F Supp 1, 5 (D DC, 1990). 
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Von Dardel’s fourth argument pertained to § 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, which inter alia recognises 
a State may implicitly waive immunity.24 By entering into certain treaties, including the Convention 
on Internationally Protected Persons, the USSR, according to Parker J, ‘has implicitly waived its 
immunity in this action alleging their breach.’25 The distinction between criminal and civil 
proceedings was germane. Implied waiver results from a State behaving in a way that shows it does 
not intend to preserve its immunity: since the Convention on Internationally Protected Persons 
concerned criminal acts, Robinson CJ held the USSR by becoming a party to the treaty could not 
have thought it was thereby subjecting itself to ‘civil suit in the United States.’26 
The District Court’s decision in Von Dardel was a creative attempt to exercise jurisdiction where 
immunity would otherwise have barred it due to the clear wording of the FSIA. Although it is said 
to have implemented the restrictive immunity doctrine, the FSIA and its counterparts actually 
installed a different regime. The restrictive theory would deny immunity for all acts except acta 
jure imperii, but the FSIA gives a comprehensive immunity, with certain enumerated exceptions. 
The FSIA was interpreted such that claimants could not ask a Court to lift immunity on the basis 
of the act complained being jure gestionis. Instead, they had to characterise it under one of the 
enumerated exceptions to immunity. Because of Amerada Hess, Robinson CJ was forced to 
overturn Parker J’s decision in Von Dardel and several avenues of remedy for victims of humans 
rights abuses perpetrated by foreign governments were closed. 
3.3. Amerada Hess 
On 8 June 1982 a '100,000-ton supertanker',27 the Liberian-registered Hercules, was bombed by 
converted Argentine C-130 transport planes about 480 nautical miles northeast of the Falkland 
Islands.28 The Hercules had been time-chartered by the Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation 
                                                 
24 The UK courts were stricter than there continental brethren on waiver. Historically, a ‘prior waiver [wa]s not 
binding on a foreign sovereign’, Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149; and ‘[n]othing short of an actual 
submission to the jurisdiction … w[ould] suffice [to establish waiver]’, Kahan v Pakistan Federation [1951] 2 KB 
1003. Continental courts were more open to recognising an explicit or implied waiver which occurred before 
judicial proceedings began. Indeed restrictive immunity gained some considerable ground because of the 
implied waiver doctrine. See ‘Sovereign Immunity. Waiver and Execution: Arguments from Continental 
Jurisprudence’ (1965) 74(5) Yale Law Journal 887, 893-900.   
25 Von Dardel, 623 F Supp 246, 256 (D DC, 1985). 
26 Von Dardel No 2, 736 F Supp 1, 7 (D DC, 1990). 
27 Frank J Prial, ‘Tanker Attacked in South Atlantic’, World, The New York Times (New York), 9 June 1982. 
28 Ibid. 
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(‘AHSC’), a Liberian subsidiary of American-owned Amerada Hess Corporation (now Hess 
Corporation), and was returning under ballast at the time of the attack after delivering ‘crude oil 
from Valdez, Alaska to a Hess oil refinery on the island of St Croix in the US Virgin Islands.’29 
The vessel had to be scuttled. Unable to pursue a suit in Argentine courts, AHSC brought a claim 
for its losses in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the 
ATCA. Argentina moved to dismiss, based on the provisions of the FSIA. Since the case involved 
damage to corporate property, and no natural persons were harmed, Amerada Hess30 is not strictly 
a human rights case; however, it is important to the present analysis because it addresses the implied 
exception argument.  
The case at first instance is interesting for Carter J’s contention that Gamal Moursi Badr and 
Sompong Sucharitkul were ‘inaccurate’ when they contended ‘the origin of nation-state—as 
opposed to personal—foreign sovereign immunity’ began with The Schooner Exchange in 1812.31 
His Honour identified Nathan v Virginia,32 from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County’s September 1781 term; however, that case concerned Virginia’s immunity in a 
Pennsylvanian court. Vattel and Blackstone are cited and the case covers some of the same ground 
as Marshall CJ’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange, but as Nathan v Virginia concerned provincial 
units of a federated republic it was strictly a case of domestic, state sovereign immunity (not foreign 
sovereign immunity as Carter J mistakenly classifies it) and is properly categorised with later case-
law on the immunity of states in federal courts which sprang up after the 1789 establishment of 
the US Supreme Court. The 1793 Supreme Court case  of Chisholm v Georgia,33 for instance, 
allowed suits by a citizen of one State against another State of the Union, based on United States 
Constitution art III § 2. This ruling apparently caused much consternation, and the Eleventh 
Amendment was enacted in direct response, proclaiming: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
                                                 
29 Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation v Argentine Republic, 638 F Supp 73, 74 (SD NY, 1986) (‘Amerada’). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 76. 
32 1 US (1 Dall) 77 (1784). 
33 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793). 
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Hollingsworth v Virginia34 soon followed, taking the opposite stance to Chisholm v Georgia, and 
recognised Virginia’s immunity, based on the United States Constitution.35 Supreme Court case law 
later expanded the scope of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
The plaintiffs in Amerada Hess argued the US could refuse immunity when faced with a manifest 
violation of obligation under international law.36 District Judge Carter seeminngly agreed foreign 
sovereign immunity was based on comity and not a binding customary norm. Therefore, as a 
matter of international law the court felt the US was not bound to uphold immunity; however, 
the Court’s hands were tied by the municipal legislation. Congress had already signalled by passage 
of the FSIA when immunity should or should not be granted. Federal courts were bound to follow 
the clear wording of the statute:37 ‘Congress could empower federal courts to hear cases such as 
this,’38 but without such a signal courts had to follow the domestic law as it stood. This is in line 
with both the Polites principle39 and Marshall CJ’s thoughts in The Schooner Exchange.40  
Carter J disagreed with Parker J’s ruling in Von Dardel. Addressing the plaintiff’s second argument 
in Von Dardel—that the FSIA should not be read to extend immunity to clear violations of 
universally recognised principles of international law—Carter J found there was nothing in the 
FSIA or its legislative history to support such an interpretation.41 The second argument of the 
plaintiffs in Von Dardel seems similar to the argument in the preceding paragraph pertaining to 
the right to refuse immunity in cases showing a manifest violation of obligation under international 
law; again, the clear wording of the statute prevailed. Relying on earlier District Court rulings, in 
California42 and the District of Columbia,43 Carter J thought he was not empowered ‘to create an 
                                                 
34 3 US (3 Dall) 378 (1798). 
35 amend XI. 
36 Identical to Von Dardel’s second argument. 
37 The concept is similar to rulings of Scottish and Australian courts: Mortensen v Peters (1906) 14 SLT 227; 
Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 (‘Polites’). 
38 Amerada, 638 F Supp 73, 76 (SD NY, 1986). 
39 Polites (1945) 70 CLR 60, 68-69. 
40 ‘Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication [of immunity]. He may 
claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary 
tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be 
considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to 
exercise.’ The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812). 
41 Ibid 77. 
42 Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina (CD Cal, No CV 82-1772-RMT(MCx), 7 March 1985) slip op 3. 
43 In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 (D DC, Misc No 83-0345, 1 September 1985) slip op 11. 
Note: the author is unable to find any record of such a decision. 
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ad hoc exception to a Congressional statute.’44 Finally, His Honour refuted the notion that 
universal jurisdiction could provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction in a civil case on the basis 
that ‘that doctrine only provides for criminal jurisdiction.45 It is doubtful whether the customary 
international law of state jurisdiction really requires such a conclusion46 and on appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Feinberg CJ felt otherwise;47 however, some 
recent US Supreme Court has limited the scope of expansive civil jurisdiction.48 
The plaintiffs were unsuccessful and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. Chief Judge Feinberg delivered the opinion, with reasoning redolent of the implied 
exception argument, claiming FSIA immunity should not apply to manifest violations of 
international law.49  Since the terms of the FSIA’s blanket grant of immunity are reasonably clear—
‘a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter’50—and none of the enumerated 
exceptions applied, the Court of Appeals had to rely on somewhat unorthodox reasoning. Feinberg 
CJ claimed the FSIA pertained chiefly to commercial matters.51 Because the case was not a 
commercial dispute, his Honour found Congress would not have intended the FSIA to uphold 
immunity.52 The decision also relied on a finding that, as a matter of customary international law, 
states were not immune for clear violations of international law.53 The Court of Appeals’ reasoning 
amounted in substance to a finding that the FSIA contained an implied exception to the blanket 
immunity. Some scholars disagreed with Feinberg CJ’s findings, pointing to the enumerated 
exceptions for territorial non-commercial torts and expropriations in violation of international law 
as evidence that when it enacted the FSIA Congress was thinking about a much wider scope of 
                                                 
44 Amerada, 638 F Supp 73, 76 (SD NY, 1986). 
45 Ibid 77. 
46 David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 2010) 227. 
47 Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation v Argentine Republic, 830 F 2d 421, 428 (2nd Cir, 1987) (‘Hess’). His 
Honour pointed to the effects doctrine. 
48 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (S Ct, No-1491, 17 April 2013) slip op 4-14. 
49 Again, this is the same as the second argument in Von Dardel, supra. 
50 FSIA § 1604. 
51 Hess, 830 F 2d 421, 427 (2nd Cir, 1987). 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid 425. More recent rulings of the International Court of Justice in Germany v Italy and the European Court 
of Human Rights in Al Adsani v United Kingdom have concluded the opposite; however, the surveys of state 
practice in those cases heavily featured domestic decisions from countries with state immunity statutes in 
place. 
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operation than just commercial matters.54 Kearse J also wrote a dissenting opinion, holding that 
the terms of the FSIA were clear and contained no relevant exception to immunity.55 Still, Feinberg 
CJ’s finding that under international custom states were not immune for clear violations of 
international law would be subsequently refined in the jus cogens context by other judges. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari56 and reviewed the matter.57 Delivering the 
opinion of the Court, Rehnquist CJ found—as intimated above—the FSIA is ‘the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.’58 The effect of this statement is that the 
FSIA is a comprehensive code, ‘covering the field’59 so that in the US a foreign state is immune 
from suit unless one of the exceptions in § 1605-1607 applies. The argument that the FSIA had a 
commercial focus and that Congress did not intend it to apply in situations where there was a 
violation of international law60 was quickly dismissed by the observation that § 1605(a)(3) refused 
immunity when expropriations were made in violation of international law.61 The FSIA’s territorial 
tort exception further strengthens this conclusion. After finding the FSIA was a comprehensive 
code, Chief Justice Rehnquist next examined whether any exceptions applied.62 The respondents 
argued for the non-commercial tort exception;63 however, Rehnquist CJ found this exception was 
limited to torts occurring in the US.64 Finally, attempts to rely on the conventions listed by 
Feinberg CJ as evidence for an exception to immunity based on either FSIA § 160465 or § 1605(a)66 
                                                 
54 Jeanne Morrison-Sinclair, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity After Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v Argentine 
Republic: Did It Go Down with the Hercules?’ (1987) 11(3) Fordham International Law Journal 660, 680. 
55 Hess, 830 F 2d 421, 430-431 (2nd Cir, 1987). 
56 485 US 1005 (1988). 
57 Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 US 428 (1989) (‘Amerada Hess’). 
58 Ibid 434. This language could mislead as the FSIA does not grant jurisdiction. It dictates whether there is a 
procedural bar preventing a court from exercising jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction would have to be ‘obtained’ 
elsewhere, for instance by the ATCA or TVPA. For immunity as a procedural bar see Al-Adsani v United 
Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 98 [48] (‘Al-Adsani v UK’), Lorna McGregor, ‘Torture and State Immunity: 
Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty’ (2007) 18(5) European Journal of International Law 903, 907, and 
Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford University Press, 2002) 525. 
59 At least in relation to civil suits against foreign governments. 
60 With the addition of talk about a ‘commercial focus’ this resembles the second argument in Von Dardel, 623 
F Supp 246, 251 (D DC, 1985). 
61 Amerada Hess, 488 US 428, 435-436 (1989). 
62 Ibid 439. 
63 FSIA § 1605(a)(5). In effect this is a ‘territorial tort’ exception. 
64 Amerada Hess, 488 US 428, 439-441 (1989). Respondents argued the effects took place in the US, but 
comparison with the commercial activity exception—which incorporated the effects doctrine—showed 
Congress would have been explicit if it wanted to refuse immunity for extraterritorial torts with domestic 
effects. 
65 Immunity is ‘subject to existing international agreements’. 
66 An attempt to portray US entry into a treaty as an implicit waiver. 
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were dismissed, in similar fashion to Robinson CJ’s dismissal of the arguments in Von Dardel.67 
This was on the basis that the conventions did not create private rights of action.68 Finding no 
exceptions to the FSIA § 1604 blanket grant of immunity, Rehnquist CJ reversed the Court of 
Appeals ruling and AHSC was left without a remedy.69 Blackmun and Marshall JJ agreed with the 
ratio, that the FSIA was a comprehensive code with a blanket immunity admitting only the 
enumerated exceptions, but would have remanded to the Court of Appeals for inquiry as to 
whether any of those exceptions applied, as Chief Judge Feinberg had reserved the issue.70 
The Supreme Court’s ruling set a precedent that has been followed in other common-law nations 
with similar immunity statutes. Since these statutes do not provide exceptions for extraterritorial 
torts, the almost invariable result in such forums has been an absence of remedy for victims of 
torture and other jus cogens violations committed abroad. Yet Amerada Hess did not completely 
foreclose judicial redress. There was still a species of argument based on the primacy of jus cogens. 
3.4. Siderman 
On 24 March 1976 Argentina’s Isabel Martínez de Perón was ousted from government in a 
military coup sponsored by the leaders of the Argentinean armed forces. The junta which replaced 
Perón instituted a National Reorganization Process (‘NRP’) led by the army’s Lieutenant General 
Jorge Rafael Videla in concert with the navy and air force chiefs, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera 
and Brigadier General Orlando Ramón Agosti. Military personnel arrived at Jose and Lea 
Siderman’s house, assaulting them and kidnapping Jose, who was tortured. The family was 
threatened with death if they did not leave Argentina.71 The Sidermans, apparently targeted 
because they were Jewish, fled Argentina. Their hotel and real property were expropriated by the 
NRP regime shortly after they left.72 
The United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled on 14 March 1984 
that the act of state doctrine barred the court from hearing any claims related to the expropriation, 
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but that the ATCA provided jurisdiction for claims related to the torture.73 The Sidermans moved 
for reconsideration on the expropriation point, but District Judge Takasugi confirmed the act of 
state doctrine barred that part of their suit.74 Argentina having failed to enter an appearance, 
Takasugi J entered a default judgment75 for US$2,607,515.63 on the torture claim.76 Argentina 
then formally claimed immunity77 under the FSIA. After reconsidering the matter, Takasugi J 
vacated the default judgment and dismissed the Sidermans’ suit on 7 March 1985;78 His Honour 
based this ruling on a finding that none of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to immunity 
applied.79 The Sidermans appealed and the matter was heard on 22 May 1992 by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.80 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Circuit Judge Fletcher ultimately reversed Takasugi J’s 
dismissal and remanded the matter for further consideration;81 however, as pertains to the torture 
claims, this reversal was based on a finding that Argentina ‘contemplated the involvement of 
United States courts in the affair’82 and had thus implicitly waived its immunity.83 More relevant 
to the present chapter was the claim by the Sidermans that Argentina should not enjoy immunity 
under the FSIA because its actions constituted a violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting 
torture.84 
The Sidermans presented an argument based upon the supremacy of jus cogens norms. By virtue of 
jus cogens norms occupying a hierarchically-superior status to regular norms, the latter were 
supposed to give way whenever they clashed.85 This is an early appearance of the trumping 
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argument. The argument has met with mixed success in later cases within various jurisdictions, 
but the Court here was sympathetic to its reasoning. Speaking as a matter of customary 
international law, Fletcher J thought ‘the Sidermans’ argument carries much force.’86 In fact, his 
Honour went further: 
International law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act. A 
state’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not be 
entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.87 
However, that was a finding of international law. The situation on the municipal plane was 
different. The Court felt its hands were tied by the clear wording of the FSIA and the US Supreme 
Court’s emphatic reasoning in Amerada Hess. Their Honours had there ruled the FSIA was the sole 
means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state. No relevant exception to the FSIA applied 
here; Fletcher J therefore felt bound to uphold immunity. A dualist attotide to the relationship 
between international law and municipal law is operating here: as a matter of international law, 
the Court would have held Argentina was not immune. Nonetheless, the statute’s clear wording 
had to prevail. ‘[I]f violations of jus cogens committed outside the United States are to be exceptions 
to immunity, Congress must make them so.’88 Therefore, but for the finding that Argentina had 
waived its immunity for the torture claims, the Siderman claims would have been blocked by the 
FSIA. Although sympathetic to the trumping claim, Fletcher J did not accept it. The US Supreme 
Court denied Argentina’s application for a writ of certiorari.89 As matters stood, the matter had 
been placed on remand for the District Court to consider both the expropriation and torture 
claims. Since the expropriated property consisted of a large hotel and almost 127,000 acres of land, 
the possible compensation owed to the Sidermans might have ended up far in excess of the US$2.6 
million default judgment Takasugi J had overturned for the torture claims. Facing this possibility, 
the Argentine government entered into a settlement with the Sidermans said to have been worth 
around US$6 million.90  
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3.5. Nelson 
An American engineer, Scott Nelson, had been hired by the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (‘the 
Hospital’) to develop and expand electronic monitoring and control systems at the hospital’s 
premises in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Nelson entered into the contract in Miami, Florida in 
November, 1983 and began working in Riyadh later that month.91 While working at the hospital 
he reported several safety hazards to the Saudi government. Nelson claims he was then summoned 
to a security office at the hospital and arrested by security agents. He was then tortured and held 
without charge by Saudi Arabian officials.92 Nelson complained to US Embassy staff who visited 
him twice at Al Sijan Prison, but did not believed his claims. Only after a US Senator request was 
Nelson released 39 days after his arrest. Nelson and his wife were allowed to leave the country.93 
Back in the US, in 1988 he brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida against Saudi Arabia, the Hospital, and Royspec (a Saudi-owned corporation 
was the Hospital’s purchasing agent) seeking damages for personal injury. Nelson claimed the court 
had subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.94 He claimed 
an exception to immunity under § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA because the dispute related to his 
employment, a commercial activity.95 Section 1603(e), however, limits the scope of the commercial 
activity exception by requiring the activity to have ‘substantial contact with the United States.’96 
The District Court found, however, that ‘the link between the recruitment activities and the 
Defendant is not sufficient to establish “substantial contact” with the United States’.97 
Nelson appealed and the matter was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit by Re CJ and Edmondson and Birch JJ. Chief Judge Re wrote the opinion, beginning the 
analysis by recalling the history of foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine in the 
US, and by noting the trend toward a restrictive application of both principles.98 On appeal, 
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Nelson claimed that ‘the arbitrary prolonged detention and the physical torture… is based directly 
upon the recruitment activity carried on in the United States by agents of Saudi Arabia.’99 Re CJ 
noted the recruitment and hiring of Nelson was part of a process having substantial contact with 
the United States.100  The next step, however, was more difficult: Nelson had to show his detention 
and torture in Saudi Arabia were ‘based upon’ the recruitment and hiring in the US. This required 
a ‘jurisdictional nexus’101 between the two. The nexus requires a ‘bond or link’ connecting the 
commercial activity and the act complained.102 Nelson argued there was such a nexus, but Saudi 
Arabia argued otherwise, contending instead that the claim was based on the governmental exercise 
of police power.103  
Ultimately, Re CJ found there was a sufficient jurisdictional nexus between the recruitment in the 
US and the torture, which was based on the commercial activity. His Honour found the detention 
and torture ‘are so intertwined’ with Nelson’s employment that they were ‘based upon’ his 
recruitment in the US.104 This was because Nelson made complaints about safety hazards he 
discovered in the course of his duties, which employment was based on his recruitment in the US, 
and the torture was a direct response to his complaints.105 Saudi Arabia asserted the detention and 
torture were based upon Nelson submitting a false diploma from MIT; Re CJ, however, found 
this argument in effect admitted the jurisdictional nexus between the recruitment and the 
mistreatment.106 The Court concluded that Nelson’s recruitment in the US was a commercial 
activity and that the detention and torture were based upon that recruitment. Therefore, the 
exception to immunity under the first clause of FSIA § 1605(a)(2) applied and the District Court’s 
decision was reversed, with the matter remanded.107 
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Saudi Arabia appealed and the matter was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States.108 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Souter J began by citing the Amerada Hess principle that the 
FSIA is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states.109 His Honour then noted the 
only relevant exception to immunity was the commercial activity exception in the first clause of § 
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. There had to be a link between the commercial activity and the acts 
complained: the suit must be ‘based on’ the activity.110 The Court found ‘based on’ meant ‘those 
elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case.’111 
This was a stricter test than the jurisdictional nexus required by Re CJ. The elements of the claim 
that, if proven, would entitle Nelson to relief under his theory of the case were the detention and 
the torture. These were misuses of police power, seemingly acta jure imperii, not commercial 
activities. 
It was also important for the Court that the third clause of § 1605(a)(2) provided an exception for 
suits ‘based… upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.’ 
(Emphasis added.) Whereas, the relevant first clause of § 1605(a)(2) only provided an exception 
for suits ‘based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States’. Congress had 
distinguished in the same provision of the FSIA between suits based upon commercial activity and 
suits based upon acts in connection with commercial activities. Since Congress had not used the 
‘in connection with’ language in the instant first clause of § 1605(a)(2), it was inappropriate to 
allow a suit based on acts complained (detention and torture) that were only ‘in connection with’ 
the commercial activity (recruitment in the USA). As Souter J noted ‘[d]istinctions among 
descriptions juxtaposed against each other are naturally understood to be significant’.112 It was the 
acts complained themselves that had to be commercial activities. Detention and torture were not 
commercial activities. They may have been in connection with commercial activities, but the first 
clause of § 1605(a)(2) required more than that.113 
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The Court noted that it had interpreted the FSIA’s usage of the term ‘commercial’ to be ‘the 
meaning Congress understood the restrictive theory to require at the time it passed the statute.’114 
Commercial activity under the restrictive theory was held by the Court in Argentina v Weltover 
Inc115 to apply to situations where the foreign nation acts ‘in the manner of a private player 
within’116 the market, by exercising ‘only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens’ 
as distinct from ‘powers peculiar to sovereigns.’117 These determinations were to be made based on 
the nature of the acts concerned, not their purpose.118 Since the abuses of police power in question 
were on the Court’s view by their nature ‘peculiarly sovereign in nature’,119 the actions could not 
be characterised as commercial activity. Souter J further cited Lauterpacht’s 1952 British Yearbook 
of International Law article in this respect.120 
White J filed an opinion, concurring only in the judgment, which was joined by Blackmun J. His 
Honour raised some interesting points about the majority’s characterisation of the conduct as 
peculiarly sovereign in nature.121 According to White J’s view, the running of the hospital was a 
commercial activity. Furthermore, if a hospital hired armed thugs to retaliate against a whistle-
blower, that sort of behaviour would be commercial in nature.122 Authority was cited in support 
of this proposition.123 The majority’s conclusion rested on the calling in of the security forces, but 
White J thought this focus on the police power was myopic and failed to capture the essence of 
Nelson’s claim, because it was the hospital that had called Nelson to its security office and the 
hospital was said to have played a part in his detention and torture.124 His Honour thought the 
hospital’s conduct was a commercial activity and that the matter had been put to rest some time 
ago when Chief Justice Marshall said: 
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It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading 
company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of the company, of its 
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the 
company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it 
associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business 
which is to be transacted.125 
Having found the claim was based on a commercial activity, White J was nevertheless unable to 
countenance jurisdiction due to his finding that the conduct wasn’t ‘carried on in the United 
States.’126 Stevens J, however, had no such reservations. Basing his decision on the presence of the 
hospital’s agencies in the US, an orientation program in Tennessee, and the recruitment process 
having taken place in America, Stevens J concluded that the commercial activity was carried on in 
the US and would have been prepared to found jurisdiction. Nelson highlights the difficulty of 
trying to squeeze a human rights claim into the contours of a commercial activity claim.  
3.6. Princz 
Hugo Princz and his family were accompanying his father on business in Czechoslovakia during 
WWII when they were arrested by Slovak police and given to German SS who interned them at 
Camp Maidanek in Poland.127 Most Americans captured by the Nazis were released in prisoner 
exchanges, but the Princzes—Jewish Americans—were not so lucky. Princz’s parents and sister 
were sent to the Treblinka concentration camp, where they were killed, whilst Princz and his 
brothers were sent to Auschwitz and loaned as workers to the German chemicals conglomerate IG 
Farben at its Birkenau facility, where his brothers starved.128 Princz was then sent to Warsaw, forced 
on a march to Dachau, and subject to slave labour again at the Messerschmidt airplane factory.129 
Surviving the war, Princz attempted to claim a German pension for Holocaust survivors, but was 
denied because his American citizenship made him ineligible.130 Princz finally brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to recover damages sustained during his 
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internment in WWII. Germany filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
due to the FSIA. 
Sporkin J began by noting the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Argentine Republic 
v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.131 Prima facie, Amerada Hess presented an obstacle to Princz’s claim. 
This was because the Court in that case had declared the FSIA was the sole means of obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state in US courts, and there did not appear to be an applicable 
enumerated exception. As intimated in the previous chapter, however, the Court in Amerada Hess 
did not have to deal with gross jus cogens violations. Unlike Spencer J in Siderman de Blake v 
Republic of Argentina,132 who felt bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Amerada Hess, Sporkin 
J was prepared to distinguish. He felt ‘[t]he Supreme Court did not have such extraordinary facts 
as those presently before this Court in rendering its decision in Hess.’133 ‘[A] human butcher shop’ 
would be a ‘generous’ term for Auschwitz, where Princz was interned, said Sporkin J.134 His 
Honour was unable to believe Congress had contemplated barring remedies for victims like Princz 
when it enacted the FSIA.135 
Germany appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied 
Princz’s motion to dismiss the appeal,136 and the matter was then heard before Wald, Ginsburg, 
and Sentelle JJ. Since the facts of the case occurred during WWII, there was much uncertainty 
about whether the provisions of the 1976 FSIA applied. This depended upon whether the FSIA 
had a retroactive application, and there were arguments either way.137 Assuming the FSIA did apply 
retroactively, Princz made three arguments against a grant of immunity to Germany. These related 
to commercial activity, implied waiver, and prior treaties.  
Regarding the commercial activity argument, Princz relied on the third clause of the relevant FSIA 
provision, which provides an exception to immunity for actions based ‘upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
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elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.’138 Germany contended its actions 
were not commercial activities because ‘private parties do not take or hold prisoners,’ whereas 
Princz claimed he was leased as a worker by Germany to IG Farben for clearly commercial 
purposes.139 In the event, Ginsburg J did not decide whether Germany’s acts constituted 
commercial activity, as she found in any case they did not have the requisite direct effect within 
the United States. Princz attempted to argue a direct effect because he worked for firms directly 
supporting the Nazi war effort against the US, because the German government used mail, wire, 
and banking systems of the US to administer pensions and other reparation programs for victims 
of the holocaust, and because he continued suffering the effects of internment after returning home 
to the US.140 These arguments were rejected. 
Princz’s implied waiver argument, also put forward in amici briefs, maintained by violating a jus 
cogens norm Germany had impliedly waived its FSIA immunity.141 Ginsburg noted the Third 
Reich’s behaviour in WWII involved systematic violation of jus cogens norms.142 Against the amici’s 
argument that implied waiver for jus cogens violations would reconcile the FSIA with international 
legal principles, the Court noted Spencer J’s decision in Siderman de Blake that jus cogens violations 
could not provide jurisdiction under the FSIA in the absence of an enumerated exception to 
immunity.143 Ginsburg J felt the intentionality requirement was not met here, because it could not 
be shown that in violating a jus cogens norm the German government had ‘indicated its amenability 
to suit.’144 It should be noted that Ginsburg J’s ruling here perhaps misses the point of the implied 
waiver argument as it pertains to violation of a jus cogens norm such as slavery.145 Such arguments 
hold that all governments are presumed to be aware of jus cogens norms and their non-derogable 
nature. Consequently, whenever a government violates a jus cogens norm it knowingly waives 
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immunity, or so the argument goes. The notion of ‘implied’ waiver means there would not 
necessarily need to be any express waiver by the delinquent government; the intentionality 
requirement is satisfied by the act which violates the universal norm. It seems what Ginsburg J was 
really doing was rejecting the notion that jus cogens violations can constitute implied waiver. 
Princz’s prior treaties argument relied on § 1604 of the FSIA, which makes the blanket immunity 
‘[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of 
[the FSIA’s] enactment’.146 By being party to the Fourth Hague Convention,147 which provides 
that inhabitants of occupied countries may not be forced to take part in military operations against 
their own country148 and imposes liability to pay compensation for a violation of that 
prohibition,149 Germany’s FSIA immunity was said to be subject to those conditions. Much like 
Robinson CJ in Von Dardel v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,150 however, Ginsburg J felt that 
FSIA immunity did not expressly conflict with art 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention. Agreeing 
with the Supreme Court in Amerada Hess by noting that treaties which only set forth substantive 
rules and state that compensation must be paid do not necessarily create private rights of action,151 
her Honour found good authority for the proposition that the Fourth Hague Convention did not 
grant individuals such a private right.152 
Having disposed of Princz’s arguments in favour of an exception to immunity if the FSIA were 
found to have retroactive application, Ginsburg J next turned to the situation which would prevail 
if the FSIA did not apply retroactively.  Under such circumstances, the common law of the DC 
Circuit from 1942-1945 would dictate Germany’s immunity or lack thereof. Germany claimed it 
would be entitled to absolute immunity, since the period was prior to the Tate Letter in 1952. 
Ginsburg J did not consider the point, because federal courts until the passage of the FSIA had 
power vested by federal diversity jurisdiction, which grant was deleted from the United States Code 
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by Congress with the enactment of the FSIA.153 If the FSIA did not apply retrospectively then the 
new FSIA § 1330 grant of jurisdiction could not apply and in the absence of the Code’s old § 1332 
grant the Court had no subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, whether or not the FSIA applied 
jurisdiction, Ginsburg found the Court would not have jurisdiction. Her Honour therefore 
declined to decide whether the act applied retroactively, but reserved the District Court’s decision 
and dismissed the case. US Diplomatic intervention organised by Sporkin J and Representative 
Chuck E Schumer later led to a reported US$2.1mil settlement paid to Princz by Germany in 
1995.154 
Wald J dissented. Her Honour began by noting that Germany’s refusal to settle with Princz over 
the decades made the suit his last resort.155 In her Honour’s view, the FSIA applied retroactively156 
and Germany by violating jus cogens norms had impliedly waived its immunity.157 After 
establishing Germany’s actions constituted jus cogens violations in that they violated prohibitions 
against forced labour and genocide, Wald J noted the history of jus cogens as stemming largely from 
the WWII behaviour of the Nazis, making the instant case the classic sort of jus cogens violation.158 
Her Honour felt that the Nuremberg Charter’s removal of immunity for government officials159 
was pertinent.160 The Nuremberg Charter was thus said to have ‘permanently eroded any notion 
that the mantle of sovereign immunity could … cloak’ jus cogens violations and Wald J claimed ‘a 
state is never entitled to immunity for any act that contravenes a jus cogens norm.’161 This reasoning 
may be questioned by some publicists, as the International Military Tribunal was a supranational 
forum instituted in a vertically superior position in the international hierarchy to that of a regular 
municipal court. Issues relating to the maxim par in parem non habet imperium do not affect an 
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160 Note however this removal of immunity was before an international tribunal. Par in parem non habet 
imperium is therefore not relevant, as international and municipal tribunals are not ‘equal’. 
161 Princz, 26 F 3d 1166, 1182 (DC Cir, 1994). 
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international court in the same way they would a municipal forum. This, however, is not fatal to 
the argument for treating jus cogens violations as a form of implied waiver. Indeed, Wald J cited a 
situation in which a municipal court refused to uphold immunity in case of a jus cogens violation, 
albeit in a criminal case against a foreign official: the Adolf Eichmann case.162 In Eichmann the 
Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal, cited both the Nuremberg 
Charter163 and the Genocide Convention164 as instruments that refused to countenance immunity 
for jus cogens violators. Citing the Trial of the Major War Criminals,165 the Eichmann court noted: 
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the 
authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence 
under international law.166 
Whether this principle, which undoubtedly applies to international courts, also applies to 
municipal courts is a separate question. Wald J continued by noting that to construe FSIA § 
1605(a)(1) to include implied waiver for breach of jus cogens was not at odds with the statute’s 
language or history.167 Wald J further disagreed with the majority that the jus cogens theory of 
implied waiver was incompatible with § 1605(a)(1)’s intentionality requirement.168 Her Honour 
thought it impossible the German government ever could have thought it likely that the US would 
accord it immunity from suit after inflicting such depravities on Princz.169 Nonetheless, Wald J 
stood alone, as Sentelle J agreed with Ginsburg J’s judgment. Attempts to fit jus cogens violations 
under the commercial activity and implied waiver exceptions had now both failed, while the 
Supreme Court in Amerada Hess had also convinced Spencer J in Siderman de Blake that the FSIA 
prevented any implied exception to immunity based on a jus cogens ‘trumping’ theory.  
3.7. Summary 
Various attempts to shoehorn jus cogens violations into exceptions designed for other purposes 
failed in US courts due to the FSIA’s clear wording. In Von Dardel, various arguments were 
                                                 
162 Attorney-General (Israel) v Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 5 (‘Eichmann’). 
163 Nuremberg Charter annex art 7. 
164 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, signed 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 
278 (entered into force 12 January 1951) art 4 (‘Genocide Convention’). 
165 In re Goering (1946) 13 ILR 203. 
166 Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 5, 46. 
167 Princz, 26 F 3d 1166, 1183 (DC Cir, 1994). 
168 Ibid 1184. 
169 Ibid. 
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proferred for a lack of immunity: failure to raise immunity as a defence; an implied exception to 
the blanket immunity for acts violating universally-accepted maxims of international law; prior 
treaties; implicit waiver; and the tort exception. Ultimately, none of these survived in the light of 
the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Amerada Hess, where Rehnquist CJ laid down the rule that the 
FSIA is the ‘sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.’170 In Siderman, 
Fletcher J thought the claimant’s jus cogens trumping argument carried significant weight, saying 
as a matter of international law ‘violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture 
therefore would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law;’171 however, the 
FSIA’s clear wording and Rehnquist CJ’s determination that it is the sole basis for jurisdiction over 
foreign governments meant Fletcher J could not accept the claim. Sporkin J attempted to surmount 
this in Princz by noting ‘the Supreme Court did not have such extraordinary facts as those presently 
before this Court in rendering its decision in Hess.’172 Ultimately this strategy was defeated on 
appeal, too. Nelson also showed the results of attempting to characterise jus cogens cases into 
enumerated exceptions they weren’t designed for, in this case the commercial activity exception. 
A sampling of US case-law in the decades following the enactment of the FSIA therefore shows its 
clear wording always prevailed, even in the instance of new sorts of cases which the statute was not 
designed for. If the drafters crafted the FSIA’s language with caution in mind then their objectives 
will have been achieved; on the other hand, the constant rejection of cases which in the theatre of 
public opinion are universally deemed as obvious injustices shows the legislation is out of line not 
just with recent developments in the law but also with popular opinion. As Judge Sporkin thought, 
there was something wrong with the law if individuals everybody can agree had been wronged were 
not entitled to compensation. The same thing occurred in the UK and Canada, in Chapter V 
below, with similar complaints from those afflicted. Diplomatic action may or may not even be 
applied let alone productive of payment, instead some demand a right to a fair hearing in court.
                                                 
170 Amerada Hess, 488 US 428, 434 (1989). 
171 Siderman de Blake, 965 F 2d 699, 718 (9th Cir, 1992). 
172 Princz v Germany, 814 F Supp 22, 26 (D DC, 1992). 
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 The UK Experience 
y accepting Kuwait’s claim to immunity, the English courts have denied 
Sulaiman al-Adsani a remedy for a terrible wrong. His pursuit of his case 
under the European Human Rights Convention could be a long process and is 
necessarily a claim against the UK Government rather than the Kuwait 
Government – the true culprit. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the State 
Immunity Act needs urgent amendment to ensure that governments responsible 
for torture will never against be able to claim immunity in an English court. 
Geoffrey Bindman1 
4.1. Outline 
As seen in the US, the clear wording of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (‘FSIA’) 
disposed of whole categories of cases before they were even heard. The US Supreme Court decision 
in Amerada Hess did not even involve jus cogens violations, but came to control cases that did 
(Siderman). There was no possibility of reading in limitations to the blanket immunity, and an act 
had to fit within one of the listed exceptions to defeat immunity. The same phenomenon could be 
witnessed elsewhere. This chapter takes a look at some representative practice in the UK courts. 
The State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) (‘SIA’) was in place almost two decades before human rights-
related claims came before the courts, testing the legislation in situations it arguably was not drafted 
to cover. As in the US, however, the clear wording of the statute prevailed. Despite the preparatory 
materials generally showing the drafters of the various foreign state immunity statutes did not have 
jus cogens cases in mind, the device of a blanket exception with specific exceptions provides certainty 
in the law. As in the US, similar arguments were made, attempting to establish either an implied 
exception to the blanket immunity or by shoehorning the acts complained into one of the 
enumerated exceptions which were mostly designed for other purposes. 
4.2. Al-Adsani 
The Al-Adsani litigation began when Suleiman Al-Adsani asked the High Court leave to serve 
proceedings out of the jurisdiction against the Government of Kuwait and three Kuwaitis. The 
allegations related to torture, specifically being put in a swimming pool with corpses and locked in 
                                                 
1 Geoffrey Bindman, ‘How courts condone torture’, Features, The Times (London) 25 March 1997, 41. 
B 
Human Rights & Foreign State Immunity: The UK Experience 
56 
 
a cell with a burning mattress. Supreme Court rules allowed such service for a claim that was 
‘founded on a tort and the damage was sustained within the jurisdiction.’2 Although the torture 
occurred in Kuwait, psychological and other damage was said to have occurred within the 
jurisdiction. Sir Peter Pain, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, granted leave against the personal 
defendants, but refused service against the Kuwaiti government on the basis he thought it was 
prohibited by the SIA.3 Mr Al-Adsani filed a renewed application with the Court of Appeal, again 
seeking leave to serve the Kuwaiti government. His counsel Mr MacDonald QC put arguments 
on two bases: an implied exception to the blanket immunity in s 1(1) of the SIA and a territorial 
tort argument under s 5. The first argument held that since public international law knows no 
immunity for acts of torture, s 1(1) should be read as only providing immunity in cases where 
states act in accordance with international law and that there should be therefore be no immunity 
in cases of, for instance, torture. Evans LJ (Butler-Sloss & Rose LJJ agreeing) upheld this implied 
exception argument (along with the territorial tort argument) and Mr Al-Adsani was duly granted 
leave to serve the proceedings out of jurisdiction against the Kuwaiti government. The case was 
still at a preliminary stage. Kuwait not having been served, it was not the proper time to make a 
definitive ruling on immunity. Applying an earlier Court of Appeal dictum,4 Evans LJ ruled the 
applicant only had to make a ‘good arguable case against immunity.’ 
Why was Mr Al-Adsani thought to have made out a good, arguable case against Kuwaiti immunity? 
Sub-section 1(1) of the Act seemed to provide a blanket immunity except in certain enumerated 
cases, none of which seemed to apply. Evans LJ had said ‘it is possible to argue that since the 
intention to the State Immunity Act was to give effect to the European Convention of 1972 and, 
more generally, to give effect to the rules of customary international law as explained by Lord 
Diplock in the Alcom case, then the argument will be that the reference to immunity in s 1(1) of 
the Act is a reference to immunity in accordance with public or general international law.’5 
(Citations removed.) Diplock LJ had in turn said that, since the SIA dealt primarily with relations 
between sovereign states, ‘its provisions fall to be construed against the background of those 
                                                 
2 Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait [1994] PIQR 236, 239. 
3 Ibid 237, 239. 
4 J H Raynor v Department of Trade [1989] 1 Ch 73, 194B. 
5 Al-Adsani [1994] PIQR 236, 240 (‘Al-Adsani’). 
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principles of public international law as are generally recognised by the family of nations.’6 This 
meant Diplock LJ brought an analysis of the customary international law of state immunity into 
his construction of the Act. In effect, Shaw LJ was using Diplock LJ’s statements to countenance 
the argument that the immunity given by s 1(1) was not a complete immunity but only amounted 
to that recognised by public international law. Counsel for Mr Al-Adsani had claimed there was 
no immunity in public international law for acts of torture. He cited US proceedings in Filartiga 
v Pena-Irala7 purportedly supporting his argument. Kaufman J had said in that case ‘the torturer 
has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.’8 It was an open question whether the apparently clear wording of s 1(1) prohibited such 
an implied exception, on grounds of the relationship between domestic and international law.9 
Nonetheless, their Lordships felt Mr Al-Adsani had made a good, arguable case for a possible 
implied exception to the blanket immunity in s 1(1) of the Act. 
The Kuwaiti government then applied to the High Court to set aside the order for service and for 
a declaration of immunity. Mantell J upheld Kuwait’s claim.10 His Honour had no difficulty 
accepting torture was an offence against international law,11 but did not agree this necessarily had 
a bearing on the content of the immunity conferred by s 1(1) of the Act. His Honour noted the 
statement of Diplock LJ in Alcom that the Act must be construed against the background of public 
international law, and that it was unlikely Parliament intended the UK to act contrary to 
international law,12 but felt ‘where the clear language of the statute is to the contrary … the statute 
must prevail.’13 Filartiga was dismissed as not dealing with state immunity. Argentine Republic v 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp14 was produced as Supreme Court authority for the contention that 
‘immunity is granted in those cases involving violations of international law that do not come 
                                                 
6 Alcom Ltd v Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580, 597 (‘Alcom’). 
7 [1980] 630 F.2d 876, a claim under the Alien Torts Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
8 Ibid 890. 
9 See generally Mortenson v Peters (1906) 8 F (J) 93. There Kyllachy LJ had said ‘there is always a certain 
presumption against the Legislature of a country … going  clearly beyond limits established by the common 
consent of nations—that is to say, by international law. … But then it is only a presumption, and as such it must 
always give way to the language used if it is clear.’ 
10 Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait (1995) 103 ILR 420, 421 (‘Al-Adsani’). 
11 Ibid 426-427. 
12 Alcom [1984] A.C. 580, 600. 
13 Al-Adsani (1995) 103 ILR 420, 428. 
14 488 US 428 (1989) (‘Amerada Hess’). 
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within one of the FSIA’s exceptions.’15 Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina16 was marshalled 
in the context of torture as 9th Circuit authority for the contention that, while torture was a jus 
cogens violation, ‘Amerada Hess forecloses [any] attempt to posit a basis for jurisdiction not expressly 
countenanced by the FSIA.’17 In the opinion of Mantell J and the court in Siderman, the obstacle 
to finding a lack of immunity was not the state of customary international law on foreign state 
immunity, but rather a domestic statute. 
Mr Al-Adsani appealed to the Court of Appeal. There his counsel refined the implied exception 
argument, proposing s 1(1) should read ‘a state acting within the Law of Nations is immune from 
jurisdiction except as provided…’18 (Emphasis added.) Stuart-Smith LJ highlighted some 
provisions of the UN Declaration on Torture19 and mentioned in passing some other instruments 
relating to the prevention of torture, including the Convention Against Torture.20 His Lordship 
thought Mr Al-Adsani’s implied exception argument urged the finding that ‘international law 
against torture is so fundamental that it is a jus cogens, or compelling law,21 which overrides all 
other principles of international law, including the well-established principles of sovereign 
immunity.’22 Mr MacDonald for Mr Al-Adsani again relied on the passages in Alcom by Lord 
Diplock, referred to above. Yet Stuart-Smith LJ thought Lord Diplock’s statements tended to 
establish that the State Immunity Act was meant to cover the field,23 so to speak. This finding that 
the Act was a comprehensive code precluded the implication that international custom could 
override, modify, or replace the plain meaning. This view was perhaps over-strict given his 
Lordship had just quoted Lord Diplock saying the provisions of the Act must be ‘construed against 
the background of … public international law.’24 Stuart-Smith LJ also said ‘At common law, a 
                                                 
15 Ibid 436. 
16 965 F 2d 699 (1992) (‘Siderman’). 
17 Ibid 714. 
18 Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536, 540 (‘Al-Adsani’). 
19 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 3452 (XXX), UN GAOR, 30th sess, 2433rd plenary meeting, UN Doc 
A/RES/3452(XXX) (9 December 1975) annex. 
20 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) (‘Convention Against Torture’). 
21 Cogens, present participle of the Latin cogo, to ‘drive together’ or ‘bring together, assemble,’ but also ‘to 
compel, force, constrain’. See A Souter et al (eds), Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1968) 366-
367. See especially definition 12. 
22 Al-Adsani (1996) 107 ILR 536, 541. 
23 Ibid 542. 
24 Ibid 541. 
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sovereign State could not be sued at all against its will in the courts of this country,’ claiming it 
was the 1978 Act that made ‘substantial inroads into this principle.’25 This was a somewhat strange 
remark, given he was considering in that very paragraph a case where Lord Diplock had said ‘the 
critical distinction drawn by … English common law and public international law alike, was 
between what a state did in the exercise of its sovereign authority and what it did in the course of 
commercial or trading activities.’26 (Emphasis added.) Regardless, Stuart-Smith LJ felt the Act was 
intended to be a comprehensive code and that Parliament clearly intended the immunity in s 1(1) 
to not be subject to any exceptions other than those enumerated. 
Rehnquist CJ’s judgment in Amerada Hess and the Ninth Circuit judgment in Siderman were again 
produced, as authority for the contention that state immunity statutes provide for a complete 
immunity subject only to specifically enumerated exceptions.27 Amerada Hess, however, was not 
dealing with a jus cogens violation. Only Siderman dealt with torture as a violation of jus cogens: the 
Ninth Circuit felt constrained by the language of the Supreme Court in Amerada Hess. Yet 
Rehnquist CJ had spoken only of ‘violations of international law’28 and the Supreme Court in that 
case was not dealing with a violation of a peremptory jus cogens norm. The Ninth Circuit 
apparently felt bound by stare decisis to follow Rehnquist’s CJ ratio, whereas arguably a distinction 
based on jus cogens could have been made. In any case the UK Court of Appeals was certainly not 
bound to follow it. Despite this, Stuart-Smith LJ gave little consideration to the theoretical 
implications of the normative hierarchy argument, where jus cogens norms are claimed to override 
conflicting norms. His Lordship’s plea that the ‘practical consequences of the plaintiff’s submission 
would be dire’29 is unconvincing.  
Ward LJ in his opinion also outlined some of the international instruments relating to the 
outlawing and prevention of torture. A key point is that neither Ward nor Stuart-Smith LJJ 
mentioned art 14 of the Torture Convention, which clearly says ‘Each State Party shall ensure in 
                                                 
25 Ibid 542. It was the courts in the UK which first adopted restrictive immunity, see Chapter I. 
26 Alcom [1984] A.C. 580, 598-599. There Diplock LJ had just shown how three cases had established the 
restrictive immunity doctrine in English common-law before the State Immunity Act 1978 came into effect: The 
Philippine Admiral [1977] AC 373; Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 
(‘Trendtex’); and I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 244. 
27 Al-Adsani (1996) 107 ILR 536, 542-543. 
28 Amerada Hess, 488 US 428, 436 (1989). 
29 Al-Adsani (1996) 107 ILR 536, 544. 
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its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to 
fair and adequate compensation’.30 The point would be addressed in the later Jones litigation, but 
it is sufficient for now to note the text of the article in question contains no territorial limitation. 
For the rest, Ward LJ’s opinion practically mirrored that of Lord Stuart-Smith. Lord Ward thought 
not acceding to the jus cogens trumping argument ‘would have the ironic result that there may be 
no international forum … where this terrible … wrong can receive civil redress.’31 Yet his Lordship 
proceeded to this ‘ironic result:’ again following Amerada Hess and Siderman. The jus cogens 
argument was therefore again given short shrift, his Lordship preferring to base his opinion on the 
finding that the clear language of the statute prevented the reading in of any implied exception to 
the immunity in sub-s 1(1).32 Buckley J joined in a unanimous decision. Mr Al-Adsani’s appeal 
was therefore dismissed. 
Al-Adsani applied for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, but was refused. Upon refusal of leave 
to appeal to the House of Lords, he applied under the European Convention on Human Rights33 
to the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). There he alleged the English Court of 
Appeal’s grant of immunity to Kuwait ‘failed to secure enjoyment of his right not to be tortured 
and denied him access to a court, contrary to Articles 3, 6 § 1 and 13  of the Convention.’34 Article 
3 of the Convention provides that ‘No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment;’35 art 6 § 1 ensures ‘In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing;’36 whilst art 13 requires ‘[e]veryone 
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.’37 Effectively, Mr Al-Adsani was claiming his subjection to 
torture violated a right guaranteed to him by the Convention, which entailed a right to fair trial 
                                                 
30 Torture Convention art 14. 
31 Al-Adsani (1996) 107 ILR 536, 547. 
32 Ibid 548-550. 
33 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (‘European Convention on Human 
Rights’). 
34 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 85. 
35 European Convention on Human Rights art 3. 
36 Ibid art 6 § 1. 
37 Ibid art 13. 
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and effective remedy. The Court had to consider whether the grant of state immunity to Kuwait 
impeded those rights to fair trial and effective remedy under arts 6 and 13 of the Convention. 
The Court considered the work of the ILC in its 1999 working group report on state immunity.38 
In the appendix to that report, the ILC working group brought to the UN General Assembly’s 
sixth committee’s attention certain developments in relation to whether immunity ‘should be 
denied in the case of death or personal injury resulting from acts of a State in violation of human 
rights norms having the character of jus cogens, particularly the prohibition on torture.’39 The Court 
noted how the working group pointed to Pinochet40 and the amendment of the US FSIA by the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 as giving ‘support to the argument that a 
State could not plead immunity in respect of gross human rights violations.’41 The judgment of 
the Court also outlined the relevant instruments prohibiting torture in Kuwait and under 
international law;42 however, like the Court of Appeals, when considering the Torture Convention 
the court failed to draw any attention to art 14, which seems to ensure a right of civil redress. The 
Court also extracted at length a passage from Prosecutor v Furundzija43 where the jus cogens status 
of the prohibition on torture was discussed: curiously, however, this page-length extract stopped 
just one paragraph short of where the ICTY explained the jus cogens status of the prohibition on 
torture, prevailing over other customary rules, would allow ‘the victim to bring a civil suit for 
damage in a foreign court;’44 it also skipped over portions saying ‘States are bound to put in place 
all those measures that may pre-empt the perpetration of torture’ and ‘[i]t follows that international 
rules prohibit not only torture but also […] the maintenance in force […] of laws which are 
contrary to the prohibition.’45  
                                                 
38 ‘Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property’ [1999] II(2) Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 149. 
39 Ibid 171-172. A publicist has concluded the ‘deliberations were inconclusive’ and the ‘releg[ation] to an 
Appendix … amounted to a flat rejection of the proposals’:  see Christian Tomuschat, ‘The International Law of 
State Immunity and Its Development by National Institutions’ (2011) 44(4) Vanderbilt J Trans L 1105, 1139-
1140. Yet these statements do not seem to accord with the working group’s statement in paragraph 13 of the 
appendix that the developments it referred to ‘should not be ignored’. 
40 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 
(‘Pinochet’). 
41 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 91. 
42 Ibid 92. 
43  Prosecutor v Furundzija (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Case No IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998). 
44 Ibid at 60. 
45 Ibid at 56-57. 
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Coming to the decision in Pinochet, the Court thought the House of Lords had there ‘made clear 
that their findings as to immunity ratione materiae from criminal jurisdiction did not affect the 
immunity ratione personae of foreign sovereign States from civil jurisdiction in respect of acts of 
torture.’46 It referred in particular to a passage of Lord Millett, but in that passage his Lordship was 
simply saying that states are immune when they act in a sovereign capacity. It is questionable 
whether all instances of torture, or any at all, should be characterised as sovereign acts. In particular, 
the acts complained occurred in the aftermath of Kuwait’s liberation from Iraq. Although 
government cars and facilities were apparently used, it is far from certain that the government itself 
even knew about the acts complained (it was instead found vicariously liable for them). All this 
could have gone to whether Kuwait could reasonably be said to be acting in a sovereign capacity 
under the traditional distinction in custom between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. In any 
case, Millet LJ’s statement that he saw ‘nothing illogical … in denying the victims of state 
sponsored torture the right to sue the offending state in a foreign court’47 was obiter. It was also 
seemingly in conflict with the above statements in Furundzija and art 14 of the Convention Against 
Torture. 
Dealing with Mr Al-Adsani’s claims under articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, the judgment of 
the Court held ‘the State’s obligation applies only in relation to ill-treatment allegedly committed 
within its jurisdiction.’48 Yet it did not proffer any supporting authority or argument. Neither of 
the articles in question contain any clause limiting territorial application. It is hard to understand 
how the prohibition on torture can be vindicated by the unqualified right to ‘effective remedy’ if 
the application can only relate to acts within the jurisdiction. As a UK citizen Mr Al-Adsani had a 
right not to be ‘subjected to torture’. He was tortured. He further had a right to ‘effective remedy’ 
if that right was violated. Yet this was denied. Regardless, the Court appears to have been 
unanimous on this point. The more controversial part was the art 6 access to justice issue. 
The UK government denied art 6 was applicable. Partly, this was because it claimed ‘Article 6 
could not extend to matters outside the State’s jurisdiction,’49 but the Court could not accept this, 
because it found state immunity does not imply an absence of jurisdiction, but is rather a 
                                                 
46 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 94. 
47 Pinochet (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 278. 
48 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 95. 
49 Ibid 97. 
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procedural bar.50 As to the art 6 right, the Court held it was subject to limitations. It said the 
limitations must not ‘restrict or reduce the access left to the individual ... to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired’ and must ‘pursue a legitimate aim’ and be proportional to the 
aim sought.51 Yet it did not consider whether the limitations the UK government imposed had 
reduced Mr Al-Adsani’s access to the point where the very essence of his right was impaired. It 
only considered whether the limitation proportionately pursued a legitimate aim, concluding 
immunity ‘pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and 
good relations between States.’52  
Finding the SIA complied with the European Convention on State Immunity 1972, the Court 
went on to consider whether the jus cogens status of the prohibition on torture could have any 
bearing on whether the grant of state immunity, though pursuing a legitimate aim, was 
proportional.53 It considered however that cases like Furundzija and Pinochet concerned criminal, 
not civil matters; it said the same of the various international instruments prohibiting torture, 
including the Convention Against Torture.54 This despite the passage in Furundzija that clearly 
considered the civil side, and art 14 of the Convention Against Torture, which clearly relates to 
civil matters. This divide between criminal and civil matters would crop up in later cases, including 
the Jones litigation and the dispute between Germany and Italy in the ICJ. It should be weighed 
against the opinion of Breyer J in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain55 that ‘consensus as to universal criminal 
jurisdiction itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening … because 
criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings.’56 Although his Honour 
was not concerned with immunity, the statement shows the somewhat artificial nature of the 
purported distinction between the criminal and civil context. Furthermore, the statement is 
perhaps even more forcible in relation to state immunity, because in both the civil and criminal 
context the immunity concerned is the same: the criminal immunity of a state official does not 
belong to the official, but to the state; it can be waived at any time by the state. After dismissing 
                                                 
50 Ibid 98. 
51 Ibid 99. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 101-103. 
54 Ibid 101. 
55 542 US 692 (2004) (‘Alvarez-Machain’). 
56 Ibid 762. 
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the 1996 amendment to the US FSIA as ‘circumscribed in scope,’57 and finding that Pinochet ‘did 
not in any way affect’58 the immunity of a foreign State in a civil suit relating to torture, the Court 
found the restriction on Mr Al-Adsani’s right to access a court was proportional and denied his 
claim. 
4.3. Jones 
On 19 July 2012 Ronald Jones, a UK subject, issued a claim against Saudi Arabian Ministry of the 
Interior (coterminous with the Saudi Kingdom) and a Lt Cl Abdul Aziz seeking compensation for 
torture by the Saudi authorities.59 Jones had been working in Saudi Arabia as an international tax 
adviser when on 15 March 2001 he was ‘mildly injured’ in a bomb blast outside a Riyadh 
bookstore; Jones was apparently taken by authorities, imprisoned, and tortured for the next 67 
days.60 The alleged torture involved beatings with a cane and a wooden staff, all over his body, as 
well as slaps and punches, the suspension of his body by his handcuffed hands, shackling around 
his ankles, along with deprivation of sleep and subjection to mind altering drugs.61 Although 
Jones’s claims had not been tried as a matter of fact (since the case did not proceed to the 
substantive stage), his claims were nonetheless supported by a medical report of Dr Nathaniel 
Roger Blair Carey, who concluded Jones’s story agreed with the evidence he had examined.62 The 
Saudis denied torture but admitted an investigator had exceeded his remit and was punished and 
replaced.63 
After Master Whitaker granted service on the Kingdom (which was duly served), Saudi Arabia 
applied inter alia for Jones’s claim to be struck out on the basis of foreign state immunity.64 As SIA 
s 1(1) applied, the question was whether any of the enumerated exceptions could lift the immunity, 
with the Saudis claiming the only possible exception was the s 5 tort provision65 which could not 
                                                 
57 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79, 102. 
58 Ibid 103. 
59 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2003] EWHC J0730-5 [1]-[2]. 
60 Ibid [4]. 
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62 Ibid [7]. 
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apply because the act and damage occurred in Saudi Arabia, not the UK.66 The Kingdom relied 
on Al-Adsani,67 where Ward LJ stated ‘state immunity is afforded in respect of acts of torture 
committed outside the jurisdiction.’68 Crystal QC as counsel for Jones had to agree SIA s 5 required 
the act or omission to occur inside the UK. Master Whitaker found s 5 could not lift immunity 
for acts occurring in Saudi Arabia.69 As Jones was claiming damages not just for torture, but also 
false imprisonment, Crystal QC tried to argue that, unlike torture (which was obviously dealt with 
under the SIA by virtue of the ruling in Al-Adsani) the false imprisonment claim could be dealt 
with under the pre-existing common law. Such a ruling would have relieved Jones from the need 
to characterise the damage under one of the enumerated exceptions  to immunity in the SIA; 
however, Master Whitaker refused to accept this argument, considering in line with Al-Adsani that 
the SIA ‘replac[ed] the common law in its entirety in relation to civil claims.’70 
Crystal QC was reduced to arguing ‘as a matter of public policy now in the year 2003 state 
immunity should not apply to acts of torture committed against British citizens in foreign states’ 
and that the SIA should therefore be ‘read down or read restrictively’ so that its provisions did not 
apply to such acts.71 This argument is similar to that raised in Al-Adsani. Master Whitaker refused 
to accept Crystal QC’s public policy argument. Despite finding Judge Ferrari Bravo’s minority 
judgment—which deplored the ECtHR missing a ‘golden opportunity to take a firm stand on 
torture’—to be ‘very compelling’,72 Master Whitaker rejected Crystal QC’s final argument and 
found that until Parliament amended the SIA or until the ECtHR decided a case in line with the 
minority in Al-Adsani, he was constrained to rule ‘with the greatest sympathy’ that the Kingdom’s 
application to dismiss Jones’s claim must be allowed and Jones’s case thereby dismissed.73 Jones’s 
claim against Lt Cl Abdul Aziz remained to be considered but as this deals with foreign official 
immunity it will be dealt with in Chapter VIII 
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Jones appealed against Master Whitaker’s verdict and the appeal was held together with a second 
matter concerning similar torture allegations by Sandy Mitchell, Leslie Walker, and William 
Sampson against four Saudi Arabian officials.74 The latter matter, like the part of Jones’s claim 
against Lt Cl Abdul Aziz, concerns the law of foreign official immunity and will be dealt with for 
convenience in the succeeding chapter. For present purposes, the main issue before the Court of 
Appeal was whether the Kingdom was entitled to immunity for the claim brought against it by 
Jones.75 The Court was composed of the Lords Phillip, Mance, and Neuberger. Delivering the 
leading judgment, Mance LJ began after a recital of the facts and procedural history by looking to 
the decision in Al-Adsani.76 Lord Mance noted the apparent applicability of that case (bearing on 
a similar matter of torture under the SIA) and in passing noted the majority’s reasoning in in Al-
Adsani had been applied in a recent Canadian case, Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran.77 
Despite the rulings in Al-Adsani and Bouzari seeming to be against him, Crystal QC for Jones 
argued international law was in “continuing development” and the current norms do not allow 
immunity for torture.78 Crystal QC placed some additional reliance upon art 14 of the Convention 
Against Torture, arguing an expansive reading of the provision which mandated all member states 
provide a civil ‘right to fair and adequate compensation’ for torture victims, regardless of whether 
the offence occurred within the forum state.79 Mance LJ, however, was not ready to accept such a 
contention. In his Lordship’s view, ‘it seem[ed] unlikely that [the framers] can have intended that 
every state should ensure that its legal system provided redress for every act of torture by the public 
officials … of other states, wherever committed and whoever the victim.’80 Mance LJ seemingly 
approved of Andrew Byrnes’s view81 that art 14 of the Torture Convention had been drafted with 
the territorial limitation in mind but that such wording was ‘omitted by inadvertence.’82 In fact, 
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an earlier draft had indeed included words of territorial limitation, which disappeared in the final 
version.83 Byrnes, however, actually said: 
[N]either the travaux préparatoires nor the commentary by Burgers and Danelius on the 
CAT provide any insight into why this phrase was removed, and it is accordingly difficult 
to assess whether its disappearance was inadvertent or whether it has some significance. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that its removal, even if undocumented by the 
travaux préparatoires, must have been intended to make clear that the revised version was 
not territorially limited—it cannot be lightly assumed that a crucially important phrase is 
dropped for no reason.84 
The above quote sounds very different from Mance LJ’s observation that the ‘most plausible 
interpretation’ of Byrnes’s work is that ‘a territorial limitation was omitted by inadvertence.’85 It is 
true that Byrnes advanced the possibility of an inadvertent omission. This argument, however, 
hung on US President Ronald Reagan’s accompanying text to the Convention Against Torture 
when it was submitted to the US Senate. There President Reagan contends ‘[t]he … wording 
appear to have been deleted by mistake.’86 Mance LJ’s position asks one to read words into a treaty 
that aren’t there, and it is questionable whether they were removed because they were thought 
redundant or if agreement could not be reached when words of territorial limitation were included. 
Regardless, Mance LJ concluded art 14 of the Torture Convention only requires a state to provide 
an avenue of civil redress if the torture was committed on that nation’s territory or by its citizens 
abroad.87 In addition to reading in a territorial limitation, Mance LJ therefore reads in another 
provision mandating the provision of civil redress in situations where torture occurs at the hands 
of a forum state’s citizens abroad. As shall be seen below, this is at least a more generous reading of 
art 14 than is to be found in Bouzari; however, inasmuch as Mance LJ seems extremely reticent to 
read an exception for torture into the SIA grant of immunity, his Lordship conversely appears 
rather willing to read words into the text of art 14 of the Torture Convention. Exactly how and 
why the words of territorial limitation proposed by the Netherlands in 1981 were removed from 
art 14 may remain a mystery. If Mance LJ had found art 14 mandates a civil avenue of redress in 
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the UK for torture committed abroad then the argument that Jones’s art 6 right to access court 
was infringed would have been more powerful. The territorial limitation of art 14 argument 
embraced by Mance LJ, however, convinced his Lordship to dismiss Jones’s claim. 
Jones and Mitchell et al appealed the decision to the House of Lords, where the matter was heard 
by Lords Bingham, Hoffman, Rodger, Walker, and Carswell. Lord Bingham characterised the 
appeal as pertaining to the relationship between two principles of international law: foreign state 
immunity and the prohibition of torture.88  The first issue to resolve was therefore whether Saudi 
Arabia was immune.89 Lord Bingham thought the SIA represented a ‘relaxation’ of the ‘well-
established’ absolute immunity rule in Cristina.90 The chain of UK cases from the Parlement Belge 
to Cristina has already been canvassed above, and the research of Sinclair and Badr reveals the 
possibility that there was never sufficient uniformity of practice to establish absolute immunity as 
a binding customary norm. 
Lord Bingham reiterated the rule that the SIA blanket immunity operated unless an enumerated 
exception applied.91  His Lordshipcould not identify any applicable exception, but in opposition 
to this Jones claimed upholding the SIA’s blanket grant of immunity would nonetheless infringe 
his right of access to court under art 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Freedoms.92 It will be recalled that a similar argument was put to the Court of Appeal and ECtHR 
in the Al-Adsani93 cases. The art 6 argument required Jones to establish three propositions: that 
immunity would engage art 6; that immunity would deny access to court; and that the restriction 
of access was not directed to a legitimate objective or was disproportionate.94 Lord Bingham had 
some difficulty in conceding the first proposition, but accepted that the ECtHR had considered 
art 6 engaged in Al-Adsani and was therefore willing to grant the proposition. The second 
proposition was considered tautological.95 The key proposition was whether the grant of immunity 
restricted Jones’s right of access to court in a way which was not directed to a legitimate objective 
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or was disproportionate. Jones supported this with the submission that the grant of immunity 
would be ‘inconsistent with a peremptory norm of international law, a jus cogens applicable erga 
omnes and superior in effect to other rules of international law,’96 that norm being the prohibition 
of torture. 
Jones’s key submission was ‘that the proscription of torture […] precludes the grant of 
immunity’.97 Naturally, Lord Bingham considered the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Adsani. This 
decision would ordinarily be followed unless its reasoning was unclear or unsound, which His 
Lordship found was not the case98. His Lordship then analysed the text of art 14 of the Convention 
Against Torture, which Jones relied on. Lord Bingham here noted an interpretative declaration 
attached by the US to its acceptance of the Convention Against Torture, which stated that art 14 
only provided a right of action ‘for torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that 
State Party.’99 Lord Bingham declined to treat the declaration as a reservation, but considered that 
in the ‘20 years [which] have passed … there is no reason to think that the United States would 
now subscribe to a rule of international law conferring a universal tort jurisdiction which would 
entitle foreign states to entertain claims against US officials based on torture allegedly inflicted by 
the officials outside the state of the forum.’100 Whatever the accuracy of this statement at the time 
it was written, this supposition is clearly now false. The final result of the Samantar litigation 
proved that at least some US courts consider it acceptable under the FSIA to exercise a universal 
civil jurisdiction in a claim against a former foreign official who had committed torture (although 
there is a circuit split).101 If the US has allowed an alien to deploy universal civil jurisdiction to 
successfully bring a torture claim against a former Somali official, it would be unable to defend in 
principle a hypothetical exercise of universal tort jurisdiction against a US official based on torture 
inflicted outside the forum. Despite the limiting of the ATCA’s scope in Sosa and Kiobel, the chain 
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of US authority going back to Filartiga—along with the Torture Victim Protection Act102—shows 
the US has subscribed to the possibility of some form of universal tort jurisdiction since 1980. 
Lord Bingham referred to his opinion in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2),103 
where his Lordship had ‘quoted with approval104 a long passage from the judgment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v Furundzija.’105 Special 
attention was placed on paragraph 155 of the judgment in Furundzija, where in the context of a 
state legislating to permit the violation of the prohibition of torture the following was specifically 
stated: 
If such a situation were to arise, the national measures, violating the general principle and 
any relevant treaty provision, would produce the legal effects discussed above and in 
addition would not be accorded international legal recognition. Proceedings could be 
initiated by potential victims if they had locus standi before a competent international or 
national judicial body with a view to asking it to hold the national measure to be 
internationally unlawful; or the victim could bring a suit for damage in a foreign court, which 
would therefore be asked inter alia to disregard the legal value of the national authorising 
act.106 [Emphasis added.]  
Lord Bingham in relation to this quote did not believe the tribunal was ‘addressing the issue of 
state immunity’ and in any case, even if it was, those observations were made ‘by a criminal tribunal 
trying a criminal case’ not a civil case like and therefore the comments in Furundzija were obiter 
and in any case not binding.107 Perhaps more importantly, it might have been noted that the 
tribunal in Furundzija was specifically talking about a situation in which Country X had actually 
enacted municipal legislation permitting the use of torture, in direct contravention of the jus cogens 
norm prohibiting it. In that situation, the tribunal said individual victims would be able to lodge 
proceedings in Country Y alleging that Country X had violated the jus cogens norm prohibiting 
torture. This is a very different statement from the contention that individuals harmed by torture 
in Country X, which had never enacted any laws permitting torture, are able in Country Y to bring 
a claim alleging the violation by Country X of the prohibition of torture.  
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If it could be shown Saudi Arabia had enacted legislation permitting torture, contravening the jus 
cogens norm and the Convention Against Torture (to which it is a signatory), then Jones might have 
had made an unanswerable argument. This approach seems not to have been taken. Considering 
Saudi Arabian law approves the lopping off of hands for thieves and the stoning to death of 
individuals, it seems to be an open question whether this point could have been proven. 
Importantly, the Torture Convention108 defines torture as ‘any infliction of pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, … intentionally inflicted … for such purposes as … obtaining a 
confession … punishing … or intimidating or coercing … a person … when inflicted by … a public 
official or ... person acting in an official capacity [but it does not include] pain or suffering arising 
only from … lawful sanctions.’109 [Emphasis added.] Since the Saudi authorities specifically 
admitted the interrogators had exceeded their remit, it might be argued that the pain or suffering 
inflicted upon Jones did not proceed from a lawful sanction, and because Saudi law does allow for 
such infliction of terrible pain in situations where it considers it to be part of a lawful sanction, 
then the specific situation of Jones could be called the precise situation described in Furundzija 
where a state has legislated allowing the infliction of pain or suffering for punishing a person, and 
that in this case the infliction did not arise from a lawful sanction, it indeed amounted to torture, 
and the violation of the jus cogens norm thereby allows Jones to seek remedy in the UK. It is 
regretful Lord Bingham so quickly disregarded Furundzija on the basis it was a criminal case and 
Jones a civil action. 
His Lordship next referred110 to Italian ruling in Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany,111 noting 
the decision had been praised by some scholars.112 Andrea Bianchi, for example, noted ‘[t]he 
argument that no express human rights exception to state immunity exists in international law is 
flawed because respect for the inalienable rights of human beings has attained the status of a 
fundamental principle of the international legal order.’113 In Ferrini, however, some of the jus cogens 
violations occurred in Italy, therefore the scope of art 14 of the Torture Convention was not an 
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issue. This point was noted by the Italian Court and used to distinguish the decision114 from those 
of other national tribunals (Al-Adsani and Jones, but also Bouzari and others covered below) where 
all the violations occurred outside the forum. However, Lord Bingham also noted the Ferrini 
decision had been ‘deplored’ by others.115 Andrea Gattini, for example, thought the types of claims 
exemplified by Ferrini posed ‘dangers’116 and were ‘disruptive’.117 Gattini, however, appears only 
to be making a policy argument on the lines of the slippery slope or flood gates metaphors. It is 
questionable whether these suffice on their own as reason to thwart justice. In Lord Bingham’s 
opinion, the Ferrini decision ‘cannot … be treated as an accurate statement of international law’ 
because ‘one swallow does not make a rule of international law’ and His Lordship preferred ‘the 
more closely-reasoned decisions’118 in Bouzari. With respect, Lord Bingham seems to have 
dismissed the decision in Ferrini too easily. Ferrini is not simply ‘one swallow’, especially when the 
decisions in A v Secretary of State,119 Furundzija,120 Pinochet (No 3),121 Samantar,122 Yousuf,123 and 
Fletcher J’s comment in Siderman de Blake124 in addition to releant US and Canadian legislation, 
could all be pointed to as evidence for the notion that under customary international law there 
need not be immunity for jus cogens violations. 
Lord Bingham also brought up the Committee against Torture’s commentary on periodic reports 
by Canada received in 2002 and 2004 recommending ‘that Canada should review its position 
under art 14 of the Torture Convention to ensure the provision of compensation through its civil 
jurisdiction to all victims of torture.’125 Without ‘wishing to question the wisdom of this 
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recommendation’ and purporting to ‘share the committee’s concern’, his Lordship simply stated 
‘the committee is not an exclusively legal and not an adjudicative body’ and dismissed ‘[w]hatever 
… value’ the recommendation had as ‘legal authority [as being] slight’.126 Seeing as the Committee 
against Torture is the specific body organised by the Convention Against Torture to look over the 
implementation of the treaty, arguably Lord Bingham could have paid more regard to the 
Committee’s ‘wisdom’. 
Opposing Jones, the Kingdom advanced four arguments which in Lord Bingham’s opinion were 
‘cumulatively irresistible’.127 First was the claim that according to Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000128 state immunity ratione personae can be claimed for an incumbent 
foreign minister even when there is a breach of a jus cogens norm; second, as foreshadowed above, 
His Lordship thought art 14 of the Convention Against Torture did not provide for a universal 
civil jurisdiction, because it was supposedly territorially limited; third, the 2004 UN Convention 
contains no exception for torture; and fourth, there was no evidence to show a norm granting 
universal civil jurisdiction ‘over claims arising from alleged breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law’.129 The strength of this four-pronged argument remains questionable. While 
immunity ratione personae for an incumbent foreign minister holds even in the face of jus cogens 
violations, personal immunity is a separate matter from the immunity ratione materiae of a former 
troika member (Head of State, Head of Government, or Foreign Official) or an incumbent lower 
level official. The fact that an incumbent foreign minister has immunity ratione personae which 
while he or she is in office has nothing to do with the fact that a former foreign minister or an 
incumbent lower level foreign official only has the benefit of immunity ratione materiae which only 
covers official acts. Furthermore, not only would such an official only have immunity for official 
and not private acts, but according to the logic above and authority cited in the proceeding 
chapter,130 the immunity only covers acts properly within the scope of the official authority, and 
not ultra vires actions. Secondly, it is possible to argue that art 14 of the Torture Convention 
should not be read as territorially limited, and the Committee against Torture has explicitly said 
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as much. Thirdly, the 2004 UN Convention only applies to ‘representatives of the State acting in 
that capacity’.131 This is in line with the response to point one above. The UN Convention only 
gives a representative such as a foreign official the benefit of the immunity it contains when that 
official is ‘acting in his capacity’ as a representative. The UN Convention does not make precisely 
clear whether it grants immunity to a representative acting ultra vires, but according to the logic 
in Larson, Chuidian, and Yousuf, the soundest answer would appear to be that it does not. Finally, 
in response to the fourth claim, Bianchi’s statement should be kept in mind: the non-derogable 
nature of the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm which ‘affects the scope of other principles 
and rules of international law, including the principle of sovereign equality of states.’132 
Lord Bingham considered the above points but decided to uphold the decision of the Court of 
Appeal below and Jones’s case was therefore unsuccessful.133 Lord Hoffman reasoned similarly. He 
described Crystal QC as putting forward a three-pronged argument as to why Jones’s art 6 rights 
to access courts had been violated,134 which rested heavily on the second prong consisting of a jus 
cogens ‘trumping’ argument as found in Al-Adsani. Lord Hoffman agreed with the ECtHR majority 
in that case.135 Like Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffman thought art 14 of the Torture Convention was 
territorially limited.136 His Lordship considered the Arrest Warrant decision in detail,137 noting in 
the separate opinions of Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buerganthal JJ the speculation about an 
emerging ‘very broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ which nonetheless ‘has not attracted the 
approbation of states generally.’138 Hoffman LJ covered the Furundzija decision,139 yet claimed the 
decision did not address the issue of immunity. 
Lord Hoffman then turned to the relevant decisions of national courts.140 Al-Adsani and 
Kalogeropoulou were cited,141 as was the Committee against Torture’s note regarding art 14 of the 
Torture Convention, but his Lordship considered (similarly to Lord Bingham) that the statement 
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had ‘no value’.142 Lord Hoffman also considered the relevance of the 1991 Torture Victim Protection 
Act, where the US legislature allows a form of universal jurisdiction over foreign states that have 
been designated as state sponsors of terrorism. His Lordship, however, considered this a ‘universal 
extension of jurisdiction by the United States’.143 Even if this is true, surely the TVPA is nonetheless 
evidence that states believe they are entitled to exercise such a jurisdiction. 
Regarding Siderman de Blake,144 Lord Hoffman noted the Court of Appeals ‘left open the 
possibility that there might be such an exception in customary international law.’145 Fletcher J did 
much more than that, specifically stating that under international law there was no immunity for 
jus cogens violations. It was only because of the clear wording of the FSIA that Fletcher J felt 
constrained to find immunity. Hoffman LJ said the FSIA was itself evidence of state practice against 
a customary norm that there was an exception to immunity for jus cogens violations.146 Actually, 
the strongest way this could be put is that the FSIA provides no positive evidence for the existence 
of such a norm. In itself it is not evidence that there is no such norm. Furthermore, the FSIA 
definitely does not provide the necessary opinio juris, since nothing in the FSIA evinces the 
intention that the USA does not recognise an exception to immunity for jus cogens because it feels 
bound by international law. Furthermore, Fletcher J’s consideration that at international law there 
was no immunity for violations of jus cogens directly confutes the idea of opinio juris for a 
disallowance of an exception to immunity in cases involving torture. 
Regarding Bouzari v Iran, Lord Hoffman noted both the Superior Court and Court of Appeals 
decisions were in accordance with his Lordship’s views.147 When noting Prefecture of Voiotia, his 
Lordship noted the decision was ‘undermined’ by the refusal of an enforcement order to carry out 
the ruling.148 His Lordship also noted the Greek decision in Margellos and the German decision in 
Distomo, which ran counter to Jones’s argument. Finally, Lord Hoffman considered the Ferrini 
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decision.149 His Lordship noted the opinion of Pasquale de Sena and Francesca de Vittor.150 In 
Lord Hoffman’s view, Sena and Vittor ‘acknowledge’ (what His Lordship considered to be) ‘bare 
syllogistic reasoning’ in Ferrini, and ‘accept that a jus cogens prohibition of torture does not entail 
a corresponding exception to state immunity … [but claim] Ferrini … should be seen rather as 
giving a priority to the values embodied in the prohibition of torture over the values and policies 
of the rules of state immunity.’151 Lord Hoffman thought that ‘[wa]s a fair interpretation of what 
the court was doing’152 in Ferrini. Yet the two propositions appear to amount to the same thing. If 
the values embodied in the prohibition of torture should be prioritised over the values and policies 
of the rules of state immunity, how is this anything other than saying the prohibition of torture 
entails an exception to state immunity? His Lordship invokes Ronald Dworkin’s views,153 
regarding the ‘ordering of competing principles according to the importance of the values which 
they embody [as] a basic technique of adjudication.’154 On the topic of syllogistic reasoning, one 
might add Judge Curtis Karnow’s piece on similarity in legal analysis to the mix.155 Nonetheless, 
it is difficult to see how Lord Hoffman is doing anything other than ordering the prohibition of 
torture as less important than state immunity norms. His Lordship claims ‘it is not for a national 
court to “develop” international law by unilaterally adopting a version of that law which, however 
desirable, forward-looking and reflective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other 
states.’156 These conclusions, however, do not support Lord Hoffman’s arguments when one 
considers the ample precedents in Furundzija, Arrest Warrant, Larson, Chuidian, Siderman de 
Blake, A v Secretary of State, Pinochet, Samantar, and Yousuf, which support Jones’s claims. 
Lord Hoffman therefore rejected the second prong of Crystal QC’s argument and thought the 
appeal by Jones against the Kingdom should be dismissed.157 The remainder of His Lordship’s 
judgment dealt with the foreign official immunity aspects of the case,158 which will be dealt with 
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in Chapter VIII. Rodger, Walker, and Carswell LJJ agreed with Bingham and Hoffman LJJ.159 
Jones’s appeal against the Kingdom was therefore dismissed. 
In light of the unanimous decision in the House of Lords, Jones, Mitchell and the others applied 
to the ECtHR, claiming the UK’s grant of immunity to Saudi Arabia was a ‘disproportionate 
interference’ with their right under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.160 
After reciting the facts161 and procedural history,162 the Court proceeded to outline the relevant 
law under the headings of domestic law and practice,163 international law materials,164 and 
comparative law materials165 (municipal statutes and decisions). 
Domestic law and practice consisted of relevant statutes and decisions in the UK, where the Jones 
and Mitchell cases originated. After outlining the contours of the SIA,166 the Court came to 
domestic precedents and first considered Propend Finance Ltd v Sing,167 which involved principles 
of foreign official immunity and will thus be dealt with elsewhere. Next, the court considered 
Pinochet168 and outlined the judgments of Browne-Wilkinson,169 Hope,170 Hutton,171 Saville,172 
Millett,173 Phillips,174 and Goff.175 
As to the relevant international law materials, the Court began by examining the Convention 
Against Torture.176 Specifically, the Court examined Article 14 of that Convention, which requires: 
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains 
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the 
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means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a 
result of the act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.177 
The Court noted that upon ratification of the Convention Against Torture the US had ‘lodged a 
reservation’ expressing the understanding that art 14 only required redress for torture committed 
within the forum state’s territory.178 It should be noted that the US statement was likely a 
declaration, not a reservation. The statement did not make the US’s consent to be bound 
contingent upon the acceptance of the provisions contained within it. It simply expressed an 
interpretation of the relevant provision which could later prove wrong.179 The Court further 
highlighted the Committee against Torture’s conclusions and recommendations in relation to 
periodic reports submitted by Saudi Arabia180 and Canada,181 and further noted a General 
Comment of the Committee which expressly stated: 
The Committee considers that the application of article 14 is not limited to victims who 
were harmed in the territory of the State Party …] The Committee has commended the 
efforts of States Parties for providing civil remedies for victims who were subjected to 
torture or ill-treatment outside their territory. This is particularly important when a 
victim is unable to exercise the rights guaranteed under article 14 in the territory where 
the violation took place. Similarly, granting immunity, in violation of international law, 
to any state or its agents … for torture … is in direct conflict with the obligation of 
providing redress to victims.182 
The Court next considered the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity183 and the 2004 
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.184 Importantly, 
although the 2004 Convention applies to foreign officials, it only does so when they act ‘in that 
capacity’ which the ILC’s commentary explains ‘is intended to clarify that such immunities are 
accorded to their representative capacity ratione materiae’.185 The Court noted the 2004 
Convention does not have a jus cogens exception.186 It concluded its outline of the 2004 
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Convention with the observation that three States made declarations when ratifying that the 
Convention was ‘without prejudice to any future international development concerning the 
protection of human rights.’187 
As to the decisions of international courts, the Court looked at the decision in Prosecutor v 
Blaškić,188 where the ICTY confirmed that foreign officials were personally responsible for 
internationally wrongful acts. It next looked at the decision in Furundzija,189 where it was noted 
that victims of torture could bring a suit against a foreign state if a national statute had authorised 
or condoned torture and torture had taken place.190 The Court then looked at the decision in Arrest 
Warrant,191 which only however applied to incumbent foreign ministers (or at least incumbent 
troika members or officials of similar status with international functions) in granting them 
immunity ratione personae.192 It was noted that Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal JJ in their 
joint separate opinion had observed that ‘in civil matters we already see the beginnings of a very 
broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ which had nonetheless allegedly ‘not attracted the 
approbation of States generally.’193 Their Honours were further noted as ‘discerning a trend 
towards the rejection of impunity for serious international crimes, a wider assertion of jurisdiction 
and the availability of immunity as shield becoming more limited.’194 The Court next looked at 
Djibouti v France195 where the ICJ declared in relation to immunity ratione materiae that the state 
which seeks to claim immunity should notify the authorities of the other state. Finally, the Court 
looked at the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State196 where Italy made both a territorial 
tort argument and a human rights exception based on jus cogens trumping argument and the matter 
being a case of the last resort.197 As will be seen in Chapter VI, the ICJ concluded immunity 
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prevailed198 and there was thought to be no conflict between jus cogens violations and state 
immunity because of the procedural/substantive divide.199 
Next the Court considered the ILC,200 which beginning in 2007 had appointed a special rapporteur 
to consider the issue of the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. As this 
pertains to foreign official immunity rather than the immunity of the state itself, this material will 
be considered in the following chapter. The Court then looked at the 2009 resolution of the 
Institute of International Law. Here the Institute decided foreign officials other than those with 
immunity ratione personae had no immunity for international crimes.201 This, however, was 
‘without prejudice’ to whether a state itself retained immunity from jurisdiction in matters 
pertaining to international crimes,202 a matter that the Institute refrained from dealing with in this 
resolution. The Court then considered the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.203 Importantly, these Articles were also ‘without prejudice’ to 
the individual responsibility of a foreign official who had acted on behalf of a state.204 
The Court turned to the relevant comparative law materials, mostly civil claims for torture,205 but 
also criminal prosecutions for torture.206 Regarding the national civil claims for torture, the Court 
began with the US, recalling Filartiga, Siderman, Princz, Smith v Libya, and Sampson v Germany 
in relation to foreign state immunity and Ye v Zemin, Chuidian, Xuncax v Gramajo, Cabiri, Belhas 
v Ya’alon, Matar v Dichter, and Samantar in relation to foreign official immunity.207 It then 
outlined the pertinent Canadian cases, including Jaffe v Miller, Bouzari, and Kazemi/Hashemi.208 
The Court turned to New Zealand, looking at Fang v Ziang.209 It also looked at a similar Australian 
case, Zhang v Zemin.210 It then turned to Europe, outlining Ferrini in Italy, Voiotia in Greece (and 
Kalogeropoulu in the ECHR), Natoniewski v Germany in Poland, Bucheron v Germany and Grosz v 
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Germany in France. Regarding national criminal prosecutions for torture, the Court recalled 
French (Ould Dah; Khaled Ben Said), Dutch (Bouterse), and Swiss (A v Attorney-General) 
precedents.211 
After briefly considering issues of joinder212 and admissibility,213 where the Court found it was 
appropriate to join the Jones and Mitchell cases and to rule that art 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights was engaged, the Court finally turned to the merits of the case. Jones submitted 
the ECtHR’s approach to the European Convention’s art 6 legitimate aims/proportionality test 
was wrong,214 distinguishing the ECtHR’s approach in Waite & Kennedy, where the applicants had 
other means of redress, and claimed the House of Lords did not properly consider whether or not 
he had alternate means of redress.215 The submissions by Mitchell and the others relate properly to 
foreign official immunity and will be dealt with in Chapter VIII. The Kingdom submitted 
immunity pursued the legitimate aim of complying with international law and comity.216 It 
asserted the courts below correctly rejected the argument that violation of a jus cogens norm 
required lifting of immunity (the trumping argument) and cited international and national court 
cases rejecting this argument. Some national courts (in Italy and Greece) had accepted the 
trumping argument, but it was noted that these were considered ‘not persuasive.’217 Purportedly 
‘no authority’ had been offered for the suggestion that certain types of government acts do not 
attract immunity,218 but the opinion of Fletcher J in Siderman de Blake219 should be noted in this 
respect. Regarding the Convention Against Torture’s art 14 obligation to provide redress, the 
Court reiterated the Kingdom’s view that the provision was territorially limited and that the words 
of limitation had been omitted ‘for reasons which were not explained’ in an omission that ‘was a 
mistake.’220 
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Regarding the fact that criminal prosecution would be possible in the UK, the court thought it 
wise to distinguish criminal and civil cases.221 This logic is doubtful. First, the Court noted the 
Convention Against Torture specifically required prosecution for torture outside the forum, and 
claimed there was ‘no comparable civil provision’.222 If not identical, art 14 is at least comparable. 
Secondly, the Court thought Pinochet’s removal of immunity was based on the Convention Against 
Torture.223 Again, when one considers art 14 of the Convention, the importance of this point 
becomes questionable. Thirdly, the Court considered criminal responsibility was not in 
international law part of responsibility of the state, but in fact a separate matter.224 This does not 
preclude a state’s responsbiiltiy being engaged. Further, art 58 of DARSIWA specifically states its 
provisions are ‘without prejudice’ to the personal responsibility of state officials who commit 
internationally wrongful acts. 
The Court then considered the arguments of the Third Party Interveners: Redress, Amnesty 
International, and others.225 Specifically, in their joint third party comments the intervenors 
stressed the need to make separate determinations about the immunity of states and officials, as 
these were not coterminous.226 Further, torture was said to give rise to both state and individual 
responsibility, which are not practically equivalent.227 The interveners further argued that 
immunity ratione materiae was not available where torture had been committed, and that there 
was ‘no distinct dividing line’ between criminal and civil cases (noting examples in France where 
courts had convicted foreign officials for torture while also awarding reparation to victims).228 
Surely this point also applies to the immunity of the state itself. The interveners further stressed 
immunity for officials in torture cases was neither a legitimate aim, nor proportionate.229 Finally, 
the interveners noted ‘the broader the immunity, the more compelling its justification had to be.’230 
It was also relevant to proportionality whether alternative means of redress were available, and 
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diplomatic protection could not be called an effective means of redress, nor was there evidence it 
had been given to Jones.231 
The Court finally pronounced its assessment of the relevant issues.232 It began by examining Jones’s 
claim that his right of access to court under art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
had been infringed by the grant of immunity. The Court noted art 6 ‘secures everyone the right to 
have any legal dispute … relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court.’233 As 
it had before, the Court ruled a grant of immunity engaged art 6. The question was whether the 
limitation was within a ‘margin for appreciation’ which states have.234 This should be compared to 
the practice of Canadian courts when interpreting section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
which grants Canadians a ‘right to a fair hearing,’235 who have ruled the provision does not give a 
‘self-standing’ right to a hearing.236 
The Court reiterated the stance it took in Al-Adsani, which does not prohibit all limitations of 
access to court, but only those which fall outside a certain margin of appreciation. To fall within 
this margin, a measure which limits access to a fair hearing must: (1) not impair the very essence 
of the right; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; and (3) be reasonably proportionate. If the measure fails 
to meet these requirements it might be deemed outside the margin of appreciation. As to the first 
stem of this test, the Court claims that the very essence of a right of access to court would be 
impaired if ‘a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention enforcement bodies, 
remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from 
civil liability on categories of persons.’237 With respect, this seems to be exactly what the grant of 
immunity does. As to the second limb, the Court claims the restriction of the right to access pursues 
a legitimate aim because sovereign immunity, which is based on the principle of par in parem non 
habet imperium pursues the ‘legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity 
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and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.’238 Prime 
facie, this statement might seem sound enough. Yet it must surely be questioned whether justice is 
legitimately served when individuals are prevented by the law from seeking justice for the violation 
of their human rights which almost all states have already agreed there should be no derogation 
from. This does not seem to be a legitimate aim. Certainly, the good working order of the 
international legal system is a legitimate aim. But unless there is something very mistaken in the 
preceding logic, a system which by its nature prevents tortured individuals from obtaining redress 
can hardly be said to be in good working order. Finally, as to the third limb, the Court thought 
the restriction of access to a fair hearing was not disproportionate because it aimed to reflect 
‘generally recognised rules of public international law.’239 If the actual state of the customary norms 
pertaining to the immunity of sovereign states was truly that they are free to torture aliens without 
any avenue of redress in a foreign court, then this might be the case. As seen in the preceding 
analysis, however, there is evidence that times have changed and that as a matter of customary 
international law states are free to lift immunity in the face of jus cogens violations. 
After considering Al-Adsani, the Court continued in its discussion of the Jones case by insisting it 
saw no reason to abandon the Al-Adsani majority’s logic. The Court concludes: 
As to the proportionality of the restriction, the need to interpret the Convention so far as 
possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including 
those relating to the grant of State immunity, has led to the Court to conclude [sic] that 
measures taken by a State which reflect generally recognised rules of public international 
law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate 
restriction on the right of access to a court in Article 6 § 1.240 
This apparent sentence borders on the meaningless. The Court has taken much trouble to 
construct an argument in defence of a position which defies simplicity and common sense. If it 
were a generally recognised rule of public international law that foreign states are absolutely 
immune from suit when they engage in torture then one might possibly defend the argument that 
the grant of immunity pursues a legitimate aim and is not disproportionate. That, however, is not 
the case. States have long since agreed that torture is absolutely prohibited, a norm from which 
there can be no derogation. Pinochet is an example of the immunity falling in the criminal context. 
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Yet we are expected to believe a law legitimately and proportionately aims to defend the good 
working order of the international legal system when it systematically prevents tortured individuals 
from obtaining redress. This is questionable. Almost two decades have passed since the House of 
Lords concluded the Convention Against Torture is reduced to nonsense if a foreign official cannot 
be prosecuted for torturing people while in office. The notion that the same logic simply does not 
apply because criminal cases are not the same as civil cases is dubious. That is because, although 
the doctrines are separate, similar principles apply. 
The Court admitted that ‘in recent years …. a jus cogens exception to State immunity in civil claims 
against the State’241 has developed. In this respect it cited Siderman de Blake, Princz, Smith, 
Sampson, Natoniweski, Bucheron, and Grosz amongst others. Yet it claimed that this trend must be 
ignored because of the ICJ’s decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, which in 2012 ruled 
that no jus cogens exception to state immunity had arisen.242 That case will be dealt with in proper 
detail in Chapter VI but was only binding for the parties to the dispute. As the Court itself had 
just mentioned, Fletcher J in Siderman de Blake had ruled as early as 1992 that as a matter of 
customary international law there was no state immunity for violations of jus cogens. The Court 
claimed that since no exception to immunity had crystallised, the grant of immunity to the 
Kingdom could not be called ‘unjustified’ in the sense that it was not disproportionate or without 
a legitimate aim.243 Although Jones’s art 6 right to a fair hearing was held to be engaged, it was 
therefore not held to be have been unjustly infringed. The remainder of the Court’s judgment 
pertained to matters of foreign official immunity and will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
Bianku J wrote a very short opinion concurring with the 13 members who joined in the majority 
opinion.  
It only remains to canvass the sole dissenting opinion of Kalaydjieva J. Her Excellency said she 
‘f[ou]nd [her]self unable to agree’ with the ‘essence of the majority’s conclusion’ that the grant of 
immunity constituted a legitimately aimed and proportionate restriction on the art  6 right of 
access to court, which was therefore not incompatible with the provision.244 After observing that it 
may be correct to conclude that ‘by 2012 … no jus cogens exception to State immunity had yet 
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crystallised,’ Kalaydjieva J said she ‘share[d] the doubts of some of the dissenting judges in 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.245 Her Excellency then made a poignant comparison, citing 
earlier ECtHR authority in Cudak v Lithuania.246 In that decision, the Court said: 
If the applicant had been required to use such a remedy she would have encountered serious 
practical difficulties which would have been incompatible with her right of access to a court, 
which, like all other rights in the Convention, must be interpreted so as to make it practical 
and effective, not theoretical or illusory.247 
The difference between Cudak and Jones is that Alicija Cudak was a Lithuanian woman working 
as a switchboard operator at the Polish embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania, suing over sexual harassment. 
There was a commercial transaction and more specifically a contract of employment. Kalaydjieva 
J was drawing attention to the reality that the ECtHR ‘had no difficulties … finding violations of 
the right of access to court’ for employment matters, but not for torture. Why, is the grant of 
immunity in employment matters not a legitimately aimed and proportional restriction of the right 
to access court, but it is legitimately aimed and proportional when a person has been tortured? 
On the matter of par in parem non habet imperium, which the majority judgment said is the 
ultimate rationale for state immunity, Kalaydjieva J refused to accept civil proceedings against a 
torturer involved greater interference in the internal affairs of a foreign state than criminal 
proceedings. Although more strictly a matter of foreign official immunity than the immunity of a 
state itself, the point is well made. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, following Hazel Fox, make 
the argument that ‘[s]ince a state acts through individuals, a suit against an individual for actions 
carried out on behalf of the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state’’248 (or, as Fox puts it, 
‘any act performed by the individual as an act of the state enjoys the immunity which the state 
enjoys’).249 Yet, while Senator Pinochet ostensibly committed his tortures as ‘an act of the state,’ 
they were not truly state acts. They were either ultra vires or purely private acts. 
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Kalaydjieva J found the majority’s conclusions ‘regrettable and contrary to essential principles of 
international law’. Strictly, her Excellency confined the majority of her dissent to the possibility of 
an exception to the immunity ratione materiae of a foreign official in cases of torture. However, as 
to whether the Kingdom itself ought to be immune, Kalaydjieva J again found in the negative. 
After referring to Cudak and Sabeh El Leil v France (another employment-related art 6 case), Her 
Excellency confessed that ‘Like Lord Mance’ she found it difficult to accept differences between 
criminal and civil law justify different application of immunity. Although Lord Mance found the 
Kingdom should be immune, if the lack of justification to treat criminal and civil cases differently 
is combined with the ECtHR readily finding violations of the art 6 access to court provision in 
employment-related matters, an argument takes shape. Combined with Fletcher J’s observation in 
Siderman de Blake and the Committee Against Torture’s, the view that Jones’s art 6 right to access 
court seems to have been disproportionately infringed seems stronger.  
4.4. Summary 
Kalaydjieva J concludes by echoing Judge Ferrari Bravo’s exclamation from his dissenting 
judgment in Al-Adsani: ‘What a pity!’ This author prefers Ferrari Bravo J’s question, borrowed 
from Cicero’s Catiline Orations: ‘Quousque tandem’. The full quote his Honour refers to is as 
follows: 
Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? Quam diu etiam furor iste tuus nos 
eludet? Quem ad finem sese effrenata.250 
When, O Catiline, do you mean to cease abusing our patience? How long is that madness 
of yours still to mock us? When is there to be an end of that unbridled audacity of yours, 
swaggering about as it does now.251 
One might also recall another famous line from the same oration: 
O tempora, o mores! 
Oh the times! Oh the customs!
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 The Canadian Experience 
hey have acknowledged my innocence. This means the world to me, to 
Monia, to my kids, to my mother, and father, to my five brothers and sister. 
My suffering and the suffering of my family did not end when I was released. The 
struggle to clear my name has been long and hard. My kids have suffered silently. 
And I feel that I owe them a lot. I feel now that I can devote more time to being 
a good father to them. And to being a good husband. And to rebuilding my life. 
Maher Arar1 
5.1. Outline 
Canadian courts considered some important human rights-related foreign state immunity cases 
shortly after the issue became live in the UK. The three cases followed in this chapter were well-
argued and contain lengthy appraisals of the law by various Canadian judges (although some wind 
was taken out of the Arar litigation by the earlier determinations in the Bouzari proceedings).  
From attempts to shoehorn the acts complained into the commercial activity and tort exception, 
to the notion of interpreting the legislation in the light of customary international law or reading 
in an implied exception, the same tactics were tried by the Canadian complainants’ counsel as their 
counterparts in the UK and US. The results were not very different, with courts consistently 
coming down in favour of the clear wording of the prevailing statute. Due to prevalence of support 
for a dualist approach to the relationship between public international law and municipal law, 
courts have sometimes felt compelled to follow the clear wording of an immunity statute in the 
event of a conflict with a customary norm.2 In Canada, the State Immunity Act, RSC 1985 (‘SIA’), 
like its American and British counterparts, provided foreign states with a blanket immunity3 
subject to several enumerated exceptions.4 Regardless of the lack of an exception in the SIA for 
human rights violations (such as torture) committed outside Canadian territory, Canadian courts 
were still asked to determine whether immunity could be lifted in foreign state immunity suits 
with a human rights dimension. 
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5.2. Bouzari 
Bouzari v Iran5 was an action by Houshang Bouzari for damages for assault, including torture. 
Bouzari was an expatriate Iranian oil man working from Rome. In 1992 he helped secure a 
US$1.8bn contract relating to the South Pars project, involving development of the South 
Pars/North Dome Gas-Condensate field in Iran and Qatar. It was the world’s largest gas field, 
holding an estimated 1,800 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and approximately 50 billion barrels 
of natural gas condensates.6 Bouzari was to be paid 2% of the contract, approximately US$36m. 
He was approached by Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani (‘Mehdi’), the son of Iran’s then-President 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Bouzari claimed Mehdi told him he could help bring the project into 
effect in return for a US$50m commission.7 Bouzari refused. Mehdi then moved to cut Bouzari 
out of the project. So Bouzari flew to Iran in May 1993 to negotiate. On 1 June 1993, however,  
Bouzari alleged that having already been warned by a friend that he was not safe in Iran and one 
day before he was due to fly back to Paris, plain clothes police officers broke into his Tehran 
apartment and ordered him to drive at gunpoint to Tehran’s Evin Prison. Once there he was taken 
to the Ministry of Information’s Section 209 and held in a small cell and blindfolded for about 40 
days, during which time he was allegedly beaten and had his head pushed into a toilet filled with 
excrement.8 Around 10 July 1993 Bouzari was transferred to Towhid Detention Centre, where a 
US$1m ransom was demanded for his release, which he refused to pay. At Towhid Bouzari was 
allegedly subjected to fake executions, beatings with cables, was hung by the shoulders, and beaten 
around the ears with slippers.9 In summer 1993 the National Iranian Oil Company cancelled the 
US$1.8bn contract it had signed with the consortium Bouzari acted for.10 After Bouzari’s family 
purportedly paid ransoms totalling around US$3.25m Bouzari was released from prison allegedly 
by being left blindfolded in the middle of a Tehran traffic circle; Bouzari obtained a passport and 
                                                 
5 [2002] OJ No 1624. 
6 ‘South Pars attracts $15b in domestic investment’, Payvand Iran News (Tehran), 15 June 2010. 
7  Rafsanjani was later implicated in a scheme where French energy conglomerate Total SA paid €60m in bribes 
to companies controlled by Rafsanjani in return for a favourable contract relating to the PSEEZ off-shore 
natural gas field. See Charles Bremner, ‘Oil Chief Held in Second Corruption Investigation’, Times (Paris), 22 
March 2007. For more information on Rafsanjani’s overtures to Bouzari, see Sohrab Ahmari, ‘Escape from Iran: 
One Man’s Journey from Riches to the Torture Chamber to Freedom’, The Atlantic (Washington DC), March 20 
2012. 
8 Bouzari [2002] OJ No 1624 [9]. 
9 Ibid [10]. 
10 Ibid [11]. 
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in July 1994 escaped to Vienna, finally moving to Canada in July 1998 with his family as landed 
immigrants.11 
Swinton J of the Superior Court of Justice delivered the opinion. Due to space constraints, a much 
fuller analysis of Swinton J’s decision has been condensed to a short summary. Despite Swinton 
J’s decision being well-reasoned, the major issues were raised on appeal and thus covered below. 
Swinton J heard evidence from two experts, Prof Greenwood and Assoc Prof Morgan, who had 
opposing views on whether art 14 of the Convention Against Torture was territorially limited.12 
Swinton J rejected the reading in of an implied exception based on the primacy of jus cogens.13 
Bouzari was therefore unsuccessful at first instance. 
Bouzari appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, where the case was heard by Goudge, 
MacPherson and Cronk JJA.14 Goudge JA delivered the opinion of the court. Most important for 
present purposes is the analysis of what his Honour termed the ‘State Immunity Act Issue’15 and 
the ‘Public International Law Issue,’16 especially the latter. The State Immunity Act Issue 
encompassed Bouzari’s arguments under ss 5, 6, and 18 of the SIA that immunity should be lifted 
either because: (1) Iran had engaged in a commercial activity; (2) the territorial tort exception 
applied; or (3) the SIA does not apply to criminal proceedings. The s 18 issue fell away quickly as 
the mere pursuit of punitive damages does not convert a civil suit into a criminal proceeding.17  
On the tort issue, Goudge JA agreed with Swinton J and held ‘the SIA requires that the physical 
breach of personal integrity giving rise to the claim [must] take place in Canada.’18 Goudge JA 
expressly based his opinion on Lebel J’s Canadian Supreme Court in Schreiber v Germany at 
paragraph 80, which states: 
Therefore, the guiding principle in the interpretation of the s. 6(a) exception, more 
consonant with the principles of international law and with the still important principles 
of state immunity in international relations, is found in the French version of the provision. 
It signals the presence of a legislative intent to create an exception to state immunity which 
would be restricted to a class of claims arising out of a physical breach of personal integrity, 
                                                 
11 Ibid [12]-[14]. 
12 Ibid [46], [50]. 
13 Ibid [59]-[62]. 
14 Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675 (‘Bouzari v Iran’). 
15 Ibid 686-689. 
16 Ibid 689-696. 
17 Ibid 687. 
18 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 687. 
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consistent with the Quebec civil law term ‘préjudice corporel’. This type of breach could 
conceivably cover an overlapping area between physical harm and mental injury, such as 
nervous stress; however, the mere deprivation of freedom and the normal consequences of 
lawful imprisonment, as framed by the claim, do not allow the appellant to claim an 
exception to the State Immunity Act. This claim seems to be more in line with a Canadian 
Charter claim of deprivation of rights and is properly dismissed against the respondent, 
Germany.19 
It is important to note that nowhere in this passage does Lebel J state that the physical breach of 
personal integrity has to occur in Canada. Instead, Lebel J in Schreiber appears to be making 
allowance for the idea that a physical breach of personal integrity (such as torture) could create 
mental injury which sufficed to fit the definition of ‘personal injury’ in s 6 of the SIA. Regardless, 
Goudge JA ruled that the tort exception could not apply.20 
The third facet of the ‘State Immunity Act Issue’ was the SIA’s commercial activity exception. 
Bouzari argued the exception ‘applies because the acts of torture on which his claim is based are 
related to the appellant’s commercial activity in connection with the South Pars oil and gas field.’21 
Goudge JA again agreed with Swinton J.22 His Honour cited La Forest J in Re Canadian Labour 
Code,23 wherein it was necessary to determine whether the acts in question constituted commercial 
activity and whether the proceedings were related to that activity. Interestingly, Goudge JA noted 
La Forest J had found that the purpose of the act was ‘of some, although limited, use’24 in 
determining the nature of an act; however, it is usually the nature test which prevails in such 
determinations.25 Goudge JA found the ‘only aspect of the acts of torture that can be linked in any 
way to the commercial activity of Iran is their alleged purpose’26and concluded that upon due 
consideration the acts complained did not relate to commercial activity and therefore the 
commercial activity exception could not apply.27 As noted above in the analysis of this case at the 
lower level before Swinton J, the minority opinions of Blackmun and White JJ in Nelson may be 
weighed against Goudge JA’s ruling here.28 
                                                 
19 Schreiber v Germany [2002] 216 DLR (4th) 513, [80] (‘Schreiber’). 
20 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 687. 
21 Ibid 688. 
22 Ibid. 
23 [1992] 91 DLR (4th) 449. 
24 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 688. 
25 Empire of Iran (1963) 45 ILR 57, 65. 
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Goudge JA next dealt with the ‘Public International Law Issue’. This is the contention that the 
SIA ‘must be read in conformity with Canada’s public international law obligations’.29 These 
obligations were both treaty- and custom-based. As regards treaty obligations, Goudge JA framed 
the matter in terms redolent of the Polites principle:30 ‘Where Canada has undertaken treaty 
obligations … so far as possible, courts should interpret domestic legislation consistently with these 
treaty obligations.’31 His Honour felt the same about custom-based obligations: ‘customary rules 
of international law are directly incorporated into Canadian domestic law unless explicitly ousted 
by contrary legislation.’32 His Honour this was even truer where the relevant customary norm had 
the status of jus cogens.33 Therefore, if Bouzari could show that Canada’s treaty or customary 
obligations conflicted with a grant of immunity, he might be expected to have a good shot of 
defeating that immunity.  
Before considering the content of these obligations, however, Goudge JA recalled: ‘as Professors 
Brunnée and Toope have written, whether Canada’s obligations arise pursuant to treaty or to 
customary international law, it is open to Canada to legislate contrary to them.’34 Again and again, 
courts faced with the clear wording of a foreign state immunity statute have ruled in favour of 
immunity, no matter what judges thought about the content of the customary norms. A state 
might even legislate contrary to jus cogens, but there would be consequences on the international 
plane, Goudge JA notes.35 This, however, is not much comfort to plaintiffs, who cannot bring a 
case in the ICJ. As a matter of policy it is states should not legislate contrary to jus cogens.36 
Goudge JA next considered Canada’s international obligations, dealing first with treaty-based 
obligations. Argument hinged upon the Convention Against Torture, specifically art 14, as had 
Swinton J’s analysis below. The issue was whether art 14 of the Convention Against Torture 
required states to provide civil redress for torture wherever it occurred or only for torture 
committed within the forum. Agreeing with Swinton J, Goudge JA held ‘a full textual analysis of 
                                                 
29 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 689. 
30 Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60. 
31 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 690. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. ‘[I]t would put Canada in breach of its international obligations.’ 
36 It is a separate matter whether dualist doctrines technically require judges to follow the clear wording of a 
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Part Two, Chapter V 
93 
 
the provisions of the Convention shows that the absence of explicit territorial language does not 
necessarily mean the absence of territorial limitation. The text of the Convention itself simply 
provides no answer to the question.’37 Goudge JA accepted Prof Greenwood’s view that state 
practice militated against a lack of territorial limitation and agreed with the point about the US 
interpretative declaration. In Goudge JA’s view, state practice on the matter was determinative: art 
14 imposed no obligation to create civil avenues of redress for torture committed outside the 
forum.38 Bouzari also argued the court should have taken into consideration an earlier draft of art 
14, which contained the phrase ‘committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.’ Since a draft of 
the article was territorially limited, and that language was removed in the final provision, the 
implication is that the article was not territorially limited. Goudge JA, however, thought Swinton 
J did not err by accepting Prof Greenwood’s contention that the words were dropped ‘because they 
were superfluous.’39 Goudge JA did not explicitly endorse such a theory. His Honour simply said 
Swinton J did not err by accepting it. 
Bouzari also relied on art 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,40 
(‘ICCPR’) which enshrines the right to a fair hearing. This is similar to the case made by Al-Adsani 
before the ECtHR under his similar European Convention on Human Rights art 6 right to a fair 
hearing. Swinton J had accepted Prof Greenwood’s contention that art 14 of the ICCPR had ‘not 
been interpreted to date to require a state to provide access to its courts for sovereign acts 
committed outside its jurisdiction’.41 Goudge JA agreed. That concluded His Honour’s analysis of 
Canada’s treaty obligations. Next on the list was Canada’s customary obligations: the jus cogens 
argument. 
Bouzari basically argued ‘that Canada is bound by peremptory norms of customary international 
law to permit a civil claim against a foreign state for torture committed abroad.’42 Goudge JA 
accepted jus cogens norms had a higher status than regular norms. His Honour did not question 
the prohibition of torture had such a status, instead disagreeing with Bouzari’s contentions about 
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the norm’s scope. Goudge JA said Bouzari’s argument was ‘that if the prohibition against torture 
is to be respected, torture cannot be considered a state function and therefore cannot be accorded 
state immunity.’43 Reliance was here placed on the decision in R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate 
ex parte Pinochet (No. 3).44 Goudge JA said he did not agree with the argument, but his Honour 
did not really explain why,45 appearing mostly to distinguish Pinochet as a criminal and not a civil 
matter.46  The question whether it is legitimate to accept the argument that ‘the commission of … 
an international crime against humanity … [cannot] be done in an official capacity’47 in criminal 
matters but deny it in civil matters will be dealt with later. For now it might be well to quote Breyer 
J’s thoughts in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain an ATCA-related decision of the US Supreme Court noted 
briefly in an earlier chapter. In his concurrence Breyer J offered the following dictum: 
The fact that this procedural consensus exists [about universal criminal jurisdiction] 
suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is 
consistent with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation’s courts 
to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly 
threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That consensus 
concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself 
suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening. That is because the 
criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those 
injured by criminal conduct to be represented and to recover damages, in the criminal 
proceeding itself. Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a 
significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.48 (Emphasis added. Citations removed.) 
Despite the above, the distinction between suits against foreign governments and suits against 
foreign officials should be remembered. As regards suits against individual foreign officials outside 
the troika, Breyer J’s statement is accurate. If an individual foreign official possessed of immunity 
ratione materiae has no immunity in a criminal proceeding because his or her acts by violating jus 
cogens could not be said to have been committed in an official capacity, then there is no reason 
why such an immunity should prevail in a civil suit.  
Breyer J’s contention that universal civil jurisdiction is no more threatening than universal criminal 
jurisdiction might not be too controversial in the context of an action against an individual foreign 
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45 Bouzari v Iran [2004] 71 OR (3d) 675, 695. 
46 Ibid. 
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official who qualifies for immunity ratione materiae but not ratione personae; it is another matter 
as to whether the distinction between civil and criminal matters is as fuzzy in actions against foreign 
governments. To begin with, foreign governments cannot be held criminally responsible. One has 
to be careful, therefore, in transposing any of the arguments in Pinochet about Augusto Pinochet’s 
lack of immunity to the context of a suit against a foreign government. Rather than issues of 
whether the individual acted in an official capacity, with respondent governments the inquiry is 
whether the acted complained by nature is public (jure imperii) or private (jure gestionis). It is 
questionable whether one can automatically import the logic in Pinochet to a case like Bouzari.49 
On the other hand, if violation of jus cogens cannot grant a foreign official other than an incumbent 
troika member immunity because even if undertaken in the course of duty it was not ‘a legitimate 
official act,’50 then why should the same act be considered jure imperii in a suit against a foreign 
government? Arguably this is inconsistent.  
Goudge JA, however, rejected the Pinochet logic, saying ‘Pinochet concerned criminal proceedings 
against an individual, not civil proceedings against the state of Chile’ and noting three of the Lord 
Justices in Pinochet accepted that the civil immunity of a state would apply.51 His Honour did not 
consider the matter very deeply. Questions pertaining to the relation between foreign state and 
foreign official immunity are often side-stepped when these circumstances are considered in 
common law courts, because the relevant foreign state immunity statutes stand in the way and 
provide a specific regime that must be followed instead of inquiry into the customary norm.  
Ultimately, Goudge JA contended there is nothing in Canada’s treaty- or custom-based obligations 
necessitating a lifting of immunity in suits against foreign governments for violation of jus cogens 
norms.52 This decision found, as a matter of custom, immunity prevails in a suit against a foreign 
government when it has violated jus cogens. Since Swinton J relied in her reasoning partly on 
Siderman de Blake, and since Goudge JA agreed with her on the matter, it is interesting that neither 
Swinton J below nor Goudge JA on appeal considered or even mentioned Fletcher J’s statement 
                                                 
49 If this logic is accepted it is also a reason why foreign state immnunity statutes should not necessarily apply 
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that ‘international law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act. A state’s 
violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not be entitled to the 
immunity afforded by international law.’53 Regardless, on the so-called ‘Public International Law 
Issue’ Goudge JA agreed with Swinton J and disallowed Bouzari’s claim.54  
Next was Bouzari’s claim that the SIA’s s 3 grant of immunity was contrary to the Constitution.55 
Specifically it was said to conflict with s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which 
guarantees ‘[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.’56 This was 
also considered by Swinton J below,57 who ruled against Bouzari’s argument.58 Goudge JA agreed, 
finding ‘the Canadian government had no participation whatsoever in his abduction, confinement 
and torture in Iran’ and ‘it cannot be said that the precluding of the appellant’s claim for torture 
has itself caused him the kind of harm necessary to trigger s 7.’59 This final claim that s 3 of the 
SIA contravened the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was therefore dismissed by Goudge 
JA60 and the appeal was denied. An application for leave to appeal to The Supreme Court of 
Canada was dismissed on 27 January 2005.61 
5.3. Arar 
Maher Arar was born in Syria in 1970 and immigrated to Canada as a teenager with his family, 
becoming a Canadian Citizen.62 He obtained a Bachelor of Engineering in Computers from 
McGill University in 1995 and later earned a Master’s degree in telecommunications from the 
University of Quebec’s Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique.63 On 26 September 2002 
Arar was returning to Canada from a trip to Tunisia with family, his route taking him via 
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Switzerland and a lay-over in New York.64 In New York he was ‘pulled side by American customs 
officials’ and after questioning placed under arrest.65 After twelve days in detention at the John F 
Kennedy International Airport and the Metropolitan Detention Centre he was told on 8 October 
2002 he would be removed to Syria.66 This was because on the prior day the Regional Director of 
the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘INS’), an agency folded into the Department of 
Homeland Security months later on 1 March 2003, had issued an order finding Arar was a member 
of al-Qaeda.67 This was erroneous: Arar was not, and had never been, a member of al-Qaeda.68 
Although he did not know it, Arar was being subjected to a process known as extraordinary 
rendition.69 A Center for Constitutional Rights lawyer, Maria LaHood, later said in 2007 ‘[t]he 
C.I.A. involvement shows this was no immigration removal, this was rendition.’70 After a stop-
over in Jordan, Arar arrived in Syria late on 8 October,71 although the Syrian authorities later told 
Canadian officials Arar had not arrived until 20 October.72 Between 8 and 20 October Arar was 
subjected to beatings, with shredded electrical cable.73 ‘He was kept in a basement cell that was 
seven feet high, six feet long, and three feet wide’ containing only two blankets, a humidity isolator, 
and two bottles for water and urine.74 He remained in this cell for ’10 months and 10 days’.75 On 
20 August 2003 Arar was transferred to Sednaya Prison and on 5 October 2003 after signing a 
‘confession’ he was released from custody.76 
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Back in Canada, Arar filed suit against Syria and Jordan.77 He sought damages for the torture and 
beatings he suffered in Syria and his ten months of detention.78 As outlined above, the Bouzari 
case had already been heard before Arar’s case could be heard by the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice. When Arar’s case was heard on 28 February 2005 he conceded ‘most of the issues relevant 
to this motion’79 had already been decided in Bouzari. Therefore, arguments relating to the SIA’s 
commercial activity and torts exceptions, for example, were moot, as were questions relating to 
Canada’s custom- and treaty-based obligations in Goudge JA’s so-called ‘Public International Law 
Issue’ from Bouzari v Iran. The only issue for the Court to decide in Arar was whether s7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘the Charter’) ‘requires the granting of a constitutional 
exemption for torture which would allow Mr Arar to sue Syria and Jordan in an Ontario court.’80 
Syria did not appear or defend the action, but Jordan sought an order under the Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure81 for ‘an order dismissing the action on the basis that the plaintiff is not entitled 
to bring such an action by virtue of the provisions of the SIA.’82 On the one hand, then, Arar was 
claiming his Charter-based s 7 right to life, liberty, and security of the person required an exception 
to the SIA’s s 3 blanket grant of immunity to Syria and Jordan, while on the other hand Jordan 
claimed the SIA’s language barred the claim. Inherent in Jordan’s claim was the contention s 3 of 
the SIA did not conflict with s 7 of the Charter. 
Echlin J first considered the SIA’s provisions, claiming it ‘provides a simple, straightforward and 
general blanket immunity to foreign states from civil actions in Canada.’83 This much should be 
clear from the above analysis of Bouzari. Echlin J then ran through the regime of ‘specifically 
enumerated exceptions’.84 His Honour stressed that counsel for Arar, Mr Lorne Waldman, did not 
claim any of the SIA’s enumerated exceptions applied.85 As noted in the previous paragraph, this 
would have been futile in the light of Goudge JA’s delivery of the unanimous Ontario Court of 
Appeal decision the prior year, which was binding precedent and rejected all three strands of the  
                                                 
77 Arar v Syrian Arab Republic (2005) 155 ILR 368 (‘Arar’). 
78 Ibid 370-371. 
79 Ibid 372. 
80 Ibid 371. 
81 Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, 21.01(1)-(2). 
82 Arar (2005) 155 ILR 368, 371. 
83 Ibid 372. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
Part Two, Chapter V 
99 
 
‘State Immunity Act Issue’. Instead, Waldman argued that s 7 of the Charter overrode the SIA. As 
Echlin J put it, ‘[i]n essence, what he is asking this Court to do is “read into” the SIA a new section 
excluding immunity for claims involving torture occurring outside of Canada.’86 As should be 
obvious, this ‘reading in’ argument is similar to tactics employed in Al-Adsani,87 Jones,88 and 
Bouzari.89 Practically speaking it amalgamated the Charter argument90 and the ‘Public 
International Law Issue’91 in Bouzari. 
Although a s 7 Charter argument had already been unsuccessfully tried in Bouzari, Waldman in 
Arar argued that ‘once section 7 of the Charter was engaged, it should be open to this Court to 
determine that the principles of fundamental justice require this Court to grant a constitutional 
exemption to permit Mr Arar to seek compensation’.92 There was probably good reason for the 
Court to consider this argument, for the following reasons. In Bouzari the s 7 Charter argument 
carried almost no weight because the Canadian government had really done nothing to interfere 
with Bouzari’s life, liberty, and security of the person. The extent of Bouzari’s argument was that 
Canada had failed to provide him with a civil remedy for the evils inflicted by Iran.93 But in the 
present case an argument could be made that the Canadian authorities were at least tangentially 
complicit in the torture Arar suffered in Syria. For example, when Arar was being held in New 
York, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 94 (‘RCMP’) supplied the FBI with inaccurate 
information, including that he was in the Washington DC area on 11 September 2001 and that 
he had declined to be interviewed by Canadian authorities in January 2002 and had then ‘departed 
the country rather suddenly for Tunisia’ (when he in fact left five months later).95 This inaccurate 
information was transmitted to American authorities at a time when they ‘were apparently 
considering Mr. Arar’s fate.’96 Furthermore, the INS order of 7 October 2002 which (erroneously) 
found Arar to be a member of al-Qaeda ‘specifically referred to information obtained from Project 
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A-O Canada’.97 The RCMP also told American authorities that Arar was an ‘Islamic Extremist … 
suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement’ but had ‘no basis for this 
description’.98 Considering all this, Waldman’s claim that there was ‘complicity of Canada in the 
acts of torture complained of by Mr Arar [which] should engage this guarantee of fundamental 
justice’99 carried some weight. Unfortunately for Arar, the case was heard before the Arar Report 
was published in 2006. If the facts above, drawn from the 2006 report, were available to Waldman 
at the time he might have been able to plead them. As it was, Echlin J found ‘a close examination 
… of the pleading does not reveal … allegations of complicity’.100 (Formatting removed.) As 
Waldman could not point to any specific complicity of Canada in the deprivation of Arar’s life, 
liberty, and security of person, Echlin J concluded ‘I cannot find that section 7 of the Charter has 
been engaged.’101 
It would be interesting to see how Echlin J would have reacted to the evidence later made public 
in the 2006 Arar Report, which appears to show at least some Canadian complicity in Arar’s ‘torture 
trip’102 to Syria. The judgment’s wording seems to imply His Honour would have had to pay more 
mind to the s 7 Charter argument if it could be shown Canada was actually complicit in the 
violation of Arar’s right to life, liberty, and security of person. As it was, without the benefit of the 
Arar Report’s factual findings, Waldman was unable to put the case in stronger terms than it was 
made in Bouzari, except for the circumstance that Arar was a Canadian citizen while Bouzari was 
not. In essence, however, both claims merely alleged Canada by upholding immunity had violated 
s 7 of the Charter, and this was not enough. Evidence relating to the inaccurate information 
furnished by the RCMP to American authorities may have tipped the scales somewhat, but this is 
only speculation. As matters stood, Echlin J acknowledged the ‘horrendous circumstances’ which 
‘significantly affected’ Arar’s life, but felt bound by the terms of the SIA which was ‘concise and 
… clear’.103 His Honour further acknowledged the ‘considerable commentary’ surrounding 
proposals to amend the SIA to exclude immunity for torture, but stressed it was the Parliament 
                                                 
97 Ibid 147. 
98 Ibid 13. 
99 Arar (2005) 155 ILR 368, 373. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid 374. 
102 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co, 9th ed, 2009) 1410. 
103 Arar (2005) 155 ILR 368, 374-375. 
Part Two, Chapter V 
101 
 
and only the Parliament which could effect such a change.104 This reminds one of Scrutton LJ’s 
pronouncement in The Porto Alexandre that he sympathised with the argument to shift from 
absolute to restrictive immunity but that ‘it seems to me the remedy is not in these Courts.’105 In 
the event, His Lordship was incorrect: a little over half a century later the remedy indeed lay in the 
courts, with the landmark decisions in The Philippine Admiral106 and Trendtex.107 The difference 
is that the common law then prevailed, there being no foreign state immunity statute in the UK 
until 1978. With the SIA’s passage in 1982 Canada became subject to a statutory regime. As such, 
Echlin J’s pronouncement is far more accurate than was Scrutton LJ’s: when a foreign state 
immunity statute applies and no applicable enumerated exception can be found it lies with the 
legislature to ensure fundamental justice by the passage of a timely amendment to the law. Arar 
was therefore left without a remedy in the courts. There was a silver lining, however: on 26 January 
2007 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued an apology to Arar on behalf of his 
government and announced a CA$10.5m compensation package.108 
5.4. Kazemi 
Zahra Kazemi was a photojournalist born in Shiraz, Iran in 1948, who after moving to France in 
1974 finally immigrated to Quebec in 1993 and became a dual Iranian-Canadian citizen. The 2nd 
of Khordad Movement going on in Iran at the time was named from the date in the Muslim 
calendar when a reform-oriented cleric, Mohammed Khatami, had been elected President of 
Iran.109 Khatami was re-elected in 2001; however, Iranian institutions such as the Presidency and 
Parliament ‘are weak when compared to the Guardian Council … and the Office of the Leader’,110 
which posts were occupied by conservative religious figures. President Khatami’s weakness was 
complemented by the ardour of reformist protesters who periodically rose up on his behalf; these 
in turn, however, were usually countered effectually by security forces. In 2003, the Daftar-e 
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Tahkim-e Vahdat,111 a student organisation and part of the 2nd of Khordad Movement, held 
demonstrations in Tehran, which Kazemi was allowed into the country to cover. The protesters 
were crushed by security forces, with many taken to Evin Prison, home of a notorious wing for 
political prisoners. Kazemi went to the prison to cover the story, but was arrested after an 
altercation. She later died in Iranian custody, apparently having been killed after suffering torture 
and sexual abuse by Iranian authorities.112 
Kazemi’s son Salman (or Stephan) Hashemi filed suit in the Quebec Superior Court, on his own 
behalf and on behalf of his mother’s estate, against Iran, its Head of State, the Chief Public 
Prosecutor of Tehran, and the Deputy Chief of Intelligence of Evin Prison (‘the Defendants’).113 
Mongeon JSC delivered the opinion of the court. Due to space constraints, Mongeon JSC’s 
judgment must be described briefly. Mongeon JSC concluded that Hashemi’s claim to have 
endured ‘psychological trauma’ was distinguishable from mere ‘mental anguish’ and involved the 
conclusion that ‘Mr Hashemi’s physical integrity has been attacked.’114 Mongeon JSC concluded 
the blanket immunity in SIA s 3 was constitutionally valid in that it violated neither the Canadian 
Bill of Rights nor the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; that the s 3 immunity applied to all 
the defendants (to be discussed in Chapter VIII); and that Hashemi’s, but not Kazemi’s estate’s, 
claim could proceed on the basis of the torts exception to the s 3 immunity under SIA s 6(a). The 
claim on behalf of Kazemi’s estate was therefore dismissed, but Hashemi’s was allowed to proceed 
to a further stage.115 
Following Mongeon JSC’s decision to allow Hashemi’s claim (but not Kazemi’s estate) to proceed, 
the Defendants and the Estate appealed. The appeals were heard in the Quebec Court of Appeal 
by Morissette, Wagner, and Gascon JJA, with the unanimous opinion delivered by Morissette 
JA.116 His Honour began by noting the ‘evil and abhorrent’ nature of torture, the prohibition of 
which had the status of a jus cogens norm, but interposed state immunity and said the present case 
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and appeal ‘result from a possible conflict between these two rules.’117 His Honour had to consider 
four main issues on appeal, which were: the precise reach of SIA s 3, including whether the SIA 
constituted a complete codification of foreign state immunity; whether the exception in SIA s 6(a) 
applies to allow Hashemi to sue the Defendants in his personal capacity; whether the foreign 
official defendants were covered by the same immunity as the Iranian state; and whether SIA s 3 
was invalid due to the Canadian Bill of Rights or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.118 
As the third issue deals with foreign official immunity it will be dealt with in a later chapter. After 
reciting the facts, history of the case below, and the statutory regime, Morissette JA began his 
analysis of the merits by tackling the four appeal issues in order.119 
The first consideration was whether the SIA constituted a complete codification of foreign state 
immunity law.120 Kazemi’s estate and several interveners argued the SIA ‘must be interpreted in a 
manner which is consistent with external sources, namely customary international law and jus 
cogens’.121 This is redolent of Diplock LJ’s statement in Alcom122 that the British SIA’s ‘provisions 
fall to be construed against the background of those principles of public international law as are 
generally recognised by the family of nations’.123 Similar arguments were made in Al-Adsani,124 
where the Court was urged to interpret the s 1(1) blanket immunity as ‘a reference to immunity 
in accordance with public or general international law.’125 (Emphasis added.) Hashemi argued a new 
customary norm had emerged which prohibited immunity in case of gross violations of human 
rights such as torture.126 Reliance was placed on a passage of LeBel J’s decision in Kuwait Airways 
v Iraq127 which appeared to allow the possibility that the SIA was not exhaustive and that exceptions 
to immunity in case of jus cogens violations might exist under customary international law.128 
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Morissette JA, however, thought ‘an especially strong argument’129 would need to be developed to 
defeat the apparently clear wording of SIA s 3, which provides a blanket immunity ‘[e]xcept as 
provided by this Act’. His Honour thought the plaintiffs had not made out such an argument.130 
Furthermore, taking the same approach as Goudge JA in Bouzari,131 Morissette JA noted that even 
if an exception to immunity for jus cogens violations had arisen under customary international law 
since the passage of the SIA, this would not really create a ‘genuine ambiguity’ in the statute but 
instead would tend to show ‘a contradiction between the SIA and a principle of international 
law.’132 Quoting Pigeon J in Daniels v White,133 Morissette JA noted the judicial practice that where 
possible statutes would be interpreted in conformity with international law but in the case of a 
clearly worded conflicting statute the statute would prevail.134 Morissette JA thought the s 3 blanket 
immunity was subject only to specific, enumerated exceptions.135 
As to whether there might be a customary norm mandating the lifting of immunity for jus cogens 
violations, Morissette JA cited the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v 
Italy; Greece Intervening).136 This case will be analysed in Chapter VI. Morissette JA noted Italy’s 
jus cogens-based ‘last resort’ argument had been rejected by the ICJ.137 Basically, the ICJ had said 
foreign state immunity was a procedural matter to be dealt with at a preliminary stage of 
proceedings, while issues of jus cogens violations were to be dealt with at the substantive stage; 
therefore, the norms could never come into conflict. Morissette JA thought the facts mirrored 
those in Germany v Italy, which case ‘provides a conclusive refutation of the arguments against 
jurisdictional immunity’ raised by Hashemi.138 
Morissette JA also considered whether art 14 of the Convention Against Torture necessitated an 
exception to the SIA’s blanket immunity. His Honour relied on the reasoning of Swinton J and 
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Goudge JA, who thought art 14 was territorially limited.139 Morissette JA noted the Committee 
against Torture’s statement that Canada ‘should ensure that all victims are able to access remedy 
and obtain redress, wherever acts of torture occurred,’140 yet his Honour thought this statement 
‘point[ed] to a “possible or even hoped for future” of conventional international law—to borrow 
the words of Goudge JA”’.141 Regardless, Morissette JA thought the recent decision in Germany v 
Italy had made ‘abundantly clear that customary international law is far from having reached that 
stage of development.’142 Morissette JA contended the Committee against Torture was making a 
statement de lege ferenda by ‘point[ing] to what in their opinion would be a desirable change, 
though not one mandated by an existing obligation.’143 His Honour concluded that ‘the SIA is a 
complete codification of the law of state immunity in Canada [and] that no exceptions to 
immunity other than those contained therein may be invoked’.144 As such Hashemi’s only hope 
for success was the SIA s 6(a) exception to immunity, whilst the hopes for Kazemi’s Estate lay in 
the possibility of a finding that the SIA unconstitutionally conflicted with the Canadian Bill of 
Rights or Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
On the matter of whether the SIA s 6(a) tort exception could apply to Hashemi’s claim in his own 
name, Morissette JA had to consider whether the facts alleged by Hashemi ‘disclose[d] a triable 
cause of action against the defendants.’145 One issue depended upon the meaning of the words 
‘death or personal or bodily injury … that occurs in Canada.’146 Did the provision require both 
the cause of the damage and the damage itself to occur in Canada, or was only the latter required? 
The defendants argued both needed to be fulfilled. Persinger v Iran147 was cited, where Bork J 
considered the meaning of the US FSIA, which contained similar wording.148 In Bork J’s opinion, 
the US FSIA’s language was ambiguous. After some consideration, and with the aid of extrinsic 
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materials, Bork J concluded the ultimate meaning of the statute was that both the causative act and 
the damage had to occur in the US.149 Morrisette JA, however, seemed to agree with Edwards J’s 
dissent in Persinger, where Edwards J concluded there was no ambiguity in the statute’s wording—
which thereby precluded resort to extrinsic materials—and that the provision only required the 
damage to have occurred in the US.150 In Morissette JA’s opinion, therefore, only the damage 
needed to occur in Canada, not the cause.151  
The other question relating to s 6(a) went to whether the damage Hashemi suffered could be truly 
said to have met the definition of a ‘personal or bodily injury’. Morissette JA cited the work of Prof 
Nathalie Vezina, who in 1993 had already noticed a recent tendency in Canadian law to include 
psychological injuries under the umbrella of bodily injury.152 Montreal v Tarquini,153 where a next 
of kin was held to be validly claiming for ‘bodily injury’ that was not in fact suffered by that person, 
but instead by their deceased relative, lent some credence to Prof Vezina’s observations. Morissette 
JA, however, thought the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Schreiber154 was on point. 
Basically, although the English text of the SIA allowed lifting of immunity for both bodily injury 
and personal injury, the French text only used the single term ‘dommages corporels’.155 The concept 
of dommages corporels required a breach of ‘physical integrity.’156 At the time of the SIA’s enactment 
the terms ‘personal injury’ and ‘dommages corporels’ had a narrow scope and required a breach of 
physical integrity.157  
Although the English text of the SIA had since been amended to refer not only to personal injury 
but also to bodily injury, the French text was unchanged and only allowed lifting of immunity for 
a dommages corporels, which required a breach of physical integrity. Morissette JA therefore found 
that the ‘common intention of the legislator’ required the claimant personally to have suffered 
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some form of breach of physical integrity in order for resultant psychological damage to fall under 
SIA s 6(a).158 In effect, because the English text was wider than the narrower French text, only the 
latter could be said to evidence the legislature’s intentions. Schreiber and Friedland were relied on 
in this respect. Hashemi needed to show that his suffering was based on a breach of his physical 
integrity. It will be recalled that Mongeon J thought Hashemi could make such an arguement. 
Morissette JA, however, ‘respectfully disagree[d]’.159 The possibility of Hashemi’s case proceeding 
under the s6(a) tort exception was precluded. Morissette JA next considered whether two foreign 
officials, Morazavi and Bakshi, were covered by foreign state immunity. This is a matter of foreign 
official immunity and will be dealt with in Chapter VIII.  
It only remained for Morissette JA to consider the challenges to the SIA’s constitutional validity, 
that is whether or not SIA s 3(1) infringed s 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights or s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.To reiterate, s 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights 
guarantees a right to a ‘fair hearing’. In a pleading similar to the ‘last resort’ argument raised by 
Italy at the ICJ in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Hashemi contended that where Kazemi’s 
Estate sought redress against Iran for violation of a peremptory norm, and where Iran did not offer 
a forum to fairly entertain the claim within its jurisdiction, Canada would not be violating 
customary international norms by providing a forum for Kazemi’s Estate to sue Iran.160 Kazemi’s 
Estate cited Aristocrat v National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan161 in support of this stance. 
Aristocrat involved the plaintiff buying shares in Alembank, which the defendant using its 
regulatory powers had merged with another institution, resulting in substantial loss to the plaintiff. 
There Granger JA had stated that if Kazakhstan did not offer a fair hearing to Aristocrat then 
Canada would have to provide one or else Aristocrat’s right to a fair hearing under s 2(e) would 
have been infringed. Morissette JA, however, Considered Granger JA’s opinion on this point to be 
obiter and not a binding precedent.162  
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Morissette JA cited the judgment in Authorson v Canada (Attorney-General),163 in support of the 
opinion that s 2(e) did not guarantee ‘a self-standing right to a fair hearing’,164 but only guaranteed 
that if there was a hearing it was to be a fair one. Because the SIA s 3(1) blanket grant of immunity 
disallowed a substantive hearing, Morissette JA thought ‘no determination of the Estate’s rights is 
therefore contemplated by the relevant law and s 2(e) of the Bill of Rights cannot apply.’165 It is 
questionable whether Kazemi’s Estate really argued that s 2(e) gave it a ‘self-standing right’ to a 
hearing. Kazemi’s Estate was making a claim for bodily or personal injury. The laws of Canada 
provide for these types of proceedings to be brought, in other words the ‘self-standing right’ to a 
fair hearing might be said to be found in the tort law of Canada. All the SIA s 3(1) grant of 
immunity did was intercept that self-standing right. 
The s 2(e) right to a fair hearing argument is similar to an argument put to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Al-Adsani.166 In Al-Adsani, the court ruled that the grant of state immunity had 
interfered with the claimant’s right to a fair hearing, but that this was permissible because the UK 
had a margin for appreciation and the limitation was not disproportionate or for an illegitimate 
purpose.167 Whether or not one agrees that the UK was within its margin of appreciation, it seems 
clear that the grant of immunity did deny Al-Adsani a fair hearing. Kazemi’s Estate could be said 
to have been denied a fair hearing on the same basis. Morissette JA did not refer to this part of the 
ruling in Al-Adsani, instead relying on Authorson and claiming because s 3(1) provided immunity 
there was no right to a trial and hence s 2(e) ‘cannot apply.’168 
Finally, Morissette JA considered Hashemi’s claim that SIA s 3(1) infringed his right to liberty 
under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, citing inter alia R v Morgentaler169 and 
Godbout v Longueuil170 for the proposition that the s7 right to liberty included the right to make 
decisions of ‘fundamental personal importance’.171 Hashemi claimed immunity inhibited his right 
to sue Iran and infringed his liberty by precluding his ability to make a decision of fundamental 
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importance (the decision to sue). There was confusion about whether Hashemi was thereby 
claiming s 7 enshrined a ‘right to sue.’172 When pressed, Hashemi would only say it enshrined a 
‘right to seek accountability.’173 Morissette JA considered there was no real difference.174 Bouzari175 
was the only case which was arguably on point and it seemed to suggest there was no right to sue. 
Hashemi argued Bouzari had been wrongly decided, but Morissette JA rejected the contention and 
thus held SIA s 3(1) did not infringe Hashemi’s s 7 liberty interest. As such, this portion of the 
claim was rejected. Morissette JA thus found that the SIA was a comprehensive code which would 
not suffer an implicit exception to be read into s 3(1); that s 6(a) did not apply to Hashemi’s claim; 
and that neither Kazemi’s Estate under the Canadian Bill of Rights nor Hashemi under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms could establish the constitutional invalidity of SIA s 3(1). 
His Honour therefore allowed Iran’s appeal and dismissed that of Kazemi’s Estate.  
Hashemi and Kazemi’s estate then appealed the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal to the 
Canadian Supreme Court,176 where LeBel J delivered the majority decision, identifying five key 
issues: whether an implicit exception for torture could be read into the SIA blanket immunity; 
whether the s  6 tort exception could apply to Hashemi’s claim; whether the SIA applied to two of 
the foreign officials who had been impleaded as defendants; whether SIA s 3(1) conflicted with s 
2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights; and finally whether SIA s 3(1) conflicted with s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.177 The third issue pertains to foreign official immunity 
and will be dealt with in Chapter VIII.  
LeBel J split the analysis of the first issue into two sections: whether the SIA represented a complete 
codification of foreign state immunity, and whether international law rendered SIA s 3(1) 
ambiguous or otherwise required an implicit exception for torture to be read in. His Honour did 
note the opinion of at least one publicist that the SIA need not be considered exhaustive.178 François 
Larocque thought there was nothing in the statute that precluded application of the common law, 
and that Canadian law would be frozen in time if common law was not allowed to be utilised in 
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the application of the statutory regime.179 LeBel J, however, disagreed with Larocque’s view, 
finding (in line with Mongeon J and Morissette JA, and with the UK cases Al-Adsani and Jones)  
the SIA was an exhaustive codification which ‘completely ousted’ the common law.180 Next LeBel 
J considered whether international law (rather than the common law) rendered SIA s 3(1) 
ambiguous such that an exception for torture had to be read in. Here again, the clear wording of a 
statute must prevail.181 Due to the SIA’s clear wording, LeBel J thus ruled that neither the common 
law nor customary international law could be used to read an implicit exception for torture into 
the s 3(1) blanket grant of immunity. 
LeBel J next considered whether Hashemi’s claim could proceed under the SIA s 6(a) tort 
exception.182 Christopher D Bredt and Heather Pessione delivered arguments for the amicus curiae, 
appointed to address arguments on which the Canadian Attorney-General took no position.183 
The amicus claimed that for an SIA s 6(a) argument to succeed, both the cause of the damage and 
the damage itself must occur in Canada.184 This aligns with Bork J’s view in Persinger, but 
contradicts Edwards J’s dissent. Alternatively, the amicus argued the injury countenanced under s 
6(a) must be a physical injury.185 The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (‘BCCLA’) 
argued injury under s 6(a) should include psychological injury.186 Canadian Lawyers for 
International Human Rights (‘CLAIHR’) made a similar submission, claiming the Court of Appeal 
below erred in finding ‘serious psychological trauma’ could not come within the exception to state 
immunity in s 6(a).187 CLAIHR maintained a psychological/physical distinction was inconsistent 
with s 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.188 It produced research showing ‘there 
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is no distinction between psychological and physical injuries’189 (presumably such research shows 
psychological injury corporeally affects the brain, producing physical trauma). 
LeBel J identified two key questions in relation to the s 6(a) argument: (1) must both the cause 
and the effect of the injury occur in Canada, or is only the latter required; and (2) does s 6(a) 
include psychological trauma, or is the personal and bodily injury there referring only to a breach 
of physical integrity?190 His Honour admitted s 6(a) could be read in two ways:191 either it requires 
both the cause and the effect occur in Canada or it only requires the latter. LeBel J agreed with the 
amicus and followed Bork J’s reasoning in Persinger,192 ruling both the cause and the effect had to 
occur in Canada. Extrinsic material was referred to, namely the purpose of the act.193 As Edwards 
J noted in Persinger, it would only be permissible to refer to such material if the provision were 
truly ambiguous; however, similarly to how Edwards J argued in relation to the US FSIA, there is 
arguably nothing ambiguous about s 6(a) of the SIA, which requires ‘personal or bodily injury … 
that occurs in Canada.’194 Nowhere in s 6 does it say the cause of the injury must occur in Canada.  
His Honour claimed interpreting s 6(a) to only require the injury occur in Canada would produce 
‘absurd results’.195 Yet consider the case of a foreign official shooting a gun from the US side of the 
border, with the bullet hitting and killing a woman on the Canadian side of the border. Or more 
generally imagine any tort begun on the US side of the border which produced effects on the 
Canadian side. Under LeBel J’s reading, s 6(a) could not apply because only the injury and not the 
cause occurred in Canada. Surely this is far more absurd than ‘two individuals … suffer[ing] the 
exact same treatment in a foreign country [and] the ability to bring a civil suit [being] determined 
solely on the jurisdiction where each individual’s injuries manifest themselves.’196 Regardless, LeBel 
J thought by requiring both the cause and the injury occur in Canada ‘the purposes of sovereign 
equality’ could be upheld ‘without leading to absurd results.’197  Both the cause and the effect were 
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therefore required to occur in Canada.198 Furthermore, LeBel J, following Schreiber, ruled there 
must be a physical breach of integrity for s 6(a) to apply and that psychological trauma was not 
enough.199 His Honour did not appear to address CLAIHR’s claims that recent science shows there 
is no difference between psychological and physical trauma; however, in fairness, it should be noted 
that generally the law notoriously been loath to allow tortious compensation for pure psychiatric 
injury.200 
LeBel J proceeded by dealing with the claim that the SIA conflicted with s 2(e) of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights and was therefore unconstitutional.201 The provision in question guarantees: 
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of 
Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed 
and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, 
abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and 
declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to … 
deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.202 [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Court of Appeal below ruled s 2(e) did not provide a ‘substantive right’ to a trial, but only 
guaranteed a fair hearing where there was already a right to one. The appellants argued the Bill of 
Rights should be interpreted in a ‘liberal and purposive’ way and that the SIA does not extinguish 
substantive rights but rather creates a procedural bar, which is incompatible with the guarantee of 
a right to a fair hearing under s 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.203 As Fox notes, state immunity is indeed 
a procedural bar, not an absence of substantive jurisdiction.204 The Canadian Attorney-General 
attempted to argue s 2(e) ‘only protects rights that existed when it was enacted in 1960.’205 
Alternatively, the Attorney-General submitted in line with the Court of Appeal’s ruling below that 
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s 2(e) only creates ‘a procedural right to natural justice’ but ‘does not provide a right of access to 
courts or a right to sue’.206 Respectfully, the Bill of Rights clearly says no law of Canada shall be 
construed or applied so as to … deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing’. It seems undeniable 
Hashemi and Kazemi’s Estate were both deprived of the right to a fair hearing. It is the author’s 
opinion that the grant of immunity clearly conflicts with rights to fair hearing. Chapter VI shows 
the recent approach of the Italian Constitutional Court in this regard. 
The Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre (‘IHRDC’) argued that, since the appellants 
could not obtain a fair hearing in Iran, the further denial of access to court in Canada would leave 
them completely without a right to a fair hearing.207 The logic here is similar to that employed by 
Italy in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, and also agrees with the logic in Aristocrat that if 
Kazakhstan did not provide a fair hearing then the denial of access to court in Canada would violate 
the s 2(e) guarantee of a right to a fair hearing. Instead of addressing this claim, LeBel J agreed 
with the Attorney-General that s 2(e) ‘does not create a self-standing right to a fair hearing where 
the law does not otherwise allow for an adjudicative process.’208 This would be the equivalent of 
the ECtHR ruling that art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not engaged by the 
grant of state immunity (of course the ECtHR ruled the opposite). His Honour cites Authorson v 
Canada, where the Canadian Supreme Court found the s 2(e) ‘only appl[ied] in the context of a 
proceeding before a court or tribunal; it does not create a right to a hearing …’.209  Therefore, 
LeBel J was following Canadian Supreme Court precedent, but a precedent which declares the 
s2(e) guarantee of ‘a right to a fair hearing’ ‘does not create a right to a hearing’ must remain 
doubtful at best. LeBel J claims ‘[t]o engage the right to a fair hearing … a court or tribunal must 
properly have jurisdiction over a matter.’210 State immunity, however, is a procedural bar to an 
otherwise existing jurisdiction. It is not an absence of jurisdiction, but a bar to it. Therefore, the 
court properly does have jurisdiction over the matter. The question is whether jurisdiction is 
barred. No substantive right is created by s 2(e). The substantive right is granted by the laws of 
Canada which allow recovery for personal injury and torture.  
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LeBel J contended Singh was unhelpful to the appellants because there ‘access to an adjudicator 
was already foreseen within the framework of the Immigration Act 1976.’211 Could not the same 
be said for Kazemi’s Estate and Hashemi? The common law of Canada allows civil suit for personal 
injury, surely this is the substantive right which foresees access to an adjudicator? LeBel J further 
cited Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization,212 which relied on Authorson in 
support of the contention that s 2(e) ‘does not create a substantive right to make a claim.’213 Again, 
it does not appear that anyone in the case actually argued s 2(e) did create a substantive right to 
make a claim. Having concluded the SIA did not infringe s 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
LeBel J next considered whether the SIA was unconstitutional by virtue of infringing s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which it will be recalled guarantees: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Unlike in the Court of Appeal, where Hashemi unsuccessfully argued his liberty had been infringed 
by the grant of immunity, here the appellants instead mounted an argument that security of the 
person was infringed. 
Lebel J therefore had to examine: (1) whether the SIA grant of immunity in cases involving torture 
infringes security of the person; and (2) whether it does so in violation of the principles of 
fundamental justice.214 The appellants claimed that the barring of an individual seeking redress for 
a family member’s death by torture ‘exacerbates trauma’ and triggers a security of the person 
interest, in that the grant of immunity creates further psychological distress.215 The Attorney-
General claimed s 7 of the Charter was not engaged because Hashemi was alleging distress from 
damage his mother suffered in Iran, not from his inability to sue in Canada.216 The Attorney-
General further argued there was no evidence to show the prohibition of access to court hampers 
rehabilitation and that the suffering was neither ‘profound’ nor ‘serious.’217 Redress intervened, 
claiming the s 3(1) grant of immunity caused Hashemi trauma, because the denial of an effective 
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remedy causes psychological harm.218 Lebel J noted Canadian case-law219 says ‘[s]tate action may 
engage security of the person when that action has an impact on an individual’s psychological 
integrity.’220 To engage, the state action must ‘have a serious and profound effect’.221 (Emphasis 
added.) There must also be a ‘causal connection’.222 To determine whether security of the person 
had been engaged, LeBel J therefore had to inquire whether: (1) the grant of immunity imposed 
serious psychological prejudice; and (2) such prejudice was causally connected to the actions of the 
Canadian state. 
LeBel J accepted that ‘impunity for torture can cause significant psychological harm’.223 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), for example, declared ‘impunity worsens the 
psychological suffering’ and ‘causes new psychosocial damage’.224 The IACHR also concluded 
‘realization of justice [is] extremely important for the rehabilitation of the victims of torture,’225 in 
direct contradiction of the Canadian Attorney-General’s claim that there is no evidence that 
prohibition of access to court hampers rehabilitation. LeBel J therefore accepted the grant of 
immunity in a case involving torture ‘causes … serious psychological harm.’226 His Honour now 
had to conclude whether there was sufficient causal nexus between the harm and the state action.227 
The Canadian Attorney-General in another case (relating to pimps and prostitutes)228 argued ‘the 
source of the harm was third parties—the johns who use and abuse prostitutes and the pimps who 
exploit them’.229 The Canadian Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, noting ‘it makes 
no difference’ that the johns and pimps were the ‘immediate source of the harms’ because the 
‘impugned laws deprive people … of the means to protect themselves’.230 The same argument 
holds true here. It matters not that Iran and its servants were the immediate source of the harm 
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suffered by Kazemi and Hashemi; if the SIA grant of immunity causes harm, there is still a causal 
connection. Moreover, the third parties (Iran and its servants) are not responsible for the lack of a 
remedy in Canada, which is the subject of the security of the person claim. The immediate source 
of the relevant harm is the SIA’s grant of immunity, so the Attorney-General’s argument that ‘Iran, 
not Canada, caused the immediate harm’231 is rendered nonsensical. LeBel J therefore accepted 
that the denial of access to court in a case involving torture imposed serious prejudice that was 
causally connected to the state’s action. The appellants’ security of person was therefore engaged, 
and they had established that security was infringed. It remained for His Honour to determine if 
it was infringed in violation of the principles of fundamental justice. 
The appellants argued that Canada’s laws outlawing torture, the Iranian failure to deliver justice, 
and Canada’s obligations under art 14 of the Convention Against Torture amounted to such a 
violation of fundamental justice.232 The Attorney-General replied: (1) the appellants failed to 
identify a specific principle of fundamental justice; (2) art 14 of the Convention Against Torture 
should be interpreted as territorially-limited, such that the provision did not benefit the appellants; 
and (3) a civil remedy for victims of torture does not meet the criteria for a new principle of 
fundamental justice.233 For a rule to be a principle of fundamental justice, it must be a legal 
principle about which there is significant societal consensus fundamental to the way in which the 
legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision.234 
LeBel J found there was no consensus that art 14 of the Convention Against Torture should be 
interpreted to allow universal civil jurisdiction.235 His Honour noted the USA’s declaration upon 
ratification of the Convention that it understood art 14 as not requiring a civil avenue of redress 
for torture committed outside US territory,236 and noted the House of Lords and ECtHR had 
ruled the same in Jones v Saudi Arabia and Jones v United Kingdom.237 Furthermore, in relation to 
art 14’s wording, LeBel J was ‘not convinced [that the] absence of an express territorial limit can 
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be determinative’.238 The appellants relied on the Committee Against Torture’s General Comment 
No 3, which stated ‘article 14 is not limited to victims who were harmed in the territory of the 
State party’. The Canadian Bar Association urged the Court ‘to place heavy reliance on the 
Committee’s comments;’239 however, LeBel J thought the Committee’s comments should not be 
given greater weight than the US declaration or the opinions of the House of Lords and ECtHR. 
This is debatable, as the Committee Against Torture is the very body created to oversee the 
Convention Against Torture. 
It was LeBel J’s opinion that, even if art 14 was not territorially limited, not all commitments in 
international agreements amount to principles of fundamental justice.240 His Honour conceded 
that a jus cogens norm could generally be equated with a principle of fundamental justice, but noted 
that the jus cogens norm in question was the prohibition in torture, not the requirement to lift 
immunity in cases of a violation of a jus cogens norm. The question was therefore whether the norm 
prohibiting torture ‘extends in such a way as to require each state to provide a civil remedy for 
torture committed abroad by a foreign state.’241 LeBel J noted the courts had considered this point 
and answered in the negative.242 In His Honour’s view, Canada could not be compelled to ‘open 
its courts’243 in this manner. 
The David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights and the International Human Rights Program 
at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law mounted a final argument that s 3(1) of the SIA was 
unconstitutional because it prevented remedies for gross human rights violations and ‘where there 
is a right there must be a remedy’244 (ubi jus ibi remedium). Kerner J of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated ‘[i]t is an elementary maxim of equity jurisprudence that there is no wrong without 
a remedy.’245 LeBel J agreed this was a legal maxim, but could not accept it was a principle of 
fundamental justice246 and doubted whether it ‘disclose[d] a manageable standard as required by 
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Malmo-Levine’.247 It seems strange to contend an elementary legal maxim could not be a principle 
of fundamental justice, and even stranger to conclude that it discloses no manageable standard: 
surely the standard is that there must be a remedy? Nonetheless, LeBel J concluded that while s 
3(1) ‘may engage security of the person, no identifiable principle of fundamental justice has been 
violated.’248 Section 3(1) was therefore held not to infringe s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and the appeal was dismissed. Abella J confined a spirited dissent to issues pertaining 
to foreign official immunity. 
5.5. Summary 
The cases selected above show the evolution of attempts to establish a human rights exception to 
foreign state immunity in Canada. Some basic lessons from earlier UK cases were repeated in the 
Canadian experience. The attempt to shoehorn a human rights exception into categories of 
statutory exceptions that were not designed for such a purpose often fell flat, as has been seen with 
attempts by Canadian claimants to categorise the acts complained under the commercial activity 
or territorial tort exception. Furthermore, the plain wording of the Canadian SIA and the blanket 
immunity it grants prevented any implied exception for jus cogens violations being read in. The 
UK claimants, by the time their cases reached the ECtHR, made arguments that the grant of 
immunity conflicted with the right of access to justice contained within the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Canadian litigants made similar claims in regard to rights enshrined in the 
Canadian Constitution and Bill of Rights. Although these arguments were unsuccessful, as they were 
in the UK, they paved the way for later courts in other nations to develop the concept further (see 
Chapter VI in this regard, especially the 2014 decision of the Italian Constitutional Court.) 
Arguably, the Supreme Court in Kazemi missed an opportunity to declare the Canadian SIA only 
required the effect of the tort to occur in Canada. The main lesson to be drawn from these cases 
in the context of foreign state immunity is, however, the lack of accommodation the SIA makes 
for human rights cases and the possible need for an amendment containing a jus cogens exception. 
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here are no short cuts. If the procedural bars of state immunity recognised by 
customary international law serve to preclude individuals from obtaining 
reparation from substantive wrongs done to them, the solution is not to pursue 
sophistic attempts to justify the unprincipled elision of procedure and substance. 
Rather, the solution is what it always has been. States must, whether proprio motu 
or at the behest of aggrieved nationals, alter their practices in a way that brings 
about the desired change in international law. 
Lucas Bastin1 
6.1. Outline 
Practically all the cases in this chapter deal with the actions of German troops in the latter half of 
WWII. The cases generally related to either massacres or subjection to forced labour. In one respect 
these sorts of claims look ill-suited to be leading cases on the subject, as the proceedings relate to 
conduct from so long ago, there have often been treaties or legislation providing for compensation, 
and factors such as the armed forces (with their attenuate special status and immunities) complicate 
matters beyond what an ideal representative case would. On the other hand, they are attractive test 
cases because Nazi Germany is the respondent.  
6.2. Greece 
In April 1941 Germany invaded Greece. Throughout the latter half of WWII a Greek Resistance 
made from a patchwork of groups across the country grew up in opposition to the Axis occupation. 
These resistance forces were not part of the Greek government, which was a collaborationist regime 
or German puppet; however, elements of the resistance played active parts in the war and would 
often attack German forces. 
6.2.1. The Distomo Massacre 
The Allied Forces had by 1944 made considerable progress against the Axis Powers. German 
strategists believed this momentum would only encourage the resistance in Greece, then under 
German occupation. A campaign of demoralisation was embarked upon, whereby members of the 
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German Gestapo and SS were disguised as Greeks and ordered to shoot and kill Greeks on the way 
to Arachova. They killed some individuals in the villages of Distomo and Stiri before being 
ambushed by members of the Greek Liberation Forces, who killed 18 of the Germans.2 In a revenge 
attack, Waffen-SS troops of the 4th SS Polizei Panzergrenadier Division under the command of SS-
Haupsturmführer3 Fritz Lautenbach encircled Distomo and later ‘went from house to house 
attacking the poor inhabitants … like wild beasts, raping, butchering and killing … women, boys, 
girls and even infants.’4 Survivors claimed the Germans ‘bayoneted babies in their cribs, stabbed 
pregnant women and beheaded the village priest.’5  
A member of the German Geheime Fieldpolizei (Secret Field Police) contradicted Lautenbach’s 
official report and a German inquiry into the massacre was convened, wherein Lautenbach 
admitted exceeding his orders6 but was acquitted by the tribunal apparently because his actions 
were not personally motivated but performed from regard for his subordinates.7 Over 2008 
innocent villagers were killed in the reprisal—‘a collective massacre, equal to which in atrocity and 
cruelty humanity has hardly known throughout the centuries’9—very few of which had any 
connection to the resistance soldiers who had attacked the disguised Germans. The massacre 
remains a reminder to many Greeks of their country’s treatment at the hands of Germany in 
WWII, with one Distomo survivor telling a British newspaper in 2015 that ‘the “no” vote [to 
German-led EU demands for austerity measures in relation to a proposed funds bail-out] felt like 
a continuation of the Greek resistance fight against the German occupation.’10  
                                                 
2 Prefecture of Voiotia v Germany (2000) 129 ILR 513, 520 (‘Distomo’). 
3 The rank of SS rank Hauptsturmführer was equivalent to the rank of captain (Hauptmann) in the German and 
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4 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 520. 
5 BBC News, ‘Greeks lose Nazi massacre claim’, Thursday 26 June 2003 available at <http:// 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3023144.stm>. 
6 Therefore, his actions were ultra vires, but the acts were still performed under colour of law. 
7 See Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece (Yale University Press, 1993) 212-214. 
8 The actual Greek casualties have been variously numbered at ‘[more than] 201’, ‘214’, ‘218’ and ‘over 300’. 
9 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 520. 
10 Nick Fagge, ‘”I despise them. Germany is the enemy”: The Greek survivors of Nazi massacre who say “No” 
vote wasn’t just about austerity but continued resistance against “occupation”’ Daily Mail, (Distomo) 8 July 
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6.2.2. The Livadia District Court Judgment 
On 27 November 1995, the Greek Prefecture of Voiotia (where Distomo is located) and more 
than 250 Distomo survivors and relatives of victims in their individual capacity instituted 
proceedings against Germany for the wilful murder and destruction of property caused by 
Hauptsturmführer Lautenbach and his men in 1944.  The Livadia District Court (Polymeles 
Protodikeio Leivadias) considered the matter and rendered its judgment in Case No 137/1997 on 
30 October 1997.11 The claimants’ complaint had been sent by the Greek Foreign Office to the 
German Foreign Office, but Germany rejected the complaint and was not represented at trial.12 
The Livadia court nonetheless conducted an inquiry into whether it was entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction over the German state under the rules of foreign state immunity.13 It began by 
observing that foreign state immunity was no longer considered absolute, but that states were 
generally only accorded immunity when they acted jure imperii and not when they acted as a ‘fiscus’ 
or  jure gestionis.14 The war-time actions of a State’s military would generally be considered jure 
imperii,15 but the court drew attention to the character of the German actions as jus cogens 
violations. Effectively, the court maintained that Article 46 of the Regulations annexed to the 4th 
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land16 required Germany as the 
occupying power to protect the rights of Greek citizens to ‘family honor, life, property and religious 
convictions’17 and the contravention of this provision constituted a jus cogens violation. 
After finding that the German conduct was a jus cogens violation, the Livadia court relied on a six-
pronged argument rejecting the possibility of immunity for the German state: 
                                                 
11 See Ilias Bantekas ‘Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany’ (1998) 92 American Journal of 
International Law 765. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 765-766. 
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15 Although not all consider this a foregone conclusion: the purely private or ultra vires actions of a military 
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based on jus cogens. 
16 Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat 2277, 1 Bevans 631. Greece had not ratified the Convention, but the court ruled the 
provision was nonetheless part of customary international law in logic similar to that applied by the ICJ in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep 14. 
17 See Bantekas, above n 10, 766. See also JK v Public Prosecutor (1981) 87 ILR 93, 94, wherein the Netherlands 
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1. A state violating jus cogens cannot bona fide expect a grant of immunity and 
therefore it is assumed to tacitly waive the privilege under the theory of constructive 
waiver; 
2. Jus cogens violations are not sovereign acts (not jure imperii)  and therefore under 
the restrictive theory are not entitled to foreign state immunity; 
3. Jus cogens acts are null and void (ab initio) and cannot create a source of legal rights 
or privileges (such as the right to immunity) under the maxim ex injuria jus non 
oritur (unjust acts cannot create law); 
4. The grant of immunity by a municipal court would amount to collaboration in a 
jus cogens violation by the forum nation; 
5. Invocation of immunity for jus cogens violations would constitute an abuse of the 
right to immunity; and 
6. Territorial sovereignty is a superior norm to the principle of state immunity and 
therefore an illegal occupier of foreign territory cannot claim immunity.18 
The court’s constructive waiver argument is complicated by the fact that Lautenbach admitted 
before a German military tribunal that his actions were ultra vires. Under the modern law of state 
responsibility these actions would still be attributable to the German state,19 but since express or 
implied waiver generally requires a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a legal privilege it 
might be questioned how Germany could have been voluntarily and intentionally relinquishing its 
immunity when Lautenbach’s actions went further than his instructions. On the other hand, it 
appears Lautenbach had been instructed to commit actions which (even if he had not exceeded his 
authority) would still have deprived Greeks of their art 46 right to life, and this could constitute 
an intentional relinquishment. 
The second prong of the Livadia court’s logic is reminiscent of some statements later made in the 
Augusto Pinochet litigation and in Italian litigation.20 As a matter of customary international law, 
if one accepts a jus cogens violation cannot be a proper exercise of a state’s sovereign power then 
under the restrictive doctrine it should follow that immunity should dissolve; however, in states 
where foreign state immunity has been codified in a statute granting a blanket immunity subject 
only to specific, enumerated exceptions this argument has less force because, whatever the content 
of the customary international norm, the municipal statute’s clear wording would prevail. 
                                                 
18 See Bantekas, above n 10, 766-767. 
19 See Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th sess, Supp No 10, UN 
Doc A/56/10, 99 in relation to art 7 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. 
20 See for example Simoncioni v Germany, Judgment No 238/2014, ILDC 2237 (IT 2014), 22nd October 2014, 
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Likewise, the third to sixth arguments21 would be lacking in force within jurisdictions which have 
enacted statutes with blanket immunities. Only the first argument pertaining to constructive 
waiver could succeed in a nation like the USA, for instance, where the lack of any operative 
enumerated exception to the FSIA’s blanket immunity, other than the exception for waiver, would 
prevent the other arguments from succeeding.22 On the other hand, the content of the second and 
third arguments are worthy of consideration and could be included as exceptions in any statute 
containing a blanket immunity. 
Due to the above logic, the Livadia court held Germany was not immune and the court had 
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. As Germany was not represented at trial the claimants’ 
allegations were accepted as facts23 and the Livadia court found Germany liable to pay 9.448bn 
drachmas24 to the claimants. Ilias Bantekas noted the significance of the case, because despite ruling 
‘that Germany was acting under jus imperii [the court] categorically noted that there are exceptions 
to sovereign immunity where rules of jus cogens are violated.’25 Germany appealed the decision to 
the Greek Supreme Court or Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos), on the basis that it should have 
been accorded foreign state immunity. 
6.2.3. The Court of Cassation Judgment 
On appeal, the Court of Cassation drew attention to Article 28(1) of the Greek Constitution, 
which provides ‘[t]he generally recognised rules of international law … shall be an integral part of 
domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law’.26 By inclusion in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international customs were said 
to constitute generally accepted rules of international law and had to be upheld by the Court, in 
accordance with the Constitution. The majority considered the ‘sovereign immunity of foreign 
                                                 
21 The sixth argument is of note because it resembles the hierarchical norm or ‘trumping’ argument relied on 
by the minority in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] XI Eur Court HR 79 and by scholars such as Alexander 
Orakhelashvili; the third to fifth arguments do not appear to have been made much elsewhere. The potential 
use of these three arguments in common law jurisdictions would appear to be limited by the immunity 
statutes, where blanket immunity would restrict their application. 
22 See Chapter III, especially Von Dardel v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F Supp 1, 4-5 (D DC, 1990). 
23 See Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 520 where the Court of Cassation on appeal similarly accepted the 
claimants’ allegations as facts. 
24 Which amounted to approximately €28m or US$30m. 
25 See Bantekas, above n 10, 768.  
26 Greek Constitution, art 28(1). 
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States’ was an established international custom, which constituted an integral part of Greek law 
taking precedence over any contradictory municipal laws.27 The exact content of the customary 
norms pertaining to sovereign immunity, however, still had to be determined. The majority began 
by observing—like the Livadia court below—that the international legal community no longer 
accepted absolute immunity, but only accorded immunity for acta jure imperii.28 The Court of 
Cassation thereafter departed from the logic of the Livadia court, by relying not on the six-pronged 
jus cogens logic but instead on the territorial tort exception to foreign state immunity.  
The Court of Cassation noted Article 11 of the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (‘The 
1972 Basle Convention’),29 which denied immunity in cases concerning torts committed by the 
foreign state on forum territory, irrespective of whether the torts were caused by jure imperii 
behaviour.30 The majority also noted the territorial tort exception had been included in the 
municipal foreign state immunity statutes of the USA, the UK, Canada, South Africa, Australia, 
and Singapore.31 It further noted32 the inclusion of the territorial tort exception in the 1991 ILC 
Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (which would later become 
the 2004 UN Convention) and the 1991 resolution of the Institute of International Law on the 
topic.33 The territorial tort exception was further observed to have been applied in two US cases: 
De Letelier v Chile34 and Liu v China.35 In both these cases US courts applied the territorial tort 
exception, which is contained in the FSIA. Finally, the Court of Cassation noted in relation to the 
territorial tort exception that it ‘is also adopted by a large number of prominent writers on 
international law’.36 
The Court of Cassation found custom pertaining to foreign state immunity included the territorial 
tort exception, even where the relevant behaviour  was performed in a  jure imperii capacity. As 
such, under art 28(1) of the Greek Constitution the territorial tort exception was part of Greek 
                                                 
27 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 516. 
28 Ibid. 
29 1972 European Convention on State Immunity. 
30 Ibid art 11. 
31 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 517. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 518. Institut de Droit International, Contemporary Problems Concerning the Immunity of States in 
Relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and Enforcement (1991) art 2(2)(e). 
34 488 F Supp 665 (D DC, 1980); 502 Supp 259 (D DC, 1980). 
35 642 F Supp 297 (ND Cal, 1986); 892 F 2d 1419 (9th Cir, 1988). 
36 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 519. 
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law and applied over any contradictory municipal principle.37 The court therefore concluded ‘[the 
customary international] rule requires, by way of exception from the principle of immunity, that 
national courts may38 exercise international jurisdiction over claims for damages in relation to torts 
committed against persons and property on the territory of the forum State by organs of a foreign 
State present on that territory at the time of the commission of these torts even if they resulted 
from acts of sovereign power (acta jure imperii).’39 It should be noted that, regardless of the 
differing logic, the Court of Cassation’s ruling still carved out an exception to the principle that 
acta jure imperii uniformly attract immunity under customary international law.  
Finally, the Court of Cassation anticipated the objection that immunity remained at customary 
international law in relation to armed conflicts—as averred to in art 31 of the 1972 European 
Convention—by noting that although ‘State immunity cannot be dispensed with in relation to … 
situations of armed conflict’ this was not the case where ‘the offenses for which compensation is 
sought (especially crimes against humanity) [targeted] specific individuals in a given place who 
were neither directly nor indirectly connected with the military operations.’40 In fact, the court also 
went slightly further, contending that immunity ‘does not cover the criminal acts of the organs of 
… an occupying force, where they are committed as an abuse of sovereign power’.41  
In light the above, the Court of Cassation ruled: 
[T]he trial court was entitled to rule that it had international jurisdiction over the relevant 
claims … albeit on the different ground that the defendant State could not invoke its right 
of immunity, which it had tacitly waived [and] [t]he trial court therefore correctly 
concluded, as to the result in question … that the plea of lack of international jurisdiction 
was inadmissible.42 
A five-member minority consisting of Matthias P and Kromydas, Rigos, Bakas, and Vardavakis JJ 
denied the territorial tort exception was a generally accepted rule of customary international law. 
The minority thought this was because the 1972 EU Convention on State Immunity ‘does not 
constitute in all its provisions a codification of previously formulated customary international 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 The court’s language here—‘requires … that national courts may exercise … jurisdiction’—is odd: But the 
syntax does not affect the underlying ratio. 
39 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 519. 
40 Ibid. 
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law.’43 Even if this statement is correct, it need not lead to the conclusion that the relevant provision 
of the Convention had not later become part of customary international law, ala the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases.44 Regardless, the minority observed only eight states had ratified the 1972 
EU Convention, and contended: 
The fact that the above-mentioned Anglo-Saxon States have enacted such an exception in 
national legislation … is of no significance for the deduction of international custom because 
these texts do not form part of the international legal order but are merely domestic law enacted 
unilaterally with regard to the jurisdiction of national courts and not bilaterally.45 [Emphasis 
added.] 
The five-member minority also contended that because the 1991 ILC Draft Articles had not been 
finalised as a treaty, this apparent ‘failure to reach agreement’ meant ‘the regulations which they 
contain … do not constitute a generally accepted rule of customary international law.’46 Despite 
the Draft Articles becaming the 2004 UN Convention, this argument is specious. The 1991 ILC 
Draft Articles contained the regulation that there is no immunity for actions relating to commercial 
activity. It cannot be contended that by 2000 the customary international law pertaining to foreign 
state immunity did not recognise an exception for acta jure gestionis. Likewise, the contention that 
the territorial tort exception was not an international custom did not follow logically from the 
observation that the 1991 ILC Draft Articles had not become a treaty by the time the case was 
decided. It is only by ignoring significant state practice that the five-member minority could make 
that conclusion.  
A four-member minority consisting of the above members minus Kromydas J further held the view 
that the territorial tort exception ‘does not include torts arising from armed conflicts.’47 Their 
Honours held this view because of commentary to art 12 of the 1991 ILC Draft Articles which 
stated the territorial tort exception ‘does not cover any claim founded on “situations involving 
armed conflicts”.’48 This means the minority dismissed the possibility that the text of the 1972 EU 
Convention and the various state immunity statutes (all of which embodied the territorial tort 
exception) could be evidence of custom, but adhering instead to a mere comment to a draft article.  
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The four-member minority concluded ‘it should be accepted that States enjoy immunity from all 
claims arising from a situation of general conflict between countries’ [emphasis added] because 
‘[a]ttempts to break down armed conflicts into different phases … are artificial and do not 
correspond to reality.’49 It should always be remembered, however, that the immunity of armed 
forces so famously recognised by Marshall CJ in The Schooner Exchange was only for friendly forces. 
Status of forces agreements in the modern era usually apply between allies and friendly nations. It 
is a long way from these considerations to the supposition that all armed forces are always immune, 
even enemies in war. 
6.2.4. Margellos 
Margellos v Germany50 also involved a retaliation by the German armed forces in 1944 against the 
actions of the Greek resistance. The target this time was the village of Lidoriki,51 approximately 80 
kilometres to the west of Distomo (the village was burnt, a loss of property for which the applicants 
claimed compensation). Unlike the Distomo proceedings, however, when the Lidoriki proceedings 
reached the Court of Cassation it decided in Decision No 131/2001 to refer the case to the Special 
Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio). Article 100(1) of the Greek Constitution provides for 
such a Special Supreme (or ‘Highest’) Court, which has jurisdiction over various matters, including 
under art 100(1)(f) ‘settlement of controversies related to the designation of rules of international 
law as generally acknowledged in accordance with article 28 paragraph 1.’ Art 28(1) of the Greek 
Constitution provides that ‘generally recognised rules of international law […] shall be an integral 
part of domestic Greek law.’ The Special Supreme Court is tasked with determining the precise 
content of the customary international norms which are to be integrated into Greek law. 
The referral in Margellos from the Court of Cassation to the Special Supreme Court asked the latter 
to determine ‘whether Article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity concluded in 
Basle in 1972 contains a generally accepted rule of international law.’52 Art 11 provides: 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another 
Contracting State in proceedings which relate to redress for injury to the person or damage 
to tangible property, if the facts which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the 
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territory of the State of the forum, and if the author of the injury or damage was present in 
that territory at the time when those facts occurred.53 
This article embodied a formulation of the so-called territorial tort exception to foreign state 
immunity. It is questionable why the Court of Cassation thought the Margellos case ‘raise[d] doubt 
with regard to the characterization of a rule of law as a generally accepted rule of international law’ 
when the same court had ruled in Distomo the previous year that the territorial tort exception 
embodied in art 11 of the 1972 Basle Convention was a generally-accepted rule of international 
law which under art 28(1) of the Constitution formed an integral part of municipal Greek law. It 
should be noted, however, that the German government was placing significant diplomatic 
pressure on the Greek government after the Court of Cassation’s 2000 ruling in Distomo. This can 
arguably be seen in the refusal of the Greek Minister of Justice to consent to the execution of the 
1997 Livadia Court of First Instance judgment, and in the purported statement by a Vice-President 
of the Court of Cassation that the President of the Court had made a deal to resolve the 
enforcement hearing in favour of Germany as a favour to the Greek government in return for 
another year on the Court. 
The Special Supreme Court took cognisance of material provided to it by the Hellenic Institute of 
Foreign and International Law, which drew the Court’s attention to: the decisions of the ECtHR 
in McElhinney v Ireland54 and Al-Adsani v United Kingdom;55 the ICJ’s decision in Arrest Warrant;56 
the text of the 1972 Basle Convention; the ILC report, proceedings, and Draft Articles on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property; the text of various municipal statutes 
dealing with foreign state immunity, including those of the USA, UK, and other nations; and 
various decisions of courts and arbitral tribunals in addition to articles and monographs containing 
the written opinions of various legal experts from around the world.57 Despite this wealth of 
material, the majority opinion of the Special Supreme Court notes that its ruling depended chiefly 
on an analysis of the decisions in McElhinney, Al-Adsani, and Arrest Warrant.58 
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The facts of McElhinney are interesting, but here it is enough to reiterate that while the ECtHR 
recognised ‘a trend in international law and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in 
respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State […] this practice 
was by no means universal’ and therefore ‘it is not possible, given the present state of the 
development of international law, to conclude that Irish law conflicts with its general principles.’59 
Paradoxically, by ruling against the very trend that it had identified, the ECtHR in McElhinney 
contributed to its extinction, as can be seen with the Special Supreme Court in Margellos relying 
on the ECtHR’s ruling to uphold immunity in circumstances identical to those in which the Greek 
Court of Cassation had the previous year ruled did not warrant immunity. The 9:8 decision of the 
ECtHR in Al-Adsani was relied on in support of the proposition that immunity could be upheld 
where there was a violation of jus cogens.60 Curiously, the ICJ’s decision in Arrest Warrant was also 
proffered in support of maintaining Germany’s immunity, even though the immunity of an 
incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs from criminal jurisdiction was a conceptually different 
matter from the immunity of a foreign government from civil jurisdiction.61 
Based on consideration of the three precedents referred to in the previous paragraph, the Special 
Supreme Court ruled 6:5 that: 
[I]n the present state of development of international law, there continues to exist a 
generally accepted rule of international law according to which proceedings cannot be 
brought against a foreign State […] for an alleged tort committed in the forum State in 
which the armed forces of the defendant State are alleged to have participated either in a 
time of war or in a time of peace.62 
It is rather surprising that the reasoning of the Greek Court of Cassation decision in Distomo, 
which related to similar facts and was delivered in the preceding year was not even referred to in 
passing by the Special Supreme Court. It is also a fact that four of the five members of the Court 
of Cassation who sat on the Special Supreme Court in Margellos voted in dissent of the majority 
opinion.  The possibility that manoeuvring by the Greek government in response to pressure from 
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the German government resulted in the referral of Margellos to a Special Supreme Court ‘stacked’ 
with members of the Council of State (who all voted in favour of immunity for Germany) might 
not have been countenanced until claims later surfaced that a vice-president of the Court of 
Cassation had heard the Court’s President talk of fixing a similar case.63 Regardless, the 6:5 decision 
of the Special Supreme Court gave a decisive ruling that the formulation of the territorial tort 
exception favoured by the applicants was not a customary international law and therefore not under 
art 28(1) of the Constitution an integral part of municipal Greek law. This meant the applicants’ 
case against Germany was doomed to fail and indeed a subsequent ruling of the Court of Cassation, 
Decision No 1117/2003, rejected their claim for compensation.64 
The five-member minority in Margellos appears to have engaged more deeply with the materials 
provided by the Hellenic Institute of Foreign and International Law, noting the territorial tort 
exception embodied in art 11 of the 1972 Basle Convention was joined by: a similar art 12 of the 
ILC’s Draft Articles (which would later become the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property); a provision of the Institute of International Law’s 1991 
resolution; and article III(F) of the ILA’s 1994 Revised Draft Articles.65 It also pointed out the 
municipal laws of various nations, whose various foreign state immunity statutes contained 
embodiments of the territorial tort exception. As regards McElhinney, it was noted both the 
majority and the minority in that case recognised a ‘trend […] towards limiting State immunity 
in respect of personal immunity caused by an act or omission within the forum State.’66 It was 
further submitted that McElhinney at least showed there was no duty on States to grant immunity 
in such cases. Indeed, the ECHR in McElhinney only concluded that ‘it cannot be said that Ireland 
is alone in holding that immunity attaches […]’.67 Stating that Ireland was far from alone in its 
conduct is a separate thing from stating Ireland was bound by international law to act in that way. 
The minority in Margellos did not neglect to point out that the decision of the Court of Cassation 
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in Distomo had lifted immunity in ‘an opinion which corresponds with the generally accepted 
restrictions on sovereign immunity’.68 
Although not relying on it expressly, much was made in the Special Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion of art 31 of the 1972 Basle Convention, which provides that ‘[n]othing in this Convention 
shall affect any immunities or privileges enjoyed by a Contracting State in respect of anything done 
or omitted to be done by, or in relation to, its armed forces when on the territory of another 
Contracting State.’69 Supposedly, this provision was to show that immunity prevailed when the 
acts complained of were performed by the armed forces, even if the tort occurred on the territory 
of the forum State; however, this reads too much into the provision. Art 31 simply made clear that 
the Convention was without prejudice to the immunities of armed forces that may have been 
specified in Status of Forces agreements, for example. The minority opinion stresses that in any 
case these immunities would only apply when ‘the armed forces of a foreign State are present on 
the territory of another State with the permission of that State.’70 (Emphasis added.) This is an 
important point. If one recalls the seminal opinion of Marshall CJ in The Schooner Exchange, His 
Honour only recognised the immunity of armed forces where the visiting troops had been granted 
a ‘free passage’ by the host sovereign and were thus in the forum state on a consensual basis.71 To 
contend that all armed forces are always immune, even belligerent troops, is incorrect (and in fact 
the majority opinion admits that inter alia the Fourth Hague Convention establishes ‘a duty for 
the State concerned to pay compensation for the harm caused’72).  
Finally, the minority opined that even if the armed forces immunity covered the unlawful presence 
of armed forces in war, it would not cover ‘the commission of war crimes’.73 Here, the status of 
the acts complained as violations of a jus cogens norm was stressed. As jus cogens norms were said to 
be ‘hierarchically higher than any other rule of international law’,74 it was supposed that ‘regular’ 
norms—such as foreign state immunity—should give way in the face of such a jus cogens violation. 
This type of argument would be considered in more detail as the fallout from the Distomo and 
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related cases reached the ICJ, and will be dealt with later in this chapter. Some comments on the 
Margellos case stressed the jus cogens angle. Maria Panezi, for example, claimed inter alia ‘when such 
crimes are concerned, the protection and reaffirmation of human rights should surmount 
immunity.’75  
Panezi also made the argument that ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity [should not] be 
considered as acts de iure imperii [but should remain] attributable to the State’.76 State officials will 
rarely be instructed to commit war crimes. Instead, they will often be acting ultra vires when they 
commit such acts. This happened with the German officer overseeing the Distomo massacre, who 
was court-martialled for exceeding his authority. If state officials who commit war crimes and other 
violations were acting ultra vires, can the behaviour really be thought of as jure imperii? Behaviour 
which is called jure imperii is classified that way because only the State, not a private individual, 
could commit it, but if the state official never had the authority to commit such an act is it really 
official state behaviour? The case of torture, for example, may be illustrative. No state claims the 
right to torture its citizens or foreigners. All states on the contrary disclaim such behaviour. So can 
torture really be called an official state act? Admittedly the definition of torture stresses that it is 
committed by state officials, but that is a separate matter as to whether the act is official state 
behaviour. The act must still be attributable to the state if it was done by a state official while on 
duty, for example, under the notion of vicarious liability, but since states in the international arena 
have disclaimed their ability to legally commit such acts it does not make sense to call the act 
official state behaviour. 
6.3. The ECtHR 
After the Areios Pagos decision in Distomo,77 the Livadia court’s 1997 decision became final. The 
257 individual applicants in that case brought proceedings to recover the approximately €28m 
debt owed to them by Germany. Article 923 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, however, 
required the prior consent of the Minister of Justice as a precondition for enforcing a decision 
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against a foreign state.78 The applicants made the relevant application to the Minister, but after 
receiving no reply brought enforcement proceedings despite not having the requisite consent.79 In 
response, Germany inter alia lodged an objection, which was dismissed by the Athens Court of 
First Instance on 10 July 200180 when it found art 923 to be incompatible with art 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the EU Convention’)81 and art 2(3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).82 Germany appealed the decision and it was set 
aside on 14 September 2001 by the Athens Court of Appeal,83 when it said art 923 pursued an aim 
that was in the public interest—namely the avoidance of disturbance in the country’s international 
relations—and was proportionate to the aim because it did not affect ‘the main kernel of the right’ 
as it did not absolutely prohibit enforcement but only required prior approval.’84 The Court of 
Appeal thus ruled the restriction in art 923 was not contrary to art 6 of the EU Convention nor 
art 2(3) of the ICCPR.85 The applicants appealed on 4 October 2001 to the Court of Cassation. 
The appeal to the Court of Cassation was heard on 16 May 2002, but controversy was generated 
when on 29 May 2002 the applicants learned a vice-president of the Court of Cassation had on 
21 May 2002 said that the President of the Court of Cassation had apparently secured an extension 
of his term of office by promising to resolve the German reparations case in a certain way.86 The 
next day, 30 May 2002, the applicants filed an application to have the President removed from the 
case, but the application was declared inadmissible due to being out of time.87 
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So on 28 June 200288 the Court of Cassation delivered its decision, upholding the Athens Court 
of Appeals rulings. Inter alia the Court of Cassation referred to the decision in Al-Adsani v United 
Kingdom89 in its determination that the art 923 ‘limitation imposed on the applicants’ right to 
obtain enforcement … against Germany was compatible’ with art 6 of the EU Convention.90 The 
applicants brought suit against both Greece and Germany in the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) for their refusal to comply with the 1997 Livadia court’s decision, alleging that this 
refusal violated art 6(1) of the EU Convention and art 1 of Protocol No 1 to the EU Convention.91 
6.3.1. Kalogeropoulou 
Relevantly, art 6(1) of the EU Convention guarantees citizens ‘in the determination of [their] civil 
rights and obligations … a fair … hearing … by an … impartial tribunal,’92 while art 1 of Protocol 
No 1 guarantees ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’93  
Basically, the two main arguments put by the applicants to the ECtHR were as follows: (1) by 
refusing to enforce the Livadia Court of First Instance’s judgment, the Greek and German 
governments had ‘infringed their right to the effective judicial protection of their relevant civil 
rights and their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions’;94 and (2) that the alleged bias of 
the President of the Court of Cassation had violated art 6(1) of the EU Convention by infringing 
their right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. While interesting, the allegations of bias are 
not germane to the topic of state immunity and will not be analysed. 
Greece submitted the refusal to allow the enforcement proceedings to proceed was not absolute 
and that ‘although it could not be enforced in Greece, it could, however, be enforced in 
Germany.’95 This turned out to be untrue, as subsequent attempts by the applicants to enforce the 
judgment in German courts were rebuffed on the basis of state immunity. Germany submitted 
that if immunity were lifted it would open the floodgates ‘to countless individual claims for 
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damages’ relating to WWII events, when ‘political solutions […] had long since been adopted’. 96  
The applicants responded that the Greek Court of Cassation ‘in judgment No 11/2000, had 
definitively rejected the argument that Germany should enjoy immunity from jurisdiction.’97 They 
argued Germany was looking to have another bite at the cherry. Judgment No 11/2000, however, 
dealt with immunity from jurisdiction, whereas the later decision of 28 June 2002 from which the 
applicants were appealing to the ECtHR dealt with immunity from execution.  
As to whether art 6 of the EU Convention was engaged, the court noted ‘[e]xecution of a judgment 
given by any court must be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 
6.’98 Art 6 guaranteed the right to a fair trial and the enforcement proceedings stage was included. 
Importantly, the ECtHR noted ‘access to a tribunal would be illusory if a […] legal system allowed 
a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative’.99 However, the ECtHR noted the right of 
access is not absolute, deploying the Waite and Kennedy v Germany ratio to allow for a limitation 
of that right so long as it pursues a legitimate aim and is proportional.100 The court looked to 
whether limiting the right of access was legitimate and proportionate, a process familiar from the 
court’s earlier decision in Al-Adsani. Predictably, the court concluded that sovereign immunity 
pursued a legitimate aim, being the promotion of ‘comity and good relations between States.’101 
As to proportionality, the ECtHR concluded that measures which ‘reflect generally recognized 
rules of public international law on State immunity’ cannot be disproportionate.102  
The ECtHR noted that ‘although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to 
the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could 
recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece.’103 Here the Court was 
distinguishing between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution. The Court did 
not, however, offer any reasons why Germany should not be immune from jurisdiction but should 
remain immune from execution. Confusingly, the ECtHR stated that the Greek Court of 
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Cassation lifted immunity because there were crimes against humanity which amounted to a 
violation of jus cogens ‘that took precedence over all other principles of international law’.104 It then 
stated that it could not find sufficient acceptance of this hierarchical, trumping argument in the 
international community, without prejudice to future developments. However, this was a 
mischaracterization of the Court of Cassation’s ruling, which was clearly based on the territorial 
tort principle. 
6.4. Germany 
While the Distomo massacre proceedings were unfolding in Greece, the same applicants also 
brought a claim against Germany in the German courts, seeking compensation for the massacre. 
6.4.1. Distomo Claimants at German Supreme Court 
The above claim was rejected by a Regional Court (Landgericht) and an initial appeal was dismissed 
by the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Cologne.105 A further appeal brought the 
matter before the German Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, ‘BGH’). 
In the meantime, the Greek Court of Cassation’s judgment in Distomo106 had rendered the Livadia 
Court of First Instance’s 1997 judgment final, and the applicants in their appeal to the BGH 
argued inter alia their appeal should succeed because the Livadia judgment must be recognised by 
the German court.107 
One possible basis for the recognition of the Livadia judgment in Germany was the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.108 The BGH claimed this treaty was inapplicable ‘when interpreted by reference to the 
scheme and objective of the Convention,’109 because the ‘civil and commercial matters’110 referred 
to in art 1 of the treaty did not include ‘a claim for damages against a sovereign State which has 
acted in the exercise of sovereign powers.’111 Nothing in the article or the treaty as a whole says 
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this, however, and nothing in the treaty’s ‘scheme and objectives’ bolsters such a claim. 
Incidentally, the Brussels Regime has since been updated and the 1968 Brussels Convention has 
now been mostly superseded by 2012 Regulations which specifically do provide that they ‘do not 
extend, in particular, to […] acta iure imperii.’112 Again, this language does not appear in the 1968 
text and nothing in the scheme and objectives warrants such a conclusion. The BGH also cited a 
decision of the European Court of Justice in support of this claim, Sonntag v Waidmann113 but no 
pinpoint citation was supplied. 
The facts in Sonntag relate to the 8 June 1984 death of student Thomas Waidmann while on a 
school trip to Italy under the supervision of teacher Volker Sonntag.114 Whether or not the 
requirements of art 1 of the 1968 Brussels Convention were met in the instant case required the 
Court to decide whether the claim related to a civil or an administrative matter, which Sonntag 
claimed the case should have been characterised as, because he was a teacher on a school trip 
supervising the class when the incident occurred. The Court, however, ruled the case would be 
classified as civil in nature ‘unless the person against whom it is made is to be regarded as a public 
authority which acted in the exercise of its powers.’115 Some later readers have attempted to 
construe this to mean that any behaviour of a public official such as an army officer would be jure 
imperii and thus not allowable by the Convention. This, however, seems like a distortion of the 
actual ECR ruling. The Court later expanded: ‘[t]he first point to be noted in that respect is that 
the fact that a teacher has the status of civil servant and acts in that capacity is not conclusive. Even 
though he acts on behalf of the State, a civil servant does not always exercise public powers.’116 The 
Court here clearly seems to be alluding to the distinction between a public official acting in the 
exercise of public powers and a public official acting either ultra vires or in a purely private capacity. 
In the latter two situations, the official would not be acting as ‘public authority […] in the exercise 
of public powers.’117 It should be noted, however, that the above analysis goes somewhat against 
the grain of ECJ clarifications. 
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The BGH’s non-recognition of the Livadia judgment was also based on its interpretation of s 
328(1)(1) and (4) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ‘ZPO’),  and on 
art 3(1) of a German-Greek treaty on Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Court 
Judgments.118 The ZPO provisions provide respectively that a foreign judgment will not be 
recognised where the foreign court lacked competence and where recognition would result in an 
outcome manifestly incompatible with essential principles of German law. Article 3 of the treaty, 
meanwhile, states ‘recognition may only be denied’ in certain circumstances, including at 
paragraph (1) if the decision is ‘contrary to the public order of the State in which [it] is asserted’.119 
The BGH does not explain how recognising the Livadia decision could seriously affect the public 
order of the German state. Furthermore, it is not explained how recognising the Greek decision 
would result in an outcome manifestly incompatible with the essential principles of German law. 
This leaves reliance on 328(1)(1) of the ZPO. 
The essential argument of the BGH majority therefore seems to have been that the state of 
customary international law did not recognise an exception to immunity in cases of acta jure 
imperii, meaning the Greek court lacked competence.120 Would the BGH consider a Greek court 
to have lacked competence if it ruled the other way in an identical case? No, it recognised such 
competence by relying on the Greek Special Supreme Court’s decision in Margellos.121 If the court 
has jurisdiction and competency to hear the case and rule one way (Margellos) then surely it has 
the power to rule the other way (Distomo). Even if a court made a ruling on the issue of foreign 
state immunity, but that ruling was not compatible with the prevailing custom, this would not 
deprive the court from having had the jurisdiction and competence to make the decision.  
Common law courts around the world have echoed the refrain that courts can deviate from custom 
if for example there is a clearly worded municipal statute. The BGH’s decision also rested in part 
on the logic that the Greek courts had erred by declaring jus cogens violations should not be 
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classified as acta jure imperii; but the same BGH approximately two decades prior had ruled 
‘[w]hether a State act was sovereign or non-sovereign was, according to established case law, to be 
determined according to the law of the forum.’122 (Emphasis added.) In this case of course the forum 
was Greece. 
In wrapping up its coverage of the investigation into the nature of the act complained, the BGH 
acknowledged the formulation of the territorial tort exception embodied in art 11 of the 1972 
Basle Convention seemingly allowed compensation for torts committed within the forum state by 
a foreign official, even if the foreign official’s behaviour was jure imperii;123 however, much was 
made of the provision in art 31 of the convention, which said the convention was without prejudice 
to the immunities of armed forces. Over reliance on this provision tends toward developing the 
erroneous view that wherever the armed forces are involved there must be immunity. In actuality, 
the treaty only acknowledges that states sometimes makes other arrangements for the immunities 
of troops present in the territories of fellow nations with the consent of their leaders. A status of 
forces agreement might be in place between two nations, one of which has invited the other to 
partake in military arrangements. Art 31 means that any applicable immunities granted in that 
agreement would hold up even if one of the exceptions to immunity in the treaty could be made 
out. Even in the absence of such an agreement, if forces were present on a consensual basis the 
customary international law would arguably provide for an immunity, as noted by Marshall CJ in 
The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon.124 Unfortunately the BGH did not consider that in certain 
situations there may not be any applicable ‘immunities or privileges […] in relation to, its armed 
forces,’125 because the aggressor state could be present in the forum nation in violation of 
international law. This was indeed the case with the German invasion of Greece beginning in April 
1941. The Germans were not present by consent. Furthermore, the Hague conventions specifically 
provided the behaviour committed on various occasions by German troops was a war crime and 
made the German state liable to pay compensation. Unless a relevant immunity of a foreign army 
present without the home state’s consent and in violation of international law can be specifically 
drawn from the customs pertaining to armed forces, then art 31 has little part to play. 
                                                 
122 Church of Scientology Case (1978) 65 ILR 193, 197. 
123 Greek Citizens v Germany (2003) 129 ILR 556, 560. 
124 11 US 7 (Cranch) 116, 139-140 (1812). 
125 Greek Citizens v Germany (2003) 129 ILR 556, 560. 
Human Rights and Foreign State Immunity: The European Experience 
140 
 
6.4.2. Distomo Claimants at the Constitutional Court 
In the wake of the adverse BGH judgment, the claimants lodged a constitutional complaint with 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, ‘BVerfG’), arguing that 
‘German courts infringed their fundamental rights, in particular their right to property under 
Article 14(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, ‘GG’) [and also 
that article 3] of the Fourth Hague Convention […] gave rise to a directly enforceable right for 
individuals to claim compensation.’126 They also claimed their right of access to ‘recourse to the 
courts’127 and ‘a hearing in accordance with law’128 under GG arts 19(4) & 103(1) respectively.129 
As regards the constitutional complaint under art 103(1), the BVerfG found ‘[t]he applicants have 
not put forward adequately substantiated arguments to show that their right to due process has 
been infringed’.130 This would be conceptually akin to the ECHR in Al-Adsani ruling that art 6 of 
the EU Convention had not been operative. Instead of making an argument that the right to a 
hearing was infringed for some legitimate purpose and in a proportional manner, the BVerfG 
instead simply ruled the right was not infringed. As to the claims under GG art 14(1) that their 
property rights had been infringed, the BVerfG simply held 
[T]he applicants have no rights to damages and compensation either under international 
law or under the law relating to public officials’ liability nor to compensation for sacrifices 
required by official measures.131 
The applicants were held to have no such right because the BVerfG agreed with the BGH on the 
merits that ‘a State may claim exemption from the jurisdiction of another state […] in so far as 
[…] sovereign conduct is concerned,’132 relying on the ECHR decision in Al-Adsani. The 
applicants’ claim that art 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention gave a direct individual right to 
compensation which would satisfy the requirements of the complaint under GG art 14(1) were 
dismissed by the BVerfG’s agreement with the BGH that art 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention 
did not provide the ‘basis […] of a direct, original right of the individual concerned to claim 
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compensation from the State.’133 The court’s conclusion that ‘irrespective of the developments in 
human rights […] damages claims against foreign nationals for the acts of a State which infringes 
international law are still in principle reserved to the home State’134 seems doubtful, and the 
conclusion that ‘any developments in the law [since 1944] must be left out of account’ is certainly 
an incorrect application of the principle of intertemporal law. As Max Huber said ‘a juridical fact 
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the 
time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled;’135 However, in the case of the 
Distomo massacre, the juridical facts to be appreciated in relation to Germany are the acts of the 
SS soldiers and whether they were at that time violations of international law (Art 3 of the Fourth 
Hague Convention confirms they were). As to the Greeks, however, the denial of immunity in the 
Livadia judgment did not occur until the 1990s; therefore, under intertemporal law the applicable 
period for determination of immunity, et cetera, is the present period. This is confirmed by a later 
majority judgment of the ICJ,136 in accordance with Article 13 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
An overview of the Distomo claimants’ hearings before the BGH and BVerfG shows the German 
courts were reluctant to engage with their arguments. The legal reasoning of the Livadia court and 
the Greek Court of Cassation in Distomo were not discussed. The engagement of the German 
courts with the actual content of the relevant customary international law was rather scant. Instead 
they treated the majority opinion in Al-Adsani as controlling. The courts’ technical arguments 
based on treaty obligations and German civil procedure law were detailed, but suffered from 
combination with a flawed application of the principle of intertemporal law. Furthermore, the 
German courts showed a tendency to ‘stretch’ the content of applicable instruments, such as the 
BGH inserting a provision in to the Brussels Regulation (that it did not apply to acta jure imperii) 
by reference to extrinsic materials when there was no need to do so as the text of the article was 
perfectly clear. Despite the Distomo claimants’ ultimate lack of success before both the Greek and 
German courts, their legal saga was not over. They would later take the 1997 Livadia judgment to 
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Italy for execution. In the meantime, however, another case had been brewing in the Italian courts, 
based on similar facts to Distomo and Margellos. 
6.5. Italy 
The focus on German WWII cases continues with Italy taking Greece’s place for the remainder of 
the chapter, which considers Italian claims against Germany for actions of the German armed 
forces in WWII, and a claim by the Greek Distomo litigants to recognise and enforce the Livadia 
judgment in Italy. 
6.5.1. Ferrini 
Luigi Ferrini was a youth when captured by German forces in Arezzo, Italy, on 4 August 1944. He 
was sent to the Walpersberg, a sandstone tableland near Kahla in Thuringia, central Germany. An 
old salt mine had been chosen as the site for a vast underground industrial complex dedicated to 
the rapid production of advanced Messerschmitt Me 262 aircraft, regular factories being vulnerable 
to Allied bombing raids. A company was formed, Flugzeugwerke Reichsmarschall Herman Göring 
(‘REIMAHG’), which produced the jets. As WWII drew to a close, the German total war economy 
relied increasingly on forced labour and REIMAHG was no exception. The first batch of forced 
labourers were a group of 500 Italians on 11 April 1944, and Ferrini arrived only a few months 
later. Miraculously, he survived the war. 
On 23 September 1998 Ferrini commenced proceedings against Germany in the Court of Arezzo 
(‘Tribunale di Arezzo’), ‘claiming proprietary and non-proprietary damages on account of having 
been captured by the German armed forces [… and] subsequently deported to Germany where he 
was used […] as “forced” labour.’137 This claim was denied by the Court on 3 November 2000 on 
the basis that the acts complained were carried out in the ‘exercise of […] sovereign powers’ and 
that immunity therefore applied.138 On appeal to the Florence Court of Appeal (‘Corte di Appello 
di Firenze’) the Court of Arezzo’s decision was upheld, partially on the basis that the 1968 Brussels 
Convention ‘excludes cases pertaining to the exercise of public powers by national authorities’.139  
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Ferrini took his case to the Supreme Court of Cassation (‘Corte Suprema di Cassazione’), which 
similarly held the case did not meet the definition of a civil matter, because it involved ‘expressions 
of individual State sovereignty carried out under the auspices of the public administration’,140 citing 
the ECR case of Sonntag much like the BGH did with the Distomo litigation.141 Unlike the 
Distomo litigation, where the 1968 Brussels Convention was invoked by the claimants for the 
recognition of a foreign judgment, in Ferrini the Convention was cited merely to grant the Italian 
courts jurisdiction over the matter. The same principles were in play, as the Convention deals with 
both recognition and jurisdiction in civil matters. The Special Court of Cassation also ruled there 
was no need to refer this point to the European Court of Justice ‘for a preliminary ruling as the 
previous case law […] was unequivocal.’142 
The Special Court of Cassation thus moved on to Ferrini’s next ground of appeal, where he argued 
the Florence Court of Appeal erred by ruling ‘the principle of State immunity possesses the nature 
and standing of a general principle of customary international law’ which ‘is capable of operating 
even in circumstances where the norms of jus cogens have been violated’.143 The Supreme Court of 
Cassation held in response that foreign state immunity’s status as a binding customary norm was 
‘beyond question’ despite ‘the extent of this principle […] gradually becoming more limited.’144 
Immunity’s status as a binding customary norm was therefore recognised.145  The Special Court of 
Cassation, however, considered a possible exception based on categorisig the acts complained as 
international crimes.146 The behaviour of armed forces is ostensibly ‘an expression of that State’s 
sovereign power’ and where the military is acting in a straightforward official capacity ‘under the 
supreme direction of the public authorities’ this will normally be seen as jure imperii behaviour 
(and thus entitled to immunity, barring the application of some other principle such as the 
territorial tort exception).147 When, however, the military commit international crimes, it is 
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arguable that the behaviour being an expression of State sovereign power ‘is not really established 
beyond doubt’148 and may in effect be illusory. This again brings to mind the distinction between 
a public official acting within the remit of his or her official duties on the one hand, and acting 
ultra vires or in a purely private capacity on the other hand. 
It should be noted that the Special Court of Cassation’s recognition of the distinction between 
armed forces acting according to domestic duty and international law and those acting ultra vires 
is reminiscent of the Greek Court of Cassation’s view in Distomo that art 31 of the 1972 European 
Convention does not negate article 12 because the armed forces immunities in art 31 do not apply 
where the actions of the military are international crimes targeting individuals who did not form 
part of the background conflict. The Special Court of Cassation, however, did not appear to 
approve of the Distomo judgment in this respect, claiming ‘[t]he argument upon which the 
judgment is based is clearly not persuasive’.149 The Ferrini Court appears, however, to have 
misconstrued the Distomo judgment, claiming the Greek Court of Cassation ‘considered that this 
[art 31] objection could be overcome on the basis that the violation of mandatory norms designed 
to protect fundamental human rights implies a renunciation of the benefits and privileges accorded 
by international law.’150 This amounts to basically an implied waiver argument, and the Supreme 
Court of Cassation treated it that way, noting ‘this is not a situation which necessarily presupposes 
a definite intention on the part of Germany [and] [a] renunciation of this nature cannot be 
construed’.151  
Scholars commenting on the Ferrini judgment noted ‘the Court first rejected the argument, 
previously held by the Greek Supreme Court in Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, 
whereby the violation of peremptory norms would constitute an implied waiver of jurisdictional 
immunity.’152 The Greek Court of Cassation, however, based its ruling not on implied waiver but 
on the territorial tort exception.153 This exception was admitted to be subject to the immunities 
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pertaining to armed forces, but these were held not to apply where the acts complained targeted 
‘specific individuals […] who were neither directly nor indirectly connected with the military 
operations’ and did not ‘cover the criminal acts of the organs of … an occupying force where they 
are committed as an abuse of sovereign power.’154 Arguably, the Greek Court of Cassation’s 
reasoning in Distomo had more to offer the Supreme Court of Cassation than it availed itself of. 
Yet it was the Livadia judgment that was sought to be enforced so it is understandable the Court 
focused on its reasoning. 
The Court next considered the trumping argument, embodying the normative hierarchy theory, 
described by various theorists, including Lee M Caplan and Alexander Orakhelashvili.155 Under 
the trumping argument, regular norms of customary international law are supposed to give way 
before hierarchically superior jus cogens norms, whenever there is a conflict. After establishing in 
detail that the acts committed by the German forces against Ferrini constituted international 
crimes,156 the Ferrini court declared ‘[t]here is no doubt that a contradiction between two equally 
binding legal norms ought to be resolved by giving precedence to the norm with the highest 
status.’157 
The Special Court of Cassation faced various precedents from the common-law world, upholding 
the immunity of foreign states despite the commission of international crimes. It took a cue from 
minority reasoning in Al-Adsani, but the majority in that case allowed Kuwait’s immunity. 
Meanwhile, the Bouzari ruling had also been handed down in Canada. To differentiate these 
adverse judgments, the Court noted ‘the judgments in question relate to cases involving illegal acts 
committed in a State other than that in which the matter was being tried’.158 In Ferrini, of course, 
the acts complained occurred within the forum state. The Court was obviously here invoking the 
territorial tort exception, and the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity as well as the 
Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property were referred to, 
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along with the various foreign state immunity statutes of the common-law world.159 As noted by 
Ingrid Wuerth: 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Cassation cited decisions of national and 
international courts to show that immunity cannot be maintained for international crimes, 
that immunity is often denied for tortious conduct in the forum state and that the distinction 
between public and private acts has been eroded in the context of torts (thus countering the 
argument that immunity should be maintained for war crimes as public acts, even when the 
conduct takes place in the forum state.160 
The embodiment of the territorial tort exception in some form or another within the texts of all 
these instruments was noted by the Court as ‘indicative of a tendency to override the theory of 
restricted immunity’ in the sense that ‘the distinction between acts performed jure imperii and acts 
carried out jure gestionis assumes no relevance in respect of [tort] claims’161 which occurred on the 
forum’s soil. As Greece had no foreign state immunity statute, the content of the relevant 
customary international norms mattered most.  
The argument that the foreign state immunity statutes of the various common-law nations (along 
with the two treaties on the topic) were evidence of state practice showing the customary 
international law of state immunity was no longer simply a matter of distinguishing between acta 
jure imperii and acta jure gestionis appears somewhat meritorious. In effect, the Court here seems 
to have been saying that, even if states are generally considered immune where acta jure imperii are 
concerned, there are some exceptions to this, including where the foreign state has committed a 
tort on the forum state’s soil. Another potential exception to immunity in cases of acta jure imperii 
was highlighted by the Court162 by reference to the US Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996,163 which amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976164 to allow for the 
non-immunity of foreign states, even where they had jure imperii, provided they had been ‘singled 
out by the US State Department as “sponsors” of terrorism.’165 No fewer than twelve US decisions 
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were noted in the period up to the end of 2001.166 It should be noted that, in the period following 
the Ferrini decision, this observation has been strengthened by the passage in Canada of the Justice 
for Victims of Terrorism Act,167 which similarly lifts immunity even where a foreign state has acted 
jure imperii provided the Canadian government has listed it as a state sponsor of terrorism.168 The 
passage of the act in Canada shows this exception to immunity in cases of acta jure imperii is no 
longer limited to the state practice of a single nation but is beginning to spread amongst other 
nations. The 2016 US Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act169 extends the concept even further. 
This act removes the requirement of State Department listing as a state sponsor of terrorism, and 
allows suit against any state sponsor of international terrorism occurring on US territory, even if 
the support occurred outside US territory. 
The final justification of the Italian Court of Cassation was the parallel between the law of foreign 
state immunity and the related issue of foreign official immunity, referred to by the Court as ‘the 
functional immunity of foreign State organs’.170 Here, the Court referred to various decisions,171 
including the Supreme Court of Israel’s 29 May 1962 decision in Eichmann and various US 
decisions, including Filartiga v Pena-Irala¸ Xuncax v Gramajo and Cabiri v Assasie Gymah.172 As 
noted by the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini: 
[I]f it is correct, as it would seem to this Court, that functional immunity does not apply in 
circumstances in which the act complained of constitutes an international crime, there is no 
valid reason, in the same circumstances, to uphold State immunity and consequently to deny 
that one State’s responsibility for such crimes can be evaluated in the courts of another 
State.173 
In the intervening years since the Ferrini decision, the decision of the US Supreme Court in 
Samantar v Yousuf174 and, on remand, in the 4th Circuit in Yousuf v Samantar175(see below, ch 7.5) 
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seems to strengthen the Court’s view in this respect. Furthermore, Breyer J’s opinion in Kiobel v 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co176 provides support for the contention that there may not be any reason 
to dismiss the applicability of criminal foreign official immunity cases to civil foreign official 
immunity cases (ie, principles applicable in, for example, Eichmann and Pinochet may be of some 
use in civil cases). 
6.5.2. Mantelli and Milde 
Two more decisions of the Italian Court of Cassation of interest where handed down on 29 May 
2008177 and 13 January 2009,178 respectively. The first decision, Mantelli, concerned Giovanni 
Mantelli and ’13 other Italian victims’ of forced deportation and labour following the 1943 
armistice ‘between Italy and the Allied armed forces’.179 Germany attempted to maintain its 
immunity, but the Court held ‘a principle restricting immunity of a State which has become the 
author of crimes against humanity can be presumed to be “in the process of formation”’.180 As the 
Court felt such a principle was in the process of forming, and as it could not be established that 
there was any norm prohibiting the lifting of immunity in such circumstances, the Court felt in 
conjunction with the Ferrini decision, the minority logic of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani, and the 
obiter in Kalogeropoulou that it was preferable ‘on the systemic level [to give] priority to higher-
ranking norms’. That is to say, it seemingly embraced the trumping argument or normative 
hierarchy doctrine.  
Similarly, in Milde, criminal proceedings were brought against Max Josef Milde, a sergeant of the 
German WWII army and after a trial in absentia Milde was found guilty before the Military 
Tribunal of La Spezia.181 Several of the victims had identified ‘Germany […] as bearing joint and 
several civil liability […] and it was ordered to pay compensation’.182 In line with the reasoning in 
Ferrini, Germany’s arguments before the Court of Cassation were rejected. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Milde case shows what was individually a criminal case, against Milde, developing 
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also into a civil case against the German state. This gels with Breyer J’s earlier opinion in Sosa v 
Alvarez Machain that ‘consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that universal 
tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening […] because the criminal courts of many nations 
combine civil and criminal proceedings’.183 
6.5.3. The Distomo Claimants in Italy 
Due to lack of success in seeking enforcement of the Greek Livadia District Court’s 1997 
judgment184 in Greece185 and Germany,186 the Distomo claimants came to Italy to execute the 
Livadia judgment. Shortly after the German BVerfG’s adverse decision on 15 February 2006,187 
the Greek Prefecture of Voiotia was successful in the Florence Court of Appeal, which ruled on 13 
June 2006 that the Livadia judgment was enforceable in Italy.188 The Greek claimants then 
registered with the Italian Land Registry Agency (Agenzia del Territorio)189 a claim over Villa 
Vigoni,190 a German-owned property containing a valuable manor house, situated near Lake 
Como, Lombardy.191 Germany appealed to the Italian Court of Cassation on seven grounds, but 
six of those ‘d[id] not concern matters of international law.’192 The pertinent ground of appeal thus 
concerned the question: 
[W]hether, based on the Italian legal order, and in the light of the general principles of public 
international law, which are applicable by virtue of Article 10(1) of our [Italian] 
Constitutional Charter, a Greek judgment that has exercised civil jurisdiction with regard to 
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a foreign State in a case involving damages for grave violations of human rights is contrary 
to the principle of public order.193 (Citations removed.) 
Germany maintained that, since the Italian Court of Cassation’s judgment in Ferrini,194 the 
international community had confirmed foreign states were immune in civil proceedings ‘even in 
cases of serious violations of human rights.’195 The Court disagreed. It approved a jus cogens 
exception in terms even stronger than Ferrini. In particular, it noted ‘[t]hese crimes violate 
fundamental values and rights protected by norms from which no derogation is permitted […] 
and [which] prevail over all other treaty-based and customary norms, including those relating to 
State immunity.’196 (Emphasis added.) In a robust adoption of the normative hierarchy doctrine, 
the Court declared ‘[t]he antinomy between such international norms that protect human rights 
and the principle of State immunity must thus be resolved by according priority to the norms of 
higher rank.’ (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, it noted that acta jure imperii are not entitled to 
absolute immunity, but one which is conditioned on respect for fundamental human rights.197 
As intimated in the preceding paragraph, Germany submitted that since the Court’s Ferrini 
judgment there had been new developments in the law,198 referring in particular to the UK’s House 
of Lords decision in Jones v Saudi Arabia199 and also contending the 2004 UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property did not include an exception to immunity ‘for 
events occurring in times of war’.200 Although the Court would later state that treaty has ‘no 
application in the case of war’,201 this is perhaps overly charitable to the German case considering 
the Greek Court of Cassation’s statement in Distomo202 regarding similar provisions in the 1972 
European Convention on State Immunity. 
In response to Germany’s arguments pertaining to Jones, the Court of Cassation referred to the 
Italian Military Court of Appeal’s decision in Milde (see above, ch 6.5.2), where that court noted 
both Jones and a 2007 decision of the ECtHR relied on by Germany concerned ‘the principle of 
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locus commissi delicti’, which was in opposition to ‘part of the Ferrini judgment which referred to 
the universal character of jurisdiction’.203 Section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) (‘SIA’) 
provides for a lack of immunity, potentially even in regard to acta jure imperii, but only where the 
foreign state commits the tort on British soil. As the behaviour complained of in Jones occurred in 
Saudi Arabia, the SIA did not allow for a lifting of immunity. Greece, however, had no such foreign 
state immunity Act,204 and the Court therefore stressed the notion of universal jurisdiction as a 
basis for distinguishing Jones, relying also on passages in Pinochet205 and Prosecutor v Furundžija206 
which emphasised the connection between universal jurisdiction and violation of jus cogens 
norms.207 The Court of Cassation chose not, however, to solely rely on Ferrini as authority for the 
principle that jus cogens violations always give rise to universal civil jurisdiction which automatically 
trumps state immunity.208 This was perhaps wise, because it should be remembered that immunity 
is not a lack of jurisdiction, but a procedural bar. Thus simply having jurisdiction over a foreign 
state, because of a principle of universal civil jurisdiction, does not automatically mean the court 
is not barred from exercising its jurisdiction due to the immunity of the foreign state.209  
By means of backing up its earlier decision in Ferrini, the Court of Cassation engaged in a rather 
extensive analysis of Greek and US precedents ‘adopted in different contexts which consider 
jurisdictional immunities to be restricted or inoperative.’210 Some of these stressed the importance 
of jus cogens norms for precluding immunity. Here the 1997 Livadia judgment was referenced, 
where the first of the court’s six-pronged ruling explicitly attributed jus cogens violations to an 
implicit waiver of immunity. Although the Greek Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Distomo did 
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not rely on the jus cogens argument,211 nonetheless it was invoked as authority for the proposition 
that (in the case of a territorial tort at least) ‘[s]tates were not covered by the principle of 
jurisdictional immunity by virtue of an international customary exception applicable even to acts 
jure imperii.’212 When the possibility of jurisdiction for a non-territorial tort is opened up by the 
application of universal civil jurisdiction, the reasoning employed in territorial tort cases that 
immunity does not apply even if the act was jure imperii may be extrapolated and transposed into 
a situation where the tort occurred outside the forum state. The Court of Cassation also floated 
the idea that when states ‘abus[e] their sovereign power […] the abuses of sovereignty cannot be 
regarded as acts jure imperii.’213 This notion has also been seen in both criminal and civil foreign 
official immunity case law, where the foreign official has acted ultra vires or under colour of law.214 
An early US decision, De Letelier v Chile,215 was marshalled by the Court in support of establishing 
‘the inadequacy of the theory of acts jure imperii as a means to resolve the issue of immunity in 
cases of violations of important norms such as those protecting human rights.’216 In De Letelier, 
the Chilean secret service had arranged and carried out an assassination of the former Chilean 
ambassador to the US, Orlando De Letelier, in Washington DC on 21 September 1976. Part of 
the Chilean argument was that immunity could not be lifted under s 1605(a)(5) because its actions 
were jure imperii. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, however, found: 
[n]owhere is there an indication that the tortious acts to which the Act makes reference are 
to only be those formerly classified as “private,” thereby engrafting onto the statute, as the 
Republic of Chile would have the Court do, the requirement that the character of a given 
tortious act be judicially analyzed to determine whether it was of the type heretofore denoted 
as jure gestionis or should be classified as jure imperii. Indeed, the other provisions of the Act 
mandate that the Court not do so, for it is made clear that the Act and the principles it set 
forth in its specific provisions are henceforth to govern all claims of sovereign immunity by 
foreign states.217 
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As noted by the Italian Court of Cassation, ‘[p]articularly noteworthy was, first of all, the court’s 
rejection of Chile’s proposal to interpret the provisions of the FSIA in conjunction with a dogmatic 
restatement of the theory of acts jure imperii.’218 It will be noted that the Greek Supreme Court in 
Distomo also referred to De Letelier and likewise stressed the relevant customary international law 
provided for an exception to immunity in the case of a territorial tort ‘even if they resulted from 
acts of sovereign power.’219 
Liu v Republic of China220 was another early US case cited, which like De Letelier concerned an 
assassination ordered and carried out by a foreign state and its officials on US soil. The two assassins 
in Liu, Wu Tun and Tung Kuei-sen, were allegedly members of Taiwan’s Bamboo Union Gang 
[‘BUG’] of criminals, who were recruited by BUG leader Chen Chi-li. Chen, in turn, was allegedly 
working as an operative for Admiral Wong His-ling, the director of the Taiwanese Military 
Intelligence Bureau (‘MIB’).221 The assassins were therefore allegedly working at the behest of the 
MIB. At first instance, ‘[t]he district court held that [Taiwan] could not be held vicariously liable 
[…] because Wong’s act of ordering Henry Liu’s assassination was outside the scope of his 
employment, and that the act of state doctrine precluded [Helen] Liu from piercing the findings 
of the [Taiwanese] tribunals.’222 On appeal, however, Hug, Tang, and Boochever JJ followed earlier 
Ninth Circuit precedent which had held that ‘the “scope of employment” provision of the [FSIA’s 
territorial] tortious activity exception [in s 1605(a)(5)] essentially requires a finding that the 
doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the tortious acts of individuals.’223 (Emphasis added.) The 
respondeat superior doctrine holds that ‘[a]n employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees 
committed within the scope of their employment’.224 A key issue was therefore what constituted 
‘within the scope’ of employment. The Ninth Circuit differed from the district court, by following 
the ‘enterprise theory’ of liability, which holds that ‘the employer’s liability should extend beyond 
                                                 
218 Germany v Prefecture of Voiotia (2011) 150 ILR 706, 716. 
219 Distomo (2000) 129 ILR 513, 519. 
220 892 F 2d, 1419 (9th Cir, 1989) (‘Liu’). 
221 Ibid [1], [7]. Boochever J in Liu refers to the bureau as the Defense Intelligence Bureau (‘DIB’), but the entity 
is referred to by the Taiwanese government on its English-language websites as the MIB. The MIB or DIB was 
created on 1 July 1985, by merging the Special Military Intelligence Office with the Intelligence Bureau. It is 
overseen by the Ministry of National Defense under the direct command of the Chief of the General Staff. See 
<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?cnid=404>. 
222 Liu, 892 F 2d, 1419 (9th Cir, 1989) [1]. 
223 Joseph v Office of Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F 2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir, 1987). 
224 Liu, 892 F 2d, 1419 (9th Cir, 1989) [42]. 
Human Rights and Foreign State Immunity: The European Experience 
154 
 
his actual or possible control over the employees to include risks inherent in or created by the 
enterprise because he, rather than the innocent party, is best able to spread the risks through prices, 
rates or liability insurance.’225 After citing various precedents, Boochever J in Liu noted that a court 
within its circuit had ruled ‘a municipality could be held vicariously liable for a deputy sheriff’s 
misuse of his authority.’226 The Italian Court of Cassation noted the Liu court’s use of this 
precedent as tending to support the notion that a foreign state’s international responsibility can be 
engaged through the enterprise theory of vicarious liability, where its organs or officials acted ultra 
vires.  
The Court of Cassation also noted the more recent ruling of the US Supreme Court (‘SCOTUS’) 
in Altmann v Austria,227 which it cited as evidence that state immunity in the US had an internal 
origin and not because the US felt bound by a customary international norm. While the scope of 
the decision was strictly limited to the finding that the FSIA applied retroactively and nothing in 
it mandated Austria's immunity, it is true that a close reading of the decision shows SCOTUS 
appeared to believe Congress was enacting the legislation to take the decision-making from the 
executive and vest it in the judiciary and not because it felt it was bound to by international law. 
Other US decisions, stretching back to The Schooner Exchange,228 have stressed the basis of foreign 
state immunity in comity, not in a binding customary international norm. The question of whether 
foreign state immunity has become a binding customary international law, has, however, been 
dealt with by various courts and publicists, with the majority these days tending to conclude it is a 
binding custom. The status of foreign state immunity as a customary norm is a separate matter, 
however, from the content of the norm. Even if foreign state immunity does have the status of a 
binding customary international norm, the Court of Cassation mounted a rather strong argument 
that in modern times the content of the norm did not include immunity where the acts complained 
of were jus cogens violations. 
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A 2002 ruling of the ICJ in a case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium229 
has been cited in various judgments supporting the retention of immunity for acta jure imperii 
even where jus cogens norms are violated. The Arrest Warrant case, however, concerned the 
immunity of incumbent high state officials, specifically foreign ministers (but also arguably the 
two other members of the so-called troika: heads of state and heads of government). This status-
based immunity for troika officials is different to the function-based immunity of former troika 
members and incumbent lower-level foreign officials. The immunity of lower-level officials has 
traditionally hinged on whether or not they were acting in their official capacity at the time the 
acts complained were committed. As noted by the Court of Cassation, the justification of 
immunity for high officials based on functional necessity ‘expresses a conception of immunity 
altogether different from the notion of a dichotomy between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
[which is based on] a principle of equality among states, according to the maxim of par in parem 
non habet imperium.’230 While reasoning contained in civil and criminal precedents concerning the 
immunity of former troika members and incumbent lower-level officials might be relevant to a 
foreign state immunity case, cases concerning incumbent troika officials do not map so well onto 
cases against foreign governments.  
In fact, as noted by the Court of Cassation, ‘the exercise of civil jurisdiction vis-à-vis other States, 
for acts which do not qualify as acts jure gestionis but which constitute grave violations of the 
inviolable rights of the person, is neither an isolated approach nor one limited to a specific 
geographic area.’231 As regards the ‘normative hierarchy doctrine’, the Court noted it was 
‘undoubtedly […] the most important dogmatic background for the Ferrini judgment and for the 
Greek [Distomo] jurisprudence’.232 This is certainly true in regard to the 1997 Livadia judgment 
in Greece and in Ferrini, but as regards the Greek Court of Cassation’s judgment in Distomo it 
should be again remembered that the court there actually relied on the territorial tort doctrine 
rather than the jus cogens trumping argument.  
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In addition to this Greek and Italian jurisprudence, the Court also looked to the opinions of 
publicists, including that of Alexander Orakhelashvili.233 The Court noted ‘the primacy theory of 
jus cogens is based on solid doctrinal development on both sides of the Atlantic,’ but did not neglect 
to mention that ‘the theory has also been criticised’.234 In the US, for instance, the SCOTUS 
decision in Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp235 precluded application of the 
normative hierarchy doctrine due to an interpretation of the FSIA which denied any exceptions to 
foreign state immunity other than those explicitly enumerated in the text of the statute. Yet, even 
in the wake of Amerada Hess, the Italian Court of Cassation noted various decisions of the lower 
courts236 showed support for the jus cogens trumping argument.237 As already noted, the Court of 
Cassation noted the situation in Europe was different to that in America (and the other common-
law nations) due to the general absence in Europe of the foreign state immunity statutes which 
tend to prevail in the common-law world. This meant ‘the formulation of the normative hierarchy 
doctrine [is] more rigid in European continental States’238 which has tended to lead European 
publicists ‘to attach maximum value to the customary origin of the principle of immunity.239 This 
European approach to foreign state immunity, focusing on customary international norms and 
state practice, was said by the Court to encourage: 
[A] move beyond the obsolete distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis […] 
[because] such a distinction cannot be relevant for excluding the application of international 
jus cogens norms […] [as it] would be absurd if such norms were held not to have such binding 
force in the case of international crimes inimical to fundamental values of the international 
legal system.240 
In common-law nations the courts are often precluded by the operation of foreign state immunity 
statutes from looking beyond the clear wording of the applicable statute. In European nations 
where no such statutes are in force, courts can focus more clearly on the customary norm. The 
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focus in the mid Twentieth Century was clearly on developing restrictive immunity and dealt 
mainly with carving out exceptions for commercial activity, while leading cases in the last quarter 
of a century have focused much more on the human rights dimension, a topic which was simply 
not being addressed by the time custom became less important in the common-law world due to 
the enactment of the various foreign state immunity statutes. 
Finally, as regards the two international treaties on foreign state immunity, the 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity and the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property, the Court of Cassation noted these two conventions are generally 
concerned with acta jure gestionis and ‘are thus of little interest for the present judgment.’241 While 
art 27(2) of the European Convention on State Immunity does say courts in contracting states ‘may 
not rule on [acta jure imperii], the Court noted the provision was ‘of no moment for the present 
controversy’ as the Convention did not take into account acts which violated jus cogens norms and 
also because the convention was not in force between the parties to the case.242 
In light of all the above considerations, the Court of Cassation concluded ‘it must therefore be 
excluded that the execution in Italy of a judgment of a foreign State […] to compensate victims 
[…] of very serious war crimes […] can be held contrary to the Italian public order’ and 
consequently the Court held ‘[w]e therefore hold that the judgment of the Greek court […] may 
be executed in Italy, since […] recognition of the judgment can in no way be considered contrary 
to the internal public order.’243 Although it has not been so widely commentated on by publicists 
as its earlier decision in Ferrini (or indeed the Greek Court of Cassation’s judgment in Distomo) 
the Court of Cassation’s judgment here was extremely detailed and well-reasoned. The Court’s 
express approval of the controversial normative hierarchy doctrine was also accompanied by a 
defence of universal civil jurisdiction in support of lifting immunity in tort cases, even where the 
tort took place outside the forum. 
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6.6. The ICJ 
In the wake of the Distomo claimants registering of a charge over the German-owned Villa Vigoni 
and the passage of their claim through Italian courts as they sought to have the 1997 Livadia 
judgment recognised in Italy, on 23 December 2008 Germany filed an application in the ICJ 
registry against Italy seeking a judgment that Italy had failed to uphold its foreign state 
immunity.244 On 13 January 2011 Greece also filed an application in the registry for permission 
to intervene pursuant to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute;245 this permission was granted by the Court 
on 4 July 2011.246 In substance, Germany asked the Court to find that: 
Italy has failed to respect the jurisdictional immunity which Germany enjoys under 
international law by allowing civil claims to be brought against it in the Italian courts, seeking 
reparation for injuries committed by the German Reich during the Second World War; that 
Italy has also violated Germany’s immunity by taking measures of constraint against Villa 
Vigoni, German State property situated in Italian territory; and that it has further breached 
Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek civil 
courts rendered against Germany on the basis of acts similar to those which gave rise to the 
claims brought before Italian courts.247 
This was a three-pronged submission: (1) that Italian courts failed to provide Germany immunity 
by allowing civil claims; (2) that allowing a measure of constraint over German property in Italy 
also violated Germany’s immunity; and finally (3) that declaring Greek decision enforceable in 
Italy similarly breached Germany’s immunity. The Court dealt with the submissions in order. 
Before dealing with Germany’s first submission, the Court dealt with an issue of intertemporal 
law. As has already been shown,248 when the Distomo claimants attempted to have the 1997 
Livadia judgment recognised in Germany, the German courts inter alia ruled that the applicable 
law of foreign state immunity was that which prevailed during the Second World War. As Max 
Huber noted in Island of Palmas,249 ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it’.250 As noted by the ICJ, this notion of intertemporal law is also reflected in 
art 13 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
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(‘DARSIWA’), which holds ‘[a]n act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international 
obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.’ 
Paragraph (1) of the commentary to DARSIWA expressly invokes Huber’s famous Palmas maxim. 
At the ICJ, Germany claimed the law of state immunity in force from 1943-1945 was therefore 
that which should be applied. A close reading of DARSIWA art 13 however shows that, since 
Germany claimed Italy breached an international obligation, it must be shown that Italy violated 
the law which was binding at the time it chose not to accord Germany immunity. As the ICJ 
correctly concluded, this meant the Court had to ‘examine and apply the law on State immunity 
as it existed at the time of the Italian proceedings, rather than that which existed in 1943-1945.’251 
Italy insisted Germany was not immune in Italian courts for two reasons: (1) ‘that immunity as to 
acta jure imperii does not extend to torts or delicts occasioning death, personal injury or damage 
to property committed on the territory of the forum state’; and (2) ‘irrespective of where the 
relevant acts took place, Germany was not entitled to immunity because those acts involved the 
most serious violations of rules of international law of a peremptory character for which no 
alternative means of redress was available.’252 These will be referred to as the territorial tort 
argument and the jus cogens or ‘last resort’ argument. 
The Court first dealt with the territorial tort argument.253 Italy’s claim was that a customary 
international law had developed for a territorial tort exception to foreign state immunity even if 
the acts complained were acta jure imperii.254 It pointed to arts 12 and 31 of the 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity. The first of those provisions embodied the territorial tort exception, 
but did not contain any language prohibiting the exception to apply to acta jure imperii,255 while 
the latter provision holds that ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall affect any immunities or 
privileges enjoyed by a Contracting State in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by, or 
in relation to, its armed forces when on the territory of another Contracting State.’256 The 1972 
Convention was not in force between the parties, but Italy was citing it as evidence of a customary 
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norm. Italy maintained that art 31 ‘is merely a saving clause aimed primarily at avoiding conflicts 
between the Convention and instruments regulating the status of forces present with the consent 
of the territorial sovereign and that it does not show that States are entitled to immunity in respect 
of the acts of their armed forces in another State [without permission].’257 This argument mirrors 
observations made by the Greek Court of Cassation in Distomo,258 the 5:6 minority of the Greek 
Special Supreme Court in Margellos,259 and the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini,260 and 
Germany v Prefecture of Voiotia.261 
Italy also pointed to art 12 of the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property, which embodied the territorial tort exception but contained no language 
preventing its application to acta jure imperii. The 2004 Convention is not in force, but Italy 
referred to it as evidence of an international custom. Finally, Italy pointed to foreign state 
immunity statutes in seven nations,262 which ‘amount to significant State practice asserting 
jurisdiction over torts occasioned by foreign armed forces.’263 
Germany for its part maintained arts 11 and 12 of the 1972 and 2004 conventions ‘are irrelevant 
to the present proceedings, because neither provision was intended to apply to the acts of armed 
forces.’264 It also stressed that apart from Italy and Greece no national court had ever held a foreign 
state ‘was not entitled to immunity in respect of acts of its armed forces, in the context of an armed 
conflict’ while several other states had accorded immunity in such cases.265 
The Court proceeded by first noting that a lack of immunity in civil proceedings for territorial 
torts ‘originated in cases concerning road traffic accidents’.266 This could be seen in the Austrian 
decision in Holubek v USA,267 which involved a traffic accident deemed to be jure gestionis. The 
situation had since changed, however, with the Supreme Court of Canada in Schreiber v 
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Germany268 ‘expressly reject[ing] the suggestion that the exception in the Canadian legislation was 
subject to such a distinction [between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis]’.269 There seemed to 
be fairly significant state practice for the notion that the territorial tort exception applies even to 
acta jure imperii; however, the ICJ considered ‘it is not called upon in the present proceedings to 
resolve the question’ of an exception to immunity for acta jure imperii territorial torts in general, 
but instead ‘confined [its decision] to acts committed on the territory of the forum State by the 
armed forces of a foreign State […] in the course of conducting an armed conflict.’270 
The Court first considered the texts of the 1972 and 2004 conventions. As will be recalled, the 
text of art 11 of the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity has to be read in conjunction 
with that of art 31, which Italy argued was merely a savings clause for status of forces agreements. 
The ICJ agreed with Italy that art 31 was a savings clause, but said ‘the result [is] is that the 
immunity of a State for the acts of its armed forces falls entirely outside the Convention and has 
to be determined by reference to customary international law.’271 This in itself is not controversial; 
the real question is to determine the exact content of the customary norm pertaining to the 
immunity not just of armed forces, but armed forces present without the consent of the host 
nation. Next the ICJ considered art 12 of the 2004 United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, which contains no express provision excluding the acts of 
armed forces from its scope.272 Against this, the Court referred to ILC commentary to the text of 
art 12 which says the provision does not apply to situations involving armed conflicts.273 It should 
be recalled that this commentary has no binding force, but even if the ICJ’s point is taken here 
again the real issue is the precise content of the customary norm. 
The ICJ next considered state practice in the form of national legislation. As the Court noted, ‘nine 
of the ten States referred to by the Parties which have legislated specifically for the subject of State 
immunity have adopted provisions to the effect that a State is not entitled to immunity in respect 
of torts […] occurring on the territory of the forum’.274 Only two of the statutes (the UK’s and 
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Singapore’s) contained provisions excluding ‘proceedings relating to the acts of foreign armed 
forces,’ while seven of the statutes excluded ‘only the acts of visiting forces present with the consent 
of the host State’.275 (Emphasis added.) This is significant: the vast majority of the relevant foreign 
state immunity acts only allowed immunity for territorial torts involving acta jure imperii 
committed by armed forces if the armed forces were present with the consent of the host nation. 
Thus the vast majority of the state practice in the form of national legislation is in favour of Italy’s 
position, not Germany’s, but this was glossed over by the Court. Moreover, one of the remaining 
statutes, that of Japan, only said foreign armed forces will not have their privileges affected if they 
are ‘based on treaties or the established international law’.276 Arguably the Japanese statute therefore 
says foreign armed forces committing acta jure imperii on the host’s soil will only be immune if 
there is a status of forces agreement (a treaty) or if the content of the applicable custom (pertaining 
to the immunity or lack thereof of armed forces present without consent of the host nation) says so. 
Therefore it is possible to say eight of the ten national statutes in question favoured Italy’s case. 
The ICJ then turned to the relevant state practice in the form of judgments of national courts. 
This is where the Court focused most of its attention. It began by looking at situations where 
foreign armed forces were visiting or stationed on a host state’s territory with that host state’s 
consent.277 With respect, these precedents are of little value. The Egyptian, Belgian, German, 
Dutch, French, Italian, and UK decisions cited here278 should therefore have had no bearing on 
the Court’s decision. The Court could only find one decision where a member of a foreign armed 
force was allegedly visiting or sojourning onto the territory of a friendly foreign nation without its 
consent, that of the Supreme Court of Ireland in McElhinney v Williams.279 Yet no pinpoint 
citation was provided and the facts of that case do not show whether: (1) the individual was really 
present in the host nation without the host state’s consent; or (2) whether a status of forces 
agreement was in place to cover situations of this nature. 
Ultimately, the Court considered that for the purposes of the decision ‘the most pertinent State 
practice is to be found in those national judicial decisions which concerned […] whether a State 
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was entitled to immunity in proceedings concerning acts allegedly committed by its armed forces 
in the course of an armed conflict.’280 Arguably, a better formulation would have been that the 
most pertinent state practice is that which concerns armed forces present on the host state without 
the host state’s consent. These are indeed the most important forms of state practice in regards to 
decisions of national courts, but it should not be forgotten that the texts of the various foreign state 
immunity statutes, canvassed above, are if not equally important then perhaps more so, a point 
which the ICJ neglected to mention. 
As noted by the ICJ, all of the cases concerning acts committed by armed forces in the course of 
an armed conflict concerned ‘the events of the Second World War’,281 specifically the actions of 
German occupying forces. The Court here referred to two French cases, along with a decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Slovenia and the Supreme Court of Poland, and a Belgian decision in 
the Court of First Instance of Ghent and Brazilian decision of the Federal Court in Rio de 
Janeiro.282 These six decisions may seem to comprise significant state practice, but they must be 
weighed against the significant state practice in the form of foreign state immunity statutes which 
weighed heavily in the other direction. Furthermore, the Polish decision Nationiewski v Germany283 
based its analysis mostly on the Ferrini, Distomo, and Margellos decisions. As has been seen above, 
two of those three decisions resulted in the court holding the foreign state was not immune and 
the third only allowed for immunity after chicanery involving the President of the Court of 
Cassation allegedly arranging to fix the decision in return for a longer term at the head of the 
court.284 Finally, the ICJ pointed to the 2003 and 2006 decisions of the German BgH and 
BVerfG,285 but the fact that the ICJ cites these uncritically when they are based on incorrect 
assumptions of intertemporal law which the ICJ disproved in this very case is not very heartening. 
Furthermore, practically the only state practice relied on by the German courts to uphold 
immunity was the Greek decision of the Special Supreme Court in Margellos which again some 
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may consider tainted due to the accusations of bias and corruption by the President of the Court 
of Cassation in arranging for referral to the Special Supreme Court. 
The ICJ concluded its coverage of the territorial tort issue by claiming ‘[t]he only State in which 
there is any judicial practice which appears to support the Italian argument, apart from the 
judgments of the Italian courts […] is Greece.’286 This may be true in terms of judicial practice, 
but this should be weighed against the significant state practice in the context of national 
legislation. Furthermore, it should be remembered that much of the state practice in regard to 
judicial decisions is based on the doubtful Greek Margellos decision. What is more, nowhere did 
the ICJ actually consider the logic behind the Greek and Italian decisions which lifted immunity. 
Specifically, if one looks to Marshall CJ’s seminal decision in The Schooner Exchange,287 his Honour 
there said one of the classic exceptions to the full jurisdiction of the forum sovereign is where a 
foreign prince’s armed forces are allowed onto the host’s soil with the permission of the host 
sovereign.288 At no point did Marshall CJ say foreign armed forces are always immune even if 
present on the forum without the permission of the host. The exception to the full extent of the 
host’s jurisdiction was said to be a necessary extension of the permission granted to the prince to 
enter, as likewise the visiting prince could not be supposed to enter without an implied licence that 
he would not be subject to the host’s jurisdiction. Where the foreign armed forces had no 
permission to enter the soil, no such implied license can be presumed. 
It seems possible to argue that the customary content of the norm must be that armed forces have 
immunity when present with permission or when a status of forces agreement applies but not when 
they have no such permission and a status of forces agreement does not apply. Again, Marshall CJ’s 
original observation that foreign forces are immune when present with permission seems non-
controversial, but with the ICJ’s ruling in Germany v Italy this seems to have ballooned into a 
statement that foreign forces are always completely immune, even when present without 
permission. If that is truly the content of the customary norm then what reason is there for status 
of forces to even exist as a concept in the first place?  
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Regardless, the ICJ considered none of this, concluding instead ‘that customary international law 
continues to require that a State be accorded immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly 
committed on the territory of another State by its armed forces and other organs of State in the 
course of conducting an armed conflict.’289 In addition to not considering the points in the 
preceding two paragraphs, the ICJ did not appearto weigh the judicial state practice against the 
state practice in the form of national legislation; it simply considered the former as completely 
determinative, as if the latter had no weight at all. The inescapable conclusion is that the ICJ’s 
ruling on Italy’s territorial tort argument is flawed, especially in its failure to adhere to the vital 
distinction between armed forces present with consent and those present without consent and in 
violation of international law. 
The Court next dealt with Italy’s three-pronged jus cogens or ‘last resort’ argument. In essence, Italy 
here argued: (1) Germany’s actions were serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity; (2) those rules which were contravened 
were peremptory jus cogens norms; and (3) the claimants having been denied other means of redress, 
Italy exercised jurisdiction as a last resort.290 In considering the first strand, the Court thought 
there was a logical problem with immunity being contingent on a delict’s magnitude, because 
immunity from jurisdiction was a procedural matter that had to be considered preliminarily.291 As 
to the second strand, the Court disagreed with Italy’s contention that there was a logical conflict 
with a hierarchically superior jus cogens norm yielding to a regular norm like state immunity. The 
Court, reasoning much like it did with the first strand, felt there was no conflict because state 
immunity is a procedural and preliminary matter that does not ‘bear upon the question whether 
or not the conduct […] was lawful or unlawful.’292 Regarding the third strand, the Court could 
find ‘no basis in the State practice [for the contention that] the entitlement of a State to immunity 
[is] dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress’.293 The Court 
therefore rejected Italy’s jus cogens argument and ruled in Germany’s favour. The two further 
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submissions pertaining to measures of constraint over the Villa Vigoni and recognition of Greek 
judgments in Italian courts were also resolved by the Court in favour of Germany.294 
The Court’s classification of Germany’s actions as sovereign in nature might initially appear 
indisputable, although that is not necessarily the case. One might argue massacres and slave labour 
are so despicable and repugnant to human dignity that they could not possibly have been public 
acts, nor could they have a public purpose, hence they could not attract immunity due to lack of 
a sovereign nature. In fact, Italy had tentatively advanced this view.295 It draws on the argument in 
Pinochet that torture could not be an official act. The ICJ rejected the notion,296 stating Pinochet 
did not apply because it was a state official immunity case, not a foreign sovereign immunity case, 
and also because it was a criminal trial, not a civil suit. Yet, elsewhere in the judgment,297 the ICJ 
cited and applied a rule from a criminal state official immunity case.298 It will furthermore be seen 
in the following chapter,299 that Traxler CJ of the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that ‘under international and domestic law, officials from other countries are not 
entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the 
defendant’s official capacity.’300 This came after a number of decisions which highlighted the 
difference between actions that were: (1) official acts within the lawful scope; (2) acts committed 
in the course of duty but outside or beyond lawful authority, being ultra vires; and (3) purely 
private behaviour. Although these distinctions are most relevant in foreign official immunity cases, 
they might also be applied in cases against foreign governments. 
Some foreign official immunity concepts might therefore equally apply to foreign state immunity 
cases, mutatis mutandis. If this is admitted, then the argument drawn from Pinochet seems to have 
been given short shrift. Assuming it were pursued, however, one might ask: if the massacres and 
slave labour complained of are not treated as public or sovereign acts, in the sense that they are 
(hypothetically) not classified as acta jure imperii, how can they attract state responsibility? 
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DARSIWA art 2 attaches responsibility only where an act ‘is attributable to the State’.301 Article 4 
then states ‘conduct of any State organ shall be considered as an act of that State’,302 while the 
commentary adds ‘it is irrelevant for the purposes of attribution that the conduct of a State may 
be classified as […] acta iure gestionis’.303 Finally, art 7 attributes responsibility to the state even if 
an official ‘exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions’304 for instance by acting ultra vires. In 
such cases of ultra vires conduct it is important to note that responsibility is engaged at both the 
individual level and the state level. State responsibility would thus remain engaged if a court were 
to rule the acts complained could not be classified as sovereign in nature or as public acts. 
The real issue Germany v Italy hinged upon, however, apart from the territorial tort exception, was 
the conflict—or lack thereof—between state immunity and jus cogens. The ICJ maintained 
immunity cannot depend upon a delict’s magnitude, because immunity is a procedural matter, 
qualitatively and completely separate from substantive issues. It is true that foreign immunity is a 
preliminary and procedural matter, as noted by the Court and by publicists such as Lady Fox and 
others. The problem lies in the court’s academic and somewhat artificial procedural/substantive 
dichotomy. Take a moment to consider the development of the restrictive doctrine of foreign state 
immunity as a customary international norm, which had its Nineteenth Century origins in 
Belgium and Italy before germinating in other Mediterranean nations and finally being adopted 
by the courts of the common law realms in the Twentieth Century.305 This restrictive immunity 
doctrine would never have been able to develop if the courts of those nations had adopted the ICJ’s 
procedural/substantive dichotomy. Those courts looked to the nature or purpose of the act in 
question in order to determine whether the foreign state had acted in a private or a public capacity. 
According to the procedural/substantive dichotomy adopted by the ICJ, however, such an inquest 
into the nature or purpose of the act delves into the substantive matters which must not be touched 
until the preliminary and procedural matter of immunity has already been disposed of. There is 
no relevant conceptual difference in an immunity qualification test that analyses whether an act is 
of a sovereign nature or whether an act would constitute a violation of jus cogens. If the courts could 
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inquire into the nature of the former to determine whether immunity applies then they should be 
able to inquire into the latter. In both situations, some investigation of the act’s nature would be 
required to ascertain whether the state qualifies for immunity, but this should not be mistaken for 
an impermissible wandering into the merits before the procedural matters are disposed of. It is 
surprising that the ICJ’s majority decision did not take cognisance of this fact, which did not escape 
Judge Yusuf’s attention.306 
6.7. Effects of the ICJ decision in Italy 
The effect of the ICJ’s decision was instant. ‘Less than 40 days were needed by the Tribunal of 
Florence to deliver a judgment’,307 which ‘decide[d] spontaneously that the ICJ judgment ha[d] 
direct effects on ongoing proceedings against Germany’308 such that it required dismissal of the 
claims. Clearly, the Italian courts had gotten the message.  
6.7.1. De Guglielmi and Albers 
Only ‘[a] few weeks later, the Court of Appeals of Turin issued a decision that, on the basis of the 
ICJ ruling, contradicted a previous one of the Tribunal of Turin in a similar case.’309 The appeal 
heard in Turin310 concerned a damages action originally lodged by Vincenzo de Guglielmi, but 
continued by his son Roberto after his death. The Guglielmis alleged the senior was subjected to 
similar deportation and forced labour practices as had been applied to Luigi Ferrini. The Italian 
Court of Cassation had originally held the Tribunal of Turin had jurisdiction ‘because state 
immunity did not cover serious human rights violations’.311 This was one of the twelve decisions 
the Court of Cassation delivered on the same date, including the Mantelli decision outlined 
previously.312 The Court of Cassation having made its ruling on jurisdiction, it duly remanded the 
case to the Tribunal of Turin for a decision on the merits. Germany in its defence inter alia asked 
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the Tribunal to stay the proceedings due to the ICJ proceedings in Germany v Italy, which were 
afoot at the time.313 The Tribunal, however, dismissed the request, as the Court of Cassation’s 
jurisdictional ruling had the effect of res judicata, which meant ‘there was no room for other 
decisions on the issue of jurisdiction, so it would have been pointless to wait for the ICJ’s 
determination’.314  
With the stay refused, the Tribunal ruled against Germany, ordering it to pay compensation.315 
Germany’s appeal to the Court of Appeals of Turin, however, was still pending when the ICJ 
delivered its judgment in Germany v Italy. The Court of Appeals recognised that the ICJ judgment 
was legally binding by virtue of art 94 of the UN Charter.316 Whilst not denying the Court of 
Cassation’s original ruling on jurisdiction had acquired the status of res judicata, the Court of 
Appeals claimed that under art 386 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code such jurisdictional rulings 
‘did not prejudice the subsequent assessment of every issue concerning the existence of the right 
invoked by the plaintiff as well as the admissibility of the claim.’317 The ICJ’s judgment was taken 
to be a ‘new element which had to be taken into account’318 and therefore Germany’s appeal was 
upheld on the basis that the Guglielmis’ claim was inadmissible.319  
The case reporter thought ‘[t]he reasoning followed by the Court [wa]s legally flawed’ and 
‘constitute[d] an awkward attempt to elude the inviolability of the Court of Cassation’s ruling on 
jurisdiction’.320 Another publicist thought ‘[t]he reasoning behind this ruling lacks any 
coherence.’321 This is because the Court of Cassation had already held the Tribunal of Turin had 
jurisdiction and this ruling had the status of res judicata. The Tribunal of Turin had furthermore 
ruled compensation should be paid. Germany’s appeal benefited from the timing of the ICJ’s 
ruling, but in essence Germany was asking the Court of Appeals to retroactively rule the Tribunal 
had no jurisdiction in order to comply with the ICJ judgment in Germany v Italy. The reasoning 
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is flawed because of the res judicata issue, but also because the ICJ judgment was binding only on 
Italy only in the sense that it had to enforce that judgment, which pertained to the Ferrini and 
Distomo decisions. It would be incorrect to infer that ICJ ruling is binding perpetually on Italy in 
the sense that it must always and forever recognise Germany’s immunity in any case which involves 
its activities in the Second World War. The ICJ has no such binding authority, because ‘decision[s] 
of the Court ha[ve] no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case.’322 (Emphasis added.) The reporter’s note that the ‘uneasiness which emerges from this 
judgment demonstrates that […] the duty to give execution to the ICJ’s ruling should be entrusted 
to the legislative power’323 was prescient, as the Italian legislature would enact precisely such a law 
in the following year.324 
The decisions continued thick and fast. Just a few weeks after De Guglielmi, ‘[f]inally, on 30 May 
2012, the Court of Cassation itself delivered a meaningful decision, deposited on 9 August 2012, 
in which the ICJ judgment was carefully considered and taken into account.’325 (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly to its earlier decision in Milde,326 the Court of Cassation’s 1st Criminal Section’s decision 
in Military Prosecutor v Albers327 concerned a massacre of Italian civilians at the hands of German 
forces in the latter half of 1944. As in Milde, a civil action in Albers was brought in the criminal 
proceeding, ‘summoning inter alia the German state as civilly responsible.’328 Over 350 civilians 
had been killed in the San Terenzo Monti massacre and their relatives were seeking compensation 
from Germany, which claimed an immunity that was denied by the Military Tribunal and the 
Military Court of Appeal of Rome, respectively,329 in line with the Court of Cassation’s earlier 
decision in Ferrini.330 Germany appealed the latter decision to the Court of Cassation, where the 
matter was heard by the 1st Criminal Section, but in the meantime the ICJ had delivered its 
judgment in Germany v Italy.331 
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The Court of Cassation in Albers distanced itself from the decision in Ferrini, but did not abandon 
the reasoning completely. Instead it pointed out that ‘no other domestic court had followed the 
Ferrini precedent’.332 This in turn, Daniele Amoroso reports, ‘led to the conclusion that the Italian 
courts’ attempt to foster a ius cogens exception to state immunity had failed, at least for the time 
being, although it could not be excluded that in the future such an exception would be endorsed 
by the international community.’333 (Emphasis added.) Although the ICJ’s recent decision loomed 
large for the Court, it was certainly also looking to the future. It considered the ICJ’s 
procedural/substantive dichotomy argument ‘was unconvincing’334 and its reasoning here bears 
repeating: 
[I]t  seems unduly limiting to confine the category of jus cogens to its substantive scope alone, 
overlooking the fact that its actual effectiveness is measured precisely on the basis of the legal 
consequences derived from violation of the binding rules. Furthermore, it would not seem a 
consideration of minor importance that the stated distinction between the “substantive” and 
“procedural” rules results in nothing other than the impunity of the subjects and ends by 
reaffirming the unconvincing inclusion, under the scope of jurisdictional exemption, typical 
of acts performed jure imperii, of acts such as crimes against humanity which some endeavour 
to include under that heading.335 (Emphasis in original.) 
In addition to considering the ICJ’s procedural/substantive dichotomy unconvincing, the Court 
of Cassation furthermore felt it ‘was not immediately bound to comply with the ICJ’s decision,’336 
as that decision did not concern proceedings relating to the San Terenzo Monti massacre. The 
Court’s point in this respect must be correct, as per art 59 of its statute the ICJ’s decisions are only 
binding in respect of that particular case.  
Despite these considerations, which might tend toward a lack of immunity, the Court of Cassation 
felt the ICJ’s decision in Germany v Italy ‘authoritatively established’ that the ‘existing customary 
international law’ was in Germany’s favour ‘and consistent with the obligations incumbent upon 
the Italian State, Germany had to be accorded immunity from jurisdiction, regardless of the 
heinous nature of the acts complained of.’337 There was a possibility that if customary international 
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law recognised a jus cogens exception to state immunity this might raise a ‘question of 
constitutionality under Article 10 of the Constitution’,338 paragraph 1 of which provides that ‘[t]he 
Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised principles of international law.’339 That 
was a question, however, for the Constitutional Court (‘Corte Costituzionale’). Therefore, while the 
Court of Cassation was happy to abide by the ICJ’s recent decision in Germany v Italy, it seemed 
to keep an eye on the future, opening a potential avenue in the Constitutional Court. 
6.7.2. Law No 5/2013  
In light of Germany v Italy and the difficulty of some Italian courts in providing sound legal 
reasoning for undermining prior decisions having the status of res judicata in pursuit of upholding 
the ICJ’s decision, ‘the enactment of a specific law enabling compliance with ICJ decisions on the 
matter of jurisdiction […] was a foregone conclusion.’340 On 14 January 2013 the Italian legislature 
obliged, enacting Law No 5/2013, art 3 of which states: 
For the purposes of Article 94, para 1, of the UN Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 
June 1945 and implemented by Law No 848 of 17 August 1957, where the International 
Court of Justice, in a judgment settling a dispute in which Italy is a party, excluded the 
possibility of subjecting a specific conduct of another State to civil jurisdiction, the judge 
hearing the case, ex officio and even where he has already passed a decision which is not final 
but has the effect of res judicata with regard to the existence of jurisdiction, shall ascertain 
the lack of jurisdiction in every stage and instance of the proceeding. […] Decisions 
constituting res judicata contrary to the above mentioned ICJ judgments, even where the 
latter have been passed subsequently, can be reconsidered not only in the cases provided by 
Article 395 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, but also due to lack of civil jurisdiction. 
In such circumstances, Article 396 of Italian Court of Civil Procedure shall not apply.  
Basically, this law allowed for judges to reopen cases where an old decision already had the status 
of res judicata and reconsider the case in the light of Germany v Italy. The intention here being the 
reversal of cases which might not have recognised a foreign state’s immunity. Law No 5/2013 also 
contained Italy’s accession to the 2004 UN State Immunity Convention and ‘[a]t the same time, the 
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Italian Government attached an interpretative declaration to that convention.341 The text of the 
declaration reads partly thus: 
[T]he Italian Republic wishes to underline that Italy understands that the Convention will 
be interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles of international law and, in 
particular, with the principles concerning the protection of human rights from serious 
violations. In addition, Italy states its understanding that the Convention does not apply to 
the activities of armed forces and their personnel, whether carried out during an armed 
conflict as defined by international humanitarian law, or undertaken in the exercise of their 
official duties. 
Similarly, the Convention does not apply where there are special immunity regimes, 
including the ones concerning the status of armed forces and associated personnel following 
the armed forces, as well as immunities ratione personae. Italy understands that the express 
reference in Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Convention, to Heads of State cannot be interpreted 
so as to exclude or affect the immunity ratione personae of other State officials according to 
international law.342 
One publicist interpreted this to mean the declaration ‘clearly demonstrated the willingness of the 
Italian Government to comply with the ICJ’s decision.’343 However, not everyone thought the 
declaration such a simple intent. In regard to the first paragraph of the declaration excerpted above, 
one publicist said it was ‘remarkable that Italy used the occasion of its adherence to the Convention 
to seek a way of implementing jurisdictional immunity rules compatibly with international 
principles forbidding gross violations of human rights.’344 By stating its intention that the 
convention should be applied in accordance with the principles protecting human rights, the 
Italian government was perhaps signifying a continued dedication to human rights and the 
possibility of a human rights exception. Although the declaration states the convention does not 
apply to acts of armed forces, this does not amount to an admission that armed forces are always 
completely immune. 
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6.7.3. Frasca, Ferrini, and Alessi 
Following the enactment of Law No 5/2013, cases against Germany for the actions of its soldiers 
continued to emerge, and others which had already been decided were now up for reconsideration.  
Around a month after passage of the law, Bruno Frascà brought a civil claim against former 
German SS Captain Erich Priebke. Frascà was the son and heir of a victim in the Fosse Ardeatine 
massacre, a reprisal which resulted in the execution in Rome of 335 civilians. The massacre was 
organized by Herbert Kappler, who was imprisoned after the war until escaping six months before 
his death by cancer in 1978. Kappler’s second in command was Priebke, who escaped to Argentina 
after the war until his successful extradition to Italy in 1995 and conviction and sentence to life 
imprisonment in 1998.345 For its part, Germany ‘sought to be excluded from the proceedings by 
invoking state immunity for acta jure imperii.’346 Frascà, however, claimed in line with Ferrini that 
state immunity could not shield conduct like that committed by Priebke, even if it was jure imperii, 
because it ‘amount[ed] to international crimes.’347 
Unlike some other decisions in the wake of the ICJ’s decision in Germany v Italy, such as De 
Guglielmi, the Frascà decision ‘was relatively unproblematic because […] the question of 
jurisdiction had not already been settled with a decision having the effect of res judicata.’348 The 
court here relied on the Court of Cassation’s 1st Criminal Division349 in Albers by rejecting Frascà’s 
Ferrini argument for the reason that Ferrini ‘remained isolated and was not “validated by the 
international community”.350  
Finally, the court relied on Law No 5/2013 art 3 as justification for according immunity to 
Germany. On the other hand, the law must not have had too big an impact on the decision, as it 
was promulgated between the date of decision and the date of filing.351 The content of the law 
would, however, have been known for some time prior to its promulgation, as it had already been 
agreed on and approved for some months.  As noted by one scholar, by leaving the issue of a lack 
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of judicial alternative ‘completely unresolved’, Law No 5 ‘is therefore contrary to Article 24 of the 
Constitution [and] the judge concerned could challenge it before the Constitutional Court.’352 The 
same publicist noted that the judge in Frascà failed to realise such a possibility and acted instead as 
if the text of the law was constitutional. Nonetheless, shortly after Frascà rumbling about possible 
referrals to the constitutional court became more apparent. 
After the Court of Cassation refused to uphold Germany’s immunity in 2004’s Ferrini decision, it 
‘referred the case back to the Tribunal of Arezzo.’353 Initially, the Tribunal ruled the claim was 
time-barred, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Florence in 2011, which ordered 
Germany to pay damages.354 Germany appealed the decision to the Court of Cassation, but before 
the hearing occurred the ICJ delivered its decision in Germany v Italy and the Italian legislature 
passed Law No 5/2013. The Court of Cassation ruled in Germany’s favour, on the basis of art 3 
of that law.355 Unlike De Guglielmi, the 2014 decision in Ferrini was less problematic 
jurisprudentially, in the sense that Law No 5/2013 art 3 provided a specific authority to reconsider 
decisions that had the status of res judicata. The Court here, however, considered art 3 ‘raised no 
issues of constitutionality’,356 failing to consider the question of whether art 24 of the Italian 
Constitution made art 3 of Law No 5/2013 unconstitutional. As will be seen below, not all Italian 
courts shared this view. 
The 2014 ruling of the Court of Cassation in Ferrini was handed down on 21 January 2014. On 
the same day, the Tribunal of Florence delivered its ruling in a case brought by the descendants of 
Luigi Capissi, who was allegedly ‘captured, deported, subjected to forced labour, and killed in the 
Kahla-Thuringia concentration camp by Nazi officers following the armistice of 8 September 
1943.’357 Like Frascà, and unlike Ferrini and De Guglielmi, the decision the Alessi began after the 
ICJ’s decision in Germany v Italy and after the promulgation of Law No 5/2013. The decision in 
Alessi also differed from the 2014 decision in Ferrini because the Tribunal specifically considered 
inter alia the issue of whether the fundamental guarantee of access to justice in art 24 of the Italian 
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Constitution rendered art 3 of Law No 5/2013 unconstitutional.358 Because of this issue, which 
the Tribunal considered was a legitimate constitutional question, ‘[t]he proceedings were 
suspended and the case referred to the Constitutional Court.’359  
The Tribunal referred three matters to the Constitutional Court. These were the constitutionality 
of: (1) the rule established by art 10(1) of the Constitution with regard to acceptance of 
international customary law as determined by the ICJ ‘in the part that denies jurisdiction for 
dealing with compensation claims for damages resulting from war crimes committed, iure imperii, 
by the Third Reich’; (2) Law No 848/1957 art 1, which in implementing UN Charter art 94 
obliges Italian courts to abide by ICJ decisions, specifically in ‘cases seeking compensation for 
crimes against humanity, iure imperii, by the Third Reich on Italian territory’; and (3) Law No 
5/2013 art 1 ‘in the part that obliges the national judge to abide by the pronouncement of the 
[ICJ] even when it has established the obligation of the Italian judge to deny its own jurisdiction 
for civil cases seeking compensation for crimes against humanity committed, iure imperii, by the 
Third Reich on Italian territory.’360 
6.7.4. The Constitutional Court 
The possibility of the Italian Constitutional Court intervening in the ongoing aftermath of the 
ICJ’s 2012 decision had already become apparent by mid-2012. Writing shortly after, in regard to 
Albers and Frascà, one publicist has noted: 
Now, with regard to the need to preserve the fundamental principles of the Italian 
constitutional order, the practical outcome of these two decisions, and therefore of the 
acceptance of the immunity rule as set out by the ICJ, is the denial of access to justice for 
victims of Nazi crimes, which is even more serious when one considers the lack of effective 
alternative means of securing redress. This circumstance raises the question of 
constitutionality in relation to Article 24 of the Constitution (which guarantees the 
fundamental right of access to justice and judicial protection) and, at the same time, amounts 
to a violation of Article 6 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). We refer especially to the judgments in Waite and Kennedy v Germany and Beer 
and Regan v Germany. In both cases, the necessity of balancing the granting of immunity 
with the right of access to courts was highlighted: “[f]or the Court, a material factor in 
determining whether granting ESA [the European Space Agency] immunity from German 
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jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to 
them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.” 
The same opinion is shared by Judge Yussuf in his dissenting opinion in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State: “[i]n today’s world, the use of State immunity to obstruct the right 
of access to justice and the right to an effective remedy may be seen as a misuse of such 
immunity”.361 
This quote has been provided in full as it provides both a reason for proposing referral to the 
constitutional court (violation of the fundamental right of access to justice) and authority for that 
proposition. The ECtHR’s rationes decidendi in Waite and Kennedy and Beer and Regan show Italy’s 
‘last resort’ argument in Germany v Italy was not without merit. The ECHR art 6 access to justice 
argument failed 9:8 in Al-Adsani, but the possibility of alternative means was not addressed there. 
The matter would finally be considered by the Italian Constitutional Court in 2014, after the 
Tribunal of Florence referred three Constitutional questions for consideration. 
Furio Simoncioni submitted one of three separate claims to the Tribunal of Florence alleging 
similar circumstances of capture and deportation to slave labor by German forces during WWII. 
Simoncioni and one other survived the war, while the third individual perished in a concentration 
camp during the war and was believed to be buried in a mass grave. The Tribunal of Florence 
questioned the constitutionality of: (1) the norm created in the Italian legal system by the 
incorporation in accordance with art 10 para 1 of the Italian Constitution, whereby customary 
norms of international law become part of Italian law; (2) Article 1 of Law No 848 of 17 August 
1957 on the 'Execution of the Statute of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 16 June 
1945' insofar as it obliges the national judge to comply with judgments of the ICJ, even when it 
established the duty of Italian courts to deny their jurisdiction in cases of crimes against humanity; 
and (3) Article 1 of Law No 5 of 14 January 2013 on the 'Accession by the Italian Republic to the 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property' signed in 
New York on 2 December 2004, as well as provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal 
order, which obliges the national judge to comply with the judgment of the ICJ even in cases of 
gross violations of international humanitarian law. 
Preliminarily, the avvocatura representing the Italian Council of Ministers (which took Germany’s 
side in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, as it did not appear) made an objection 
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based on a point of inter-temporal law, claiming that since immunity as a customary international 
norm developed before the formation of the Italian Constitution it therefore could not be subject 
to constitutional review.362 This argument was rejected by the Court, which thought ‘there is no 
reason, from a logical and systematic standpoint, to exclude the constitutional review of 
international customs, or to limit it to customs subsequent to the Constitution.’363 
As regards the first constitutional question referred to it, the Court held this was technically ill-
founded.364 It is the role of the Constitutional Court to consider whether customary norms conflict 
with the Constitution and if they do the Court may hold such norms have not been incorporated 
into the Italian legal system as others normally would under art 10 of the Constitution. It is true 
that art 10 generally provides that '[t]he Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised 
principles of international law.' Under this provision, customary international norms are generally 
held to be 'incorporated' into the municipal Italian law rather than needing to be 'transformed'; 
however, under the 'counter-limits doctrine',365 customary norms which conflict with fundamental 
principles and inalienable rights contained within the Italian constitution are said to be prohibited 
and thus do not become a part of the municipal Italian law by virtue of art 10 or any other provision 
of the Italian Constitution. Since the right of access to court contained in art 24 of the Constitution 
was one such fundamental principle, indeed 'one of the grand principles of legal civilization', the 
norm recognised by the ICJ, which required the grant of immunity even in cases of egregious 
human rights violations in contravention of jus cogens norms, could not be said to have entered 
the Italian legal system by virtue of art 10 of the Constitution. 
It is certainly true that Western nations such as the United Kingdom and Australia have adhered 
to the doctrine that municipal laws may constrain a judge to act in direct conflict with a customary 
norm or treaty provision. In the Scots law case of Mortensen v Peters, Kyllachy LJ noted that 
although 'there is always a certain presumption against the legislature of a country [being in conflict 
with] international law', that was 'only a presumption' and 'as such, it must always give way to the 
language used if it is clear'. In Australia, Latham CJ noted in Polites v Commonwealth that 'all the 
authorities in English law also recognize that courts are bound by the statute law of their country, 
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even if that law should violate a rule of international law.' If this dualist view is accepted in regard 
to ordinary legislation, it must similarly hold true in relation to a nation's constitution. 
As to the second and third constitution questions, the Court considered them well-founded;366 
however, it considered Article 1 of Law No 848/1957 and Article 3 of Law No 5/2013 as 
unconstitutional,367 on the basis that they purported to oblige Italian judges to comply with 
judgments of the ICJ even when they recognised immunity in cases of jus cogens violations, which 
would infringe arts 2 and 24 of the Italian Constitution. The decision to recognise these provisions 
as unconstitutional opened the way for Italian jurisprudence to deviate from the ICJ’s ruling in 
Germany v Italy. One reporter on the Simoncioni case noted ‘the Constitutional Court has exposed 
Italy to international responsibility’.368 If that is the case, Italy has done no more than many nations 
often do when their judges rule in favour of statutes where the clear wording conflicts with 
international law on the topic. It is perhaps ironic that this thesis is replete with cases of the courts 
of common law nations ruling the clear text of their state immunity statutes prevents them from 
lifting immunity even if this is in conflict with the prevailing customary international law. One 
stark example is the US case of Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina,369 where Fletcher J stated: 
International law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act. A 
state’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not be 
entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.370 
This was a clear statement that Fletcher J would have ruled in favour of Siderman de Blake, but 
for the clear wording of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (‘FSIA’) and the US 
Supreme Court precedent in Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp371 which held the 
FSIA rules were comprehensive and it was not permissible to read in implied exceptions to the 
blanket immunity. Undeniably this is an example of the principle in Mortensen v Peters and Polites 
v Commonwealth at play on the side of upholding immunity. If the Italian Constitutional Court’s 
decision is to be challenged on the basis of it conflicting with a customary international norm, then 
the principle must go both ways.   
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6.7.5. New Beginnings 
In the year following the Constitutional Court’s constitutional review in Simoncioni, various Italian 
courts handed down decisions refusing to recognise the immunity of inter alia Germany in 
situations which, prior to that decision, Italian courts would have had to recognise immunity on 
the basis of Germany v Italy and Law No 5/2013.372 No less than eight decisions in the year 
following the Constitutional Court’s seminal decision show Italian practice has come full circle on 
the issue of exceptions to immunity for serious violations of human rights norms having the status 
of jus cogens, even where the act complained was committed jure imperii. 
6.8. Summary 
It is obvious that two countries in which no foreign state immunity statutes applied, Greece and 
Italy, had the most interesting jurisprudence on the topic in the last forty years. Italy was one of 
the originators of the restrictive immunity doctrine and Greece was also an early adopter. For 
decades, the doctrine of restrictive immunity germinated in a few European nations, including 
Italy and Greece. It was not until later that the common-law realms caught on and international 
law witnessed a so-called trend toward restrictive immunity. Arguably, a similar phenomenon is 
occurring in the modern era, with Italy and Greece acting as forerunners for the recognition of a 
jus cogens exception to foreign state immunity. The ICJ’s decision in Germany v Italy certainly put 
a dent in this strategy; however, the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court that a right of 
access to justice was a fundamental constitutional guarantee which was infringed by the grant of 
immunity which must therefore be lifted, flies in the face of the ICJ ruling and declares Italy’s 
ambition to change the prevailing state practice.  Coverage of the multiple proceedings in the year 
following the Constitutional Court’s decision brings to mind a quip of Lord Bingham in Jones v 
Saudi Arabia; it is no longer ‘one swallow’373 making law, but multiple decisions yearly.
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 The US Experience 
amantar, 74, stiffly hauls himself halfway up from the threadbare brocade sofa. 
[…] His five accusers in a civil lawsuit call him a war criminal, a monster living 
out his golden years with impunity in a quiet suburban neighborhood. This man, 
they say, was responsible for the unjust torture that they or members of their 
families suffered in the 1980s. They say Samantar administered a regime of 
repeated rape, abduction, summary execution and years-long imprisonment in 
solitary confinement. The accusers want someone, finally, to be held accountable 
for the well-documented human rights atrocities of that era. 
Brigid Schulte1 
7.1. Outline 
An earlier chapter surveyed the development and general state of US case-law on civil suits against 
foreign states for jus cogens violations.2 This chapter concerns suits against individual foreign 
officials, rather than governments. This area has been of more interest in the last decade, as will be 
seen toward the end of this chapter with coverage of the US Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Samantar v Yousuf,3 which held the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (‘FSIA’) does not 
apply to suits against individual foreign officials. SCOTUS left that to the common law. In 
response, a body of law on foreign official immunity has arisen in the US over the last decade. It 
should also be recalled that, prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, the US Department issued 
its determinations to the courts which were treated as binding. In the wake of Samantar, the State 
Department is attempting to take back up its old role, stating ‘[u]nder Supreme Court Precedent, 
the Department of State’s Foreign Official Immunity Determinations Are Controlling and Are 
Not Subject to Review.’4 As shall be seen in the latter half of the chapter, it is doubtful whether 
these views represent the whole truth. At least one Court of Appeal has ruled State Department 
rulings will only be treated controlling if they relate to the personal immunity of the troika, while 
determinations relating to those with a functional immunity ratione materiae will only be treated 
as persuasive but not necessarily binding. It will be seen there is a circuit split as to whether an 
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individual with immunity ratione materiae is immune under the prevailing US common law. 
Regardless of the eventual outcome, SCOTUS’s decision to read the FSIA as not governing suits 
against foreign officials has opened up a new area of case-law with the possibility of finding 
individuals accountable for heinous actions, while the old approach—strict application of the 
FSIA—might have resulted in immunity. 
7.2. Filartiga 
Dr Joel Filártiga and his daughter Dolly brought a suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York against Americo Norberto Peña-Irala for the wrongful death of Dr 
Filártiga’s teenage son Joelito. All three individuals and the deceased were citizens of the Republic 
of Paraguay and were resident in Paraguay at the time of the act complained. Peña was Inspector 
General of Police in Asunción. Dr Filártiga described himself as an opponent of President Alfredo 
Stroessner’s regime. The Filártigas claimed that on 29 March 1976 Peña kidnapped and tortured 
Joelito to death; that the police brought Dolly to Peña’s home, where she saw her brother’s body; 
that Dolly fled the house and was followed by Peña, who shouted ‘Here you have what you have 
been looking for so long and what you deserve;’5 and that Joelito was tortured and killed because 
of his father’s political activities. District Judge Nickerson dismissed the suit, but the Filártigas 
were successful on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Delivering 
the judgment, Circuit Judge Kaufman said ‘whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with 
process by an alien within our borders [the ATCA] provides federal jurisdiction.’6 
Filartiga is mentioned here chiefly because it highlighted the ATCA as a possible basis for 
recovering civil damages from foreign torturers. Following remand back to the District Court and 
after objecting to an initial award of US$375,000,7 the Filártigas were eventually awarded a total, 
including punitive damages, of US$10,385,364.8 Importantly for present purposes, Peña did not 
claim immunity as a state official (although his role as Inspector General of Police may have entitled 
him to functional immunity ratione materiae, which would have covered his official acts). Before 
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the Court of Appeals, Peña did claim inter alia ‘the suit is barred by the Act of State doctrine;’9 
however, he was prevented from relying on that argument because it was a new point not raised 
below. In obiter, however, Kaufman J doubted ‘whether action by a state official in violation of 
the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation’s 
government, could properly be characterized as an act of state.’10 At a later stage of the litigation, 
Nickerson J similarly thought Paraguay’s lack of ratification told against interpreting Peña’s 
behaviour as an act of state.11 It would have been interesting if Peña had attempted to rely not on 
a purported act of state but on foreign state or foreign official immunity. This is because his 
behaviour was carried out under colour of law: the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held on 2 November 2012 that ‘officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign 
official immunity [ie, immunity ratione materiae] for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were 
performed in the defendant's official capacity.’12 Although beyond the scope of his official duties, 
Peña’s behaviour might be said to have been carried out within their course. Would this have been 
enough to qualify for immunity? Regardless, as it stands, Filartiga is of interest here because it 
launched a chain of cases against foreign governments and foreign officials, most of which did 
come to grapple specifically with immunity claims. In the days immediately following Filartiga, 
most human rights-related immunity cases in the United States were against foreign governments, 
as seen in the first half of Chapter IV above, but with the onset of the 1990s more cases against 
foreign officials began to filter in. 
7.3. Lafontant 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti in the 1990-1991 general elections. The left-
leaning former Priest was scheduled to take office when an attempted coup led by Roger Lafontant 
was thwarted on 8 January 1991.13 Lafontant had been a former leader of the Tonton Macoutes 
paramilitary forces created during the long rule of father and son François 'Papa Doc' and Jean-
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Claude 'Bébé Doc' Duvalier, who dominated the country from 1957 to 1986.14 Lafontant was 
later convicted of sedition and sentenced to life in prison,15 but was shot to death ‘in his cell in the 
National Penitentiary’16 on 29 September 1991. While this was occurring Aristide was deposed in 
another coup, this time led by army veteran General Raoul Cédras.17 Lafontant’s widow Gladys 
claimed Aristide had ordered the commander of the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, 
Captain Stagne Doura, to carry out the killing and Doura allegedly passed the order on to Private 
Sincere Leus who was said to have committed the execution.18 Ms Lafontant therefore filed a 
wrongful death suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 
alleging inter alia the ATCA as a basis for jurisdiction.19  
Aristide claimed immunity. Although he had been ousted in the September 1991 coup, the US 
continued to recognise him as the lawful President of Haiti and the Department of Justice 
submitted a State Department Suggestion of Immunity.20 In his analysis, Weinstein J considered 
both common law head of state immunity and the FSIA’s impact. His Honour concluded that 
according to The Schooner Exchange ‘a head-of-state is absolutely “exempted” from the jurisdiction 
of the receiving state’s courts.’21 His Honour provided no pinpoint reference, simply citing the 
case itself; however, a passage in Marshall CJ’s judgment clearly contradicts Senior District Judge 
Weinstein’s conclusion.22 Furthermore, His Honour contended that the immunity only extended 
to heads of state,23 but then proceeded to cite Saltany v Reagan,24 where UK head of government 
Margaret Thatcher was accorded immunity. Weinstein J said this was because the Restatement 
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(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 66 defines ‘head-of-state as either the 
head-of-state or head of government, thus both Queen and Prime Minister are considered the 
head-of-state.’25 But that document says no such thing: it simply extends a foreign state’s 
immunity26 to inter alia the head of state and head of government.27  
Weinstein J also cited Kilroy v Windsor28 as ‘holding Prince Charles as heir apparent to the throne 
is head-of-state,’29 but Kilroy did not say that. Lambros J held there that, as the Attorney-General 
had filed a suggestion of immunity on behalf of the Department of State,30 he was bound by Spacil 
v Crowe31 to dismiss the suit. The State Department’s determination in Kilroy was based on a 
finding that Prince Charles’s visit was a special mission;32 although the Convention on Special 
Missions33 was not yet in force, previously-existing customary international law would have 
provided the basis for the State Department’s suggestion of immunity. Weinstein J’s attempt in 
Lafontant to define all the various state officials entitled to immunity as heads of state—His 
Honour refers to a ‘Common Law Head-of-State Immunity’34—is problematic, since ‘foreign 
official immunity’ is a more appropriate term.35 ‘Head of state immunity’ is a confusing way to 
classify immunities that also apply to other foreign state officials,36 but this awkward terminology 
was prevalent at the time and did not affect the outcome in Lafontant. 
                                                 
25 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 133 (ED NY, 1994). 
26 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 65. 
27 Ibid § 66(b), (d). 
28 (ND Ohio, No C-78-291, 7 December 1978) (‘Kilroy’). 
29 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 133 (ED NY, 1994). 
30 Kilroy (ND Ohio, No C-78-291, 7 December 1978) slip op 1-2.  
31 489 F 2d 614, 621 (5th Cir, 1974). The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit here held State 
Department suggestions of immunity were binding. 
32 Kilroy (ND Ohio, No C-78-291, 7 December 1978) slip op 3. 
33 opened for signature 8 December 1969, 1400 UNTS 231 (entered into force 21 June 1985). 
34 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 131 (ED NY, 1994). 
35 Weinstein J was not alone in using the term ‘head of state immunity’. See Jerrold L Mallory, ‘Resolving the 
Confusion over Head of State Immunity: the Defined Rights of Kings’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 169; the 
term is still used by American publicists, but modern scholars increasingly favour the term ‘foreign official 
immunity’ unless an actual head of state is involved. See Beth Stephens, ‘The Modern Common Law of Foreign 
Official Immunity’ (2011) 79(6) Fordham Law Review 2669; Ingrid Wuerth, ‘Foreign Official Immunity 
Determinations in US Courts: the Case Against the State Department’ (2011) 51(4) Virginia Journal of 
International Law 915; Curtis A Bradley and Laurence R Helfer, ‘International Law and the US Common Law of 
Foreign Official Immunity’ (2011) The Supreme Court Review 213. 
36 Foreign ministers and heads of government have the same status-based immunity ratione personae. 
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Because Aristide was still recognised by the US Department of State as the Haitian head of state, 
and because Weinstein J found there had been no waiver of immunity,37 His Honour found at 
common law immunity would have prevailed. Weinstein J then had to consider the impact of the 
FSIA: did that Act apply to suits against foreign officials? If it did then the FSIA’s exceptions in § 
1605-1607 would come into play (although it is difficult to see how any of them could have applied 
to the act complained). There was still doubt at the time whether or not the FSIA applied to suits 
against foreign officials.38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had previously 
ruled, in Chuidian v Philippine National Bank,39 that the pre-1976 common law of head of state 
or foreign official immunity did not survive the passage of the FSIA. It based this finding in part 
on the American Law Institute deleting ‘in its entirety the discussion of the United States common 
law of sovereign immunity’40 in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States and replacing it with analysis of the FSIA. According to Wallace J in Chuidian, therefore, a 
suit against a foreign official was the same as a suit against a foreign government and only the FSIA 
applied.41 In Lafontant, Weinstein J took a different view. In effect, he found the pre-1976 
common law—which involved courts abiding by binding State Department Suggestions of 
Immunity—survived the passage of the FSIA.42 His Honour’s analysis is compelling because it 
accords with the FSIA’s wording: nowhere does the FSIA speak of heads of state or foreign officials, 
only agencies or instrumentalities. Weinstein J’s analysis of this issue is also in line with the US 
Supreme Court’s later ruling in Samantar v Yousuf.43 
Finally, Ms Lafontant had made a claim under the recently-enacted Torture Victims Protection Act 
of 1991,44 which inter alia provides: 
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation … subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to 
that individual.45 
                                                 
37 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 134 (ED NY, 1994). 
38 Mallory, above n 134, 174-175. 
39 912 F 2d 1095 (9th Cir, 1990) (‘Chuidian’). 
40 Ibid 1103. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 137 (ED NY, 1994). 
43 560 US 305 (2010). The history of the Samantar litigation is discussed below. 
44 Pub Law No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (‘TVPA’). 
45 Ibid § 2(a)(1). 
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Ms Lafontant alleged ‘Aristide should be denied immunity because head-of-state immunity extends 
only to official acts, and the alleged extrajudicial killing is not an official act under color of law.’46 
There appears to be a misunderstanding here as to the difference between the immunity ratione 
materiae available to all current and former foreign state officials and the immunity ratione personae 
which is only available to incumbent high-level officials. Functional immunity ratione materiae 
only covers official acts. As Aristide was found to be an incumbent head of state, he was amongst 
the small group of officials entitled to immunity ratione personae, which also covers private acts; if 
he were found to be a former head of state that personal immunity would have evaporated, leaving 
behind a functional immunity ratione materiae covering only his official acts.47 Since under one 
view torture is not an official function—one might say it can be carried out within the course of 
official duties but is not within their scope—then current or former officials with only functional 
immunity ratione materiae could be said to be liable (and this seems to be the intention of the 
TVPA), but the same is not true for incumbent high-level officials, whose immunity ratione 
personae also covers private acts. Without making such a distinction, Weinstein J found the act 
complained of fell within the TVPA’s language, but that the TVPA did not trump Aristide’s 
immunity. His Honour should have been more specific and found that the TVPA does preclude 
the functional immunity ratione materiae of current foreign officials and former high-ranking 
foreign officials, but does not prevail against the immunity ratione personae of an incumbent high-
ranking foreign official. This would have been in line with an earlier dictum of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which in Mr and Mrs Doe v United States48 found 
‘respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-of-state for private or 
criminal acts in violation of American law.’49  
                                                 
46 Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128, 137 (ED NY, 1994). Why Ms Lafontant claimed the act was completely private 
and not under colour of law is unclear, as the TVPA only applies when a person was acting actually or 
apparently in an official capacity. 
47 See eg James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 
2012) 488-489. 
48 860 F 2d 40 (2nd Cir, 1988). 
49 Ibid 45. Cardamone J cites The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812). His Honour must have 
meant page 145; the relevant passage is quoted above, n 119. Oakes J in Republic of the Philippines v Marcos, 
806 F 2d 344, 360 (2nd Cir, 1986), who Cardamone J also cites, gets the citation right. Regardless there is 
nothing in Marshall CJ’s passage that distinguishes incumbent and former sovereigns or state officials; it does 
however make the public/private distinction. 
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7.4. Marcos 
Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin Marcos was President of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. The 
1935 Philippine Constitution, in force for the initial period of Marcos’s Presidency, specified no 
individual could serve more than two consecutive four-year terms.50 Toward the end of his second 
term of office, purporting to exercise powers afforded to him under the 1935 Constitution,51 
Marcos proclaimed ‘a state of martial law in the Philippines’52 lasting until 1981. Meanwhile, a 
new 1973 Constitution increased Presidential terms from four to six years and removed limits on 
consecutive terms.53 Marcos faced escalating challenges to his power throughout the early-to-mid 
1980s, in the form of public protests, culminating in the People Power Revolution along Epifanio 
de los Santos Avenue from 22-25 February 1986 after a 7 February 1986 ‘rigged’54 snap election 
wherein Marcos was declared the winner. Forced from office, Marcos fled to the US State of 
Hawaiʻi with his wife Imelda and daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc, where ‘[a]lmost immediately 
thereafter, complaints were filed against him … under the [ATCA]’55 for thousands of incidents 
involving torture and other gross human rights violations. 
An early suit against Marcos was dismissed due to the act of state doctrine in 1986.56 This ruling 
was reversed57 three years later by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on the 
basis that neither ‘the Republic of the Philippines nor the United States government object[ed] to 
judicial resolution’.58 The myriad claims against Marcos and his relatives were consolidated by the 
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation and were certified as a class action naming Marcos’s 
Estate as a defendant.59 Complex litigation ensued. For present purposes, two stages of the 
proceedings are pertinent: (1) Marcos-Manotoc appealed a 1986 default judgment in favour of 
                                                 
50 Constitution of the Philippines 1935 art VII ss 2, 5. 
51 Ibid art VII s 10(2). 
52 Proclamation No 1081 (Republic of the Philippines) 21 September 1972. 
53 Constitution of the Philippines 1973 art VII. 
54 Jon M Van Dyke, ‘The Fundamental Right of the Marcos Human Rights Victims to Compensation’ (2001) 76 
Philippine Law Journal 169, 184. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Trajano v Marcos (D Haw, Civil No 86-0207, 18 July 1986) slip op 21. 
57 Trajano v Marcos, 878 F 2d 1438 (9th Cir, 1989). 
58 Trajano v Marcos, (9th Cir, US App LEXIS 23935, 10 July 1989) slip op 5. The Court relied on earlier findings in 
a claim against Marcos, where it said that ‘[o]nce deposed, [a] dictator will find it difficult to deploy the [act of 
state doctrine] successfully.’ See Republic of the Philippines v Marcos, 862 F 2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir, 1988) 
(‘Philippines v Marcos’). 
59 Hilao v Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F 3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir, 1994) (‘Hilao’). 
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Agapita Trajano for the torture and wrongful death of Trajano’s son, Archimedes, on the basis that 
the District Court supposedly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA and that the 
FSIA did not authorise jurisdiction over ‘actions taken by a foreign government against its own 
citizens’;60 and (2) the Marcos Estate filed an interlocutory appeal against a preliminary injunction 
(pending a jury trial) enjoining it ‘from transferring or secreting any assets’,61 arguing that the 
claims made against it—including torture—did ‘not fall within any of the [FSIA’s] articulated 
exceptions to immunity’.62 
Marcos-Manotoc relied on a claimed immunity under § 1604 of the FSIA,63 stressing that the 
tortious acts complained64 occurred outside the US—so the FSIA’s non-commercial or 'territorial' 
tort exception could not apply—and maintaining that the inapplicability of any other FSIA 
exceptions necessitated a finding of immunity. Trajano for her part pointed to Marcos-Manotoc’s 
admission that she was ‘acting on her own authority, not on the authority of the Republic of the 
Philippines.’65 Whether Marcos-Manotoc was acting in a personal or official capacity was a 
material point, because the Ninth Circuit had previously averred the distinction had consequences 
for immunity in Chuidian.66 In that case, Vincente B Chuidian had named the bank and a 
Philippine government official, Raul Daza, as co-defendants. During the final months of the 
Marcos regime in 1985 a state-owned Philippine instrumentality sued several companies owned 
by Chuidian, who counterclaimed. The parties quickly reached a settlement under which the bank 
issued Chuidian an irrevocable letter of credit on behalf of the instrumentality.67 Soon after, new 
Philippine President Corazon Aquino formed a commission tasked with recovering funds 
misappropriated by Marcos; Daza was appointed to the commission and instructed the bank not 
to honour Chuidian’s letter of credit. Chuidian attempted to argue that Daza had acted in a 
personal capacity—out of malice—and not an official capacity. The court rejected this argument, 
                                                 
60 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F 2d 493, 495 (9th Cir, 1992) (‘Trajano’). 
61 Hilao, 25 F 3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir, 1994). 
62 Ibid 1470. 
63 Trajano, 978 F 2d 493, 497 (9th Cir, 1992). 
64 On 31 August 1977, Marcos-Manotoc attended a discussion at a Philippine university while serving as the 
National Chairman of the Kabataang Baranggay when Archimedes Trajano was kidnapped, interrogated, and 
tortured to death after asking her a question about her appointment as a director of an organization. Ibid 495-
496. 
65 Ibid 498. 
66 912 F 2d 1095 (9th Cir, 1990). 
67 Ibid 1097. 
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but noted with approval a post-WWII US Supreme Court decision, Larson v Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corporation,68 where Vinson CJ said: 
There may be, of course, suits for specific relief against officers of the sovereign which are 
not suits against the sovereign. If the officer purports to act as an individual and not as an 
official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the 
[government official] had completed a sale of his personal home, he presumably could be 
enjoined from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar theory, where the officer’s 
powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered 
individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the 
sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has 
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object 
of specific relief. It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without 
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer’s lack of delegated power. A claim of 
error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.69 
Importantly, both Larson and another case the Ninth Circuit cited on this point, United States v 
Yakima Tribal Court,70 were concerned with federal sovereign immunity (which is a doctrine 
concerning the immunity of a sovereign in its own domestic tribunals).71 Nonetheless, in Chuidian 
Wallace J approved the reasoning from those precedents in a suit against a foreign official.72 
Although US courts at this time were generally still dealing with claims against foreign officials 
under the framework of the FSIA,73 the ruling in Chuidian appeared to recognise an ‘exception’ 
for conduct of foreign officials that was either: (a) purely personal; or (b) ultra vires.74 However, it 
was not really an exception. More accurately, it was a determination that the FSIA simply did not 
apply in these two categories of cases. Additionally, this may have been obiter, since the court did 
not accept Chuidian’s argument that Daza actually was either acting in a personal capacity or was 
acting ultra vires; however, Rymer J later applied Wallace J’s logic in the Trajano ratio: finding 
that Marcos-Manotoc by defaulting had admitted to acting on her own authority, Her Honour 
found ‘[u]nder these circumstances, her acts cannot have been taken within any official mandate 
                                                 
68 337 US 682 (1949) (‘Larson’). 
69 Ibid 689. 
70 806 F 2d 853 (9th Cir, 1986) (‘Yakima’). 
71 Similar in concept to domestic, state sovereign immunity cases under United States Constitution amend XI. 
This transposition in logic in Chuidian from the field of US sovereign immunity to foreign sovereign immunity 
has been noted by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Velasco v Government of Indonesia, 370 F 3d 
392, 399 (2004) (‘Velasco’). 
72 Chuidian, 912 F 2d 1095, 1106-1107 (9th Cir, 1990). 
73 But see Lafontant, 844 F Supp 128 (ED NY, 1994). 
74 See Yang, who agrees with this reading of Chuidian: Xiaodong Yang, State Immunity in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 435. 
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and therefore cannot have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state.’75 The FSIA 
therefore could not apply and consequently there could be no immunity. There was still the matter 
of subject-matter jurisdiction, but Circuit Judge Rymer found this was granted by the ATCA.76 
In the second relevant proceeding, the Marcos Estate pleaded immunity because supposedly none 
of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions applied to the action. More especially it argued—along 
similar lines to Marcos-Manotoc—that the only exception which might apply, contained in FSIA 
§ 1605(a)(5), was territorially limited in scope to torts occurring within the US.77 It further claimed 
that Marcos was acting within his official authority when he committed the acts complained; Tang 
J, however, pointed to the decision against Marcos-Manotoc, where by defaulting she had been 
held to have admitted acting on her own authority. Circuit Judge Tang then said ‘because the 
allegations of the complaint are taken as true for purposes of determining whether an action should 
be dismissed, Marcos’ actions should be treated as taken without official mandate pursuant to his 
own authority.’78 This seems to be a controversial statement and, with respect, incorrect. If all the 
plaintiff’s claims are to be taken as completely true at the jurisdictional stage of proceedings, and 
jurisdiction will in some cases depend on whether the defendant acted in a personal or official 
capacity, there is nothing to stop plaintiffs always describing defendants as acting on personal and 
not official authority. Since ‘the allegations of the complaint [will be] taken as true,’ the defendant 
would have no way of rebutting and there would never be any immunity. Clearly this is an incorrect 
stance: there must be some investigation into whether the behaviour was official or private in 
nature.79 Later US Court of Appeals precedents confirmed this reasoning: 
In some cases, however, the motion to dismiss will present a dispute over the factual basis 
of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, that is, either contest a 
jurisdictional fact alleged by the plaintiff, or raise a mixed question of law and fact. When 
the defendant has thus challenged the factual basis of the court’s jurisdiction, the court may 
not deny the motion to dismiss merely by assuming the truth of the facts alleged by the plaintiff 
and disputed by the defendant. Instead, the court must go beyond the pleadings and 
                                                 
75 Trajano, 978 F 2d 493, 498 (9th Cir, 1992). 
76 Ibid 499. 
77 Hilao, 25 F 3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir, 1994). 
78 Ibid 1470-1471. 
79 For the same reason, some investigation should be allowed at the jurisdictional stage into whether the act 
complained, if proven, would constitute a violation of ius cogens; although, the ICJ recently ruled otherwise. 
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy; Greece intervening) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 
136. Similarly, judges delved tentatively into substance—looking at whether a foreign government’s actions 
were jure imperii or jure gestionis—when restrictive immunity evolved. 
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resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the 
motion to dismiss.80 (Emphasis added, citations removed.) 
Jungquist v Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa al Nahyan81 and Price v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya82 confirmed this general point in the specific context of whether the act complained 
was performed in an official capacity or was ultra vires.83 
Fortunately, Their Honours based the decision about the capacity in which Marcos acted on more 
than just the above shaky basis. Tang J pointed to an earlier decision where the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting as a limited en banc court,84 heard a civil case brought 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act85 against Marcos by the Republic of 
the Philippines.86 Tang J said in that case ‘we held that Marcos’ alleged illegal acts were not official 
acts’.87 Noonan J had said in Philippines v Marcos that ‘[o]ur courts have had no difficulty in 
distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in 
law.’88 His Honour had based that finding on analysis of an earlier decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit involving deposed dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez.89 Jiménez 
was a general in the National Army of Venezuela who as part of a triumvirate90 including Luis 
Felipe Llovera Páez and Carlos Delgado Chalbaud overthrew the democratically-elected President, 
Rómulo Gallegos, in a bloodless 1948 coup. The country was thereafter ruled by a military junta. 
Delgado Chalbaud served as President of Venezuela until his assassination in 1950; thereafter, the 
junta installed Germán Suárez Flamerich as president, who served until early results for the 30 
November 1952 Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly elections showed an expected loss for the 
junta’s political party, the Frente Electoral Independiente91 (‘FEI’) to the opposition Unión 
                                                 
80 Phoenix Consulting v Republic of Angola, 216 F 3d 36, 40 (DC Cir, 2000). 
81 115 F 3d 1020 (DC Cir, 1997) (‘Jungquist’). 
82 294 F 3d 82, 87 (DC Cir 2002) (‘Price v Libya’). 
83 Ibid 1027-1028. 
84 When most US circuit courts sit en banc they empanel all the judges. See 7 Fed R App P 35. With 29 judges, 
this would be impractical in the 9th Circuit. Its rules allow a randomly-selected 11-member, ‘limited en banc 
court.’ See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Circuit Rules (effective 1 January 2015) r 35-3. 
85 18 USC §§ 1961-1968 (‘RICO’). 
86 Philippines v Marcos, 862 F 2d 1355 (9th Cir, 1988). 
87 Hilao, 25 F 3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir, 1994). 
88 862 F 2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir, 1988). 
89 Jimenez v Aristeguieta, 311 F 2d 547 (5th Cir, 1962) (‘Jimenez’). 
90 Ibid 560. 
91 Independent Electoral Front [Google trans]. 
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Republicana Democrática92 (‘URD’) led by Jóvito Villalba Gutiérrez. In response the junta on 2 
December 1952 dismissed Suárez Flamerich and appointed Jiménez as Provisional President. 
Jiménez acted in that capacity for some months until sworn in as President of Venezuela on 19 
April 1953, ruling thereafter until public protests and rioting forced him to flee to the US on 23 
January 1958. 
On 24 August 1959 Manuel Aristeguieta, Venezuela’s Consul General, filed an application for 
Jiménez’s extradition back to Venezuela—to face charges of murder and financial crimes involving 
unjust enrichment up to at least US$13 million—in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida. Jiménez filed a habeas corpus petition asserting ‘the extradition file 
discloses defects which made unlawful both his commitment to custody and his detention’.93 The 
petition was dismissed and Jiménez promptly appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. Distinguishing the case from Underhill v Hernandez,94 Estes J said that case ‘does 
not support appellant’s claim of sovereign immunity.’95 In Underhill, Fuller CJ delivering the 
opinion of the US Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit that Venezuelan army commander José Manuel Hernández’s actions ‘were 
acts of the government of Venezuela … [and were] “not sufficient to have warranted a finding by 
the jury that the defendant was actuated by malice or any personal or private motive”’.96 District 
Judge Estes interpreted Fuller CJ as making it clear ‘that [the Supreme Court’s] decision would 
have been otherwise had defendant’s action been differently motivated, as is the case here.’97 
Hernández was therefore ‘immune’, his actions having been found to be committed in an official 
capacity; whereas Jiménez, having acted in a personal capacity, was not ‘immune’.98  
Writing for the majority of the en banc court in the Marcos RICO proceedings, Noonan J found 
‘[a]s in the case of the deposed Venezuelan ruler, Marcos Perez Jimenez, the latter acts are as 
adjudicable and redressable as would be a dictator’s act of rape.’99 In the Marcos Estate proceedings, 
                                                 
92 Democratic Republican Union [Google trans]. 
93 Jimenez, 311 F 2d 547, 550 (5th Cir, 1962). 
94 168 US 250 (1897) (‘Underhill’). 
95 Jimenez, 311 F 2d 547, 558 (5th Cir, 1962). 
96 Underhill, 168 US 250, 254 (1897). 
97 Jimenez, 311 F 2d 547, 558 (5th Cir, 1962). 
98 ‘Immune’ is used loosely here, as these cases concerned acts of state not foreign sovereign or foreign official 
immunity. 
99 Philippines v Marcos, 862 F 2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir, 1988). 
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Senior Circuit Judge Tang relied on the Jimenez and Underhill logic referred to in the Marcos 
RICO proceedings as a basis for finding that Marcos, by acting in a private and not official capacity, 
was not immune. This involved a transposition of logic from the act of state doctrine to the realm 
of foreign official immunity. Tang J also rejected the contention that the court’s finding was at 
odds with its prior precedent in Siderman de Blake. In that case of course the court felt constrained 
by the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Amerada Hess to rule that immunity must prevail—even in 
cases of ius cogens violations—unless a FSIA exception applied; however, Tang J noted: 
Siderman was an action against the Republic of Argentina, which clearly fell within the 
‘foreign state’ scope of FSIA. In this case, the action is against the estate of an individual 
official who is accused of engaging in activities outside the scope of his authority. FSIA 
thus does not apply to this case.100 
In effect, Tang J was stating that the FSIA applied to cases against individual foreign officials when 
they were acting in their official capacity; however, His Honour held that the FSIA did not apply—
and there could be no shield of immunity—wherever an individual foreign official acted in a 
personal capacity. 
This reasoning, which relies on act of state precedents,101 accords with Wallace and Rymer JJ’s 
reasoning, which came to an identical conclusion by relying on federal sovereign immunity 
precedents.102 The door was now ajar for civil suits against certain types of foreign officials103 (but 
not foreign governments) who had committed serious human rights violations in contravention of 
ius cogens norms while acting in a personal capacity (and arguably when acting ultra vires) but not 
while acting in an official capacity.  Another important question remained. It concerned a finding 
in Chuidian.104 In that case, Wallace J held ‘a suit against an individual acting in his official capacity 
is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly’105 and that ‘a bifurcated approach 
to sovereign immunity was not intended by the Act.’106 However, Chuidian and the US 
Department of State had argued the FSIA ‘is not meant to encompass individuals.’107 Did the US 
                                                 
100 Hilao, 25 F 3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir, 1994). 
101 Jimenez, 311 F 2d 547 (5th Cir, 1962); Underhill, 168 US 250 (1897). 
102 Larson, 337 US 682 (1949); Yakima, 806 F 2d 853 (9th Cir, 1986). 
103 Those who had only immunity ratione materiae, incumbent lower-level foreign officials and former foreign 
officials of any level. Incumbent high-level foreign officials would probably still be immune by virtue of their 
immunity ratione personae. 
104 912 F 2d 1095 (9th Cir, 1990). 
105 Ibid 1101. 
106 Ibid 1102. 
107 Ibid 1100. 
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Congress by enacting the FSIA intend it to cover suits against foreign officials or was the legislature 
only intending that statute to cover suits against foreign governments? Ultimately, this was a 
question for the US Supreme Court to decide in a subsequent ATCA/FSIA case. 
7.5. Samantar 
What is now Somalia was in the period leading up to World War II (‘WWII’) divided into the 
British and the Italian Somaliland. The former spanned the northwest (roughly equivalent to the 
territory presently occupied by the breakaway Republic of Somaliland),108 while the latter ranged 
from the country’s northeast to its southern extremity. Britain captured Italian Somaliland during 
WWII; however, the United Nations General Assembly—when it was dealing with the disposal of 
the former Italian colonies—decided to place Italian Somaliland ‘under the International 
Trusteeship System with Italy as the Administering Authority’ for a period of ten years, after which 
it was to become an ‘independent sovereign State.’109 A Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory 
of Somaliland under Italian administration was approved on 2 December 1950.110 Near the 
expiration of that trusteeship, on 26 June 1960 British Somaliland was granted independence and 
became the State of Somaliland;111 on 30 June 1960 Adan Abdulle Osman proclaimed Italian 
Somaliland’s independence as the State of Somalia;112 and on 1 July the two nations’ legislatures 
formed a union as the Republic of Somalia.113 Frustration with the Republic’s second President, 
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, led to his assassination on 15 October 1969 and Siad Barre’s accession 
less than a week later by way of coup. Barre adopted ‘scientific socialism’114 in 1970, ruling the 
country for more than two decades until he fled Mogadishu on 26 January 1991.115  
                                                 
108 ‘The territory of the Republic of Somaliland covers the same area as that of the former Somaliland 
Protectorate and is located between Latitude 8’ to 11’30’ north of the equator and Longitude 42’45 to 49’ 
East’. See Dastuurka Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland [Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland] art 2(1) [Google 
trans]. 
109 Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies GA Res 289 (IV), UN GAOR, 4th sess, 250th plen mtg, 
UN DOC A/RES/289(IV) (21 November 1949). 
110 Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration GA Res 442 (V), UN 
GAOR, 5th sess, 316th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/442(V) (2 December 1950). 
111 Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary of Somalia (Scarecrow Press, 2003) xxxiv.  
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ioan M Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society (Columbia University Press, 
2008) 39. 
115 Ibid 72-73. 
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Although he initially intended to erase tribal divisions and capitalise on strong pan-Somali 
sentiment throughout the 1950s and 1960s to form a new national identity, Barre’s policies 
backfired and in ‘the ensuing post-Siyad [sic] period … the Somali nation became more deeply 
divided along its traditional kinship lines than perhaps at any other time in the twentieth 
century.’116 Faced with strong opposition from the Isaaq clan’s Somali National Movement in the 
northwest117 and the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress in and around Mogadishu,118 
Barre resorted to ‘barbaric’119 tactics in an effort to cling to power; however, he also employed other 
methods. An example of the latter was the formation of a ‘new’ government in 1987. For the first 
time since the 1969 coup, Somalia was given a Prime Minister: Mohamed Ali Samantar, a ‘long-
serving and politically-unassuming military commander’.120 
Samantar, however, was in fact a ‘hard-liner’121 who ‘had been one of the founders of the military 
regime’122 and was cited as instrumental in carrying out a policy that a Somali scholar described as 
involving ‘torture, rape, and all forms of psychological intimidation.’123 Before becoming Prime 
Minister, he was Somalia’s Defence Minister from about January 1980 to December 1986, by 
virtue of which he purportedly ‘possessed and exercised command and effective control over the 
Somali military.’124 Samantar fled to Italy when the Barre regime collapsed in January 1991 and 
arrived in the United States in 1997.125 US citizens Bashe Abdi Yousuf and Aziz Mohamed Deria, 
along with several Somali John and Jane Does—granted permission to proceed anonymously 
because they feared reprisals—brought suit on 10 November 2004 against Samantar under the 
TVPA and ATCA respectively in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia’s Alexandria Division,126 alleging liability for acts including torture, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. After some procedural delay caused by the State Department’s lack of 
response to a request for a Statement of Interest on immunity, Brinkema J heard the parties on 
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Samantar’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to the FSIA on 27 April 
2007.127 
District Judge Brinkema proceeded from the assumption that the FSIA only immunised 
individuals who had acted in an official capacity.128 Yousuf and the other plaintiffs therefore had 
to establish Samantar acted in a personal capacity or acted ultra vires. Specifically, they claimed 
that ‘act[ing] contrary to international norms [wa]s conclusive as to whether he acted beyond the 
scope of his authority.’129 Torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity violate international 
norms; therefore, they could not be within the scope of Samantar’s authority. By ordering them or 
allowing them to occur he must have acted ultra vires and inasmuch could not claim the FSIA’s 
blanket grant of immunity. So went the plaintiff’s argument.130 They faced a hurdle, however, 
because—although the State Department itself had not issued a suggestion of immunity on 
Samantar’s behalf—the Somali Transitional Federal Government had sent two letters to the State 
Department claiming Samantar would have been acting in his official capacity if and when he 
undertook, authorised, or failed to prevent the acts complained.131 Brinkema J looked at two cases 
involving similar circumstances, Belhas v Ya’Alon132 and Matar v Dichter.133 
The Belhas dispute sprang out of a conflict between Israel and the militant Shi’a Muslim group 
Hezbollah. Since its official founding in 1985, Hezbollah has waged sporadic guerrilla warfare 
against the Israeli Defence Forces (‘IDF’) in Lebanon. After a US-brokered 1993 truce broke down 
in April 1996, Israel executed Operation Grapes of Wrath in southern Lebanon.134 Israel’s current 
Minister of Defence, Moshe Ya’alon, was then a Major General in the IDF and head of the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (‘Aman’). As Aman’s chief, Ya’alon allegedly was involved in 
the 18 April 1996 bombing of Qana, where approximately 800 Lebanese civilians were shelled by 
the IDF inside a United Nations compound where they had taken refuge. Ali Belhas and others 
sued Ya’alon under the ATCA and TVPA, claiming his actions ‘constitute[d] war crimes, 
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extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’135 Ya’alon claimed immunity under the FSIA and filed a motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Friedman J in Belhas proceeded on the basis that if Ya’alon was acting in an official capacity then 
FSIA immunity would arise,136 since none of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions were applicable. 
There was no indication that Ya’alon’s actions were personal and not official in nature; in fact, the 
Israeli Ambassador had written the US Department of State a letter claiming ‘[a]t all times relevant 
hereto, Defendant was acting under color of Israeli law’ and this convinced the Court that it was 
‘undisputed that General Ya’alon was acting in his official capacity.’137 (Emphasis added.) An 
attempt to argue that, even if Ya’alon acted in an official capacity, he nevertheless acted outside the 
scope of his lawful authority was also rebuffed. As stated, the Court had held there was no indication 
that Ya’alon acted in a personal capacity or in anything other than an official capacity.138 The 
plaintiffs also alleged, however, that Ya’alon’s actions could not have been within the scope of his 
authority, because they violated norms of international law (inasmuch as the actions constituted 
war crimes, etc). The court rejected this claim by stating simply that such a claim did not fit ‘within 
the framework of the statutory exceptions to immunity.’139 The court’s reliance on DC Circuit 
precedent took it in a different direction from Ninth Circuit rulings canvassed above. District 
Judge Friedman began by proceeding upon the assumption that the FSIA did not apply to suits 
against officials if they were not acting in an official capacity; however, as seen above, Trajano and 
Chuidian—the former relying on the latter, and the latter relying on Larson—seemed to establish, 
at least in the Ninth Circuit, the notion that the FSIA did not apply to foreign officials who were 
acting either in a personal capacity or were acting ultra vires. By refusing to countenance the notion 
that a foreign official’s ultra vires actions might preclude FSIA immunity in the same way that 
acting in a personal capacity would, the US District Court for the District of Columbia seems to 
have parted ways in Belhas from the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit. The key point is that 
the claim need not have had to ‘fit within the framework of the statutory exceptions to immunity’ 
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(as Friedman J claimed) because, as is the case with purely personal behaviour, a foreign official 
acting ultra vires simply does not enliven the FSIA in the first place (at least according to Ninth 
Circuit precedent). 
Belhas and the other plaintiffs appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, where Sentelle CJ heard the matter with Henderson and Williams JJ.140 Again, an 
important element of the judgment dealt with what Sentelle CJ described as the appellants’ ‘Jus 
Cogens Exception’141 argument. Here Belhas’s counsel argued the acts they accused Ya’alon of 
having committed amounted to ius cogens violations and ‘that any act that violates a jus cogens norm 
must, by definition, be outside the scope of the individual’s authority because no sovereign can 
authorise jus cogens violations.’142 The Court, however, dismissed the argument outright, on the 
basis that ‘the FSIA contains no unenumerated exceptions’ and there was a ‘prohibition on creating 
new exceptions to the FSIA’.143 While US jurisprudence certainly does preclude the reading of so-
called unenumerated exceptions into the FSIA’s text,144 Their Honours—like Friedman J at first 
instance—with respect seem to have missed the point. The appellants were not arguing for the 
reading in of an unenumerated ius cogens exception. Instead, they were arguing that if Ya’alon’s 
actions constituted ius cogens violations then the acts complained were outside his lawful authority, 
putting him in a position where the FSIA didn’t apply. In such a case there would of course be no 
need to establish an unenumerated exception. The appellants did not need to contrive a new 
unenumerated FSIA exception. Instead, they were asking for a ruling in accordance with the logic 
that ultra vires behaviour, like purely personal behaviour, doesn’t enliven the FSIA. If the Court 
had found that Ya’alon’s actions were purely personal, it would have ruled that the FSIA was not 
enlivened and that Ya’alon had no immunity. The appellants were arguing that, similarly to purely 
personal behaviour, the FSIA also was not enlivened if the act complained was ultra vires. The 
Court seems to have not comprehended this point, or to have side-stepped it; however, it accords 
with the ratio in Trajano. Rymer J in that case stated: 
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In Chuidian, we held that the FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official capacity, 
but that an official is not entitled to immunity for acts which are not committed in an official 
capacity (such as selling personal property), and for acts beyond the scope of her authority 
(For example, doing something the sovereign has not empowered the official to do).145 
(Emphasis added.) 
Her Honour, delivering a unanimous opinion with which Browning and Pregerson JJ concurred, 
clearly pointed to two categories of cases where the FSIA is not enlivened. Those are: cases where 
the foreign official (1) acted in a personal and not in an official capacity; and (2) acted in an official 
capacity, but beyond the scope of lawful authority such that the actions were ultra vires. In the 
former, an official would not be acting within the course of official duties; in the latter, the official 
would not be acting within their scope. This second category, however, was omitted by Sentelle CJ 
in Belhas (as it was also missed by Friedman J at first instance). Friedman J’s order dismissing the 
suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to the FSIA was thus affirmed by Sentelle CJ and 
Henderson and Williams JJ; although, arguably this should not have occurred. 
The other case Brinkema J looked at when considering Yousuf and the other plaintiffs’ claims was 
Matar;146 although, the parties did not have the opportunity to discuss this ruling in their briefs 
because it was decided after the hearing.147 The situation in Matar was conceptually similar to that 
in Belhas. The case concerned Israel’s ‘targeted killing’ strategy, pursuant to which hundreds of 
suspected terrorists and bystanders have been killed since 29 September 2000.148 The defendant, 
Avi Dichter, is a former Israeli Minister of Internal Security. At the time of the acts complained, 
Dichter was Director of Israel’s General Security Agency (‘Shin Bet’).149 The plaintiffs were 
individuals injured, or the representatives of those killed, in a 22 July 2002 IDF bombing of an 
apartment building in Gaza’s al-Daraj neighbourhood. The attack aimed at and succeeded in 
killing Salah Shehade, who until that time led Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades.150 As head of Shin Bet, Dichter was supposed to have created the targeted killing policy 
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and to have planned the al-Daraj bombing.151 As in Belhas, the Israeli Ambassador in the Matar 
case conveyed to the US Department of State a letter claiming all Dichter’s actions were ‘in the 
course of [his] official duties.’152 
Making the same argument as the plaintiffs in Belhas, the Matar plaintiffs claimed ‘the FSIA does 
not apply to Dichter because jus cogens violations are necessarily beyond the scope of an official’s 
authority.’ Pauley J’s laconic reply? ‘This court disagrees.’153 His Honour based the refusal on a 
contention that, in all the cases the plaintiffs cited where ius cogens violators were denied immunity, 
none of the officials ‘act[ed] in their official capacity.’154 This reasoning mishandles the plaintiffs’ 
argument. As in Belhas, this line of logic refused to countenance the second category of case (an 
official acting ultra vires) which sat alongside cases where the official acted in a personal capacity 
as an example of a situation where the FSIA did not apply. 
Pauley J first pointed to Hilao.155 His Honour claimed this case could not help the plaintiffs 
because it held that the defendant’s acts were taken without official mandate. It is true, the Court 
made that determination; however, Tang J in the very passage Pauley J cites said ‘in Chuidian, we 
had held that FSIA does not immunize a foreign official engaged in acts beyond the scope of his 
authority.’156 (Citations removed, emphasis added.) Tang J could not have been clearer. He wasn’t 
talking about cases where a foreign official acted in a personal and not an official capacity. He was 
talking about cases where the official was acting within the course of his official duties—was at 
least prima facie acting in an official ‘capacity’—but whose actions exceeded the scope of their 
authority. Tang J went even further, recalling ‘[w]here the officer’s powers are limited by statute, 
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions.’157 
(Emphasis added.) Pauley J then cited Doe v Qi158 as useless to the plaintiffs because it held that 
there was no immunity where acts covertly authorized by China were publicly disclaimed. It is 
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difficult to understand how this authority can be made to serve Pauley J’s argument that the foreign 
official was not acting in an official capacity. Again, the very passage His Honour cites begins by 
stating in its second sentence that ‘ultra vires actions are not subject to sovereign immunity.’159 
Pauley J next cited Cabiri v Assasie-Gyimah160 as useless because the defendant there did not claim 
the torture he allegedly committed fell within the scope of his authority. Again, however, the very 
passage Pauley J cites quotes Chuidian when recalling ‘the FSIA “will not shield an official who 
acts beyond the scope of his authority.”’161 Finally, Xuncax v Gramajo162 was cited as useless to the 
plaintiff’s arguments because Guatemala never specifically characterised the actions as officially 
authorised. Again, however, the very passage Pauley J cites says ‘I find that the acts which form the 
basis of these actions exceed anything that might be considered to have been lawfully within the 
scope of Gramajo’s official authority. Accordingly, I conclude that the defendant is not entitled to 
immunity under the FSIA’.163 
As should be clear, none of the cases Pauley J refers to make good the proposition that the FSIA 
was only inapplicable to a foreign official when that official acted in a personal and not an official 
capacity.164 They all specifically recognise that a foreign official acting in the course of their official 
duties might exceed the scope of their lawful authority and that in such a situation the FSIA would 
not apply and there could therefore be no immunity. This distinction between the personal and 
the ultra vires behaviour of a foreign official is redolent of the Mallén165 arbitration. In that case 
Francisco Mallén was twice assaulted by Juan Franco, a deputy constable. The first assault was 
clearly a purely private act: Franco saw Mallén in the street, said he would ‘get’ him, and proceeded 
to assault him. The arbitrators said ‘[t]he evidence as to the first assault on Consul Mallén by 
Deputy Constable Franco … clearly indicates a malevolent and unlawful act of a private individual 
who happened to be an official; not the act of an official.’166 The second assault involved the misuse 
of official capacity: on a train from Mexico to the USA, Franco assaulted Mallén while purporting 
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to arrest him, then took him off to gaol.167 The judges in Belhas and Matar seem to be saying that 
the FSIA is only inapplicable to the first category of cases, where the foreign official acted in a 
purely personal capacity; however, they ignore the weight of authority in Chuidian, Trajano, Hilao, 
Cabiri, and Xuncax. All of these latter cases clearly recognise the FSIA as inapplicable in two 
situations: where the foreign official acted in a personal capacity; and when they acted ultra vires. 
The fact that ultra vires behaviour may still be attributable to the foreign official’s home state for 
the purposes of state responsibility should not necessitate a finding that the foreign official is 
immune. Foreign state immunity acts as a procedural bar, and steers those seeking a remedy against 
the state toward a different avenue of redress: for instance, diplomatic means.168 There is no reason, 
however, to accord a similar immunity to a foreign official who was in fact exceeding lawful 
authority or blatantly violating their home state's laws. A private suit against that natural person 
will not involve the interests of the state.169 Furthermore, if aggrieved parties are able to find a 
remedy in private suits against the responsible foreign official they will be less likely embark on 
fruitless claims against the state itself; diplomatic negotiations with the foreign state itself would 
also be presumably hastened—or possibly even dispensed with—if the aggrieved parties had 
already been able to obtain a remedy against the responsible official. 
Since Pauley J did not accept this second category of ultra vires behaviour as precluding the 
operation of the FSIA, His Honour granted Dichter’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.170 The ‘threshold question’ on appeal was whether ‘Dichter enjoy[ed] immunity from suit, 
either under the FSIA or under common law.’171 Importantly, here, the Court considered not just 
whether Dichter might have a statutory, FSIA-based immunity, but also whether he might enjoy 
a common law immunity. Indeed, the Department of State had urged the Court at first instance 
to hold that ‘the FSIA did not apply to individual foreign officials’.172 This recommendation was 
in line with the Department’s rejuvenated policy against the application of the FSIA to foreign 
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officials:173 tricky questions of statutory interpretation, about whether the FSIA’s language covered 
natural persons such as foreign officials, could be avoided if instead those individuals were found 
to be covered by common law rules of immunity pre-dating the FSIA’s enactment.174 
One of those tricky questions was now before the Court: Matar and the other appellants claimed 
that, even if the language of the FSIA allowed a foreign official to be an ‘agency’, in this case Dichter 
should not have the benefit of the immunity because he was no longer a foreign official at the time 
the suit was filed175 (Dichter left Shin Bet in 2005 and did not take up office as Israel’s Minister of 
Internal Security until 4 May 2006, almost six months after the suit was brought in December 
2005; therefore, he was not a foreign official at the time.) The appellants relied on Dole Food Co v 
Patrickson176 in support of their claim. In Dole Food the US Supreme Court was considering when 
a corporation’s status as an instrumentality should be determined: at the time of the act complained 
or at the time the suit is filed. It ruled in favour of the latter. Based on this, the appellants claimed 
that as Dichter was no longer a foreign official at the time the suit was filed he could not qualify 
as an agency under the FSIA. Two other circuit courts had considered the issue: it was raised in 
Belhas,177 where the DC Circuit rejected the comparison and found Dole Food was not relevant;178 
and the Fourth Circuit considered the matter in Yousuf v Samantar,179 where the Court reached 
the opposite conclusion and held Dole Food was ‘directly applicable to claims of immunity by 
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individual officials’.180 Jacobs J in Matar side-stepped the issue—which His Honour called a ‘close 
and interesting question’181—by partially adopting the State Department’s recommended course. 
While the State Department had urged that the FSIA should not apply at all to foreign officials, 
Jacobs J did not go so far. The Second Circuit had already ruled that suits against incumbent foreign 
officials came under the FSIA’s aegis (at least if they were acting in an official capacity).182  As to 
suits against former foreign officials, Jacobs J declined to rule on whether the FSIA applied, 
preferring instead to recognise a pre-existing common law immunity that was not displaced by the 
passage of the FSIA.183 
As to the appellants’ jus cogens claims, they were given short shrift on the basis that ‘there is no 
general jus cogens exception to FSIA immunity.’184 As in Belhas, the Court arguably failed to do 
justice to the appellants’ argument. They were not arguing for an exception to FSIA immunity, 
but were instead contending that the FSIA did not apply (because a jus cogens violation would mean 
the behaviour was ultra vires and therefore, similarly to a case of purely private behaviour, would 
preclude the FSIA’s enlivenment). Furthermore, since the Court had specifically declined to rule 
on whether the FSIA applied to suits against former foreign officials, it is curious that Jacobs J dealt 
with the jus cogens argument by stating that there is no jus cogens exception to FSIA immunity. 
This is because Jacobs J was recognising Dichter as the beneficiary of a common law immunity, 
not a FSIA-based immunity. Arguably, Jacobs J should have investigated the content of the 
common law immunity in more detail. As Dichter was only a former official, he could not have 
been the beneficiary of any status-based immunity ratione personae: this, if he ever had its benefit, 
would have evaporated upon the cessation of his term in office. Instead, Dichter could only have 
been the beneficiary of a function-based immunity ratione materiae. This would have given Dichter 
immunity for any acts performed in his official capacity. The appellants, however, were arguing 
that by committing jus cogens violations Dichter must certainly have exceeded the scope of his 
lawful authority and acted ultra vires; such behaviour, although in the course of his official duties, 
would not have been within their scope, and could not really be deemed an official act. Jacobs J’s 
                                                 
180 Matar v Dichter, 563 F 3d 9, 13 (2nd Cir, 2009). 
181 Ibid 15. 
182 Ibid 12. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F 3d 71, 81 (2nd Cir, 2008). 
183 Matar v Dichter, 563 F 3d 9, 13-14 (2nd Cir, 2009). 
184 Ibid 14. 
Part Three, Chapter VII 
207 
 
ruling, however, considers none of this. Instead, the Court meekly deferred to the State 
Department’s Statement of Interest,185 which recommended immunity. As will be seen below, 
there is arguably a constitutional basis for courts to defer to State Department determinations of 
status-based immunity in relation to incumbent foreign heads of state, but ‘there is no equivalent 
constitutional basis for a finding of conduct-based immunity for foreign officials’.186 Arguably, 
therefore, Jacobs J should not have automatically deferred to the State Department’s opinion, but 
should have conducted an independent inquiry into the scope of Dichter’s common-law immunity 
and whether it held up in the circumstances. 
At first instance in Yousuf v Samantar,187 Brinkema J only had the benefit of the lower court 
findings in Belhas and Matar, as the Court of Appeals decisions in those cases had not yet been 
handed down. The ratios before Brinkema J were, therefore: that the acts complained were official 
and not personal acts, there further being no enumerated exception in the FSIA for war crimes or 
other jus cogens violations.188 Brinkema J, noting those rulings,189 felt ‘the factual similarities 
between the instant action and Belhas and Matar … cannot be ignored.’190 Her Honour noted, 
however, that ‘Samantar is perhaps entitled to even more deference because he was Minister of 
Defense, a cabinet level position, and then Prime Minister, during the alleged events;’191 however, 
this observation made in passing could only be obiter and is in any case misconceived. By the time 
the suit was filed, Samantar was no longer a Somali official. Therefore, any status-based immunity 
ratione personae which may have attached to him during his term of office would have evaporated 
with the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, leaving only a residual function-based immunity 
ratione materiae. Regardless, Brinkema J clearly thought Belhas and Matar were on point, not 
distinguishable, and made much of the letters from Israel in both cases requesting immunity and 
the letters from the Somali Transitional Federal Government similarly requesting immunity for 
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Samantar.192 Yousuf and the other plaintiffs cited Trajano193 and Hilao194 as precedent for the 
contention that defendants acting outside the scope of their authority are amenable to suit under 
the ATCA.195 These were distinguished,196 however, because in Trajano Marcos-Manotoc by 
defaulting was deemed to have admitted her actions were outside the scope of her authority197 and 
in Hilao the Philippine government affirmed Marcos’s actions were outside the scope of his 
authority.198 As regards jus cogens, Brinkema J simply stated that such violations do not constitute 
an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.199 Apparently the plaintiffs did not even attempt to make 
such an argument. There was no mention of the more nuanced ius cogens argument urged by the 
plaintiffs in Belhas and Matar. 
Ultimately, Brinkema J found Samantar ‘at all relevant times, […] act[ed] upon the directives of 
the then-Somali government in an official capacity, and not for personal reasons or motivation.’200 
In fact, ‘personal reasons or motivation’ would seem to be irrelevant. In Chuidian, a case Brinkema 
J cited in the same paragraph, the Ninth Circuit clearly state as much: 
[W]hile Daza may or may not have acted with an individual motive, it is clear that in 
ordering the payment not be made he purported to act as an official, not an individual. … 
But Chuidian once more confuses the motive with the actions arising from the motive. 
Chuidian has not alleged any respect in which Daza’s actions departed from his statutory 
mandate. … Chuidian does not argued otherwise. Rather, he contends that Daza’s 
personal motive renders his actions ultra vires even though the actions themselves were 
fully authorised. Under Chuidian’s view, every otherwise proper sovereign action would 
be subject to judicial examination to ensure that the acting officer did not derive some 
personal satisfaction from the commission of his official duty. There is no authority to 
support such a radical expansion of the exceptions to sovereign immunity.201 
Although, countering this is the opinion of Estes J in Jimenez, relying on Hernandez, which 
indicates acting out of malice could be a determining factor. Regardless of this, because the Somali 
government claimed Samantar was acting in an official capacity, and because the facts seemed to 
parallel those in Belhas and Matar, Brinkema J felt compelled to uphold Samantar’s immunity and 
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granted his motion to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.202 Arguably, the 
plaintiffs made a grave error in not forcibly pleading that ius cogens violations committed by 
Samantar necessitated a ruling that his actions, by transgressing international law, were beyond the 
scope of his lawful authority and that the FSIA therefore could not have been enlivened. On appeal 
the Court did come to that conclusion— that the FSIA was not applicable—but for very different 
reasons. 
Traxler, King, and Duncan JJ heard the plaintiffs’ appeal in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit on 23 September 2008.203 In a change of tack, the appellants ‘most 
fundamental assertion’204 on appeal was that the FSIA does not apply to suits against foreign 
officials. Section 1604 of the FSIA gives a blanket immunity—subject to the exceptions in § 1605-
1607—to ‘a foreign state’.205 Foreign state is defined as including ‘a political subdivision of a 
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality […]’206 (Emphasis added.) The FSIA then stipulates: 
An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity— 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) 
and (e) of this title nor created under the laws of any third country.207 
Essentially, a foreign official would need to qualify as an agency or instrumentality by satisfying all 
three prongs of the definition in § 1603(b) before he or she could receive the FSIA’s § 1604 blanket 
immunity. The appellants argued these three requirements were not met.208 Some scholars,209 
writing in the lead-up to the Fourth Circuit’s decision, disagreed with the appellants’ contention, 
                                                 
202 Yousuf v Samantar (ED Vir, 1:04cv1360, 1 August 2007) slip op 46. 
203 Yousuf v Samantar, 552 F 3d 371 (4th Cir, 2009). 
204 Ibid 377. 
205 28 USC § 1604. 
206 Ibid § 1603(a). 
207 Ibid § 1603(b). 
208 The appellants’ argument accorded with the State’s Departments new policy. 
209 ‘[C]ontrary to what some courts have assumed, suits against individual officials fall naturally within the plain 
language of the FSIA’s immunity provision.’ Curtis A Bradley and Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation’ (2009) 13 Green Bag 9, 10. Bradley and Goldsmith 
argued for the treatment of suits against foreign officials as ‘in reality a suit against the foreign state’. Ibid 13. 
This view, however, was later disavowed by the Supreme Court in Samantar, 560 US 305, 306 (2010). 
Human Rights and Foreign Official Immunity: The US Experience 
210 
 
advocating instead for a continuance of the view—espoused in Chuidian210—that suits against 
foreign officials acting in their official capacity came under the FSIA. The Court, however, agreed 
with the appellants. Delivering the majority opinion, Traxler J211 ruled that ‘the FSIA does not 
apply to individuals and, as a result, Samantar is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA.’212 His 
Honour began by noting the majority of Circuit Courts had concluded that foreign officials acting 
within the scope of official duties qualified as an agency or instrumentality under § 1603(a)-(b) of 
the FSIA.213 Decisions from the Ninth,214 Second,215 Sixth,216 Fifth217 and DC218 Circuits were all 
marshalled in support of the idea that foreign officials qualified as agencies or instrumentalities 
under the FSIA.219 All of these decisions, however, stemmed from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Chuidian. In opposition to these stood Enahoro,220 a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit.  
Deciding the Court was not bound by prior Fourth Circuit precedent,221 Traxler J turned to 
interpret the definition of agency or instrumentality. His Honour found the ratio in Enahoro 
‘especially persuasive.’222 There Evans J noted the usage of the phrase ‘separate legal person’, which 
had ‘the ring of the familiar legal concept that corporations are persons’.223 This pointed toward 
the Congressional intention that the FSIA applies to legal and not natural persons. Evans J also 
thought Congress would have been clearer and more explicit if it meant the FSIA to apply to 
natural persons.224 After agreeing with Evans J about the interpretation of § 1603(b)(1), Traxler J 
then looked at the requirement in § 1603(b)(3). In that context, he noted 28 USC § 1332(c) 
                                                 
210 912 F 2d 1095, 1099-1103 (9th Cir, 1990). 
211 King J joined the judgment; Duncan J wrote a separate opinion concurring with the majority of the 
judgment, but declined to join Part III of Traxler J’s judgment—wherein Traxler J ruled Dole Food applied 
equally to agencies as it did to instrumentalities. 
212 Yousuf v Samantar, 552 F 3d 371, 373 (4th Cir, 2009). 
213 Ibid 378. 
214 Chuidian, 912 F 2d 1095, 1099-1103 (9th Cir, 1990). 
215 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F 3d 71, 83 (2nd Cir, 2008). 
216 Keller v Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F 3d 811, 815-816 (6th Cir, 2002) (‘Keller’). 
217 Byrd v Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho, 182 F 3d 380, 388-389 (5th Cir, 1999) (‘Byrd’). 
218 El-Fadl v Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F 3d 668, 671 (DC Cir, 1996) (‘El-Fadl’). 
219 Yet, despite this apparent wealth of precedent, all of the cited decisions rest ultimately on the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Chuidian, as the pinpoint in the preceding four footnotes show (Keller ostensibly follows El-
Fadl, but El-Fadl follows Chuidian). 
220 408 F 3d 877, 881-882 (7th Cir, 2005). 
221 Yousuf v Samantar, 552 F 3d 371, 378-379 (4th Cir, 2009). 
222 Ibid 380. 
223 Enahoro, 408 F 3d 877, 881 (7th Cir, 2005). 
224 Ibid 881-882. 
Part Three, Chapter VII 
211 
 
governs the citizenship of corporations and representatives of deceased estates.225 By requiring that 
an agency or instrumentality not be ‘a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in § 1332(c)’ 
the FSIA is clearly talking about corporate-type entities and not natural people.226 Still addressing 
§ 1603(b)(3), Traxler J points out that would be nonsensical to speak of a natural person being 
‘created under the laws of any third country.’227 His Honour also thought it would be consistent 
with the FSIA’s overall scheme to construe agency or instrumentality as referring to corporate or 
political entities, but not natural people. This was because the method of exclusive service in § 
1608 ‘does not contemplate service on an individual’ but is instead ‘strikingly similar to the general 
procedural rule for service on a corporation’.228 Finally, Traxler J noted the House Committee 
Report on the FSIA defined ‘separate legal person’ in terms consistent with the idea that it included 
corporate or political entities but no natural persons.229 
The Court concluded ‘the FSIA does not apply to individual foreign government agents like 
Samantar.’230 The plaintiffs also argued in the alternative as a backup argument that, even if the 
FSIA applied to foreign officials, Dole Food controlled and there could be no FSIA immunity for 
former foreign officials. The Court agreed with this argument.231 The Dole Food ruling that status 
as an instrumentality had to be determined at the time of the suit, not the time of the act 
complained—and Traxler J’s view that Dole Food also applied to agencies—seems to be more 
evidence that an individual foreign official cannot be an agency for the purposes of the FSIA. This 
is because as a matter of customary international law it is well known that foreign officials retain 
act-based functional immunity ratione materiae even after they leave office; it is unlikely that 
Congress would have so starkly modified the law relating to immunity of foreign officials, by 
removing their residual act-based immunity after the cessation of office, without being more 
explicit. Regardless, having ruled that Samantar was not entitled to FSIA immunity, the Court 
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remanded the matter to the District Court, where Samantar would be free to mount an argument 
that he possessed a common law immunity.232 Samantar, however, applied to the US Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari. 
Samantar’s petition for writ of certiorari was granted233 and the Supreme Court heard the matter 
on 3 March 2010.234 It was tasked with deciding whether the FSIA granted foreign officials 
immunity for actions taken in official capacity. Justice Stevens gave a detailed textual analysis of 
the FSIA provisions, along with an investigation of relevant legislative history.235 Much like Traxler 
J in the Fourth Circuit, Stevens J felt the statutory definition of an agency or instrumentality 
precluded its application to a natural person.236 Samantar, however, had raised another argument. 
Sub-section 1603(a) of the FSIA states that a foreign state ‘includes a political subdivision of a 
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’. (Emphasis added.) Samantar 
claimed this formulation set forth a non-exhaustive list, that political subdivisions and agencies or 
instrumentalities were included within the definition of a foreign state but were not the only 
possible entities that met the definition.237 The possibility that the list was not exhaustive was 
frankly admitted by Stevens J; however, His Honour felt this was no help to Samantar, as a foreign 
official did not fit within the genus or category of entities enumerated in the illustrative list. A 
foreign official was not ejusdem generis in relation to the ‘entities’ contemplated by the language in 
§ 1603(a) and (b). Furthermore, elsewhere within the FSIA foreign officials were expressly 
mentioned. It was therefore incorrect to assume from a provision’s silence that it meant to include 
a category Congress had elsewhere shown it knew how to specifically address.238 
Samantar further argued that because of the history and purpose of the FSIA, the Court should 
have concluded that Congress by enacting the statute had intended to codify not only the rules 
pertaining to foreign state immunity but also those pertaining to the immunity of foreign 
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officials.239 Inter alia this was because he claimed ‘state and official immunities are coextensive’,240 
but the Court disagreed and pointed out situations in which the immunities differed.241 Even a 
cursory consideration of the historical common-law rules or customary international norms 
pertaining to foreign state immunity and foreign official immunity shows the Court’s view must 
be correct. Under the doctrine of restrictive immunity, what mattered for foreign state immunity 
was whether a state acted jure imperii or jure gestionis; whereas the immunity of a foreign official 
with a functional immunity ratione materiae depended upon whether the official was acting in an 
official capacity. To claim these immunities are co-extensive appears nonsensical. Take the case of 
a foreign official employed in a state-owned trading company or a government department engaged 
in state trading: his or her actions taken in an official capacity would qualify for immunity, whereas 
the state itself by acting jure gestionis would not qualify for immunity. Although His Honour did 
not consider this situation specifically, Stevens J appears to have realised the general possibility, 
noting ‘historically, the Government sometimes suggested immunity under the common law for 
individual officials even when the foreign state did not qualify.’242 
Finally, the Court rejected the sentiment in Chuidian that ‘artful pleading’ could ‘in effect make 
the statute optional’.243 Stevens J correctly concluded that while some cases against foreign officials 
acting in an official capacity ‘should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself’244 this was 
not the case in every situation. For instance, the present suit was against Samantar in his personal 
capacity and sought damages from his own pockets.245 The distinction thus seems fairly clear: a 
suit against a foreign official acting in an official capacity is actually a suit against the state itself, 
because the official was acting for the state, which can only act through its officials; whereas a suit 
against a foreign official who was acting in a personal capacity (or even ultra vires) is properly 
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conceived as a suit against the official personally and seeks damages from his or her personal 
pockets, not from the state fiscus. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar v Yousuf had important ramifications. The decades-
long practice of clumsily characterising foreign official suits as creatures of the FSIA was brought 
to an abrupt halt. Although it confined its ruling to the determination that the FSIA did not apply 
to suits against foreign officials, the clear implication was that such suits would now be governed 
by the common law of foreign official immunity now held to have survived the passage of the 
FSIA. The case was remanded to the District Court, where the possibility of Samantar’s immunity 
under common law principles was to be addressed at first instance. 
On remand to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s Alexandria 
Division, Samantar renewed his motion to dismiss, this time on the basis of two common law 
immunity doctrines: head-of-state immunity and foreign official immunity.246 Although Samantar 
was never Somalia’s head of state, he was prime minister for at least some of the period relating to 
the acts complained. The prime minister is head of government and a part of the troika entitled to 
status-based immunity ratione personae, which appears to be the underlying justification for the so-
called ‘head-of-state’ immunity claim. The district court again requested the State Department 
provide a response to Samantar’s immunity claims. Unlike five years prior, when the State 
Department had remained silent on the issue of immunity, it now provided a Statement of Interest 
‘opposing immunity for Samantar’247 chiefly on the basis that he was a former government official 
of a state with no currently recognised government able to request immunity on his behalf and 
because he was a US resident, enjoying the protection of US laws, so should be subject to the 
jurisdiction of US courts. Having received the adverse immunity determination from the State 
Department, Brinkema J on 15 February 2011 decided ‘defendant’s common law sovereign 
immunity defense is no longer before the Court’248 and Samantar’s motion to dismiss was 
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denied.249 Motions to reconsider and for a stay pending appeal were also denied.250 While an appeal 
to the Fourth Circuit on the common-law immunity issues was pending, Samantar filed for 
bankruptcy and ‘informed the [District] Court that [he] intended to take a default rather than 
contest liability and damages.’251 The plaintiffs’ claims thus being admitted by default, a US$21m 
judgment (consisting of US$7m in compensatory and $US14m in punitive damages) was entered 
against Samantar by Brinkema J on 28 August 2012.252 
Samantar’s appeal from Brinkema J’s 15 February 2011 denial of his motion to dismiss on 
common-law head-of-state and foreign official immunity grounds had still to be heard by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The matter came before the same Fourth 
Circuit judges as had heard Samantar’s 2008 appeal against Brinkema J’s initial 2007 decision: 
Traxler CJ, King and Duncan JJ (Traxler having been appointed Chief Judge effective from 8 July 
2009). Samantar’s argument was two-fold. He first contended the District Court improperly 
deferred to the State Department and ‘abdicated its duty to independently assess his immunity 
claim.’253 Secondly, he claimed a proper assessment would entitle him to foreign official immunity 
‘for all actions taken within the scope of his duties and in his capacity as a foreign government 
official’254 and that he was completely immune on the basis of head-of-state immunity for any of 
the claims relating to the period when he was Somalia’s Prime Minister. This final argument was 
in effect a claim to status-based immunity ratione personae, which seems misconceived because 
personal immunity evaporates upon the cessation of office, leaving behind only a function-based 
immunity ratione materiae, which is the so-called foreign official immunity in United States 
terminology. 
Again delivering the opinion of the Court, Traxler CJ engaged in a detailed threshold consideration 
of the proper deference to be accorded to State Department Suggestions of Immunity or 
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Statements of Interest.255 This was important in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, because 
the pre-FSIA United States practice was to accord an absolute deference to State Department 
determinations of immunity.256 State Department officials were understandably pleased by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar, as the Department had been advocating forcibly since the 
Enahoro decision that the FSIA did not apply to suits against foreign officials. This is because 
determination of foreign official immunity on a common-law rather than a FSIA basis allows the 
possibility of a larger role for the State Department in immunity cases. As Harold H Koh, legal 
advisor to the Department put it: 
Some commentators have already suggested that Samantar’s deference to State 
Department immunity determinations marks an unfortunate return to the ‘bad old days’ 
of executive suggestion. But we at the State Department are more optimistic. In general, 
we consider it a good idea for courts in such cases to seek executive guidance, for the simple 
reason that institutionally, the State Department is best situated to establish the initial 
framework for making decisions regarding foreign official immunity, and best positioned 
in the long run to consider the remedial, substantive, and prudential concerns raised by 
suits against foreign officials.257 
But Koh as a State Department employee had a vested interest and there are several problems with 
his statement. First, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court in Samantar dictated any necessary 
deference to State Department immunity determinations, at least for foreign officials as opposed 
to heads of state. As pointed out by other publicists, despite referring to the pre-FSIA practice of 
deference to the State Department, the Supreme Court confined its decision to a determination 
that immunity is governed by the common law and nowhere did it ‘direct the courts on remand 
to solicit or consider the Executive Branch’s views in determining the content of the common 
law.’258 Furthermore, in the closely-related context of the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has rejected the contention that executive determinations are binding.259 Second, and on a related 
point, the commentator Koh was referring to was Ingrid Wuerth. Yet, the article he cites nowhere 
mentions any return to ‘bad old days’ of executive suggestion. In fact, Wuerth argues precisely the 
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opposite: despite claiming ‘that it controls foreign official immunity determinations in US courts 
in the absence of a federal statute’,260 Wuerth feels the State Department’s arguments are 
‘unconvincing’ and that on neither the grounds of constitutional provisions nor on that of 
congressional authorization or functionality can the State Department be said to have a power to 
make binding immunity determinations.261 Regardless of whether one adheres to Koh’s or 
Wuerth’s views, Bradley and Helfer’s asseveration that ‘After Samantar, the question of whether 
federal courts should defer to the Executive’s views regarding immunity will be a key point of 
contention’262 proved prescient and it was the Fourth Circuit in later proceedings in the very same 
case that was amongst the first to tackle the issue. 
The United States in its amicus curiae brief took the position that State Department views were 
entitled to absolute deference, no matter whether the immunity being sought was a status-based 
head-of-state immunity or conduct-based foreign official immunity.263 Samantar, on the other 
hand maintained executive determinations were only binding when the State Department made a 
recommendation that immunity be granted.264 The plaintiffs offered a third view: that State 
Department determinations were not completely controlling, but that courts must defer to the 
reasonable views of the Executive Branch.265 In the end, the Fourth Circuit took a bifurcated 
approach. Because the Constitution assigned to the President the power to ‘receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers’,266 which included ‘by implication, the power to accredit diplomats 
and recognize foreign heads of state’,267 Traxler CJ decided that in relation to head-of-state 
immunity determinations the State Department deserved absolute deference; however, there was 
‘no equivalent constitutional basis’268 for State Department control of determinations of foreign 
official immunity. Determinations relating to this function-based immunity, which is generally 
available to all foreign officials, were not to be completely controlled by the State Department. 
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Instead, the Fourth Circuit decided State Department determinations in these matters were not 
controlling but carried ‘substantial weight in our analysis of the issue.’269 
As to the matter of whether Samantar was entitled to head-of-state immunity, Traxler CJ merely 
noted ‘The State Department has never recognized Samantar as the head of state for Somalia’270 
and ruled the district court was correct to abide by the State Department’s determination that he 
did not qualify for the immunity. While the conclusion is correct, the ruling deserves a comment. 
The status-based immunity ratione personae Samantar was pleading for is available at customary 
international law not only for heads of state, but also for heads of government and foreign 
ministers. As the Somali Prime Minister, Samantar definitely possessed this immunity ratione 
personae while in office; however, personal immunity evaporates upon the cessation of office. 
Therefore, the conclusion that he could not have benefited from the immunity is correct—because 
he was a former and not an incumbent Prime Minister—but Traxler CJ’s apparent feeling that 
only heads of state qualify for this immunity was incorrect. In any case, however, Traxler CJ had 
ruled the State Department was entitled to absolute deference on matters of head-of-state 
immunity, and the State Department had determined Samantar did not qualify for this immunity. 
Samantar’s conduct-based, functional immunity ratione materiae as a foreign official was another 
matter. After a survey of prior case-law, Traxler CJ concluded generally that foreign officials can 
claim immunity for acts within the scope of their duty, but not ‘for private acts that are not 
arguably attributable to the state.’271 This is true, but deserves a proviso. As seen above, in 
Chuidian, relying on Larson, the Court concluded that not only are foreign officials unable to claim 
immunity for private acts, but also for acts generally within the course of their duties but which 
are conducted ultra vires. This is important, because according to the rules of state responsibility 
such ultra vires acts will still be attributable to the state.272 The Fourth Circuit therefore appeared 
ready to adopt a narrower set of circumstances in which a foreign official will not be able to claim 
immunity than was previously contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian. Whether or not 
Samantar’s conduct was ultra vires, it was carried out in the course of his duties. Yet the plaintiffs 
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in response claimed the conduct-based immunity Samantar would otherwise possess for acts in the 
course of his duties could not be used ‘as a shield against atrocities such as torture, genocide … or 
any other act that would violate a jus cogens norm of international law.’273 
The acts which the plaintiffs accused Samantar of committing, authorising, or failing to prevent 
clearly constituted violations of ius cogens norms. Traxler CJ correctly noted that unlike private 
acts—such as drug dealing—ius cogens violations ‘may well be committed under color of law and, 
in that sense, constitute acts performed in the course of the foreign official’s employment by the 
Sovereign.’274 His Honour noted an increasing trend toward the abrogation of immunity in such 
cases.275 After concluding American courts had generally followed the trend,276 Traxler CJ 
concluded that ‘under international and domestic law, officials from other countries are not 
entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the 
defendant’s official capacity.’277 This was based on the logic—similar to that found in Pinochet—
that jus cogens violations can never be official acts. Effectively, this constitutes an acceptance of the 
view that ultra vires actions do not attract immunity under the common law. This decision is as 
remarkable as the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in the same case. As will be seen, courts in other 
common-law nations have fairly consistently ruled that their state immunity statutes are 
comprehensive codes which also govern the law of foreign official immunity. Those courts have 
also ruled that even where a foreign official violates a jus cogens norm, his or her immunity prevails 
in the face of the peremptory norm violation unless a statutory enumerated exception applies. The 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in the Samantar litigation show, however, 
the willingness of the United States to forge another path for suits against foreign officials who 
seriously violate human rights. 
Samantar applied on 4 March 2013 for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, seeking review 
of the Fourth Circuit’s immunity decision.278 On 24 June 2013, the Supreme Court invited the 
Solicitor General to file a brief in the case (Justice Kagan took no part in these proceedings as she 
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had been Solicitor General and filed briefs in earlier proceedings of the same case).279 Agreeing 
with Samantar that the Fourth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split and also claiming the Fourth 
Circuit had fundamentally erred by fashioning a judicial exception to immunity for jus cogens 
violations, the US urged the Supreme Court to grant the writ.280 The respondents, Yousuf et al, in 
turn filed their brief in opposition to the petition for the writ.281 After considering various amici 
briefs and supplemental briefs from the petitioners and respondents, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on 13 January 2014.282 In the meantime, as the District Court had refused Samantar’s 
application for a stay pending appeal of Brinkema J’s 15 February 2011 denial of his motion to 
dismiss on common-law immunity grounds, the District Court had entered its default judgment 
of US$21m against Samantar (see above). On 3 February 2014, the Fourth Circuit disposed of 
Samantar’s appeal against the District Court’s final US$21m judgment against him, deciding that 
in light of its 2012 decision on immunity his appeal against the final judgment was ‘moot’.283 On 
5 May 2014 Samantar again sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to review this decision.284 
On 14 October 2014 the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief in the case, 
expressing the view of the United States.285 The United States filed its amicus brief on 30 January 
2015.286 This time, although it still maintained the Fourth Circuit’s decision in holding that State 
Department determinations of immunity in foreign official cases were not controlling was 
incorrect, the United States urged certiorari should be denied.287 On 9 March 2015, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari,288 bringing the Samantar litigation to an end. 
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7.6. Post-Samantar Cases 
After the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Samantar, it was definitely established that the FSIA 
only governed suits against foreign states, not suits against foreign officials, which were to be 
governed by the common law. With a return to common law governance of conduct-based foreign 
official immunity cases, a key question was the level of deference courts would pay to State 
Department Suggestions of Immunity and Statements of Interest. It has been shown above that 
the Fourth Circuit solved this issue by determining that State Department rulings were not 
controlling in relation to conduct-based foreign official immunity cases. It also carved out a judicial 
exception to the conduct-based immunity in cases involving jus cogens violations. However, the 
Supreme Court did not rule on the specific issue of the exact deference to be paid to State 
Department determinations of immunity (either in status-based head-of-state immunity ratione 
personae cases or in conduct-based foreign official immunity ratione materiae cases). Therefore, it 
was an open question as to whether other circuits would follow the Fourth Circuit’s path or create 
a split by according absolute deference to State Department rulings on conduct-based foreign 
official immunity. 
Ahmed v Magan concerned another former official of the Somali Barre regime, Abdi Aden Magan. 
Magan was a ‘Colonel in the National Security Service of Somalia and [served] as Chief of its 
Department of Investigations from about 1988-1990.’289 The State Department on 15 March 
2011 filed a Statement of Interest290 at the request of the District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio’s Eastern Division,291 recommending against immunity for the same reasons it had with 
Samantar: that Magan was a former official of a state with no currently recognised government to 
request immunity on his behalf and because it is appropriate for US residents (like Magan) who 
enjoy the protection of US laws to also be subject to the jurisdiction of US courts.292 Judge Smith 
said ‘this Court gives due deference to the well-reasoned express determination of the Department 
of State, and accordingly concludes that Defendant is not immune’.293 It is arguable whether this 
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wording signifies the Court’s view that all State Department determinations are completely 
binding, whether the Court felt bound to follow determinations if they are ‘well-reasoned’, or 
whether the Court felt Department determinations were not controlling but were very persuasive 
and deserved ‘due’ deference.  
Giraldo v Drummond Co Inc concerned a case in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia whereby the plaintiffs, Claudia Balcero Giraldo et al, sought to depose former Chilean 
President Alvaro Uribe ‘regarding his relationship with the United Self Defense Forces of 
Colombia and the Drummond Company.’294 The State Department filed a Statement of Interest 
and Suggestion of Immunity295 claiming that as a former high official Uribe had immunity for acts 
taken in his official capacity but no immunity from questions pertaining to actions taken outside 
his official capacity or pertaining to the period before he was a government official. Bates J 
apparently treated the State Department’s determination as completely controlling.296 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs contended as part of their claim that Uribe engaged in jus cogens 
violations, which could not be compassed within the scope of conduct-based official acts 
immunity. Relying on prior DC Circuit precedent in Belhas, Judge Bates rejected the contention 
that jus cogens violations provided an exception to function-based foreign official immunity ratione 
materiae. As this case was decided before the Fourth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Yousuf v Samantar, 
the plaintiffs here were unable ‘to cite any case that holds that allegations of violations of jus cogens 
norms will defeat foreign official immunity.’297 The case was appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where Tatel, Williams, and Randolph JJ affirmed 
the decision of the District Court.298 Their Honours could find no error in the decision below. 
Their Honours did not specifically address the matter of whether a jus cogens violation could 
possibly provide an exception to foreign official immunity, thus sidestepping the recent Fourth 
Circuit decision in Yousuf v Samantar. The Court here found, in what amounted to a one 
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paragraph decision, that ‘plaintiff’s mere allegations were insufficient to defeat President Uribe’s 
immunity.’299 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.300 
Several American and Israeli citizens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York ‘in connection with the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.’301 The State 
Department filed a Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity302 claiming that former 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (‘ISI’) directors Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Nadeem 
Taj were immune from suit under the common-law principles of residual foreign official 
immunity.303 At first instance, Irizarry J noted the contention of the State Department that its 
determination was controlling, but that the plaintiffs argued State Department determinations 
were only controlling when they pertained to head-of-state immunity cases, not foreign official 
immunity cases.304 Her Honour also noted the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf v 
Samantar that there was an exception to foreign official immunity in cases of ius cogens violations.305 
The plaintiffs claimed that, because this case involved jus cogens violations, there should be no 
immunity. Noting a ‘circuit split’,306 Irizarry J felt bound by prior Second Circuit precedent in 
Matar. As seen above, the Court in Matar felt that violations of jus cogens did not defeat foreign 
official immunity, but this was because it said there was no enumerated exception in the FSIA (an 
approach which the Supreme Court in Samantar said was incorrect). Despite this, Her Honour 
ruled that Matar had to be followed. As Samantar’s petition for writ of certiorari was still pending 
before the Supreme Court at that stage, District Judge Irizarry was ‘uncertain whether Yousuf will 
have enduring precedential value’, but noted that ‘[i]f the Supreme Court grants certiorari in 
Samantar v Yousuf, and affirms the Fourth Circuit’s exception to foreign official immunity, 
Plaintiffs may move to reinstate their claims’.307 In the event, certiorari was denied and the Fourth 
Circuit’s jus cogens exception has not been validated by Supreme Court precedent.  
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On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Irizarry J’s decision was 
affirmed.308 Carbanes, Straub, and Lohier Jr JJ were ‘bound to follow [the Matar] precedent, unless 
and until it is overruled implicitly or expressly by the Supreme Court, or by this Court sitting in 
banc [sic].’309 Because Matar had not been overruled by an en banc Second Circuit court, the matter 
turned upon whether the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Samantar constituted ‘intervening 
Supreme Court precedent that requires us to alter our clear precedent.’310 Their Honours thought 
it did not. That was because Their Honours thought the Supreme Court decision did not address 
the content of the common law of foreign official immunity, instead confining itself to the ruling 
that the FSIA does not cover suits against foreign officials. Their Honours therefore thought Matar 
controlled and, as stated, Irizarry J’s decision was affirmed. As such, a clear circuit split has arisen 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar. The Fourth Circuit has ruled that State 
Department determinations of foreign official immunity are not binding and it has created an 
exception to foreign official immunity in cases of ius cogens violations. In contrast, the DC Circuit 
and the Second Circuit appear to consider State Department recommendations binding and in the 
absence of Supreme Court precedent on the matter refuse to acknowledge a foreign official 
immunity exception for jus cogens violations. 
An issue needs to be raised here in relation to the decisions in Giraldo and Rosenberg. Respectively, 
the Courts felt bound by earlier circuit precedent in Belhas and Matar to not recognise an exception 
to immunity for jus cogens violations. In both Belhas and Matar, as seen above, the jus cogens 
exception arguments were rejected because it was claimed the FSIA provided no enumerated 
exception to immunity for jus cogens violations. During the interval, however, the Supreme Court 
had decided in Samantar that suits against foreign officials were not to be dealt with under the 
FSIA. If the FSIA doesn’t apply to suits against foreign officials then the argument that there can 
be no exception to immunity for jus cogens violations because the FSIA doesn’t provide such an 
exception makes no sense. The inescapable conclusion appears to be that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Samantar overturned those parts of the decisions in Belhas and Matar that rejected the 
jus cogens argument because of the lack of an enumerated exception in the FSIA. It appears, 
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therefore, that the DC Circuit decision in Giraldo and the Second Circuit decision in Rosenberg 
were both incorrect: Belhas and Matar did not control their decisions, because the relevant portions 
of those cases—dealing with the jus cogens exception argument—were decided on the view that the 
FSIA applied. Since the Supreme Court had specifically stated that the FSIA does not apply to suits 
against foreign officials, it must have made bad law of any decision that rejected a jus cogens 
exception because of the contention that the FSIA did not allow for one. Arguably, then, the 
Giraldo and Rosenberg courts should not have followed Belhas and Mater; instead, they should have 
declared the relevant portions of those judgments as overturned by Samantar and proceeded to 
investigate whether the common law of foreign official immunity allowed an exception for 
violations of jus cogens norms. The Fourth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Yousuf v Samantar, as well as 
other precedents—for instance Fletcher J’s obiter in Siderman—would have argued in favour of 
the recognition of such an exception. 
7.7. Limitation of the ATCA’s Scope 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have dramatically limited the ATCA’s scope. In 2004, the 
Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain311 limited the types of claims that could be brought under the 
ATCA. At the time the ATCA became law, the Court ruled that the common law ‘would only 
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations thought to carry 
personal liability at the time.’312 These included offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe 
conducts, and piracy.313 As to the right to sue under the ATCA for cases outside those three 
categories, the court found ‘federal courts should not recognize claims under federal common law 
for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations than the 18th-Century paradigms familiar when [the ATCA] was enacted.’314 
Therefore, post-Sosa, cases could only be brought under the ATCA for violations of international 
norms, attracting personal responsibility, which are now as well-accepted by the community of 
nations as offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy were in the 18th 
century.  Alvarez’s attempt to sue under the ATCA for false arrest thus failed; however, suits against 
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foreign officials for serious violations of human rights norms that have the status of jus cogens such 
as torture are still allowed under the ATCA. This is because there is basically universal agreement 
within the community of nations that torture, for example, is a tortious violation of the law of 
nations which attracts personal responsibility. 
The second case, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,315 did not limit the type of claims that may 
be brought under the ATCA, but rather imposed a territorial limitation on the ATCA’s scope. By 
finding that a constitutional presumption against extraterritoriality applied to claims under the 
ATCA,316 and that nothing in the ATCA rebutted the presumption,317 the Court held that, since 
the petitioners sought relief for acts occurring outside the United States, their case was barred.318 
Justice Breyer’s separate opinion, concurring in the judgment, would however find jurisdiction 
where: 
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or 
(3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from 
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
common enemy of mankind.319 
Under this theory, suits against former foreign officials who are now resident in the United States 
(such as, for example, the suits against Samantar and some other cases analysed above) would still 
be cognisable under the ATCA. Indeed, when Ahmed v Magan was heard after the resolution of 
the immunity issue, United States Magistrate Judge Abel found ‘as [Magan was] a permanent 
resident of the United States, the presumption of [sic] against extraterritoriality has been overcome 
in this case.’320 
7.8. Summary 
Since the re-enlivening of the ATCA in Filartiga, human rights claims under the ATCA have 
evolved considerably. It was established by Amerada Hess that the ATCA prevented claims against 
foreign states, even for gross violations of peremptory norms. In the context of heads of state, 
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Lafontant early established a lack amenability to suit under the ATCA. This prohibition has 
survived the Supreme Court’s ruling in Samantar that suits against individuals such as heads of 
state or foreign officials are not governed by the FSIA, but rather by the common law. The State 
Department’s rulings on head-of-state immunity are controlling and deserve absolute deference, 
although not all publicists agree.321 Even if State Department determinations are not controlling 
in head-of-state cases, principles of customary international law probably dictate that US courts 
would rule the status-based immunity ratione personae of an incumbent head of state, head of 
government, or foreign minister would prevail possibly even for jus cogens violations on the basis 
of funcational necessity. However, the Supreme Court ruling in Samantar opened an avenue for 
redress in cases against foreign officials and former troika members who only possess the function-
based immunity ratione materiae.  
The Fourth Circuit has ruled State Department determinations in these cases are not binding. It 
has carved out an exception to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations.  This is in line 
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chuidian and the Supreme Court’s domestic sovereign 
immunity decision in Larson, both of which contemplate that an official is not immune ultra vires 
or purely private acts. Although jus cogens violations by foreign officials are often committed within 
the course of their duties, by nature they are not within the scope of their official authority and are 
ultra vires. The Fourth Circuit’s view that there can be no function-based foreign official immunity 
in a case of jus cogens violation accords with the relatively uncontroversial view there should be no 
function-based immunity for acts that are not properly characterised as within the scope of that 
official’s functions. Although international law invokes a state’s responsibility for such ultra vires 
behaviour, this is without prejudice to personal responsibility which is also enlivened. If the foreign 
state is immune because there is no enumerated exception in the FSIA for jus cogens violations then 
arguably an amendment is called for.  
Failing this, a suit against the official in his or her personal capacity may proceed under a common 
law exception to foreign official immunity. The DC Circuit and the Second Circuit, however, felt 
bound by prior decisions in Belhas and Matar. Because of these decisions, those circuits claim they 
cannot recognise the Fourth Circuit’s new judicial exception to foreign official immunity for 
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violations of jus cogens norms. Although the Supreme Court denied Samantar’s second and third 
petitions for certiorari, which may have resolved the issue, the matter is not likely to disappear. 
Furthermore, the DC Circuit and Second Circuit were arguably incorrect in their determination 
that Belhas and Matar controlled, because in those cases the claimed exception to foreign official 
immunity in case of jus cogens violations was rejected on the basis that the FSIA does not enumerate 
an exception for violations jus cogens; however, the Supreme Court ruled the FSIA does not apply 
to suits against foreign officials, making those parts of Belhas and Matar bad law.  Eventually the 
Supreme Court will need to consider whether State Department determinations pertaining to 
function-based foreign official immunity are binding and, as a corollary, whether the common law 
of foreign official immunity allows an exception for jus cogens violations. Until then, or until the 
DC Circuit and the Second Circuit return to the issue in light of the above considerations, the 
circuits look to remain split on these important issues. 
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 Other Common Law Nations 
e have come this far, it has taken us years and it’s not about money any 
more, it’s about justice. Any British national can be tortured by a foreign 
power and there is no legal avenue of redress to them. If it takes me the rest of my 
life I will continue to pursue it to my dying day. 
Sandy Mitchell1 
8.1. Outline 
The preceding chapter concluded with a circuit split in US federal courts. The US Supreme Court 
had definitively ruled the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 did not apply to civil suits 
against foreign officials. This chapter deals with the position in other common-law realms, 
specifically the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The coverage of the United Kingdom 
jurisprudence will be limited to selected portions of key cases dealing with foreign official 
immunity in the Ronald Jones et al litigation before the UK Court of Appeal, House of Lords, and 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Canadian coverage will be limited to an analysis of 
the portions of the Zahra Kazemi and Salman Hashemi proceedings in the Quebec Superior Court, 
Quebec Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court of Canada. Finally, the Australian coverage will be 
limited to the proceedings filed by Falun Gong practitioners against inter alia former Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin. These representative cases have been chosen due to scope constraints 
pertaining to the length of this thesis. 
8.2. The United Kingdom 
The definition of a state in the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) (‘SIA’), as well as the definitions for 
separate entities, are not precisely the same as those found in the US FSIA; however, the statutory 
regime is not altogether dissimilar. Before delving into the immunity of foreign officials in UK 
jurisprudence, it would be well to recall the wording of SIA s 14(1)-(2), which is as follows: 
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14 States entitled to immunities and privileges 
1. The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to any foreign or 
commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and references to a State include 
references to— 
a. the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; 
b. the government of that State; and 
c. any department of that government. 
But not to any entity (hereafter referred to as a “separate entity”) which is distinct from the 
executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued. 
2.  A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom 
if, and only if— 
a. the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of 
sovereign authority; and 
b. the circumstances are such that a State (or, in the case of proceedings to 
which section 10 above applies, a State which is not a party to the 
Brussels Convention) would have been so immune. 
As can be plainly seen, nowhere in the definition of a foreign state is a natural person mentioned, 
other than a head of state. The other entities which are to be included within the definition of 
foreign state are the agencies and departments of the national government. In this respect, although 
the wording is not identical, the UK SIA is similar to the US FSIA in the wording it deploys to 
define a foreign state. It shall be seen below whether UK courts came to the same conclusion as 
their US brethren on the matter as to whether foreign officials should be encompassed within SIA.  
8.2.1. Jones 
The claim brought by Ronald Jones against the government of Saudi Arabia for the torture and 
other mistreatment he suffered after being injured in a bomb blast outside a Riyadh bookstore has 
already been covered earlier in this thesis.3 That coverage dealt with the foreign state immunity 
aspect of the case. It will be recalled that ultimately the House of Lords felt that none of Mr Jones’s 
claims could be brought within any of the specifically enumerated exceptions to the SIA’s s 1(1) 
blanket immunity and that an implied jus cogens exception could not be read into the blanket 
immunity.4 This chapter, however, deals with foreign official immunity. As such, the Jones 
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litigation will be analysed in respect of the portions of the judgments which dealt with claims 
against Saudi officials. 
In addition to filing suit against the Saudi Ministry of the Interior (which for the purposes of the 
case was held to be the government of Saudi Arabia), Ronald Jones also brought suit against Lt 
Col Abdul Aziz. At first instance this claim was heard by Master Whitaker, who also entertained a 
second claim by Sandy Mitchell, Leslie Walker, and William Sampson against four Saudi officials: 
Ibrahim Al-Dali, Khalid Al-Saleh, Col Mohamed al Said, and Prince Naif. In the event, Master 
Whitaker refused permission to serve these officials, although permission was granted to appeal the 
decision to the Court of Appeal. At the Court of Appeal, the matters were heard by Lord Phillips 
of Worth Matravers MR and Mance and Neuberger LJJ, with Mance LJ delivering the leading 
opinion, of which the foreign official immunity portions will be analysed here. 
So far as Mance LJ was concerned, ‘[t]he starting point in English law is Part I of the State 
Immunity Act’.5 Lord Mance began by noting ‘the Act makes no express reference to the position 
of individual officials of the state.’6 Careful perusal of the provision on the previous page will 
confirm the truth of this statement. Mance LJ was specifically concerned with ss 14(1)-(2) of the 
SIA, opining that paragraph (1) ‘on its face reflects […] personal immunity’ while paragraph (2) 
‘is apt to cater for […] functional immunity.’7 (Citations removed.) This is an astute observation, 
as paragraph (2) clearly states separate entities are only immune for conduct performed ‘in the 
exercise of sovereign authority.’8 The first hurdle Mance LJ faced was the Court of Appeal’s prior 
decision in Propend Finance v Sing,9 where the Court had ruled: 
The protection afforded by the 1978 Act to states would be undermined if […] officers […] 
could be sued as individuals for matters of state conduct [such that] Section 14(1) must be 
read as affording to […] officers of a foreign state protection under the same cloak as protects 
the state itself.10 
If one recalls Mance LJ’s observations regarding how paragraph (1) of SIA s 14 seemed to provide 
for personal immunity, while paragraph (2) seemed to provide for functional immunity, the above 
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ratio from Propend must seem jarring.  Only the troika—the head of state, head of government, 
and foreign minister—are entitled to status-based immunity ratione personae. Other, lower-level 
foreign officials are only entitled to function-based immunity ratione materiae. If these officials 
were to be included under any of the SIA’s provisions, it would seem more logical that they be 
included under paragraph (2) of SIA s 14. As Mance LJ observed, however, ‘[t]he Court in the 
Propend case did not consider that section 14(2) could […] have any relevance to individual 
functionaries. Nor did the court distinguish […] between the scope of personal and subject matter 
immunity.’ For its part, Saudi Arabia submitted the officials were covered by the principle in 
Propend, but in the alternative ‘asks us, if necessary, to review the application of section 14(2) and 
[…] the common law’.11 
Mance LJ’s carefully-reasoned and lengthy opinion considered the common law position in 
detail.12  The Propend court had relied chiefly on three authorities: Church of Scientology,13 Jaffe v 
Miller,14 and Herbage v Meese.15 As to Church of Scientology, that case concerned a foreign official 
acting in a completely official capacity, such that his actions could not be personally attributable 
to him and could only be attributable to the state.16 The reader will recall in the context of foreign 
official immunity that such officials can act in one of three ways: (1) in the course of their duties 
and within the scope of their authority; (2) in the course of their duties but outside the scope of 
their authority (under colour of law or ultra vires); and (3) in a purely private capacity. The Church 
of Scientology conduct was clearly of the first variety, so is not controlling in a case like Jones which 
deals with the second category of behaviour. In Meese the American plaintiff brought a claim 
against inter alia some British foreign officials who were also acting in the course of their duties 
and within the scope of their authority.17 The Court in Meese held the FSIA covered such persons; 
                                                 
11 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 722. 
12 On appeal Hoffman LJ began covering the case’s foreign official immunity angle by noting ‘I must at the 
outset pay tribute to the careful judgment of my noble and learned friend, Lord Mance, which meticulously 
confronts and deals with every objection to his view of the case’. Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 298. 
13 (1978) 65 ILR 193. 
14 (1993) 95 ILR 446 (‘Miller’). 
15 747 F Supp 60 (D DC, 1990) (‘Meese’). 
16 Church of Scientology (1978) 65 ILR 193, 195-198. 
17 Meese, 747 F Supp 60, 66 (D DC, 1990). 
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however, it should be noted the position in the US has since been superseded by Supreme Court 
authority in Samantar.18  
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Miller followed Meese and like Church of Scientology was 
concerned to stop claimants going around the ‘backdoor’ by suing individual foreign officials in 
situations where the state itself would be immune. In Miller the defendants were Floridian state 
officials who conspired to ‘arrange the kidnapping of Jaffe from his residence in Toronto thereby 
compelling him to return to Florida to face trial’.19 Although this behaviour was definitely within 
the course of the officials’ duty, it is probable the conduct verges into the second category, acting 
under colour of law. Despite the Floridian officials arguably acting ultra vires, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal felt if immunity were lifted ‘the foreign state would have to respond to it by indemnifying 
its functionaries’.20 In Mance LJ’s view, however, there was a ‘difficulty in reconciling the court’s 
previously expressed rationale for immunity [that the state would have to indemnify the officials] 
with the incongruity of postulating any requirement (legal, moral or practical) to indemnify state 
functionaries for “illegal or malicious” conduct.’21 The logic is unassailable. Without doubt, a state 
would be required to indemnify an official acting in the course of duty and within the scope of 
lawful authority; however, an official who exceeds lawful authority or acts in a purely personal 
capacity becomes personally liable for his or her actions and cannot expect to be indemnified by 
the state. 
After reviewing various other common law precedents,22 Mance LJ came to consider the 
Convention Against Torture and ‘official immunity in respect of the international crime of 
torture’23 specifically. What followed were various statements from the Augusto Pinochet litigation 
to the effect that torture cannot be an official act.24 For present purposes it is enough to recall the 
sentiment of Browne-Wilkinson LJ. ‘How can it be for international law purposes an official 
function to do something which international law itself prohibits and criminalises?’25 
                                                 
18 560 US 305 (2010). 
19 Jaffe v Miller (1990) 87 ILR 197, 199. 
20 Miller (1993) 95 ILR 446, 459. 
21 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 724. 
22 Ibid 724-727. 
23 Ibid 727. 
24 Ibid 729-730. 
25 R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 205 (‘Pinochet (No 3)’). 
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Moving on to consider other jurisprudence concerning the immunity of ‘officials alleged to have 
committed crimes against international law’,26 Mance LJ noted the dicta in Furundzija that victims 
of international crimes could bring civil suits for damages in a foreign court27 and noted the joint 
separate concurring opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal JJ in Case Concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 that ‘[i]t is now increasingly claimed in the literature that serious 
international crimes cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal State 
functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform.’28 (Citations 
removed.) 
Mance LJ also recalled Breyer J’s observation in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,29 which bears repeating: 
The fact that this procedural consensus exists [viz a consensus that ‘universal jurisdiction 
exists to prosecute a subset’ of certain universally condemned behaviour which includes 
torture] suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms 
is consistent with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation’s courts 
to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly 
threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That consensus 
concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself 
suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening. That is because the 
criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those 
injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in the criminal 
proceedings itself.30 (Citations removed.) 
Coverage of some US jurisprudence followed, including the decisions in Filartiga, Marcos, Trajano, 
Hilao, Chuidian, Larson, Xuncax, and Cabiri.31 Lord Mance diligently traversed the landscape of 
US jurisprudence and presciently reached the same conclusion as the US Supreme Court would 
half a decade later. 
Mance LJ then reverted to considering the English position, specifically the Saudi claim that their 
officials were immunised under the Propend ratio.32 The Kingdom asserted that to avoid the 
Propend principle the claimants had to rely on the Convention Against Torture, but in relying on 
art 1(1) of that Convention ‘they must affirm that they were […] acts by […] “a public official or 
                                                 
26 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 735. 
27 Prosecutor v Furundzija (Case no IT-95-17/I) (10 December 1998) 38 ILM 317 [155]. 
28 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ 
Rep 3, 88 [85]. 
29 542 US 692 (2004) (‘Sosa’). 
30 Ibid 762. 
31 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 736-741. For analysis of these precedents see above, ch 7.2-7.4. 
32 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 741-742. 
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other person acting in an official capacity” [which meant] the claimants bring themselves within 
statements regarding the scope of state immunity in such cases as […] Propend.’33 Mance LJ did 
‘not accept’ such a claim.34 Inasmuch as various jurists have raised the supposed dilemma caused 
by the Convention Against Torture defining torture as committed by officials or people acting in 
an official capacity, which purportedly comes up against the doctrine that foreign officials are 
immune when acting in an official capacity, Mance LJ’s detailed commentary deserves to be 
carefully considered: 
[T]he requirement that the pain or suffering be inflicted by a public official does no more in 
my view than identify the author and the public context in which the author must be acting. 
It does not lend to the acts of torture themselves any official or governmental character or 
nature, or mean that it can in any way be regarded as an official function to inflict, or that 
an official can be regarded as representing the state in inflicting, such pain or suffering. Still 
less does it suggest that the official inflicting such pain or suffering can be afforded the cloak 
of state immunity. To this extent, I would also disagree with, in particular, Lord Millett’s 
dictum […] to the effect that ‘the very official or governmental character of the acts … still 
operates as a bar to the civil jurisdiction of national courts.’ […] I do not consider that one 
can derive from its definition of torture ‘for the purposes of the Convention’ any conclusion 
on the different question whether a state can assert state immunity in respect of a civil claim 
against its officials based on allegations of systematic torture.35 
Saudi Arabia further submitted any claim against its officials would indirectly implead it and that 
it would interfere with the Kingdom’s internal affairs,36 but Mance LJ insisted it was not ‘easy to 
see why a civil claim against an individual torturer should be regarded as indirectly impleading a 
foreign state’ and reiterated ‘[t]here is no basis on which the state could be made liable to indemnify 
one of its officials proved to have committed systematic torture.’37 Therefore, the Kingdom’s 
submission that it would be indirectly impleaded was not a strong one. 
Mance LJ finally came to consider the European Convention on Human Rights, noting that art 6(1) 
was definitely engaged.38 Lord Mance furthermore distinguished the ECtHR’s decision in Al-
Adsani on the basis that Al-Adsani concerned ‘a state’s claim to immunity ratione personae’ while 
the Jones case concerned ‘a state’s claim to immunity ratione materiae in respect of a claim against 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 742-743. 
37 Ibid 744. 
38 Ibid 747. 
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one of its officials.’39 This is a cogent point. Mance LJ also delved into the ‘last resort’ argument,40 
which would later be raised by Italy before the ICJ. 
Ultimately, Mance LJ concluded ‘[t]here is nothing in the 1978 Act which expressly covers the 
civil liability of state officials against whom conduct is alleged constituting serious international 
crime.’41 Therefore, Lord Mance decided the SIA did not apply to the claims against the Saudi 
officials. As they only had a function-based immunity ratione materiae, they could only be shielded 
if their actions were performed within the course of their duties and within the scope of their lawful 
authority. This was not the case. The actions clearly fell into the second category of ultra vires or 
acting under colour of law. Therefore, Mance LJ thought ‘[i]t follows that the Kingdom has not 
made good its blanket claim to state immunity in respect of the civil proceedings for torture 
brought against the individual defendants. This appeal should be allowed accordingly’.42 Although 
Lord Mance did not have the benefit of the US Supreme Court’s later decision in Samantar, the 
same conclusion was nonetheless reached. Arguably the US decision provides a more satisfactory 
unpacking of the statutory language, showing that the FSIA did not include individual foreign 
officials in its definition of a foreign state; Mance LJ, however, correctly pointed out that the UK 
SIA nowhere expressly referred to individual foreign officials (other than heads of state). As 
Neuberger LJ and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR agreed with Mance LJ, the appeals by 
Jones and Mitchell et al against Master Whitaker’s refusal to permit service out of the jurisdiction 
were allowed.43 
Saudi Arabia appealed the part of the Court of Appeal judgment which allowed service against the 
foreign officials and the matter was heard by the House of Lords. In the leading judgment, Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill began by noting the 1978 SIA did not provide ‘expressly’ for cases against 
the ‘servants or agents, officials or functionaries of a foreign state’.44 Lord Bingham, however, 
thought there was ‘a wealth of authority’ to show ‘the foreign state is entitled to claim immunity 
for its servants as it could if sued itself.’45 Here Lord Bingham mostly cited the authorities listed 
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41 Ibid 750. 
42 Ibid 753. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 281. 
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by Mance LJ, but did not engage deeply with Mance LJ’s reasoning. Lord Bingham did allow that 
in some ‘borderline cases there could be doubt’46 as to whether a foreign official’s conduct was 
sufficiently connected with the state to allow a claim for immunity, but felt there was no such 
possibility in this case. 
After neglecting to follow Mance LJ’s reasoning above, Lord Bingham considered the statements 
made in Pinochet (No 1) and (No 3) that torture could not be an official act were not very helpful, 
because that was a criminal case.47 Lord Bingham portrayed the claimants’ reasoning as paradoxical, 
by noting their ‘argument encounters the difficulty that it is founded on the Torture Convention; 
but to bring themselves within the Torture Convention they must show that the torturer was […] 
official; yet they argue that the conduct was not official in order to defeat the claim to immunity.’48 
The detailed quote by Mance LJ, excerpted above, is all that need be said in response to this 
contention, yet Lord Bingham did not engage with this logic. Over the following pages, Lord 
Bingham also disavowed prior statements his Lordship had made in support of the dicta in 
Furundzija that there should be a civil avenue in domestic courts against foreign governments for 
cases of torture,49 and dismissed the Italian Ferrini completely, stating ‘one swallow does not make 
a rule of international law.’50 
Lord Bingham held ‘the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the torture claims against the individual 
defendants cannot be sustained.’51 His Lordship thought Mance LJ ‘departed from the principle 
laid down in Propend,’52 though it is debatable whether this was really the case. According to Lord 
Bingham, ‘[a] state can only act through its servants and agents; their official acts are the acts of 
the state’.53 Of course, this is not controversial, but it should be noted that Mance LJ was looking 
to situations where the state official though acting ostensibly in the course of duties was not really 
performing an official act. Lord Bingham thought Mance LJ was incorrect to conclude that ‘a civil 
claim against an individual torturer did not indirectly implead the state’.54 According to Lord 
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52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
Human Rights and Foreign Official Immunity: Other Common Law Nations 
238 
 
Bingham, the state was indirectly impleaded because the official’s acts were attributable to it. Yet 
the mere fact that a foreign official’s ultra vires actions may be attributable to the state under the 
rules of state responsibility surely does not mean the state is automatically thereby impleaded. Lord 
Bingham did not take up the logic of Mance LJ’s discussion pertaining to indemnities. It is at least 
arguable that a state is not required to indemnify an official who abuses his or her office or 
contravenes their lawful authority. In a situation where an official has acted ultra vires both the 
individual responsibility of the official and the responsibility of the state are engaged. If a suit is 
brought against the official in such circumstances it is hard to see how the state could be made to 
automatically indemnify the individual. 
Lord Bingham held the civil and criminal dichotomy was a fundamental divide and was ‘not a 
distinction which can be wished away.’55 Yet in this context His Lordship might have engaged with 
the content of Breyer J’s statement in Sosa, which suggests the distinction is not so fundamental as 
Lord Bingham would have us believe. His Lordship cited two publicists in respect of the contention 
that the Court of Appeal had ‘asserted what was in effect a universal tort jurisdiction in cases of 
official torture, for which there was no adequate foundation in any international convention, state 
practice or scholarly consensus’.56 Yet Michael Akehurst has noted in the civil context ‘[i]n practice, 
the assumption of jurisdiction by a state does not seem to be subject to any requirement that the 
defendant or the facts of the case need to have any connection with that state; and this practice 
seems to have met with acquiescence by other states’.57 So the contention that the exercise of 
jurisdiction was ‘novel’ is unfounded.  
Lord Hoffman delivered his opinion by ‘start[ing] with the proposition that, as a matter of 
international law, the same immunity against suit in a foreign domestic court which protects the 
state itself also protects the individuals for whom the state is responsible’ and noted ‘acts of state 
officials acting in that capacity are not attributable to them personally but only to the state.’58 It 
should be noted however that where a state official acts ultra vires the behaviour is attributable 
both to the state and to the individual official personally. As the fourth defendant, the head of the 
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57 Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972-1973) 46 British Yearbook of International Law 
145, 176. 
58 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 298. 
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Ministry of Interior, had previously admitted the individual who committed the beatings had 
overstepped his authority, this was certainly such a situation where the behaviour was indeed 
attributable both personally and to the state. To be clear: 
In a letter dated 26 March 2003 from Human Rights Watch, the Minister of the Interior, 
Prince Naif, is recorded as having told a member of a Human Rights Watch delegation 
visiting Saudi Arabia in January/February 2003 ‘that an investigator had exceeded his limits 
and may have been a little harsh in his treatment of Mr Jones’.59 
Therefore, Lord Hoffman might have considered the behaviour fell into the second category of 
acts attributable both to the state and to the official, in a situation where it was unlikely the state 
would have to indemnify the state official if a civil suit were brought against the official only. 
Instead, Lord Hoffman appeared to treat the case as if the behaviour could only be attributed to 
the state and not to any individual official, which would only be appropriate in the case of an 
official acting completely in accord with his or her duties. 
Although Lord Hoffman notes ‘Mance LJ says more than once that the SIA does not expressly 
mention officials’ His Lordship thought ‘the question is not what words the Act uses but what it 
means.’60 Lord Hoffman did engage61 with the fine distinctions made in Mallén v USA,62 but it is 
uncertain whether His Lordship did so profitably. It is certainly true that ultra vires behaviour of 
the second category can be attributed to the state, but that does not mean it is not also attributable 
to the person, and to hold that it is not attributable to the individual would seem odd. Take the 
case of a domestic police officer who contravenes his or her lawful authority. It would seem to be 
in precisely that situation where a manslaughter charge or some civil liability might come into play; 
in a civil context a complainant may prefer the deeper pockets of the municipality (under the 
theory of enterprise or vicarious liability), but that does not mean there would be no personal 
liability for the individual officer. Regrettably, like Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann relied again on 
the supposed paradox of the ‘Torture Convention and the rules of immunity if it were to be held 
that the same act was official for the purposes of the definition of torture but not for the purposes 
of immunity.’63 Unlike Lord Bingham, however, Lord Hoffman did engage with Mance LJ’s 
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detailed commentary in this respect.64 Unfortunately, the engagement was rather shallow: ‘I do 
not, with respect, find this answer satisfactory. The acts of torture are either official acts or they are 
not.’65 This does not accord with Lord Hoffman’s engagement a page earlier with the Mallén 
decision, which clearly outlines three categories of actions. With respect, the matter is not so simple 
as acts being ‘official […] or […] not’. Clear US Supreme Court authority in Larson v Domestic & 
Foreign Commerce Corporation66 and Court of Appeals authority in Chuidian v Philippine National 
Bank67 also painstakingly highlight the three categories of behaviour, and publicists such as 
Chimène Keitner and others have made this point. 
Lord Hoffman then proceeded to dismiss the line of US authority, culminating at the time in 
decisions like Xuncax v Gramajo, which noted the Ninth Circuit had earlier held ‘an individual 
official of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA in an action brought against 
him for acts beyond the scope of his authority.’68 Woodlock J in Xuncax followed the Ninth Circuit 
authority and held ‘[u]pon review of the evidence adduced in support of default judgment, I find 
that the acts which form the basis of these actions exceed anything that might be considered to 
have been lawfully within the scope of Gramajo’s official authority. Accordingly, I conclude that 
the defendant is not entitled to immunity’.69 Yet Lord Hoffman dismissed these authorities 
without engaging with their logic, doing so on the basis that ‘they are in my opinion contrary to 
customary international law.’70 Why this was so, was not explained. His Lordship’s decision to 
allow the Kingdom’s appeal,71 with which the remainder of the Lords agreed, must therefore be 
treated with some caution. 
8.3. Canada 
Much like the situation in the UK, analysed above, Canadian courts have recently had to consider 
human rights-related civil suits by individuals against not just foreign states but also foreign 
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66 337 US 682 (1949). 
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68 Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162, 175 (D Mass, 1995) (‘Xuncax’). 
69 Ibid 175-176. 
70 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 305. 
71 Ibid 306. 
Part Three, Chapter VIII 
 
241 
 
officials. The foreign state immunity angle has already been covered in Chapter V, above, but the 
foreign official immunity aspect remains to be dealt with.  
8.3.1. Kazemi 
The story of Zahra Kazemi and her son Salman Hashemi has already been relayed in the context 
of the son’s suit (and the suit of her estate) against Iran in the Canadian courts.72 That coverage, 
however, only looked at the aspects of the case pertaining to foreign state immunity. Meanwhile, 
the suits were also brought against various Iranian officials, including the Chief Public Prosecutor 
of Tehran and the Deputy Chief of Intelligence of Evin Prison. At the Quebec Superior Court, 
the immunity of the Ayatollah as head of state was taken for granted73 as the text of the State 
Immunity Act is clear on that point, but it was the immunity of the prosecutor and prison chief 
that was in question. 
As to the individuals in question, Mrs Mortazavi and Bakhshi, the ‘question [was] whether or not 
the definition of “foreign state” includes the employees of the state acting in their capacity as 
employees.’74 The cases considered most closely were Jaffe v Miller,75 Jones v Saudi Arabia,76 and 
Samantar v Yousuf.77 Jaffe v Miller was on point, being an Ontario Court of Appeal decision which 
‘held that a state acted through its organs, which, themselves, acted through their employees, 
functionaries or representatives and consequently, these individuals should be accorded the same 
immunity as the organs or states which employ them.’78 This might be true when an official acts 
in accordance with his or her duty, but the propensity for individuals to abuse powers and act 
under colour of law means it is better to recognise the dual responsibility engaged when an official 
commits an ultra vires act: the responsibility of the state and the responsibility of the official. Under 
the rules of state responsibility, the state’s responsibility is engaged vicariously, and this is explicitly 
without prejudice to the individual responsibility of the individual who committed the act. 
Modern US publicists in the field of foreign official immunity, like Chimene Kèitner, talk about 
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the three categories of official behaviour and why that third category of behaviour is important for 
classifactory purposes.79 
As to Jones v Saudi Arabia, this case was barely discussed. Notably, Mance LJ’s detailed reasoning 
in the Court of Appeal judgment was not engaged with. Instead, the House of Lords was simply 
quoted as extending state immunity to servants or agents.80 Samantar v Yousuf was quoted and 
discussed at length, with some effort taken to distinguish the US context of that case from the 
Canadian context of the instant case. Rather than attempt to prove the US court’s logic wrong, the 
Quebec court attempted to differentiate the statutory regimes.81 Ultimately, it chose to follow the 
examples of Jaffe v Miller and Jones v Saudi Arabia, rather than the American example.82 
In Iran v Hashemi,83 when the matter was heard by the Quebec Court of Appeal, Morissette JA 
delivered the opinion of the court. In a few paragraphs,84 his Honour disposed of the matter very 
quickly. Again assuming the immunity of the Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei,85 Morissette JA 
likewise proceeded by taking pains to point out a supposed ‘distinctive feature of American law 
not shared by Canadian law’86 as a basis for not recognising the American approach in Samantar. 
Unlike the Quebec Court of Appeal, LeBel J delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada gave a well-structured and ample space87 to the consideration of whether or not Mrs 
Mortazavi and Bakhshi were covered by the SIA. LeBel J broke the question up into three parts: 
(1) are public officials acting in their official capacity included in the term ‘government’ as it is 
used in the SIA; (2) were Mrs Mortazavi and Bakhshi acting in their official capacity in their 
interactions with Ms Kazemi; and (3) can acts of torture be ‘official acts’ for the purposes of the 
SIA? LeBel J answered all three in the affirmative and held both individuals were immune from 
suit under the SIA. LeBel J does note that nowhere does the SIA mention ‘public officials’ but 
believes this requirement needs to be ‘interpreted in context and, as previously mentioned, against 
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the backdrop of international law.’88 This sounds exactly like the implied exception to the blanket 
immunity argument that was so stalwartly rejected in cases like Al-Adsani and Jones, although it is 
now being accepted in one direction where the same logic was rejected in the other direction in 
those earlier cases. LeBel J claimed ‘[e]xcluding public officials from the meaning of government 
would completely thwart the purposes of the SIA’,89 but this sounds a little hollow as the US is a 
living example of a system that adopted a bifurcated approach for suits against governments and 
officials, and the US FSIA has not been ‘completely thwart[ed]’. Just like in the courts below, LeBel 
J when confronted with the US Supreme Court decision in Samantar v Yousuf, chose to make a 
case for differentiation based on ‘specific language found [in] the FSIA [and] [a] number of 
differences between Canadian and US legislation [which] render Samantar inapplicable to the case 
at hand.’90 
By choosing to follow Jaffe v Miller rather than Samantar v Yousuf, the Supreme Court of Canada 
answered its first question in the affirmative. It then only remained to show Mrs Mortazavi and 
Bakhshi were acting in their official capacity, and that acts of torture could be ‘official acts’ for the 
purposes of the SIA. Instead of recognising the three ways in which an official can behave: (1) 
officially; (2) ultra vires; (3) privately, the Court stuck to the dualist view, leading to questions as 
to whether ‘governmental acts are “official enough” to attract immunity’.91 LeBel J again noted the 
definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture as being committed by a public official or 
someone acting in that capacity.92 The mere fact that an act is committed by an official does not, 
however, make it an official act. If a police officer were to deal drugs, would that be an official act? 
LeBel J’s views on the third question, as to whether acts of torture can be ‘official acts’ followed in 
much the same vein. Thus LeBel J affirmed ‘neither Mr Hashemi nor Ms Kazemi’s estate may avail 
themselves of a Canadian court in order to sue Iran or its functionaries for Ms Kazemi’s torture 
and death’,93 with functionaries taken to include Mrs Mortazavi and Bakhshi. It is noteworthy that 
at no stage in the Kazemi litigation did the court consider the logic of the US Supreme Court that 
an individual official was not ejusdem generis with the types of entities in the illustrative list of the 
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particular statutory provision. It is certainly true that the Canadian SIA has different wording in 
some respects to the American FSIA. It is also undeniably true that corresponding sections tend to 
cover certain common concepts. Although the implementation may vary, the intention is often 
the same. If the Canadian legislature had really intended the SIA to govern foreign officials they 
probably would have been a lot more detailed about how such cases would proceed. It is more 
likely that the statute was simply not really crafted with such cases in mind, and largely (or 
exclusively) deals with the immunity of the foreign state (and its agencies and instrumentalities). 
The US Supreme Court recognised this, and held the FSIA does not apply to suits against foreign 
officials. Perhaps one day Congress will enact legislation dealing with the immunities of foreign 
officials, or amend the FSIA to include them. Until then, the common law prevails. This clearly 
does not ‘completely thwart’ the operation of the FSIA. Nonetheless, the Canadian courts preferred 
to follow the approach earlier taken by the UK’s House of Lords in Jones v Saudi Arabia, by ruling 
the SIA applied to suits against foreign officials. 
8.4. Australia 
Australia has not produced a huge number of cases dealing with foreign state immunity or foreign 
official immunity. The question of agencies and instrumentalities was looked at in the context of 
state owned commercial entities, or so-called ‘separate entities’, by the High Court,94 whilst the 
Full Federal Court looked at the act of state doctrine in Habib v Commonwealth.95 Most relevant 
for present purposes, however, was a suit in New South Wales which has counterparts in a few 
countries (similar cases were heard and decided in the US and New Zealand, for instance) and 
involves Falun Gong practitioners bringing suit against Chinese officials accused of cracking down 
on the organisation and its members. 
8.4.1. Zemin 
In Zhang v Zemin96 the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered inter alia whether the 
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (‘FSIA ’) applies to suits against foreign officials such as 
a member of the politburo of the Communist Party of China. Spigelman CJ, delivering the lead 
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opinion, noted the appellants relied on the US decision in Samantar but said only ‘[t]he 
constitutional and legislative position is so different in Australia that I do not find that decision of 
significant assistance for the purposes of interpreting the Australian legislation.’97 Spigelman CJ 
further contended that ‘[t]he alternative and primary submission [was] that former officers are not 
entitled to immunity’.98 With respect, that is jumping the gun, so to speak. In Samantar the point 
was not that Samantar was not immune, but simply that the statute did not apply, leaving the 
common law to operate. In the event the case was remitted and the lower courts eventually found 
under the common law that Samantar was not immune; however, the question of whether the 
statute or the common law applies is a separate matter to the presence or lack of immunity per se. 
Spigelman CJ said the legislative position is ‘so different in Australia’ but this is arguable. The 
relevant Australian provision is excerpted below, followed by the corresponding US provision: 
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth), Section 3: 
(3) Unless the contrary intention appears, a reference in this Act to a foreign State 
includes a reference to: 
(c) the executive government or part of the executive government of a foreign 
State or of a political subdivision of a foreign State, including a department 
or organ of the executive government of a foreign State or subdivision 
 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (US), 28 US Code § 1603: 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(a) A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political 
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as 
defined in subsection (b). 
(b) An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity— 
1. which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
2. which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership is owned by a foreign state or 
political subdivision thereof, and 
3. which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 
1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country. 
The structure of the provisions may not be the same, but they both provide illustrative lists 
including the following entities: political subdivisions and organs. The Australian act also lists 
‘government’ and ‘department’. While the wording of the Australian legislation is different, in 
both cases an illustrative list is given. Where such lists are given, the proferred items are not 
determinative of the list. Any item not on the list, however, must be ejusdem generis with the items 
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included in the illustrative list; that is to say, it must be of the same type. The logic in Samantar 
was that a natural person such as a foreign official does not belong in the same category as ‘political 
subdivisions’ and ‘organs’, if anything in Australia that case is strengthened by the addition of the 
words ‘government’ and ‘department’. None of these imply a natural person but all seem to imply 
government entities of some sort. 
Resort can also be had to the preparatory report delivered before the enactment of the FSIA. On 9 
October 1984 the Australian Law Reform Commission published a report on foreign state 
immunity, which was tabled the next day.99 This was an extremely comprehensive report 
representing the Australian effort to prepare thoroughly for the FSIA’s passage. Judge Crawford of 
the ICJ and Justice Kirby formerly of the High Court were respectively Commissioner in Charge 
and Chairman of the project. Despite the detail of the report, which runs to almost 200 pages, 
there is no coverage of foreign officials per se. The only relevant portions are to do with 
definitions,100 specifically agencies, instrumentalities and other special entities, where the report 
states ‘to deny state immunity to an entity simply because it has legal personality distinct from the 
state would be unacceptable to many states’101 note the use of the word ‘it’ and ‘entity’ as if artificial 
rather than natural people are being referred to. Continuing, the report states ‘[t]he fact that the 
entity is organised as a board, commission or the like should not disqualify it from being considered 
as a department of government.’102 Clearly, when s 3(3)(c) of the FSIA was being drawn up, 
consideration was being paid to ‘entities’ under this section being artificial people, rather than 
natural people such as an individual foreign official. The provisio ‘there is no justification for 
extending immunity to separate entities which are corporations established under Australian law 
or who […] are Australian citizen’ is redolent of the Samantar case where similar language in the 
US legislation was held to be conclusive proof the provision dealt with artificial entities not natural 
persons. Apart from this, some reference is made to political subdivisions, but these are taken to 
refer to the provinces, et cetera, of federal states.103 Nowhere does the comprehensive Australian 
Law Reform Commission’s Foreign State Immunity report deal with the positions of foreign 
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officials other than a head of state and nowhere does it say such cases should be dealt with under 
the act. Spigelman CJ’s contention ‘that it is not surprising that the drafter of the Immunities Act 
did not find it necessary to make any express reference to individuals in, relevantly, s 3(3)(c)’104 
appears to be entirely without basis. Nonetheless, Spigelman CJ held that the reference to 
individuals could be implied into the language of s 3(3)(c). Another example of implied passages 
being permissively read in to uphold immunity, while they are rejected whenever an attempt is 
made to read an implied exception to the blanket immunity. 
8.5. Summary 
Courts in Canada and Australia have tended to follow the British approach, rather than that of the 
US. The UK approach, exemplified by Jones, treats foreign officials as covered by the state 
immunity act. The US approach, on the other hand, since Samantar, treats suits against foreign 
officials as covered not by the FSIA but by the common law. The courts in Canada and Australia 
had the advantage of reading both Jones and Samantar, and chose to follow the example in Jones.  
It is significant that, in Zemin, Samantar was given short shrift and not even analysed. In the 
Kazemi cases Samantar was analysed thoroughly enough but it was not explained why its logic was 
rejected. In Canada, the situation has already been treated by the Supreme Court. In Australia, 
however, the High Court has not yet considered the matter of whether the FSIA applies to suits 
against foreign officials. 
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Conclusion 
he material covered in this thesis hopefully paints a cautiously optimistic picture if one takes 
a long view to the relationship between human rights and state immunity. Restrictive 
immunity germinated in several states for decades before a confluence of events swept it to 
prominence.  Much like veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Coucnil, states 
themselves can be reluctant to relinquish their immunities. The classic story of ‘absolute immunity’ 
is somewhat of a fiction, as Chapter I shows, but the view that absolute immunity is the starting 
point from which exceptions to immunity must be carved out can be attractive to foreign office 
staff wishing to retain immunity for their nation and its allies. Marshall CJ’s decision in The 
Schooner Exchange never really recognised absolute immunity. It was only with a chain of British 
decisions which increasingly enlarged the scope of immunity that absolute immunity crystallised 
in the Anglo-American world. This British doctrine grew out of proportion. The courts later 
corrected course, recognising restrictive immunity, in the process recognising a prior key precedent 
establishing absolute immnunity had been wrongly decided. Meanwhile, restrictive immunity had 
been germinating in a few realms, including Belgium, Italy, Greece, Egypt with more to follow.  
Chapters III to V illustrate the difficulties of claimants in common-law nations with foreign state 
immunity statutes, which usually provide foreign states a blanket immunity subject only to certain 
enumerated exceptions. Chapter II explained the context in which these statutes, and various 
international instruments, came into being. It is not a criticism of the treaties and statutes that they 
were drafted at a time when human rights cases for jus cogens violations were not a prominent issue. 
These instruments were designed mainly to enshrine some exceptions well-recognised at the time, 
including commercial activity and territorial torts. They were simply not designed with human 
rights claims in mind. Therefore, there is no exception to immunity for jus cogens violations. 
Claimants attempted to characterise their claims as falling under a recognised exception, such as 
commercial activity, territorial tort, or implied waiver. Failing this, an implied exception was 
proposed, with the blanket immunity to be read in accordance with international law. A trumping 
argument based on the primacy of jus cogens was made. Finally, it was submitted immunity 
conflicted with a statutory or treaty-based right of access to court. These arguments were generally 
unsuccessful, but the points were taken up and refined by claimants in other jurisdictions. 
T 
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Inquiring into whether an act was sovereign or private (imperii/gestionis) is conceptually no 
different from asking whether an act, if proved, would constitute a jus cogens violation or would 
not. If courts were not allowed to inquire into the nature of the act complained at the preliminary 
stage then the restrictive immunity doctrine would not have been able to develop. Yet, as seen in 
Chapter VI the ICJ in Germany v Italy claimed immunity is a procedural matter which must be 
determined before any other matters thus there is no clash at all with the jus cogens norm.  This is 
somewhat artificial. When restrictive immunity was developing, the courts considered the nature 
of the act complained at the immunity stage of proceedings, to determine whether the state’s act 
was jure imperii or jure gestionis. The ICJ did not explain why courts can inquire into the nature 
of the act complained in this instance but not in the exact same manner when it comes to 
ascertaining whether the act if proved would constitute a jus cogens violation. 
Also in Chapter VI, the Constitutional Court of Italy has responded by embracing the type of 
dualist perspective on the relationship between municipal and international law that has 
historically been favoured by nations such as the UK and the US. The Italian Court claimed the 
grant of immunity was contrary to a constitutionally imperative right of access to the courts. In 
effect, this is similar to a judge ruling in line with the principle in Polites or Mortensen that, while 
courts will attempt to read statutes in conformity with international law, when faced with 
inconsistency the clear wording of the statute must prevail. This logic has been deployed by US 
and UK courts, in Siderman de Blake and Jones, for example, as justifications for upholding the 
immunity accorded by statute even if it involves a departure from the relevant customary 
international norms. If this principle is validly deployed by these courts with regard to regular 
legislation, it must hold more weight in Italy’s case, which concerns no mere statute but a 
constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, it should be remembered that, under the terms of Article 
59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ICJ’s decisions are only binding on the 
parties to the dispute and only in the instant case.  The Italian Constitutional Court ruling 
concerned a case brought after the Germany v Italy dispute, so while these new cases could be the 
subject of new complaints by Germany it could not be said that they violate the precedent in 
Germany v Italy because the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply. Italy is again acting as an 
incubator state, once for restrictive immunity and now for the human rights exception. This may 
have implications for the evolution of foreign state immunity. 
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Regarding suits against foreign officials, the US has been the jurisdiction most amenable to change, 
in the period leading up to and especially following the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar v 
Yousuf. Chapter VII explores the US experience in regard to human rights suits against foreign 
officials. The ruling FSIA does not apply to suits against foreign officials means that in the US the 
common law applies to such suits. Potentially, this allows for more engagement with the pure 
customary norms, rather than judges being bound by statutory provisions; however, pre-FSIA the 
US Department of State had a large role in the common law regime, issuing Statements of Interest 
and Suggestions of Immunity that were usually considered binding. There is currently a circuit 
split as to whether these determinations are binding in the context of individuals with immunity 
ratione materiae. The UK House of Lords and Canadian Supreme Court both ruled their immunity 
states do govern suits against foreign officials, as seen in Chapter VIII. Australian courts have ruled 
likewise, but the High Court of Australia has yet to consider the issue. 
To conclude, this research produced three major findings: 
1. In relation to the history of foreign state immunity: Marshall CJ’s judgment in The 
Schooner Exchange was not an example of absolute immunity. This judgment, 
confined to friendly foreign armed ships of war, was gradually expanded in a chain 
of British cases 1820-1920 which built the initial precedent into an eventual absolute 
immunity. Marshall CJ’s judgment however explicitly opined a foreign sovereign 
might not be immune if it engaged in private or commercial behaviour. Furthermore, 
in the period this absolute immunity was solidifying, restrictive immunity was 
germinating in various Mediterranean and other nations. It is arguable whether 
sufficient uniformity in practice established absolute immunity as a binding norm 
and, even if it did, this could only have been during 1920-1976. This goes to whether 
immunity should be seen as an absolute immunity from which exceptions need to be 
carved, or whether the true distinction all along was between jure imperii and jure 
gestionis. 
2. In relation to human rights and foreign state immunity. Foreign state immunity 
statutes were mostly drafted before human rights cases against foreign states became 
an issue, as such they are not designed with jus cogens violations in mind. The blanket 
immunity granted by the various foreign state immunity treaties and statutes is 
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arguably overly-conservative. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht recommended a blanket 
removal of immunity, with enumerated cases where immunity applied. Reform is 
needed to lift immunity for extraterritorial jus cogens violations, whether this should 
be via amending the blanket immunity or simply inserting a new exception is 
debatable. 
3. In relation to human rights and foreign official immunity. The US Supreme Court 
ruled the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not apply to foreign officials. 
The House of Lords had earlier ruled the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) did apply 
to foreign officials. The Supreme Court of Canada, having the benefit of both the 
UK and US judgments, ruled the State Immunity Act, RSC 1985 also applies to 
foreign officials. In Australia, the New South Wales Court of Appeal ruled in line 
with UK and Canadian practice that the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) 
applies to foreign officials under the s 3(3)(c) definition of foreign state. Regretably, 
the leading US precedent was dismissed without consideration. If the High Court of 
Australia considers the matter in a future case it would be beneficial to engage with 
the relevant US Supreme Court authority and properly weigh the strengths and 
weaknesses of the countervailing approaches. The customary norms pertaining to 
foreign officials with immunity ratione materiae relate to whether the individual was 
acting in an official, ultra vires, or private capacity. This is different to the customary 
reasoning in suits against foreign governments, which is whether the behaviour is jure 
imperii or jure gestionis. Although related, the customary norms are sufficiently 
different to argue different treatment. US Supreme Court precedent describes how 
FSIA statutory definitions were not designed with individuals in mind, the Australian 
act is not much different. The Australian Law Reform Commission’s preparatory 
report contains no real consideration for the notion of suits against individuals with 
immunity ratione materiae being covered by the Act. 
As to the state of customary international norms pertaining to immunity of foreign governments 
and foreign officials for jus cogens violations, they can only be said to be in a state of flux. In states 
with foreign state immunity statutes, the situation is ripe for reform. Arguably, there is also a 
chance to progress the law in Australia by adopting the US approach to suits against officials.
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